Soft constraints in interactive behavior: the case of ignoring perfect knowledge in-the-world for imperfect knowledge in-the-head

Constraints and dependencies among the elements of embodied cognition form patterns or microstrategies of interactive behavior. Hard constraints determine which microstrategies are possible. Soft constraints determine which of the possible microstrategies are most likely to be selected. When selection is non-deliberate or automatic the least effort microstrategy is chosen. In calculating the effort required to execute a microstrategy each of the three types of operations, memory retrieval, perception, and action, are given equal weight; that is, perceptual-motor activity does not have a privileged status with respect to memory. Soft constraints can work contrary to the designer’s intentions by making the access of perfect knowledge in-the-world more effortful than the access of imperfect knowledge in-the-head. These implications of soft constraints are tested in two experiments. In experiment 1 we varied the perceptual-motor effort of accessing knowledge in-the-world as well as the effort of retrieving items from memory. In experiment 2 we replicated one of the experiment 1 conditions to collect eye movement data. The results suggest that milliseconds matter. Soft constraints lead to a reliance on knowledge in-the-head even when the absolute difference in perceptual-motor versus memory retrieval effort is small, and even when relying on memory leads to a higher error rate and lower performance. We discuss the implications of soft constraints for routine interactive behavior, accounts of embodied cognition, and tool and interface design.     

Age-related differences in acquisition of perceptual-motor skills: working memory as a mediator

Aging is associated with reduced performance on information processing speed, memory, and executive functions tasks. Although older adults are also less apt in acquiring new perceptual-motor skills, it is unclear whether and how skill acquisition difficulties are associated with age-related general cognitive differences. We addressed this question by examining structural relations among measures of cognitive resources (working memory) and indices of perceptual-motor skill acquisition (pursuit rotor and mirror tracing) in 96 healthy adults aged 19-80 years of age. Three competing structural models were tested: a single (common) factor model, a dual correlated factors model, and a hierarchical dual-factor model. The third model provided the best fit to the data, indicating age differences in simple perceptual-motor skill are partially mediated by more complex abilities.     

Age-Related Differences in Acquisition of Perceptual-Motor Skills: Working Memory as a Mediator

ABSTRACT

Aging is associated with reduced performance on information processing speed, memory, and executive functions tasks. Although older adults are also less apt in acquiring new perceptual-motor skills, it is unclear whether and how skill acquisition difficulties are associated with age-related general cognitive differences. We addressed this question by examining structural relations among measures of cognitive resources (working memory) and indices of perceptual-motor skill acquisition (pursuit rotor and mirror tracing) in 96 healthy adults aged 19–80 years of age. Three competing structural models were tested: a single (common) factor model, a dual correlated factors model, and a hierarchical dual-factor model. The third model provided the best fit to the data, indicating age differences in simple perceptual-motor skill are partially mediated by more complex abilities.     

Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective

A lay definition of intuition holds that it involves immediate apprehension in the absence of reasoning. From a more technical point of view, I argue also that intuition should be seen as the contrastive of reasoning, corresponding roughly to the distinction between Type 1 (intuitive) and Type 2 (reflective) processes in contemporary dual process theories of thinking. From this perspective, we already know a great deal about intuition: It is quick, provides feelings of confidence, can reflect large amounts of information processing, and is most likely to provide accurate judgments when based on relevant experiential learning. Unlike reasoning, intuition is low effort and does not compete for central working memory resources. It provides default responses which may—or often may not—be intervened upon with high effort, reflective reasoning. Intuition has, however, been blamed for a range of cognitive biases in the psychological literatures on reasoning and decision making. The evidence indicates that with novel and abstract problems, not easily linked to previous experience, intervention with effortful reasoning is often required to avoid such biases. Hence, although it seems that intuition dominates reasoning most of the time—both in the laboratory and the real world—it can indeed be a false friend.     

Personality and motivation: Sources of inefficiency in cognitive performance

Impulsivity and anxiety are two dimensions of personality which have strong effects upon the efficiency of cognitive performance. The effects of these two variables depend upon characteristics of the task as well as upon four types of tradeoffs between psychological resources. Tasks may be characterized in terms of their relative requirements for sustained information transfer (SIT), short-term memory (STM), and long-term memory (LTM). Resource tradeoffs may be automatic, strategic, directional, or stylistic. Impulsivity effects on performance involve an automatic arousal-induced tradeoff between SIT and STM, strategic tradeoffs of speed for accuracy, and stylistic differences in persistence. Anxiety effects involve strategic, directional, and stylistic tradeoffs.     

价值计算决定何时与如何努力

优化努力的分配,最小化努力成本和最大化收益是各个领域的关键问题。本文梳理了基于努力的决策(effort-based decision-making)的理论与实证研究,讨论了努力的两面性：固有成本和潜在价值。通过拓展控制期望价值理论(Expected Value of Control, EVC),本研究探讨了影响努力的非社会与社会因素。探索人们何时以及如何付出努力的计算神经机制,有利于理解与促进社会互动中的努力行为,以及为干预精神疾病中动机缺失症状提供参考。     

Approach motivation and cognitive resources combine to influence memory for positive emotional stimuli

Inspired by the elaborated intrusion theory of desire, the current research tested the hypothesis that persons higher in trait approach motivation process positive stimuli deeply, which enhances memory for them. Ninety-four undergraduates completed a measure of trait approach motivation, viewed positive or negative image slideshows in the presence or absence of a cognitive load, and one week later completed an image memory test. Higher trait approach motivation predicted better memory for the positive slideshow, but this memory boost disappeared under cognitive load. Approach motivation did not influence memory for the negative slideshow. The current findings support the idea that individuals higher in approach motivation spontaneously devote limited resources to processing positive stimuli.     

On the Cognitive Argument for Cost-Benefit Analysis

In a number of writings, Cass Sunstein has argued that we should use cost-benefit analysis as our primary approach to risk management, because cost-benefit analysis corrects for the cognitive biases that mar our thinking about risk. The paper critically evaluates this ‘cognitive argument for cost-benefit analysis’ and finds it wanting. Once we make distinctions between different cognitive errors and between different aspects of cost-benefit analysis, it becomes apparent that there are really two cognitive arguments, neither of which is successful as arguments for cost-benefit analysis as a whole. One argument shows that the analysis aspect of cost-benefit analysis is warranted because it corrects for false beliefs about the magnitudes of risk and for the neglect of some costs. While this is a sound argument, it does not provide an argument for other aspects of cost-benefit analysis. The second argument purports to show that commensurating and monetizing the values of the effects of regulation is warranted because it corrects for the use of widely diverging values of a statistical life. This argument fails because the use of widely diverging values of a statistical life is not a cognitive error: It is neither precluded by considerations of instrumental rationality, nor by the requirement of treating like cases alike.     

Need for closure and dealing with uncertainty in decision making context: The role of the behavioral inhibition system and working memory capacity

The aim of the present study was to investigate the moderated mediation model of the relationship between the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), need for closure (NFC) and working memory capacity (WMC) in the decision making process. It was assumed that NFC works as a motivational mechanism that enables individuals high in BIS to deal with uncertainty; therefore, NFC mediates the effect of BIS on behavior in a decision-making situation. Moreover, as uncertainty management requires cognitive resources, we expected WMC to moderate this relationship. In line with our hypothesis, we found that NFC mediated the relationship between BIS and the information search about the job candidates, and this effect occurred only for individuals high in WMC. We discuss these results in the context of effective self-regulation, as well as motivational and cognitive determinants of effort.     

Anxiety‐induced performance catastrophes: Investigating effort required as an asymmetry factor

Two studies are reported that test the hypothesis that previous support for the cusp catastrophe model of anxiety and performance, and the hysteresis effect in particular, could have been due to a complex interaction between cognitive anxiety and effort required rather than between cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal. We used task difficulty to manipulate effort required in a letter transformation task. Experiment 1 (N=32) used high levels of trait anxiety together with a competitive environment to induce state anxiety. Experiment 2 (N=20) used a competitive environment with social pressure and ego threat instructions to induce high levels of worry. Both studies revealed significant three‐way interactions as hypothesized with follow‐up tests showing some support for the hysteresis hypothesis in Study 1, and strong support for the hysteresis hypothesis in Study 2. The findings support a processing efficiency theory explanation of anxiety‐induced performance catastrophes and indicate that two cusp catastrophe models of performance may exist; one that incorporates the interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal upon performance and the other that incorporates the interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and effort required upon performance.     

How much “effort” should be devoted to memory?

We focus on the issue of whether cognitive effort is causally related to memory. We begin with a discussion of the concept of cognitive effort as derived from capacity models of attention. We then suggest that the theoretical analysis of memory may involve concepts from different levels of psychological analysis, and we draw a distinction between concepts that represent boundary conditions and sufficient cause. When applied to memory phenomena, attentional concepts serve only as a boundary--or limiting--function in memory theory. In contrast, concepts that represent memorial processes serve as a sufficient cause function. In some instances, cognitive effort appears to have been used as a sufficient cause concept, resulting in some confusion. A review of the literature reveals a haphazard correlation between indexes of cognitive effort and of memory performance. Alternatively, the application of cognitive effort or capacity to the memory performance of certain populations (clinical, children, and elderly) illustrates a potentially more appropriate use of the concept.     

Serial neuropsychological assessment and evidence of shunt malfunction in spina bifida: a longitudinal case study.

Myelomeningocele is often accompanied by hydrocephalus (MMH), making it a potentially unstable neurological condition requiring shunt placement and possible revisions. Serial neuropsychological assessment is an important tool in monitoring children with MMH, as cognitive changes can indicate shunt malfunction and hydrocephalus. We present the case of a girl with MMH who had five neuropsychological assessments (ages 5, 7, 11, 12, and 14). Despite a lack of overt neurological symptoms or report of behavioral decline, testing at age 11 revealed decline in multiple neurobehavioral domains, and imaging at that time showed increased hydrocephalus, requiring shunt revision. Subsequent neuropsychological assessment conducted after a 2-year period of medical stability showed improvement and/or a return to baseline levels in some skill areas (i.e., working memory, verbal memory, visuomotor integration, and sustained attention), yet more lasting impairments in others (i.e., Verbal IQ, processing speed, organization, and response inhibition). These lasting cognitive deficits potentially impact independent completion of complex medical self-care tasks. This pattern of recovery highlights vulnerability of brain systems supporting executive functions in children with hydrocephalus and shunt failure.     

Serial Neuropsychological Assessment and Evidence of Shunt Malfunction in Spina Bifida: A Longitudinal Case Study

Myelomeningocele is often accompanied by hydrocephalus (MMH), making it a potentially unstable neurological condition requiring shunt placement and possible revisions. Serial neuropsychological assessment is an important tool in monitoring children with MMH, as cognitive changes can indicate shunt malfunction and hydrocephalus. We present the case of a girl with MMH who had five neuropsychological assessments (ages 5, 7, 11, 12, and 14). Despite a lack of overt neurological symptoms or report of behavioral decline, testing at age 11 revealed decline in multiple neurobehavioral domains, and imaging at that time showed increased hydrocephalus, requiring shunt revision. Subsequent neuropsychological assessment conducted after a 2-year period of medical stability showed improvement and/or a return to baseline levels in some skill areas (i.e., working memory, verbal memory, visuomotor integration, and sustained attention), yet more lasting impairments in others (i.e., Verbal IQ, processing speed, organization, and response inhibition). These lasting cognitive deficits potentially impact independent completion of complex medical self-care tasks. This pattern of recovery highlights vulnerability of brain systems supporting executive functions in children with hydrocephalus and shunt failure.     

Adult counting is resource demanding

Several recent studies on both the development of counting and working‐memory span tasks have provided results that could be interpreted as ruling out any cognitive resource model for counting. The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that, even in adults, counting is a demanding task that requires the allocation of cognitive resources. In a first experiment, we asked adults to count arrays of dots while maintaining 5 items in memory (either digits or letters). As we predicted, the concurrent memory load did not increase the rate of errors but induced longer counting times. In a second experiment, we asked adults to count using either the numeric chain or the alphabet while they maintained 1, 3 or 5 items in memory (digits or letters). First, we replicated the load effect observed in Experiment 1. Second, though both types of counting required similar amounts of time, counting with the less automatized chain (i.e. the alphabet) resulted in a poorer recall performance. Finally, this detrimental effect in recall was all the more pronounced the greater the number of items to be recalled. These results are interpreted within theoretical frameworks that consider cognitive resources as attentional capacities.     

Generation difficulty and memory for source

The role of the word predictability from sentence context for reality monitoring and external source monitoring was examined in two experiments. In a reality-monitoring task, discrimination of an internal source was better in the hard than in the easy condition. It is probable that extra cognitive operations engaged during word generation in the hard condition were effective cues for reality-monitoring judgements. In contrast, in an external source-monitoring task (recognition memory of item's colour), the hard condition resulted in worse source memory for generated words than did the easy condition. This result is consistent both with an item-context trade-off hypothesis and a processing hypothesis. Greater effort involved at the time of generation might limit resources available for encoding of an external source. It is also possible that for generated words, the hard condition promoted conceptual processing instead of perceptual processing; therefore the item's colour was not effectively encoded.     

Working Memory Deficits in Boys with Attention-deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): The Contribution of Central Executive and Subsystem Processes

The current study investigated contradictory findings from recent experimental and meta-analytic studies concerning working memory deficits in ADHD. Working memory refers to the cognitive ability to temporarily store and mentally manipulate limited amounts of information for use in guiding behavior. Phonological (verbal) and visuospatial (nonverbal) working memory were assessed across four memory load conditions in 23 boys (12 ADHD, 11 typically developing) using tasks based on Baddeley's (Working memory, thought, and action, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007) working memory model. The model posits separate phonological and visuospatial storage and rehearsal components that are controlled by a single attentional controller (CE: central executive). A latent variable approach was used to partial task performance related to three variables of interest: phonological buffer/rehearsal loop, visuospatial buffer/rehearsal loop, and the CE attentional controller. ADHD-related working memory deficits were apparent across all three cognitive systems--with the largest magnitude of deficits apparent in the CE--even after controlling for reading speed, nonverbal visual encoding, age, IQ, and SES.     

Mechanisms of developmental change in infant categorization

Computational models are tools for testing mechanistic theories of learning and development. Formal models allow us to instantiate theories of cognitive development in computer simulations. Model behavior can then be compared to real performance. Connectionist models, loosely based on neural information processing, have been successful in capturing a range of developmental phenomena, in particular on-line within-task category learning by young infants. Here we describe two new models. One demonstrates how age dependent changes in neural receptive field sizes can explain observed changes in on-line category learning between 3 and 10 months of age. The other aims to reconcile two conflicting views of infant categorization by focusing on the different task requirements of preferential looking and manual exploration studies. A dual-memory hypothesis posits that within-task category learning that drives looking time behaviors is based on a fast-learning memory system, whereas categorization based on background experience and assessed by paradigms requiring complex motor behavior relies on a second, slow-learning system. The models demonstrate how emphasizing the mechanistic causes of behaviors leads to discovery of deeper, more explanatory accounts of learning and development.     

On the relationship between effort toward an ongoing task and cue detection in event-based prospective memory

In recent theories of event-based prospective memory, researchers have debated what degree of resources are necessary to identify a cue as related to a previously established intention. In order to simulate natural variations in attention, the authors manipulated effort toward an ongoing cognitive task in which intention-related cues were embedded in 3 experiments. High effort toward the ongoing task resulted in decreased prospective memory only when the cognitive processing required to identify the cue was similar to the cognitive processing required to complete the ongoing activity. When the required processing was different for the 2 tasks, cue detection was not affected by manipulated effort, despite there being an overall cost to decision latencies in the ongoing tasks from possessing the intention. Resource allocation policies and factors that affect them are proposed to account for ongoing vs. prospective memory task performance.     

Generation difficulty and memory for source

The role of the word predictability from sentence context for reality monitoring and external source monitoring was examined in two experiments. In a reality-monitoring task, discrimination of an internal source was better in the hard than in the easy condition. It is probable that extra cognitive operations engaged during word generation in the hard condition were effective cues for reality-monitoring judgements. In contrast, in an external source-monitoring task (recognition memory of item's colour), the hard condition resulted in worse source memory for generated words than did the easy condition. This result is consistent both with an item–context trade-off hypothesis and a processing hypothesis. Greater effort involved at the time of generation might limit resources available for encoding of an external source. It is also possible that for generated words, the hard condition promoted conceptual processing instead of perceptual processing; therefore the item's colour was not effectively encoded.     

Age-related differences in face processing: a meta-analysis of three functional neuroimaging experiments.

Differences between young and old adults in brain activity, measured with positron emission tomography, were examined during three face processing experiments: episodic memory, working memory, and degraded face perception. Each experiment contained an easy face matching condition and a more difficult processing condition. Young adults showed greater activity in bilateral prefrontal cortex during the memory tasks, compared to face matching, but no difference in prefrontal activity between degraded and nondegraded perception. Older adults, on the other hand, had greater prefrontal activity in both memory and degraded perceptual tasks compared to matching. This suggests that increased prefrontal activity is task-specific in young adults, but, in old adults, is a more general response to increased cognitive effort or need for resources. These data are consistent with the dedifferentiation hypothesis of aging, and suggest a possible neural mechanism for this dedifferentiation, such that dependence on prefrontal activity across a greater number of tasks could also increase the amount of covariance across these tasks.