Revisiting the destiny compulsion

This paper is an attempt to deal with some questions raised by the so‐called ‘compulsion of destiny’ constellation. In presenting the standpoints of Freud and of psychoanalysts who after him were concerned with this problematic, the author takes the view that several aspects of the configuration merit further discussion. Accordingly, the dynamics of repetition compulsion, the complexity of the projective strategy, the coexistence of passive and omnipotent trends are considered. Concerning compulsive repetitions the dimension of drive intrication is underlined, thus moderating the understanding of this clinical entity as mainly related to death drive trends. Projection is understood as serving complex psychic demands. The coexistence of passive and omnipotent trends is envisaged, as manifested in phantasies of submission / participation of patients to a force that exceeds human limitations. For certain cases the consonance of somatic and psychic experiences is noted. Finally, elements from the material of two cases are presented which pertain to the problematic of the compulsion of destiny in which random events are submitted to heavy psychic necessities.     

The compulsion to confess and the compulsion to judge in the analytic situation

In this paper the author shows that human beings have two quasi‐instinctual primitive tendencies – namely, the compulsion to confess and the compulsion to judge (to condemn or to absolve). These compulsions are originally unconscious and become conscious during the course of the analytic process. The compulsion to judge is a natural consequence of the compulsion to confess. These two tendencies are intensified by the analytic situation. The patient has a compulsion to confess to the analyst and to himself, and likewise the analyst has a compulsion to confess to himself and to the patient. The patient therefore has a compulsion to judge himself as good or bad and to judge the analyst as good or bad while, on the other hand, the analyst has a compulsion to judge himself as good or bad and to judge the patient as good or bad. The task of analysis is to make both patient and analyst conscious of their compulsions to confess and to judge (to condemn or to absolve). The compulsion to judge in the analyst, particularly if unconscious, may give rise to mistakes in diagnosis, technique, treatment, and the assessment of analysability. The requirement of analytic neutrality in the analyst constantly conflicts with his compulsion to judge. If we are profoundly involved in our patient's dramatic conflict, we are bound to pass a judgement (condemnation or absolution); however, when we judge, we are not neutral and therefore become incapable of intellectual consciousness of the patient's conflict. Conversely, if we do not judge, we are neutral, but are then relatively uninvolved in the patient's conflict and are hence virtually unable to achieve emotional consciousness. The author attempts to show that neutrality cannot and must not be a preconstituted attitude in the analyst, but can and must be a point of arrival following a profound, intensely felt existential experience based on an attitude of non‐condemnation and non‐absolution.     

Weakness and compulsion: the essential difference

This paper aims to defend the common-sense view that we exempt compulsive agents from responsibility to the extent that they are unable to choose what they do and hence they cannot control their actions by their choices. This view has been challenged in a seminal paper by Gary Watson, who claimed that akratic agents lack control in the same sense but they are responsible nonetheless. In the first part of the paper, I critically examine the arguments Watson advances for this claim first in his original paper and then in some more recent works. I conclude that his account is based on the widely held assumption that both compulsive behavior and weakness of the will must be understood as a direct result of some inner motivational conflict. In the second part, I argue for an alternative understanding of the difference between weakness and compulsion. My claim is that compulsion is a cognitive rather than a motivational deficiency, since the compulsive, unlike the weak-willed, does not desire to perform the action which she actually performs. Furthermore, I argue that compulsive agents cannot control their actions by their choices because they have a distorted view of their own actional abilities. In the final part of the paper, I discuss a consequence of this account to the conditional analysis of free will as a condition of responsibility.     

Repetition compulsion and self-psychology: Towards a reconciliation

The concept of repetition compulsion, which has never been fully acknowledged by Kohut and his followers, is re-evaluated in this article within the context of self-psychology. In line with the underlying principles of defensive contact-shunning on the one hand, and non-traumatic empathic failure on the other hand, the repetition can be seen as the twofold expression both of the wish for a new benign relationship and of the dread of traumatic, repeated disappointment. Therefore, early non-traumatic disappointments are initiated by the patient, and role-responded to by significant others. This way, the risk of disillusionment of full-blown expectations is avoided. The repetition compulsion, then, is a complex mechanism: preventive in one part, it protects the vulnerable self from potentially traumatising experiences; thus, it is operated in response to the danger signal of emotional cravings, once the latter are experienced as getting out of hand. Providing novel experiences, in its other part, it can lead to opening the road for change; such curative impact relies on lengthy working through in a safe, empathic, holding environment.     

Weakness of will, reasonability, and compulsion

Experimental philosophers have recently begun to investigate the folk conception of weakness of will (e.g., Mele in Philos Stud 150:391–404, 2010; May and Holton in Philos Stud 157:341–360, 2012; Beebe forthcoming; Sousa and Mauro forthcoming). Their work has focused primarily on the ways in which akrasia (i.e., acting contrary to one’s better judgment), unreasonable violations of resolutions, and variations in the moral valence of actions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will. A key finding that has emerged from this research is that—contrary to the predominant view in the history of philosophy—ordinary participants do not think of weakness of will solely in terms of akrasia but see resolution violations and moral evaluations as playing equally important roles. The present article extends this line of research by reporting the results of four experiments that investigate (i) the interplay between hastily revising one’s resolutions and the degree of reasonableness of the actions one had resolved to undertake, (ii) whether ordinary participants are willing to ascribe weakness of will to agents whose actions stem from compulsion or addiction, and (iii) the respects in which akratic action, resolution violations, and the seriousness of an addiction impact attributions of weakness of will to agents acting in accord with their addictions.     

Sexual addiction and compulsion: recognition, treatment, and recovery

The management of patients with compulsive sexual behavior requires an understanding of the profile of the sexually compulsive or addicted patient. This article summarizes patient characteristics and their implications for treatment. Data from a study of the recovery of 957 patients who had problematic, sexually excessive behavior are presented. Spanning 5 years, the study shows six distinct stages patients experienced and the clinical activities that were most useful to them. A trajectory of a typical diagnosis and treatment path is provided, as well as important resources for physicians and patients.