Self-affirmation moderates effects of unrealistic optimism and pessimism on reactions to tailored risk feedback

We examined whether self-affirmation would facilitate intentions to engage in colorectal cancer (CRC) screening among individuals who were off-schedule for CRC screening and who were categorised as unrealistically optimistic, realistic or unrealistically pessimistic about their CRC risk. All participants received tailored risk feedback; in addition, one group received threatening social comparison information regarding their risk factors, a second received this information after a self-affirmation exercise and a third was a no-treatment control. When participants were unrealistically optimistic about their CRC risk (determined by comparing their perceived comparative risk to calculations from a risk algorithm), they expressed greater interest in screening if they were self-affirmed (relative to controls). Non-affirmed unrealistic optimists expressed lower interest relative to controls, suggesting that they were responding defensively. Realistic participants and unrealistically pessimistic participants who were self-affirmed expressed relatively less interest in CRC screening, suggesting that self-affirmation can be helpful or hurtful depending on the accuracy of one's risk perceptions.     

Later life health optimism,pessimism and realism: Psychosocial contributors and health correlates

Prior research has established positive outcomes of health optimism (appraising one's health as good despite poor objective health (OH)) and negative outcomes of health pessimism (appraising health as poor despite good OH), yet little is known about their contributors. We examined the role of psychosocial factors (life event stress, depression, dispositional optimism, perceived social support) in health realism (appraising health in accordance with OH), optimism and pessimism among 489 older men and women. We then accounted for the psychosocial factors when examining multiple health correlates of health realism, optimism and pessimism. Controlling for age, gender and income, regression results indicate that depression and social support were associated with less health optimism, while dispositional optimism was associated with greater health optimism among those in poor OH. Dispositional optimism was associated with less health pessimism and life event stress was associated with greater pessimism among those in good OH. Beyond the effects of the psychosocial factors, structural equation model results indicate that health optimism was positively associated with healthy behaviours and perceived control over one's health; health pessimism was associated with poorer perceived health care management. Health optimism and pessimism have different psychosocial contributors and health correlates, validating the health congruence approach to later life well-being, health and survival.     

Perception of health risks: How smoker status affects defensive optimism

Abstract

People generally underestimate their risk to come down with a life-threatening disease when comparing themselves to similar others. However, to some extent they do take objective risk status or actual risk behavior into account. The present study examined specific conditions of this phenomenon. It was found that smoker status was associated with a somewhat higher perceived risk of getting lung cancer or smoker's cough or having a heart attack, but not of coming down with other diseases. Still, smokers did not admit that they had an above-average risk for these maladies, thus reflecting defensive optimism. In addition, smokers characterized the behavior of an abstract person, a “risk stereotype”, by estimating the number of years of smoking, the daily number of cigarettes, and the cigarettes' nicotine content necessary to be at high risk for lung cancer. There was evidence that smokers used these risk stereotypes as a reference point for evaluating their own relative risk. Smokers also made higher risk estimates if their own behavior approached that of the risk stereotype. On the whole, the results suggest that people use subjective risk factor theories when estimating their own personal health risks.     

The rational side of egocentrism in social comparisons

Prior work has found that when people compare themselves with others they egocentrically focus on their own strengths and achievements more than on the (equally relevant) strengths and achievements of the comparison group. As a consequence, people tend to overestimate their comparative standing when absolute standing is high and underestimate their comparative standing when absolute standing is low. The present research investigated a rational discounting explanation of this bias—namely, that people weight the target of the comparison (the self) more than the referent of the comparison (others) because they typically have more knowledge about the former than the latter. In three studies, we found that the tendency to focus on the target in social comparisons—and the over and underestimation of relative standing that tendency engenders—was reduced (but not eliminated) as people’s knowledge about the comparison group increased. These results suggest that there may be a rational side to egocentrism in social comparisons.     

Between a rock and a hard place: Damned if you do, damned if you don’t

Individuals are frequently forced to make decisions from among undesirable choice-sets. Raise taxes or cut social services? Lay off workers or go bankrupt? Go deep in debt or forgo a college education? The research presented here suggests that in such situations, decision-makers are often evaluated negatively regardless of the choice they make. In Experiment 1, participants read about a judge deciding which of two seemingly unfit parents to award sole custody in a real-life divorce case. In Experiment 2, participants were led to believe that their partner in the experiment was forced to pick one of two unpleasant tasks for the participant to perform. In both cases, the decision and decision-maker were evaluated negatively regardless of the alternative chosen–and regardless of the fact that they were the only options in the choice-set. Discussion focuses on the source, scope, and consequences of this phenomenon.     

The bias in the bias: Comparative optimism as a function of event social undesirability

We present a new event-level predictor of comparative optimism: comparative optimism is larger for more socially undesirable events. A meta-analysis shows that event social undesirability predicts comparative optimism effect sizes reported in the literature, over and above the effects of other known predictors. Four experiments corroborate this finding and demonstrate the key role played by respondents’ impression management motives. The effect of social undesirability decreases with stronger than usual anonymity assurances, increases with greater impression management tendencies, and reverses when people want to make a negative impression. Because social undesirability is correlated to other known predictors of comparative optimism (e.g., controllability, severity), it is important to take its effects into account when assessing the effect of other event characteristics. The current research adds to, and bridges, the literatures on event-level predictors and impression management in comparative optimism.     

Dispositional pessimism but not optimism is related to sickness absence caused by musculoskeletal symptoms

Musculoskeletal disorders account for a higher proportion of sickness absence from work in the European Union than any other health condition. The present study examined the associations between work environment, dispositional optimism/pessimism and medically certified sickness absence caused by musculoskeletal complaints in a sample of employees from the Norwegian Armed Forces (N = 1190, 77.5% men). Dispositional pessimism, but not optimism, predicted the amount of absence also when taking into account the effects of age and the work environment. Overall, our results support previous studies suggesting that pessimism is a more salient predictor of physical health than optimism. Our results also suggest that it may be beneficial for employers to combine medical treatment of musculoskeletal symptoms with psychological treatment targeting pessimistic outcome expectancies in order to reduce the amount of sickness absence.     

The role of egocentrism and focalism in the emotion intensity bias

People sometimes judge their emotions, preferences, and attitudes to be more intense than those of other people. Two experiments tested whether this emotion intensity bias in direct comparisons results from two non-motivated cognitive processes—egocentrism and focalism. In Study 1, the intensity bias was found even when comparing a friend’s preferences to peers. In Study 2, attention given to own versus other’s preferences, and the referent of the comparison (self or others) were manipulated. Results indicated that attention to others reduced the bias, presumably by reducing egocentrism. Consistent with focalism, the bias also emerged when a friend was the target of comparison, and the bias was eliminated when the self was the referent rather than the target of comparison. In the discussion, we evaluate these accounts in light of some alternative explanations for the intensity bias.     

A new measure for dispositional optimism and pessimism in young children

We describe here a new test for dispositional optimism and pessimism in young children, the Parent‐rated Life Orientation Test of children (the PLOT) and assess its psychometric properties. Two hundred and twenty one mother–father pairs rated their children's (mean age = 8.1, SD = 0.3 years) dispositional optimism and pessimism using a new scale, the PLOT, including four optimism and four pessimism items. We associated the PLOT with parent‐rated self‐esteem (Behavioral Rating Scale of Presented Self‐Esteem in Young Children), social competence (Social Competence and Behaviour Evaluation Scale, the SCBE‐30), psychiatric symptoms (Child Behaviour Checklist, the CBCL) and temperament (Children's Behaviour Questionnaire, the CBQ) of the child. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the mother‐ and father‐rated PLOT revealed a significantly better fit for a two‐ over a one‐factor solution (p < 0.001). The optimism and pessimism subscales displayed good reliabilities, inter‐parental agreement and modest to moderate associations, in the expected direction, with the measures of self‐esteem, social competence, temperament and behaviour problems. To conclude, the PLOT shows good construct and convergent validity and reliability. The findings encourage its use to assess early emerging generalized expectancies of positive and negative outcomes in young children. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The roles of dispositional optimism and pessimism in hiv disease progression

Relationships between dispositional optimism and pessimism and the course of HIV infection, determined by changes in viral load and CD4 counts, were studied in a longitudinal cohort of 412 patients on antiretroviral therapy (ART). Multiple regression analyses controlling for baseline levels of disease status, ethnicity, and depressive symptoms demonstrated that higher pessimism at baseline was associated with higher viral load at follow-up (average of 18 months later). Optimism at baseline had a curvilinear relationship with CD4 counts at follow-up. Moderate levels of optimism at baseline predicted the highest CD4 counts at follow-up. Although optimism and pessimism were associated with specific health behaviors (e.g., ART adherence, cigarette use, drug use, dietary practices), none of these behaviors mediated the optimism/pessimism effects. The biologic and behavioral mediators of associations of personality variables with the course of treated HIV infection deserve continued investigation.     

On the genesis of inflated (and deflated) judgments of responsibility

Prior research has found that people tend to overestimate their relative contribution to joint tasks [e.g., Ross, M., & Sicoly, F. (1979). Egocentric biases in availability and attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,37, 322–336]. The present research investigates one source of this bias, and in doing so, identifies an important moderator of the effect. Three studies demonstrate that when people estimate their relative contribution to collective endeavors they focus on their own contribution and give less consideration to the contribution of their collaborators. This can cause overestimation for tasks in which total contributions are plentiful, but underestimation for tasks in which total contributions are few—despite the fact that both tasks reflect positively on the person who performs them. These results extend Ross and Sicoly’s (1979) original analysis of bias in responsibility judgments, but also suggest that the tendency to overestimate one’s relative contribution to collaborations is not as ubiquitous as once thought.     

Comparative Optimism and Event Skewness

Comparative judgment biases—wherein a majority of people report being above‐ or below‐average in their abilities, traits, or future events—are a robust phenomenon in psychology. A recent explanation for these biases has focused on people's awareness that many comparative judgment domains form skewed distributions, and, hence, a majority of people can feasibly be above or below average. Indeed, this prior research found that comparative biases for abilities emerged more for skewed (vs. normal) distributions. In the current research, we attempted to (i) conceptually replicate this finding in a comparative likelihood context and (ii) provide evidence of an alternative explanation for the prior results. Replicating prior research, three correlational studies and one experimental study found that event skewness was related to direct comparative likelihood judgments for health events, such that comparative optimism emerged more for events judged or manipulated to come from positively skewed distributions than from negatively skewed distributions. However, event skewness was unrelated to indirect comparisons (absolute self minus absolute other). Moreover, consistent with an egocentric‐processes account, absolute self‐judgments were more predictive of direct comparisons than were absolute other judgments and showed the same association with event skewness as direct comparisons. Implications for explaining and interpreting comparative judgment biases are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Better in the (near) future: Group-based differences in forecasting biases

Social identities are an important component of an individual’s self-concept. In the current research, we examine how identification with a group can lead to biased intergroup judgments similar to those made when evaluating the self, relative to others. We compared evaluations of in- and outgroups in order to examine differences in temporal perspective and optimistic evaluations. Our findings suggest that compared to an outgroup, ingroup members more strongly consider the future potential of their group, are more optimistic when considering future ingroup outcomes, and hold a more uniformly positive view of an ingroup’s future. Furthermore, we find that when evaluating ingroups, shifts in temporal perspectives are related to greater optimism. We conclude by discussing theoretical implications and future research related to temporal judgments and social groups.     

Losing sight of oneself in the above-average effect: When egocentrism, focalism, and group diffuseness collide

Four experiments examined the relative influence of three causal processes in the above-average effect (AAE) and related comparative biases: (a) egocentrism, (b) focalism, and (c) referent group diffuseness. By manipulating the inclusion or exclusion of the self from the referent group (Experiments 1-3) or target group (Experiment 4), the relative contributions of each influence were assessed. In direct comparisons, single peers were systematically judged more favorably relative to groups including the self, suggesting that egocentrism plays a lesser role than focalism or group diffuseness. Thus, in response to the question such as “How friendly is Nancy compared to the rest of us?” the answer tends to be “More friendly.”     

Miserliness in human cognition: the interaction of detection,override and mindware

ABSTRACT

Humans are cognitive misers because their basic tendency is to default to processing mechanisms of low computational expense. Such a tendency leads to suboptimal outcomes in certain types of hostile environments. The theoretical inferences made from correct and incorrect responding on heuristics and biases tasks have been overly simplified, however. The framework developed here traces the complexities inherent in these tasks by identifying five processing states that are possible in most heuristics and biases tasks. The framework also identifies three possible processing defects: inadequately learned mindware; failure to detect the necessity of overriding the miserly response; and failure to sustain the override process once initiated. An important insight gained from using the framework is that degree of mindware instantiation is strongly related to the probability of successful detection and override. Thus, errors on such tasks cannot be unambiguously attributed to miserly processing – and correct responses are not necessarily the result of computationally expensive cognition.     

Examining the trade‐off between confidence and optimism in future forecasts

Confident business forecasters are seen as more credible and competent (“confidence heuristic”). We explored a boundary condition of this effect by examining how individuals react to the trade‐off between confidence and optimism. Using hypothetical scenarios, we examined this trade‐off from the perspectives of judges (i.e., business owners who hired analysts to make sales predictions) and forecasters (i.e., the analysts hired to make predictions). Participants were assigned to the role of either judges or forecasters and were asked to rate 2 potential forecasts. In the “no trade‐off” condition, the 2 forecasts were aligned in optimism and confidence (the more confident forecast was also more optimistic); in the “trade‐off” condition, the more confident forecast was less optimistic. In Experiment 1, judges were more likely to positively evaluate confident forecasters when confident forecasters were the more (vs. less) optimistic ones. Experiment 2 demonstrated that forecasters were aware of judges' preferences for optimism and strategically relied on methods that resulted in more optimistic (but less reliable) predictions. Experiment 3 directly compared the perspectives of judges and forecasters, revealing that forecasters overestimated judges' preferences for optimism over confidence. The present studies show that forecasters and judges have different views of the trade‐off between confidence and optimism and that forecasters may unnecessarily sacrifice accuracy for optimism.     

Real‐World Correlates of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks in a Community Sample

In the current study, we sought to examine whether performance on several heuristics and biases tasks and thinking dispositions was associated with real‐life correlates in a community sample of adults. We examined performance on five heuristics and biases tasks (ratio bias, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, cognitive reflection, probabilistic and statistical reasoning, and rational temporal discounting), three thinking dispositions (actively open‐minded thinking, future orientation, and avoidance of superstitious thinking), and a questionnaire assessing real‐world correlates in several domains (substance use, driving behavior, financial behavior, gambling behavior, electronic media use, and secure computing). Our heuristics and biases tasks and thinking disposition measures were modestly associated with several real‐world outcomes, including the domains of secure computing, financial behaviors, and the total scores. That is, better performance on the heuristics and biases measures was associated with fewer negative outcomes. We found that the associations were generally higher in males than in females. Heuristics and biases performance and thinking dispositions were unique predictors of real‐world outcomes after statistically controlling for educational attainment and sex differences. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Activating a mental simulation mind-set through generation of alternatives: Implications for debiasing in related and unrelated domains

Encouraging people to consider multiple alternatives appears to be a useful debiasing technique for reducing many biases (explanation, hindsight, and overconfidence), if the generation of alternatives is experienced as easy. The present research tests whether these alternative generation procedures induce a mental simulation mind-set (cf. Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), such that debiasing in one domain transfers to debias judgments in unrelated domains. The results indeed demonstrated that easy alternative generation tasks not only debiased judgments in the same domain but also generalized to debias judgments in unrelated domains, provided that participants were low in the need for structure. The alternative generation tasks (even when they were easy to perform) showed no evidence of activating a mental simulation mind-set in individuals high in need for structure, as these individuals displayed no transfer effects. Implications of the results for understanding the role of the need for structure, ease of generation, and mental simulation mind-set activation for debiasing are discussed.