The ‘Divine Names’ and the ‘Attributes of Deity’: On the (Infinite) Analogical Interval in Forty-Six Aphorisms

For the modern tradition of analytic philosophy of religion (that this article rejects), goodness, beauty, wisdom, and so on are divine attributes, whereas, for the classical tradition of Christian theology, they are divine names. This crucial distinction between attributes and names helps to explain why feminist philosopher Grace Jantzen’s charge of an identification of the male self with the divine self in Anglo-American philosophy of religion leads on, directly, to a critique of the ‘doctrine’ of analogy. Jantzen’s critique of ‘classical theism’ is directed against the (largely modern) reduction of God to a (male) superbeing. Here, God’s ‘attributes’ are merely human ones, even if extended to a superlative degree. I distinguish the analogical reflections of Aquinas (following Dionysius) and his heirs from the anthropomorphic dissolutions of the divine in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Theology’s analogical speech, I argue, has the potential to answer – at least partially – the feminist critique of God as a ‘pure projection’ of ‘man’. For Aquinas, God’s perfections must be qualitatively different and not merely quantitative maximisations of our own. I contend that feminist philosophy of religion cannot afford to dismiss the potential of the way of analogy, especially in its negative or apophatic dimensions.     

Divine Simplicity and the Holy Trinity

The doctrine of divine simplicity is largely ignored in modern continental theology and has been criticized by some analytic theists. However, it plays a central role in patristic and medieval trinitarian thought, and is a doctrinal affirmation of the Catholic Church. This article seeks to illustrate the significance of the teaching first by examining the contrasting modern trinitarian theologies of Karl Barth and Richard Swinburne, noting how each suffers from a deficit of reference to the doctrine of divine simplicity. The article then presents four aspects of Aquinas’ teaching on divine simplicity. From this a consideration of trinitarian persons ensues that illustrates why the distinction of persons in God can best be understood by making use of Aquinas’ theology of ‘subsistent relations’, while the unified nature of God can best be understood in terms of ‘personal modes of subsistence’. Based on this analysis, the contrasting insights of both Barth and Swinburne can be fully retained, without the contrasting inherent problems that the theology of each presents.     

Tradition and Reason: Two Uses of Reason, Critical and Contemplative

Abstract: Reason, as it is proper to the task of theology, has two uses: critical and contemplative. This twofold appropriation of reason sets the stage for this article, a stage occupied in turn by Newman and by Aquinas. The critical function of theological work is expressed via the 1877 preface which Newman wrote for his Lectures on the Prophetic Office of the Church. The critical office of theology is vital not only to the practice of theology itself but to the liturgical and spiritual life of the church, and to the exercise of church leadership if that leadership is not to descend into tyranny. For the theologian, reason is not antithetical to contemplation; rather, contemplation includes a form of reasoning. Theology is ‘a schooling in the discipline of contemplating the self‐revealing God’, a discipline of ‘metaphysical ascesis’ which compels both intellectual conversion and moral practice. Such an ascesis was practised well by Aquinas, and Kerr reflects on the Summa Theologiae as ‘a training in a form of metaphysical reasoning’, being schooled in the knowledge of God which strips away our ‘idolatorous inclinations’.     

“SIN IS BEHOVELY” IN JULIAN OF NORWICH's REVELATIONS OF DIVINE LOVE1

Julian, showing no inclination to accept the ‘free‐will’ defence nonetheless says that “sin is behovely”. She cannot mean by this that sin is necessary within the created order nor can she mean that it is completely contingent and outside the remit of divine providence. Sin's being behovely means, I argue, that it is conveniens, in a sense recognisable within some standard medieval scholastic theologies. This is to say that sin ‘fits’ with some story which God wills, a story of salvation history, in the way that events in any narrative can be said to ‘fit’ with the narrative they are events within. That for Julian we do not and cannot know the story shows her commitment to a negative theology.     

Divine authority and the virtue of religion: a Thomistic response to Murphy

In his book, An Essay on Divine Authority, Mark Murphy argues that God does not have practical authority over created, rational agents. Although Murphy mentions the possibility of an argument for divine authority from justice, he does not consider any. In this paper, I develop such an argument from Aquinas’s treatment of the virtue of religion and other parts of justice. The divine excellence is due honor, and, as Aquinas argues, honoring a ruler requires service and obedience. Thus, a classical conception of God coupled with some of Aquinas’s theses concerning justice show that God has practical authority over all created, rational agents.

     

Synchronicity and meaning

It is usually thought that synchronicity, characterised as ‘meaningful coincidence’, is therefore understandable in relation to the concept of ‘meaning’. I will explore the largely unhelpful symbiotic relationship between ‘coincidence’ and ‘meaning’ by comparing synchronicity with synchoricity ‐ coincidence in space rather than time. These two concepts are often mixed together and I will attempt to describe a ‘pure’ synchronicity in order to sharpen our sense of how meaning is felt to arise from coincidence. It will then be suggested that the standard concept of synchronicity is mostly psychologically irrelevant and, when adjusted to remove elements which are explained quite naturally by evolutionary theory, we are left with a concept which has implications both for the metaphysical foundations of Analytical Psychology and the individualistic emphasis one commonly finds in the field.     

BEING AS THE GROUND OF TRUTH IN AQUINAS

Although St. Thomas Aquinas holds that the transcendentals are convertible with being, one may question whether they all follow upon the metaphysical principles of a creature in the same way. Aquinas raises the question when he says that creatures are one by essence but good only by being. This paper examines the ground of truth according to Aquinas, considering his distinction between types of truth as well as his distinguishing kinds of knowers. To advance this investigation the essay compares truth and goodness; it also includes a discussion of unity. Clearly there is a close parallel between goodness and ‘the truth of a thing’, but must the truth of the intellect – truth in the primary sense – be grounded in the extramental being of a creature? This paper argues that, for Aquinas, human knowledge of composite beings is attained through encounters with their real instances and is reflected in necessarily true yet nonanalytic statements about these creatures, statements that can be explained by St.Thomas's theory of predication, to which the theory of an influential contemporary thinker is strikingly similar. God's knowledge of finite essences, and hence truth concerning them, does not assume the actual existence of their instantiations from all eternity, but it does assume their real existence at some time. The requirement of real existence for the human mode of knowing, and, as explained, for divine knowing, underscores the value of finite being and thus harmonizes with Aquinas's claims that composite beings, as what they are, possess being more truly in themselves than as in the mind of God, and they are known properly by God only when grasped as actually existent particulars.     

How Opposites (Should) Attract: Humility as a Virtue for the Strong

This article first examines pervasive present‐day attitudes toward humility (‘The Contemporary Distaste for Humility’) before turning to Thomas Aquinas and Zhu Xi for their more positive treatments of this disposition (‘Thomas Aquinas and Zhu Xi on Humility’). It then considers their ideas about how humility is related to our human limitations (‘Humility Grounded in Our Finite Nature and Knowledge’), before surveying how they think it should be expressed in our relationships with our neighbours (‘Humility in Community’). The article looks at what Thomas and Zhu have to say about excessive pride in rulers (‘Humility and Authority’) before closing in the Conclusion with some thoughts about the viability of humility as a virtue for the strong, and its especial importance in contemporary politics.     

Acquaintance and the sublime: an alternative account of theistic sublime experience

In this paper I argue that when one has an epiphany of the form ‘God is F’ (e.g., ‘God is wise’) upon having a sublime experience one can be accurately described as being acquainted with the fact that God is F as opposed to inferring that God is F from the experience at hand. To argue for this, I will, first, outline what a sublime experience is, in general, before outlining what a theistic sublime experience is in particular. Second, I will outline two ways of understanding theistic sublime experiences. First, I will outline a model that I will call the ‘inference model’ which, put simply, says that when one has an epiphany of the form ‘God is F’, upon having a theistic sublime experience, one is drawing this conclusion via a process of ‘inference-to-the-best-explanation’ (Chignell and Halteman in: Costelloe (ed) The sublime: From antiquity to the present, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 426). Second, I will outline an alternative model that I call the ‘acquaintance model’ which, put simply, says that no inferential process occurs when one has an epiphany of the form ‘God is F’ upon having a theistic sublime experience, but one is made directly aware of the fact that God is F. Third, and finally, I will respond to some objections to the acquaintance model.     

‘Fides mater virtutum est’

Abstract

Peter Martyr Vermigli’s elevation of faith over charity displays similarities and differences with Thomas Aquinas and other medieval authors. For Thomas, faith does not perceive its object and thus denotes an uncertain assent to imperfectly revealed truths. Aquinas posits a reordering of will and intellect in order to explain how faith is more certain than ‘scientia.’ Vermigli on the other hand attempts to maintain the natural order between intellect and will in virtuous action (that is, natural law) even for the theological virtues. He likens faith to vision and practical wisdom arguing that God illuminates the mind to make the object of faith apprehensible to the judgment of reason. This perspective presents a more optimistic account of temporal, intellectual perfection via grace.     

A Response to Paul Griffiths’ Annihilationist Proposal

In his recent influential theological work, Paul Griffiths, the esteemed Buddhism scholar and Anglican convert to Catholicism, proposes, among other things, that annihilationism is a viable option for Christians, including Catholics, despite apparent magisterial prohibition. He argues, in effect, that every creature must be naturally mortal because bodily, including the angels. Therefore, de facto immortal creatures are not immortal by nature, but by a positive act of God in addition to the creative act. Accordingly, it makes no sense to assert the existence of an eternal hell. Rather, since sin is fundamentally corrosive, those who opt to continue down the rabbit's hole of sin literally become nothing. Hell, then, is a no‐place and a no‐time. Hence, as long as the damned continue to exist, they have the opportunity for eventual redemption as for eventual self‐annihilation. Griffiths attempts to defend this thesis in dialogue with Augustine, in particular, to the neglect of Aquinas, except to argue that Aquinas’ own arguments for the natural immortality of the human soul are incoherent. I will argue instead that spiritual being exists, that it is naturally immortal, that Aquinas demonstrates both, and that even an Augustinian such as Joseph Ratzinger recognizes Aquinas’ theological insights and builds on them.     

‘As in a Mirror’: Jonathan Edwards,Self-Love and Enlarging to Receive Another

Through a robust deployment of visual metaphors, Jonathan Edwards’s theology utilizes notions of vision to articulate his doctrine of God, creation, anthropology, redemption and ultimately glorification. Focusing on anthropology, this article attends to how human beings are constituted through sight, and reconstituted (i.e. regenerated) as they are contemplated in the Son and as they are given a vision of the Father in the Son by the Spirit of illumination. Put differently, Edwards’s anthropology is ordered around its teleology of becoming like God only if one can ‘see him as he is’ (1 Jn 3:2), which is anticipated by faith in this present age and ‘through a mirror dimly’ (1 Jn 13:12). After mooring his anthropology to broader theological concerns, the article narrows to consider how Edwards’s idiosyncratic personalism is developed around the notion of a ‘reflective self’ that can enlarge to internalize an ‘other’. Clarifying this notion is a brief comparison of a similar construction in Thomas Aquinas, showing how Edwards’s theory of loving neighbor as oneself is a unique contribution to questions concerning personhood, self-love and neighbor-love.     

Peacocke on red and red′

How are we to define ‘red’? We seem to face a dilemma. For it seems that we must define ‘red’ in terms of ‘looks red’. But ‘looks red’ is semantically complex. We must therefore define ‘looks red’ in terms of ‘red’. Can we avoid this dilemma? Christopher Peacocke thinks we can. He claims that we can define the concept of being red in terms of the concept of being red′; the concept of a sensational property of visual experience. Peacocke agrees that his definition of red makes use of a concept that those who possess the concept of being red need not possess; namely, red′. But he thinks that this does not matter. For, he says, the definition is justified provided we can specify what it is to possess the concept of being red in terms of the concept of being red′. What he tries to show is that this might be so even if no-one could possess the concept of being red′ unless he possessed the concept of being red. Peacocke has two attempts at showing this. However, both these attempts fail. What Peacocke does show is something weaker. He shows that, using red′, we can construct a concept that gives what he calls the ‘constitutive role’ of the concept of being red; but, importantly, that it gives the constitutive role of red does not suffice for what Peacocke says is required for giving a definition. Thus, if we accept Peacocke's standard for definition, it follows that he gives us no way of avoiding the original dilemma. If this is right then perhaps we should join with those like Colin McGinn who think that we should give up our attempts to define our secondary quality concepts.     

Hearts Set to Obey

Abstract : Caught in the tension between the reality of our sin and the reality of God's forgiveness and grace, how are we to obey the commandments of God and strive for a holy life? Many have argued that the Lutheran tradition has undermined the ethical imperative of the Christian walk. While it is true that Lutheran theology in some modes has denied the sort of linear moral progress emphasized by some other traditions, it affirms the reality of genuine transformation in the Christian life, which moves us beyond the static Sisyphean tension in which we are simultaneously sinners and saints. Though emphasizing grace as pardon and righteousness as relational, Lutheran theology also has place for a grace that empowers believers for growth in discipleship. The terms ‘justification’ and ‘sanctification’ point not to different works of God but to two different angles—pardon and power—from which to describe the one work of God in Christ, reconciling the world to himself. In light of this, we need not sever ethics from theology to understand how our hearts may be set to obey the commandments of God.     

Religion,Philosophy and Family Resemblances

Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances has been adopted by some writers either to explain the use of the word ‘religion’ or to advocate a use in the context of a definition. The purpose of this definition is supposedly to avoid an essentialist definition of religion such as ‘belief in God or gods’ which is seen as too parochially tied to Judaeo-Christian theistic origins of the word, while at the same time guaranteeing a distinctive role for religion as a universally applicable analytical concept. However, if an essentialist definition is not smuggled in for the purpose of maintaining a distinction between the ‘religion’ family and other neighbouring families such as ideologies, worldviews, values or symbolic systems, then the family becomes so indefinite that the word ceases to pick out any distinctive aspect of human culture. And this definitional dilemma in fact reflects the actual use of the word ‘religion’ by the scholarly community. Analysis of ‘religion’ texts shows that the word is used in such a large range of contexts that it is devoid of analytical value. Consequently, there is an obligation on the community of scholars to reconceptualize the wide and valuable range of work which is being carried out in ‘religion’ departments.     

‘The Body of Christ is Made From Bread’: Transubstantiation and the Grammar of Creation

Aquinas's theology of Christ's eucharistic presence, often identified by the term ‘transubstantiation’, can best be understood by locating it in relation to the ‘grammar’ of the creator–creature relationship. After a brief overview of Aquinas on creation, the article examines closely Aquinas's analysis of the statement that ‘the body of Christ is made from bread’. This allows us to begin to imagine how Aquinas might respond to one of the most influential contemporary critiques of his sacramental theology: that of Louis‐Marie Chauvet. In addition, such an examination casts new light on Aquinas's doctrine of creation itself.     

Architectonics Matter: Some Advantages of Treating the Unicity of God in Advance of the Trinity of Persons,in Dialogue with Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas's distinction between what is essential and personal in God has been widely criticized in Protestant and Catholic modernity because of its supposed isolation of God from the economy of salvation. Based upon consideration of the divine goodness, I defend Aquinas's arrangement in Summa Theologiae I, qq. 1–49, advancing metaphysical inquiry along four lines. I discuss, first, the fittingness of ascribing conceptual priority to the common in advance of the particular; second, how Aquinas's ‘double perspective’ illuminates the New Testament language of ‘participation’ in the divine nature; third, the manner in which God's attributes structure God's works, illustrating the concordance of nature and works; fourth, and last, how Aquinas’s architectonic clarifies the relationship between God's essential names and transcendentality.     

The Problem of Criteria and the Necessity of Natural Theology

Most streams of Christianity have emphasized the unknowability of God, but they have also asserted that Christ is the criterion through whom we may have limited access to the depths of God, and through whose life and death we can formulate the doctrine of God as Triune. This standpoint, however, leads to certain complications regarding ‘translating’ the Christian message to adherents of other religious traditions, and in particular the question, ‘Why do you accept Christ as the criterion?’, is one that Christian thinkers have attempted to answer in different ways. There are two influential responses to this query in recent Christian thought: an ‘evidentialist’ approach which gradually moves from a theistic metaphysics to a Christ‐centred soteriology, and an ‘unapologetic’ standpoint which takes God's self‐disclosure in Christ as the perspectival lens through which to view the world. The opposition between these two groups is primarily over the status of ‘natural theology’, that is, whether we may speak of a ‘natural’ reason, which human beings possess even outside the circle of the Christian revelation, and through which they may arrive at some minimalist understanding of the divine reality. I outline the status of ‘natural theology’ in these strands of contemporary Christian thought, from Barthian ‘Christomonism’ to post‐liberal theology to Reformed epistemology, and suggest certain problems within these standpoints which indicate the need for an appropriately qualified ‘natural theology’. Most of the criticisms leveled against ‘natural theology’, whether from secular philosophers or from Christian theologians themselves, can be put in two groups: first, the arguments for God's existence are logically flawed, and, second, even if they succeed they do not point to the Triune God that Christians worship. In contrast to such an old‐fashioned ‘natural theology’ which allegedly starts from premises self‐evidently true for all rational agents and leads through an inexorable logic to God, the qualified version is an attempt to spell out the doctrinal beliefs of Christianity such as the existence of a personal God who interacts with human beings in different ways, and outline the reasons offered in defence of such statements. In other words, without denying that Christian doctrines operate at one level as the grammatical rules which structure the Christian discourse, such a natural theology insists on the importance of the question of whether these utterances are true, in the sense that they refer to an objective reality which is independent of the Christian life‐world. Such a ‘natural theology’, as the discussion will emphasize, is not an optional extra but follows in fact from the internal logic of the Christian position on the universality of God's salvific reach.     

No Empathy for Empathy: An Existential Reading of Husserl’s Forgotten Question

ABSTRACT

Empathy is a term used to denote our experience of connecting or feeling with an Other. The term has been used both by psychologists and phenomenologists as a supplement for our biological capacity to understand an Other. In this paper I would like to challenge the possibility of such empathy. If empathy is employed to mean that we know another person’s feelings, then I argue that this is impossible. I argue that there is an equivocation in the use of the term ‘empathy’ which conditions the appropriation of the Other as we think that we know how the Other feels. To claim that we do know an Other’s feelings – or any kind of their intentional experience – means to appropriate their experience through our own. I will first reveal the equivocal use of the term ‘empathy’ and, then, I will explore Husserl’s use of the term. In Husserl, the understanding of an Other as empathy is only partial. I shall conclude by reiterating a thesis from philosophy of existence and feminist theory according to which to know another person comes from creating a community with them and not because we have a biological structure that can mirror each other’s feelings.     

Facing being: the significance of Thomist ontological epistemology to realism in post-Kantian philosophy

The Kantian ‘Copernican Revolution’ contained in his Prologomena and The Critique of Pure Reason deemed metaphysical statements to be ‘transcendental illusions’, so directing metaphysics to its dearth. As a consequence, no longer could objects be known ‘in-themselves’ by the sensorily-reliant human. This perceived impossibility of metaphysical knowledge in the turn to the subject from Kant through Nietzsche's rejection of true knowledge has heavily inclined Continental Philosophy to an anti-metaphysical quandary. Analytic Philosophy is no different following the influence of Carnap, Wittgenstein and Rorty upon its own ‘linguistic turn’. An inevitable consequence of things not being knowable in themselves is the philosophical distance from ‘the world’, which Stephen Hawking has argued, makes the philosophical enterprise ‘dead’. In dialogue with this widespread decline in metaphysics, I will attempt to reclaim realist metaphysics through the employment of a Thomist paradigm. If philosophy is to be relevant to the knowledge economy, it is compelled to be in relation with what is. Thus, in my theoretical framework, being will be considered as central to all knowledge systems seeking to correspond to ‘hard’ science. The Thomist realist natural philosophy of ‘scientia’ – wherein truth is conformed with being – will be at the core of the argument. This paper challenges the ignoring of being because extant reality is composed of all that is, continuously faced and never evadable. Consequently, Thomism is recaptured as significant to post-Kantian philosophy as Aquinas articulated a means through which the thinking subject engages with being through sensation and cognition.