“Feeling” the pain of those who are different from us: Modulation of EEG in the mu/alpha range

We explored how apparently painful stimuli and the ability to identify with the person on whom the pain is inflicted modulate EEG suppression in the mu/alpha range (8–12 Hz). In a 2 × 2 design, we presented pictures of hands either experiencing needle pricks or being touched by a Q-tip. In the dissimilar-other condition, the hand was assigned to a patient suffering from a neurological disease in which Q-tips inflicted pain, whereas needle pricks did not. In the similar-other condition, the hand was assigned to a patient who responded to stimulation in the same way as the healthy participant. Participants were instructed to imagine the feeling of the person whose hand was shown and to evaluate his or her affective state. Pain conditions elicited greater EEG suppression than did nonpain conditions, particularly over frontocentral regions. Moreover, an interaction between pain and similarity revealed that for similar others, the pain effect was significant, whereas in the dissimilar-other group, suppression was equally large in the pain and no-pain conditions. We conclude that mu/alpha suppression is elicited both automatically, by observing a situation that is potentially painful for the observer, and by empathy for pain, even if the other person is different from oneself.     

Empathy and values as predictors of care development

Juujärvi, S., Myyry, L. & Pesso, K. (2012). Empathy and values as predictors of care development. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 53, 413–420. This study investigates values and affective empathy as predictors for care‐based moral development. Fifty‐three students from a university of applied sciences were interviewed with Skoe’s Ethic of Care Interview at the beginning of their studies and two years later. Value priorities were measured by Schwartz et al.’s Portrait Value Questionnaire, empathy variables by Davis’ Interpersonal Reactivity Index, and feelings of sympathy were rated using a real‐life moral conflict. The results showed that students in care‐oriented fields progressed in care reasoning. Real‐life sympathy and the value of self‐direction positively predicted development in care reasoning, whereas personal distress was a negative predictor. The results indicate that care‐based moral development is more closely connected with affective empathy than personal values. Individuals who feel empathy for others, and who prefer independent thinking and action, achieve the greatest gains in care development. In conclusion, educators should encourage students’ empathy and moral reasoning in authentic moral conflicts.     

The development of cognitive empathy and concern in preschool children: A behavioral neuroscience investigation

This developmental neuroscience study examined the electrophysiological responses (EEG and ERPs) associated with perspective taking and empathic concern in preschool children, as well as their relation to parental empathy dispositions and children's own prosocial behavior. Consistent with a body of previous studies using stimuli depicting somatic pain in both children and adults, larger early (~200 ms) ERPs were identified when perceiving painful versus neutral stimuli. In the slow wave window (~800 ms), a significant interaction of empathy condition and stimulus type was driven by a greater difference between painful and neutral images in the empathic concern condition. Across early development, children exhibited enhanced N2 to pain when engaging in empathic concern. Greater pain‐elicited N2 responses in the cognitive empathy condition also related to parent dispositional empathy. Children's own prosocial behavior was predicted by several individual differences in neural function, including larger early LPP responses during cognitive empathy and greater differentiation in late LPP and slow wave responses to empathic concern versus affective perspective taking. Left frontal activation (greater alpha suppression) while engaging in affective perspective taking was also related to higher levels of parent cognitive empathy. Together, this multilevel analysis demonstrates the important distinction between facets of empathy in children; the value of examining neurobehavioral processes in development. It provides provoking links between children's neural functioning and parental dispositions in early development.     

Attentional bias toward negative and positive pictorial stimuli and its relationship with distorted cognitions,empathy, and moral reasoning among men with intellectual disabilities who have committed crimes

The aims of this study were to examine: (a) whether men with intellectual disabilities who have a history of criminal offending attend to affective pictorial stimuli in a biased manner, and (b) whether there is a relationship between an affective attentional bias and offense‐supportive cognitions, empathy, and moral reasoning. Forty‐six men with intellectual disabilities who had a documented history of criminal offending, and 51 men who also had intellectual disabilities, but no such history, were recruited and asked to complete a computer‐based dot‐probe task using affective pictorial stimuli with randomization, along with measures of distorted cognitions, empathy, and moral reasoning. Those with a history of criminal offending endorsed significantly more offense‐supportive cognitions, had significantly lower general empathy, and more “mature” moral reasoning, as well as a significant attentional bias toward affective pictorial stimuli. Attentional bias significantly predicted offense‐supportive cognitions, and vice versa, having controlled for offense history, and Full‐Scale IQ, but this was not the case for empathy or moral reasoning. While the findings require replication, interventions that aim to modify attention bias with this population should be tested.     

Empathie und Persönlichkeitsstörungen aus neurobiologischer Sicht

In contrast to the vague application of the term empathy in general usage, the neurobiological literature differentiates between cognitive empathy and emotional empathy. The former includes cognitive recognition of the mental state of someone else due to reflexive acquisition of perspectives and theory of mind functions, the latter includes the reflexive intuitive sympathy and sharing the emotions of others. Both independent from each other and interindividual differently expressed facets can be assigned to different brain networks which process these events. Early evolutionary processes of emotional empathy are already developed in infants by mirror image imitation of mimicry and gestures of the primary contact person. They involve premotor regions, areas of the sensomotor cortex, the inferior parietal lobule and the anterior insular regions. Phylogenetically younger processes of cognitive empathy are represented in particular in midline structures, such as the medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus, posterior cingulum or precuneus as well as in the temporoparietal junction. They have their beginning in shared attention processes in early dyadic processes. Both facets of empathy are involved in moral decision-making processes. In this context, neurobiological studies show that psychopaths have undisturbed cognitive empathic capabilities and are principally able to recognize and apply moral values but confer little attentional importance to them when they compete with own targets. Individuals with borderline personality disorders in contrast to psychopaths show impairments in cognitive empathy. The deficits affect mentalization functions, which involve the understanding of the mental state of others and oneself and are also the starting point for many misunderstandings in an interpersonal context. Additionally, individuals with borderline personality disorder have a tendency to share emotions with other people. They therefore succeed in showing sympathy and compassion although associated with the danger of diffusion of self and third party borders.     

6～10岁儿童道德移情特点的研究

道德移情是近期日益受重视和研究的一种重要情感形式。本研究以6、8、10岁的176名儿童为样本,参照M.L Hoffiman关于道德移情的理论观点,运用个别交谈法以道德情境故事为材料探究了儿童的道德移情特点。结果表明：我国6－10岁儿童面临道德情境时作出的道德移情反应随年龄的增长而提高;他们对集体的道德移情反应强于对个人的道德移情反应;他们对声誉损害的道德移情反应最强、其次是对人身伤害的、最后是对财物损坏的;他们在相同感、内疚感、气愤感诸不同情感上的移情反应与Hoffman的设想既有相同点,也有不同处。     

The phenomenology of empathy: a Steinian emotional account

This paper presents a phenomenological account of empathy inspired by the proposal put forward by Edith Stein in her book On the Problem of Empathy, published originally 1917. By way of explicating Stein’s views, the paper aims to present a characterization of empathy that is in some aspects similar to, but yet essentially different from contemporary simulationist theories of empathy. An attempt is made to show that Stein’s proposal articulates the essential ingredients and steps involved in empathy and that her proposal can be made even more comprehensive and elucidating by stressing the emotional aspect of the empathy process. Empathy, according to such a phenomenological proposal, is to be understood as a perceptual-imaginative feeling towards and with the other person’s experiences made possible by affective bodily schemas and being enhanced by a personal concern for her. To experience empathy does not necessarily or only mean to experience the same type of feeling as the target does; it means feeling alongside the feeling of the target in imagining and explicating a rich understanding of the experiences of the very person one is facing.     

The Longitudinal Relationship Between Media Violence and Empathy: Was It Sympathy All Along?

Previous research with adolescents has reported a negative relationship between media violence and empathy. There are, however, two important conceptual issues in this earlier literature that deserve further research attention. First, studies often treat empathy as a one-dimensional construct while it consists of both an affective and cognitive component. Second, while aiming to measure empathy, several studies have measured sympathy instead. Driven by these concerns, this study was designed to investigate the longitudinal relationship between media violence, affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and sympathy. Using data from a two-wave panel study with 943 adolescents (10–14 years old), a cross-lagged model tested whether media violence exposure negatively influences empathy and sympathy (desensitization) or whether empathy and sympathy negatively influence media violence exposure (selection). Results were in line with desensitization. However, rather than showing that media violence leads to a decrease in empathy (which previous studies have shown), results indicate a decrease in sympathy instead. These findings provide clarification to existing work as well as offer methodological and practical implications.     

Self-compassion,empathy, and helping intentions

The trait of self-compassion has three components: (1) kindness toward oneself when facing pain or failure; (2) perceiving one’s experiences as part of a larger human experience rather than feeling isolated; and (3) holding painful thoughts and feelings in balanced awareness. The present research explores if self-compassion predicts willingness to help others and empathy for others in need of help. Study 1 found that self-compassion predicted greater willingness to help a hypothetical person while simultaneously reducing empathy for that person. Study 2 used a more nuanced measure of empathy and found that self-compassion was only related to feeling less personal distress in response to someone else’s emergency. In addition, in Study 2, self-compassion only predicted greater helping intentions when the target was at fault for the emergency. Lastly, both self-compassion and empathy were uniquely related to participants’ willingness to help an individual in need.     

Moral Sentimentalism

In a way reminiscent of Hume's approach in the Treatise, a reviving moral sentimentalism can use the notion of empathy to ground both its normative account of moral obligation and its metaethical account of moral language. A virtuous person is empathically caring about others and expresses such feeling/motivation in her actions. But the judgment that something is right or good is also based in empathy, and the sentimentalist can espouse a form of moral realism by making use of a Kripkean reference-fixer theory of the role of feelings of approval and disapproval in moral judgment.     

Development of the Adolescent Measure of Empathy and Sympathy (AMES)

The aim of the present study was to develop and validate a new instrument to measure empathy and sympathy in adolescents that differentiates between empathy and sympathy, and balances its emphasis on affective and cognitive empathy. The psychometric properties of the Adolescent Measure of Empathy and Sympathy (AMES) were established in two studies. In the first study, among 499 adolescents (10–15 years old), the structure of the AMES was investigated and the number of items was reduced. In the second study, among 450 adolescents, test-retest reliability and construct validity of the AMES was evaluated. Results indicate that the AMES met the standards of reliability and validity. By specifically distinguishing between affective empathy and sympathy, the AMES provides a distinct advantage over existing measurement tools and is useful in elucidating the relationship between empathy and behavior in adolescents.     

In Defense of the Moral Significance of Empathy

It is commonly suggested that empathy is a morally important quality to possess and that a failure to properly empathize with others is a kind of moral failure. This suggestion assumes that empathy involves caring for others’ well-being. Skeptics challenge the moral importance of empathy by arguing that empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient to care for others’ well-being. This challenge is misguided. Although some forms of empathy may not be morally important, empathy with another’s basic well-being concerns is both necessary and sufficient to care for another’s well-being, provided that one’s empathy is both cognitive and affective. I further defend the idea that empathy of this form is a moral virtue. In doing so, I address three challenges to empathy’s status as a virtue: (1) that empathy is unnecessary for being ethical, (2) that it is not useful for promoting ethical behavior, and (3) that an empathetic person can lack other traits central to being virtuous, such as being motivated by the moral good and being disposed to do virtuous things whenever appropriate opportunities arise. I argue that these challenges are mistaken.     

疼痛共情的神经机制

疼痛是一种多维度的体验。情感成分和感觉成分是疼痛体验的主要成分,二者有着不同的神经机制。疼痛共情是痛觉"共鸣"的情绪反应,其神经机制的研究也围绕疼痛的情感成分和感觉成分展开。疼痛共情的情感成分的相关脑区主要有前扣带皮层和脑岛等脑区,与自身疼痛时相比,它们的激活位点及所处的神经网络存在差异;疼痛共情的感觉成分主要与初级感觉皮层以及一些其它的躯体感觉皮层有关,对它们的激活情况的研究受技术手段和实验范式的影响较大。未来的研究应从技术手段、分析方法及实验操作上予以关注。     

The who and whom of help giving: An attributional model integrating the help giver and the help recipient

In this article, we investigate the influence of responsibility, moral emotions, and empathy on help giving for stigmatized persons in need. Both characteristics of the recipient of help and the help giver are analyzed within a general theoretical framework. Based on an online study (N = 332), structural equation models confirm and extend an attributional explanation of help‐giving, based on a thinking‐feeling‐acting model. Conditions promoting help giving are identified: (i) A potential help giver who regards himself or herself as responsible for the recipient's misfortune is likely to experience guilt, regret, and shame, thus increasing the likelihood of help. (ii) A potential recipient of help who is regarded as being not responsible for his or her plight elicits sympathy and is thus more likely to receive help. In contrast, when the person in need is regarded as being responsible for his or her plight, anger and even schadenfreude are elicited, and likelihood of help giving decreases. (iii) Different aspects of empathy as a stable personal characteristic exert direct and indirect (i.e., emotionally mediated) effects on help giving. Using structural equation modeling, we outline an attributional model of helping conceptualizing helping behavior within an actor–observer system integrating a variety of moral emotions involved in help giving.     

The impact of implicitly and explicitly primed ingroup–outgroup categorization on the evaluation of others pain: The case of the Jewish–Arab conflict

Despite the automaticity of affective sharing, many studies have documented the role of top-down effects, such as social categorization, on people’s empathic responses. An important question, largely ignored in previous research, concerns empathy to ingroup and outgroup members’ pain in the contexts of ongoing intergroup conflict. In the present study we examined how implicit and explicit ethnic social categorization of others affects empathy to pain in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. To meet this aim, we assessed the evaluation of pain by Jewish and Arab participants who viewed a series of visual stimuli depicting painful and non-painful familiar situations. The stimuli were associated with explicitly or implicitly primed typical names depicting ingroup, neutral outgroup, and adversary outgroup members. Results demonstrate that pain ratings in the explicit priming condition provide support for the ingroup empathy hypothesis, positing that empathy is higher for ingroup than for outgroup members for both Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Conversely, when the targets’ categories are primed implicitly, results revealed difference in empathy by the two ethnic groups where an ingroup bias was detected only for Palestinian Arabs. This suggests that the activation of ingroup bias on the subliminal implicit level among Palestinian Arab participants might be mediated by the amount of conflict permeating in their daily lives and by deeply rooted cultural values and behavioural patterns.     

Age differences in three facets of empathy: performance-based evidence

This study investigated age differences in cognitive and affective facets of empathy: the ability to perceive another's emotions accurately, the capacity to share another's emotions, and the ability to behaviorally express sympathy in an empathic episode. Participants, 80 younger (M(age) = 32 years) and 73 older (M(age) = 59 years) adults, viewed eight film clips, each portraying a younger or an older adult thinking-aloud about an emotionally engaging topic that was relevant to either younger adults or older adults. In comparison to their younger counterparts, older adults generally reported and expressed greater sympathy while observing the target persons; and they were better able to share the emotions of the target persons who talked about a topic that was relevant to older adults. Age-related deficits in the cognitive ability to accurately perceive another's emotions were only evident when the target person talked about a topic of little relevance to older adults. In sum, the present performance-based evidence speaks for multidirectional age differences in empathy.     

Edith Stein’s phenomenology of sensual and emotional empathy

This paper presents and explicates the theory of empathy found in Edith Stein’s early philosophy, notably in the book On the Problem of Empathy, published in 1917, but also by proceeding from complementary thoughts on bodily intentionality and intersubjectivity found in Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities published in 1922. In these works Stein puts forward an innovative and detailed theory of empathy, which is developed in the framework of a philosophical anthropology involving questions of psychophysical causality, social ontology and moral philosophy. Empathy, according to Stein, is a feeling-based experience of another person’s feeling that develops throughout three successive steps on two interrelated levels. The key to understanding the empathy process á la Stein is to explicate how the steps of empathy are attuned in nature, since the affective qualities provide the energy and logic by way of which the empathy process is not only inaugurated but also proceeds through the three steps and carries meaning on two different levels corresponding to two different types of empathy: sensual and emotional empathy. Stein’s theory has great potential for better understanding and moving beyond some major disagreements found in the contemporary empathy debate regarding, for instance, the relation between perception and simulation, the distinction between what is called low-level and high-level empathy, and the issue of how and in what sense it may be possible to share feelings in the empathy process.     

Compassion and purity: the ethics and boundary-making of Christian evangelicals

The paper explores the ethical attitude of Christian evangelicals in a church in Britain and how it affects boundary-making of their community. Evangelicals in the case study seek to be accepting of the person and to refrain from being judgemental. The paper distinguishes between the person-centred ‘ethic of compassion’ and the norm-centred ‘ethic of purity’. The ethic of compassion consists in accepting another and recognising the dignity of another based on shared humanity. It is a frame of mind that combines moral intention with the emotions of empathy and sympathy. In contrast, the ethic of purity privileges adherence to the moral order of the group over considerations for the person. The ‘compassionate’ frame of mind weakens boundaries, while the ‘pure’ frame of mind reinforces them. The boundaries of a community result from the interplay of the two ethics.     

Varieties of Empathy and Moral Agency

Contemporary literature includes a wide variety of definitions of empathy. At the same time, the revival of sentimentalism has proposed that empathy serves as a necessary criterion of moral agency. The paper explores four common definitions in order to map out which of them best serves such agency. Historical figures are used as the backdrop against which contemporary literature is analysed. David Hume’s philosophy is linked to contemporary notions of affective and cognitive empathy, Adam Smith’s philosophy to projective empathy, and Max Scheler’s account to embodied empathy. Whereas cognitive and projective empathy suffer from detachment and atomism, thereby providing poor support for the type of other-directedness and openness entailed by moral agency, embodied and affective empathy intrinsically facilitate these factors, and hence are viewed as fruitful candidates. However, the theory of affective empathy struggles to explain why the experience of empathy includes more than pure affective mimicry, whilst embodied empathy fails to take into account forms of empathy that do not include contextual, narrative information. In order to navigate through these difficulties, Edith Stein’s take on non-primordial experience is used as a base upon which a definition of affective empathy, inclusive of an embodied dimension, and founded on a movement between resonation and response, is sketched. It is argued that, of the four candidates, this new definition best facilitates moral agency.     

Affective empathy as core moral agency: psychopathy,autism and reason revisited

Empathy has become a common point of debate in moral psychology. Recent developments in psychiatry, neurosciences and social psychology have led to the revival of sentimentalism, and the ‘empathy thesis’ has suggested that affective empathy, in particular, is a necessary criterion of moral agency. The case of psychopaths – individuals incapable of affective empathy and moral agency, yet capable of rationality – has been utilised in support of this case. Critics, however, have been vocal. They have asserted that the case of autism proves the empathy thesis wrong; that psychopathy centres on rational rather than empathic limitations; that empathy is not relevant to many common normative behaviours; and that rationality is required when empathy fails. The present paper analyses these four criticisms. It will be claimed that they each face severe difficulties, and that moral agency ought to be approached via a multi-tier model, with affective empathy as a baseline.