Pretending to cooperate. How speakers hide evasive actions

The paper is based on the following two assumptions. Firstly, evasive utterances are those which are semantically irrelevant to the question they are an answer to. Secondly, they can be divided into two main categories — overt and covert. The question to be asked as regards covert evasion is: How is it possible that an evasive speaker can nevertheless count on her/his utterance being considered cooperative? The objective of this paper is to analyse the means which are used by evasive speakers to pretend that their utterance does cooperatively answer the question and thereby meet its conversational demand. Semantic and pragmatic means were identified as serving the purpose of concealing evasive action. Within the former ones operation within the same topic as the questioner, and, secondly, equipping her/his evasive utterance with some formal characteristics which may indicate its relationship with the question, were listed. On a pragmatic level, the speaker may explicitly or implicitly indicate her/his willingness to answer the question: by statement or implication as well as licenses of uncooperativeness or hedging.     

How people explain actions performed by groups and individuals.

The authors explore whether people explain intentional actions performed by groups differently from actions performed by individuals, A theoretical framework is offered that distinguishes between 2 modes of explanation: the agent's reasons (beliefs or desires in light of which the agent decided to act) and causal histories of reasons (CHRs; factors that preceded and brought about the agent's reasons). The authors develop the hypothesis that people use more CHR explanations when explaining group actions than when explaining individual actions. Study 1 demonstrates this asymmetry. Studies 2 and 3 explore 2 necessary conditions for the asymmetry: that the group be perceived as an aggregate of individual actors rather thin as a jointly acting group and that explainers have general information available about the group. Discussion focuses on people's perception of groups as entities and agents.     

Decomposing the action effect: How simple actions affect subsequent perception

Simple actions toward an object cause people to allocate attention preferentially toward properties of that object in subsequent unrelated tasks. We show here that it is not necessary to process or attend to any properties of the object in order to obtain the effect: Even when participants knew prior to the object’s onset that they would be acting, the effects of the object remained. Furthermore, the effect remained when the action had no visible effect on the object. In addition, we examined the extent to which the effect may be due to goal updating (which is necessary only on trials that require action) and found that the effect remained even when goal updating was not necessary. The results reveal that a simple action does, indeed, affect perception and have implications for understanding vision as individuals make actions in naturally occurring behavior.     

Dynamics of self-regulation: How (un)accomplished goal actions affect motivation

Two factors increase the motivation to adhere to a goal: goal commitment and lack of goal progress. When people ask about commitment, focusing on what they have accomplished (to date) signals to them high commitment and increases motivation. Conversely, when commitment is certain and people ask about goal progress, focusing on what they have yet to accomplish (to go) signals to them lack of progress and increases motivation. Accordingly, 4 studies show that emphasizing to-date information increases goal adherence when commitment is uncertain--that is, when participants study for a relatively unimportant exam, consume luxuries, fulfill a desire, and make first-time contributions to a charity. Conversely, emphasizing to-go information increases goal adherence when commitment is certain--that is, when participants study for an important exam, consume necessities, fulfill a need, and make repeated contributions to a charity.     

How formulating implementation plans and remembering past actions facilitate the enactment of effortful decisions

Building on prior research studying effortful decision making and enactment processes (Bagozzi, Dholakia, & Basuroy, 2003; BDB), we identify and provide an in‐depth understanding of two specific self‐regulatory strategies: (1) formulating an implementation plan, and (2) remembering past actions, that decision makers can use in facilitating enactment of effortful decisions. The results of three experiments, in which the decision maker's goal and self‐regulatory strategy were manipulated, showed that for goals that decision makers chose volitionally, the motivational effects of both these strategies lay in increasing levels of proximal implementation‐related variables (implementation intentions, plan completeness, plan enactment, and goal realization) significantly. In contrast, for goals that were assigned to participants, these strategies' motivational effects additionally extended to significantly increasing distal goal‐related variables (goal desire, goal intentions, perceived self‐efficacy, and implementation desires). The theoretical implications of our findings are discussed, and future research opportunities are explored. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How we use rules to select actions: A review of evidence from cognitive neuroscience

Much of our behavior is guided by rules, or prescribed guides for action. In this review, I consider the current state of knowledge of how rules are learned, stored in the brain, and retrieved and used as the need arises. The focus is primarily on studies in humans, but the review is informed by relevant studies in nonhuman primates. Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) has been implicated in rule learning, retrieval from long-term memory, and on-line maintenance during task preparation. Interactions between VLPFC and temporal cortex are required for rule retrieval in nonhuman primates, and brain imaging findings in humans suggest that rule knowledge is stored in the posterior middle temporal gyrus. Dorsolateral PFC appears to be more closely related to rule-based response selection than to rule retrieval. An important task for the future is to explain how PFC, basal ganglia, and temporal, parietal, and motor cortices interact to produce rule-guided behavior.     

When two actions are easier than one: How inhibitory control demands affect response processing

Numerous studies showed that the simultaneous execution of multiple actions is associated with performance costs. Here, we demonstrate that when highly automatic responses are involved, performance in single-response conditions can actually be worse than in dual-response conditions. Participants responded to peripheral visual stimuli with an eye movement (saccade), a manual key press, or both. To manipulate saccade automaticity, a central fixation cross either remained present throughout the trial (overlap condition, lower automaticity) or disappeared 200 ms before visual target onset (gap condition, greater automaticity). Crucially, single-response conditions yielded more performance errors than dual-response conditions (i.e., dual-response benefit), especially in gap trials. This was due to difficulties associated with inhibiting saccades when only manual responses were required, suggesting that response inhibition (remaining fixated) can be even more resource-demanding than overt response execution (saccade to peripheral target).     

How writing system and age influence spatial representations of actions: a developmental, cross-linguistic study

Recently, researchers reported a bias for placing agents predominantly on the left side of pictures. Both hemispheric specialization and cultural preferences have been hypothesized to be the origin of this bias. To evaluate these hypotheses, we conducted a study with participants exposed to different reading and writing systems: Germans, who use a left-to-right system, and Israelis, who use a right-to-left system. In addition, we manipulated the degree of exposure to the writing systems by testing preschoolers and adults. Participants heard agent-first or recipient-first sentences and were asked to draw the content of the sentences or to arrange transparencies of protagonists and objects such that their arrangement depicted the sentences. Although preschool-age children in both countries showed no directional bias, adults manifested a bias that was consistent with the writing system of their language. These results support the cultural hypothesis regarding the origin of spatial-representational biases.     

Rationing just medical care

U.S. politicians and policymakers have been preoccupied with how to pay for health care. Hardly any thought has been given to what should be paid for--as though health care is a commodity that needs no examination--or what health outcomes should receive priority in a just society, i.e., rationing. I present a rationing proposal, consistent with U.S. culture and traditions, that deals not with "health care," the terminology used in the current debate, but with the more modest and limited topic of medical care. Integral to this rationing proposal--which allows scope to individual choice and at the same time recognizes the interdependence of the individual and society--is a definition of a "decent minimum," the basic package of medical treatments everyone should have access to in a just society. I apply it to a specific example, diabetes mellitus, and track it through a person's life span.     

Intentions in teasing: when "just kidding" just isn't good enough

Teasing is ambiguous. Although the literal content of a tease is, by definition, negative, seldom do teasers intend for their tease to be taken literally. Toward this aim, teasers often attempt to mitigate the negative surface content of the tease by communicating via gesture, facial expression, or tone of voice that they are "just kidding." The research presented here suggests that such attempts often fall on deaf ears. Despite teasers' attempts to mitigate the tease, targets are often unaware of--and unmoved by--the teaser's benign intentions. As a result, teasers and targets systematically differ in their perceptions of teasing: Although it is often seen as innocent and playful by the teaser, it tends to be construed as considerably more malicious by the target.     

How infants grasp two adjacent objects: effects of perceived display composition on infants’ actions

In this research, 12.5- and 9.5-month-old infants’ use of information about the composition of a display to guide their actions on the display was examined. The display was composed of two pieces that were either glued together (the one-object display) or not (the two-object display). At the beginning of the session, the composition of the display was revealed to the infant and then the display was placed on the table within the infant’s reach. When resting on the table, these two versions of the display were indistinguishable. The results showed that the 12.5-month-old infants reached with one hand after they had experience with the display as a single object, and with two hands if they had experience with the display as two separate objects. The 12.5-month-old infants also placed their grasps differently depending upon the experienced composition: infants who experienced a single object tended to distribute their reaches evenly along the display, whereas infants who experienced two separate objects placed their reaches toward the outer ends of the display, avoiding the boundary between the two pieces. In contrast, the 9.5-month-old infants reached with one hand for both the one-object and the two-object displays, and their reaches did not show a difference in the distribution pattern that could be traced back to the infants’ prior experience with the composition of the display they were grasping.     

Schadenfreude and just world belief

The present study tested the hypothesis that a threat of a just world belief intensifies experience of schadenfreude (i.e., pleasure at another's misfortune). The participants read scenarios which were designed to threaten or maintain their just world belief. Subsequently, they were transferred to an online magazine presenting funny stories about other peoples' failures. As presumed, the participants exposed to the threat of just world belief spent more time on reading. These results confirmed the existence of a link between just world threat and schadenfreude.     

Talking about actions

This article was written as an abstract of a paper or perhaps book which has yet to be written; this explains the sketchiness. The author is grateful that Professor Wójcicki has seen fit to accept it for inclusion here.     

Programming tool-use actions

When humans plan to execute a tool-use action, they can only specify the bodily movement parameters by taking into account the external target or goal of the tool-use action and the target-movement mapping implemented by the tool. In this study, the authors used the movement precuing method to investigate how people prepare for actions made with tools. More specifically, they asked whether people would be able to specify the spatial target and the target-movement mapping of the tool-use action independently of each other, and to what degree they would be able to prepare these components in advance. In 3 experiments, they precued either the target or the target-movement mapping of tool-use actions involving either a compatible or an incompatible target-movement mapping. Results indicate that participants benefit from partial advance information about the target-movement mapping, whereas no significant effects were found for precuing the spatial target of the action. These results occurred regardless of whether the target-movement mapping was compatible or incompatible and provide evidence for the notion that the target-movement mapping of a tool-use action is part of its cognitive representation.