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认知神经心理学简介 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Max Coltheart 《心理科学进展》2008,16(1):4-9
认知神经心理学是认知心理学的一个分支。它的目的是探讨当人们执行认知活动的时候,心理信息加工过程是怎样的,所采用的手段是研究这些认知功能受损的病人。它与认知神经科学的不同在于:认知神经心理学关注的是心理(mind),而认知神经科学关注的是大脑(特别是关注与认知有关的大脑机制)。研究认知神经心理学的方法也可以用于研究发展性认知障碍,如阅读障碍,或者特殊的语言损伤,这就是发展性认知神经心理学。这些方法还可以用于高级认知发面的研究,如信念形成和心理理论。这些高级认知方面的障碍是精神病学的范畴,因此这类研究错觉、幻想或虚构等的认知神经心理学叫做认知神经精神病学。认知神经心理学的典型特征有:1)研究症状,而不是并发症;2)采用个案研究,而不是群体研究;3)主要数据来源是症状间的双分离;4)致力于模块化认知模型的建立。 相似文献
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从逻辑哲学观点看,在“符号化、公理化的模糊逻辑”与非形式化的“人脑使用的模糊逻辑”(苗东升的说法)这两者之间,只是形式模型及其现实原型的关系,决不相互排斥。真正的问题不在于,在现实生活中人脑所使用的实际上行之有效的模糊推理,是否应该和可能符号化、公理化,而是在于如何恰当地进行形式化。笔者采用苏珊·哈克(Susan Haack)的逻辑哲学观点,认为非经典逻辑可划分为扩展逻辑和异常(deviation)逻辑,模糊逻辑归属于异常逻辑。本文以模糊逻辑系统FZ为例,具体分析了虽然经典逻辑中一些较强的公理和推理规则均不成立,但是与之对应的较弱的“合经典的”(well-behaved)公理和推理规则却仍然可以成立,由此导致一系列新奇性质。笔者采用了达·柯斯塔(da Costa)的形式化技巧,它是关于“在虚设不矛盾律成立的前提下”(相应公式可以称为“合经典的”)才能成立的逆否律。当我们撤除了“虚设不矛盾律为前提”的限定,它又重新回到了无条件成立的情况。笔者也推广了玻尔(N.Bohr)和冯·威扎克(von Weizsaecker)关于对应原理的思想,认为作为非经典逻辑的模糊逻辑与经典逻辑之间也应当遵守“对应原理”:经典逻辑是模糊逻辑的前身,模糊逻辑将构成更为普遍的逻辑形式,经典逻辑作为模糊逻辑的极限形式,在局部情况下还保持自身的意义。 相似文献
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以活动为认知对象的逻辑还没有系统地建立。本文我们采用半无穷方法、自代入方法、固定点方法和拟赋值方法全面建立这样的逻辑,从而研究知道一个活动的各种逻辑特性。根据这些方法,我们分别提出四类刻画知道一个活动的逻辑系统和相应的语义,然后证明这些系统相对各自的语义是可靠和完全的。 相似文献
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本研究采用眼动追踪和问卷测量相结合的方法,对气质类型和眼动控制的关系进行了探讨。眼动实验为2(眼跳方向:朝向眼跳和反向眼跳)X 2(任务类型:重复眼跳和转换眼跳)组内设计;气质分数用陈会昌编制的《气质类型测试量表》测量。结果表明,气质分数与眼动特性之间存在显著的相关性,不同气质类型(神经活动类型)在抑制过程和任务重置过程中表现出不同的相互作用模式。具体而言,神经活动强度是一个基本维度,它与认知控制的抑制功能和转换功能都有着密切联系;而神经活动的灵活性和平衡性则分别是转换功能和抑制功能的重要条件。 相似文献
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在《逻辑研究》中具有本源性奠基意义的胡塞尔意义上的内感知,实际上是一个歧义两可的概念:作为对真理、本质的相即感知,它实现了直观的明见性理想,但其对象性感知的自然意识特征使其无法作为现象学考察的根基,而实际上它又并不具有对象性感知的意向构造性;只有作为“自身给予”(明见性)意义上的自身意识:才可以在起源的意义上真正实现现象学反思以至本质直观的切实意蕴。而这种意识一体验的时间性本性又使得明见性坐落于作为其根源的“自我”的问题域中。由此,自身意识与反思的含义、关系及其发展脉络才能真实呈现,明见性从相应性向绝然性的逐步过渡才能被理解。 相似文献
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Jaroslav Peregrin 《Studia Logica》2008,88(2):263-294
The topic of this paper is the question whether there is a logic which could be justly called the logic of inference. It may seem that at least since Prawitz, Dummett and others demonstrated the proof-theoretical prominency
of intuitionistic logic, the forthcoming answer is that it is this logic that is the obvious choice for the accolade. Though there is little
doubt that this choice is correct (provided that inference is construed as inherently single-conclusion and complying with the Gentzenian structural rules), I do not think that the
usual justification of it is satisfactory. Therefore, I will first try to clarify what exactly is meant by the question, and
then sketch a conceptual framework in which it can be reasonably handled. I will introduce the concept of ‘inferentially native’
logical operators (those which explicate inferential properties) and I will show that the axiomatization of these operators
leads to the axiomatic system of intuitionistic logic. Finally, I will discuss what modifications of this answer enter the
picture when more general notions of inference are considered.
Presented by Hannes Leitgeb 相似文献
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Historically, it was the interpretations of intuitionist logic in the modal logic S4 that inspired the standard Kripke semantics for intuitionist logic. The inspiration of this paper is the interpretation of intuitionist logic in the non-normal modal logic S3: an S3 model structure can be 'looked at' as an intuitionist model structure and the semantics for S3 can be 'cashed in' to obtain a non-normal semantics for intuitionist propositional logic. This non-normal semantics is then extended to intuitionist quantificational logic. 相似文献
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Yaroslav Shramko 《Studia Logica》2005,80(2-3):347-367
We consider a logic which is semantically dual (in some precise sense of the term) to intuitionistic. This logic can be labeled as “falsification logic”: it embodies the
Popperian methodology of scientific discovery. Whereas intuitionistic logic deals with constructive truth and non-constructive
falsity, and Nelson's logic takes both truth and falsity as constructive notions, in the falsification logic truth is essentially
non-constructive as opposed to falsity that is conceived constructively. We also briefly clarify the relationships of our
falsification logic to some other logical systems. 相似文献
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In this paper, we present a generic format for adaptive vague logics. Logics based on this format are able to (1) identify
sentences as vague or non-vague in light of a given set of premises, and to (2) dynamically adjust the possible set of inferences
in accordance with these identifications, i.e. sentences that are identified as vague allow only for the application of vague
inference rules and sentences that are identified as non-vague also allow for the application of some extra set of classical
logic rules. The generic format consists of a set of minimal criteria that must be satisfied by the vague logic in casu in
order to be usable as a basis for an adaptive vague logic. The criteria focus on the way in which the logic deals with a special
⊡-operator. Depending on the kind of logic for vagueness that is used as a basis for the adaptive vague logic, this operator
can be interpreted as completely true, definitely true, clearly true, etc. It is proven that a wide range of famous logics for vagueness satisfies these criteria when extended with a specific
⊡-operator, e.g. fuzzy basic logic and its well known extensions, cf. [7], super- and subvaluationist logics, cf. [6], [9],
and clarity logic, cf. [13]. Also a fuzzy logic is presented that can be used for an adaptive vague logic that can deal with
higher-order vagueness. To illustrate the theory, some toy-examples of adaptive vague proofs are provided. 相似文献
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Ronald Cordero 《Metaphilosophy》2016,47(4-5):719-727
Logic is a central and highly useful part of philosophy. Its value is particularly evident when it comes to keeping our thinking about disjunctive probabilities clear. Because of the two meanings of “or” (“just one of these statements is true,” “at least one of these statements is true”), logic can show how the likelihood of a disjunction being true can be determined quite easily. To gauge the chance that one of two or more exclusive alternatives is true, one need only sum up their respective likelihoods. And to know the chance that at least one of two or more compatible alternatives is true, one simply has to figure the chance that it is false that all of them are false! 相似文献
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The mathematical concept of pragmatic truth, first introduced in Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui (1986), has received in the last few years several applications in logic and the philosophy of science. In this paper, we study the logic of pragmatic truth, and show that there are important connections between this logic, modal logic and, in particular, Jaskowski's discussive logic. In order to do so, two systems are put forward so that the notions of pragmatic validity and pragmatic truth can be accommodated. One of the main results of this paper is that the logic of pragmatic truth is paraconsistent. The philosophical import of this result, which justifies the application of pragmatic truth to inconsistent settings, is also discussed. 相似文献
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Situationist Deontic Logic 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
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Game Logic is a modal logic which extends Propositional Dynamic Logic by generalising its semantics and adding a new operator to the language. The logic can be used to reason about determined 2-player games. We present an overview of meta-theoretic results regarding this logic, also covering the algebraic version of the logic known as Game Algebra. 相似文献
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Marcus Kracht 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1998,27(1):49-73
In this paper we will study the properties of the least extension n() of a given intermediate logic by a strong negation. It is shown that the mapping from to n() is a homomorphism of complete lattices, preserving and reflecting finite model property, frame-completeness, interpolation and decidability. A general characterization of those constructive logics is given which are of the form n (). This summarizes results that can be found already in [13,14] and [4]. Furthermore, we determine the structure of the lattice of extensions of n(LC). 相似文献