Ethnicity of Defendants and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions1

To assess the influence of ethnicity on jury decisions, 480 subjects viewed a videotaped trial of an Anglo or Hispanic defendant. Anglo or Hispanic majority 6-person juries deliberated until a unanimous verdict was reached. The juries that convicted the defendant were asked to determine sentence length and to provide a probation/ parole recommendation. Anglo majority juries convicted the defendant significantly more (M= 79%) than did the Hispanic majority juries (M= 52%), x²= 5.45, p < 0.02. No main effect of defendant ethnicity was obtained, but there was an interaction between the defendant and the jury's ethnicity, x²= 5.41, p < 0.02. Anglo majority juries were more lenient with the Anglo defendant, but the Hispanic majority juries did not differ in their conviction rates. No significant effects were obtained for sentence length. Differences in probation/parole recommendations were a function of jury ethnicity, F(l, 15) = 4.74, p < 0.05. Anglos were more likely to recommend that the defendant serve the full term of the sentence. These results are interpreted in terms of stereotyping and are discussed regarding their implications for a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.     

Effects of inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma

In a 2 × 3 design, simulated jurors received either weak or strong evidence against a defendant in a murder case. Within each evidence condition, subjects were given either additional evidence ruled admissible, additional evidence ruled inadmissible, or no additional evidence. Results indicated that ( a ) jurors were biased by inadmissible evidcnce in the weak-evidence but not in the strong-evidence condition, ( b ) strong evidence resulted in more guilty verdicts than did weak evidence, ( c ) confidence in verdict was influenced by strength of evidence, and ( d ) confidence of guilt was positively correlated with severity of punishment. Implications of the results are discussed within the context of the judicial process.     

The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification: Predicting When Jurors Disobey the Law1

The United States judiciary assumes jurors obey the law as it is charged to them in the trial judge's instructions. This paper contends that jurors' comprehension of the law results from an active intelligence which makes available alternative decision rules giving rise to the power of juries to nullify instructions. To study the compliance assumption, we presented to mock jurors pattern jury instructions along with summaries of testimonies from a rape trial. Four times during the trial we administered to participants measures of their attributions of defendant responsibility, judgments about the legal elements of the case, and verdicts. Multiple regressions conducted with data from separate subsamples and with separate questionnaire administrations revealed that a) verdicts were based on attributions independent of the jury instructions, b) individual differences in life experiences predicted the degree to which decision makers used their attributions, and c) the more practiced participants were at applying the jury instructions the more heavily they weighed their own attributions and less heavily the judgments required by the law. We concluded that comprehension alone cannot predict the likelihood that jurors will comply with the law. Therefore, the assumption that jurors follow the law needs to be more carefully considered.     

Racial Bias in Decisions Made by Mock Jurors Evaluating a Case of Sexual Harassment

Abstract

White (N = 161) and Black (N = 152) college students served as mock jurors in a simulated civil case in which a female plaintiff accused a male defendant of sexual harassment. The authors experimentally manipulated the race (Black or White) of the litigants and asked the mock jurors to decide whether the defendant was guilty; to rate the certainty of their belief in the defendant's guilt; and, when they judged the defendant guilty, to recommend an award to the plaintiff. Mock jurors of both races tended to favor litigants of their own race and their own gender. Racial bias was highest among White male jurors and lowest among White female jurors.     

Bias in Jurors vs Bias in Juries: New Evidence from the SDS Perspective

Prior research by Kaplan and Miller (1978) suggested that juries are generally influenced less by extralegal, biasing information than individual jurors are. A social decision scheme (SDS) analysis of this question by Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1997) suggested (a) that Kaplan and Miller's conclusion should hold only for relatively extreme legal cases (i.e., cases where the probability of conviction, without biasing information, was either very high or very low) and (b) that the opposite pattern should hold for moderate cases (with moderate conviction rates)—i.e., juries should show even greater sensitivity to biasing information than should individual jurors. An experiment is reported that compared juror vs jury sensitivity to biasing information (viz., prejudicial pretrial publicity) for versions of a legal case with a moderate and an extreme conviction rate. Consistent with the SDS analysis, juries were more biased than jurors for the moderate-case version, but the reverse was true for the extreme-case version. The implications of these findings and the more general utility of the SDS model for studying group processes are discussed.     

A Defence of Jury Nullification

In both Great Britain and the United States there has been a growing debate about the modern acceptability of jury nullification. Properly understood, juries do not have any constitutional right to ignore the law, but they do have the power to do so nevertheless. Juries that nullify may be motivated by a variety of concerns: too harsh sentences, improper government action, racism, etc. In this article, I shall attempt to defend jury nullification on a number of grounds. First, I discuss the use of general verdicts and reject their replacement in criminal trials by special verdicts. Second, I examine verdicts based upon mistakes and racial prejudice, turning my attention to perverse verdicts and the question of whether or not juries are guilty of legislating when nullifying the law. Finally, I look at the problem of the awarding of excessive damages by juries. My goal will be to provide a sound theoretical defence of the practice of jury nullification.R. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, American Law Review 44 (1910),18.The term jury nullification is synonymous with jury equity. The use of jury nullification has been suspected of playing a role in the infamous trials of O. J. Simpson and Rodney King in the last decade. See People v Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995); People v Powell, No. BA035498 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991).     

Exploring the subcategories of stereotypes: Not all mothers are the same

Stereotypes of mothers employed outside the home, unemployed at home with their children, and whose work role was unspecified were compared and contrasted. Two hundred and twenty-six randomly assigned university students rated how typical personality traits were of one of the three mothers. While the employed mother was perceived as retaining feminine qualities, she was described as less feminine, more masculine, and generally less desirable than the other mothers. Ratings for the mother with role unspecified paralleled those for the at-home mother, suggesting that she was assumed to be a mother at home rather than a generic or general entity. Implications for projects in which stereotypes of generic individuals have been described or evaluated are discussed.     

Trait expectancies and stereotype expectancies have the same effect on person memory

Two studies examined whether trait expectancies and stereotype expectancies similarly affected memory for expectancy-relevant behaviors. The results of both studies showed that, when activated in identical ways, trait expectancies and stereotype expectancies had similar effects on recall. Better recall was obtained for expectancy-incongruent items when expectancies were activated in relatively overt ways, while better recall for expectancy-congruent items was obtained when expectancies were activated in less overt ways. Additional analyses examining the order of events that emerged in the recall protocols provided little evidence that participants attempted to reconcile the items, as would be predicted by some earlier models of person memory (e.g., Srull, 1981). The implications of these findings for how social expectancies guide social information processing are discussed.     

Interhemispheric interaction when both hemispheres have access to the same stimulus information

Right-handed Ss identified consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) nonsense syllables presented tachistoscopically. The CVC on each trial was presented to the left visual field-right hemisphere (LVF-RH), to the right visual field-left hemisphere (RVF-LH), or the same CVC was presented to both visual fields (bilateral presentation). When recognition was incorrect, the pattern of errors was qualitatively different on LVF-RH and RVF-LH trials, suggesting that each cerebral hemisphere has its own preferred mode of processing the CVC stimuli. The qualitative pattern of errors on bilateral trials was identical to that obtained on LVF-RH trials. The bilateral results are described well by a model that assumes the mode of processing characteristic of the RH dominates on bilateral trials but is applied to both the LVF-RH and RVF-LH stimuli.     

Not all effect sizes are the same: Comments on Holden (2008)

Despite the common belief that response bias is a significant moderator of psychological tests in field settings, these biases have been notoriously difficult to identify. Holden (2008) has recently presented evidence suggesting this paradox may at least in part be explained by problems inherent to the use of moderated regression with self-report indicators of response bias. His article offers an innovative proposal for understanding a central issue in applied test use. However, the conclusions drawn about both moderated regression and the general validity of response bias indicators are open to alternative explanations. It would be premature to assume these factors are important contributors to the ephemeral character of response bias effects.     

The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony: A Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors

To compare people's beliefs about eyewitness testimony with expert opinion, 79 college students and community adults filled out a questionnaire in which they reported whether they agreed or disagreed with 21 statements previously used in a survey of eyewitness experts (Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989). The results indicated that there was a significant inter-item correlation of agreement rates but that subjects differed from the experts on 15 of these items. For courts seeking to determine the extent to which juries need assistance in their evaluations of eyewitness evidence, these findings offer a tentative list of topics worthy of either expert testimony or cautionary instructions from the judge.     

But murderers can have all the children they want: Surrogacy and public policy

No new ethical issue is created by reproductive technologies. The state should not intervene to suppress individual rights to take advantage of these technologies, including third party donations. Some individuals will view these technologies as the best available option for having and rearing children. The major values to be protected in public policy ought to be compassion, privacy and procreative rights.     

Effects of Eyewitness Evidence on Plea-Bargain Decisions by Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys1

The present experiment tested the relative impact of two types of eyewitness evidence (identification and non identification) on plea-bargain decisions by prosecutors and defense attorneys. A hypothetical case involving a robbery was mailed to three prosecutors and three defense attorneys in each of 47 states. The subjects were randomly assigned to receive a case in which an eyewitness claimed: (a) the defendant was the criminal (identification), (b) the defendant was not the criminal (non identification), or (c) it was not possible to tell whether the defendant was the criminal (control). Similar to findings with jurors, both prosecutors and defense attorneys underutilized the non identification information in making their plea-bargain decisions. In the case of the prosecutors, there was evidence that the underutilization of eyewitness non identification was at least partially mediated by the prosecutors' predictions of juror reaction to the evidence.