Testing the limits of optimistic bias: event and person moderators in a multilevel framework

N. D. Weinstein (1980) established that optimistic bias, the tendency to see others as more vulnerable to risks than the self, varies across types of event. Subsequently, researchers have documented that this phenomenon, also known as comparative optimism, also varies across types of people. The authors integrate hypotheses originally advanced by Weinstein concerning event-characteristic moderators with later arguments that such optimism may be restricted to certain subgroups. Using multilevel modeling over 7 samples (N = 1,436), the authors found that some degree of comparative optimism was present for virtually all individuals and events. Holding other variables constant, higher perceived frequency and severity were associated with less comparative optimism, higher perceived controllability and stereotype salience with more comparative optimism. Frequency, controllability, and severity were associated more with self-risk than with average-other risk, whereas stereotype salience was associated more with average-other risk than with self-risk. Individual differences also mattered: comparative optimism was related negatively to anxiety and positively to defensiveness and self-esteem. Interaction results imply that both individual differences and event characteristics should jointly be considered in understanding optimistic bias (or comparative optimism) and its application to risk communication.     

Premise Acceptability and Message Effectiveness

Previous research shows inconsistent evidence in regard to gender differences in optimism for experiencing a happy marriage or avoiding divorce depending on whether optimism is measured as comparative optimism (thinking you are better off than your peers) or as personal optimism (estimating your own chances). Results from four samples of unmarried college students (N = 814) indicated that men exhibited greater comparative optimism than women for having a happy marriage but not for getting divorced. For having a happy marriage and avoiding divorce, men exhibited greater personal optimism relative to women. Experience (with parental divorce) moderated the gender difference in personal optimism and perceived control partially mediated the gender difference in comparative optimism (but only for having a happy marriage) and in personal optimism (for both having a happy marriage and avoiding divorce). Results are discussed as they relate to the existing literatures on risk perception and gender differences in romantic relationships.     

Comparative risk and perceived control: implications for psychological and physical well-being among older adults

As older adults become more susceptible to certain health crises, their preoccupation with their risk of suffering such events increases. Understanding the implications of risk perceptions is critical because they may have consequences for psychological and physical well-being in later life. In the present study of older adults living in the community, the authors examined participants' comparative risk estimates (CREs)--their perceptions of their own risk relative to a similar other's risk--of suffering a hip fracture. Using multiple regression analyses, the authors examined the role of CREs on psychological well-being (negative emotions, life satisfaction) and self-rated physical well-being (general physical health, recent physical health). The authors expected perceived control (PC) to moderate the relationship between CREs and well-being. The predicted interaction did occur: Among individuals with high PC, comparative optimism (perceiving a comparatively low risk) was associated with better psychological well-being (fewer negative emotions and greater life satisfaction) and better physical well-being (general and recent physical health) relative to comparative pessimism (perceiving a comparatively high risk). Among individuals with low PC, there were no differences in well-being between comparative optimists and comparative pessimists. These findings suggest that the protective effect of comparative optimism on well-being is limited to older adults who have a strong sense of control.     

Egocentrism, event frequency, and comparative optimism: when what happens frequently is "more likely to happen to me"

Three studies investigated the role of nonmotivated egocentric processes in comparative optimism (and pessimism). According to an egocentric-processes account, when people judge their comparative likelihood of experiencing an event (e.g., "Compared to the average person, how likely are you to become wealthy?"), they consider their own chances of experiencing the event more so than the referent's chances. This should produce higher comparative estimates when an event's absolute frequency is high rather than low-a prediction supported in Study 1, which manipulated event frequency through a novel, time frame manipulation. Study 2 empirically distinguished egocentrism from a related focalism account. In Study 3, comparative estimates were related to the perceived frequency of events, independent of the events' perceived desirability and controllability. Path analyses provided additional support for egocentrism, and systematic cases of comparative pessimism were observed as predicted by the egocentric-processes account.     

Unrealistic optimism about future life events: a cautionary note

A robust finding in social psychology is that people judge negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to the average person, a behavior interpreted as showing that people are "unrealistically optimistic" in their judgments of risk concerning future life events. However, we demonstrate how unbiased responses can result in data patterns commonly interpreted as indicative of optimism for purely statistical reasons. Specifically, we show how extant data from unrealistic optimism studies investigating people's comparative risk judgments are plagued by the statistical consequences of sampling constraints and the response scales used, in combination with the comparative rarity of truly negative events. We conclude that the presence of such statistical artifacts raises questions over the very existence of an optimistic bias about risk and implies that to the extent that such a bias exists, we know considerably less about its magnitude, mechanisms, and moderators than previously assumed.     

Are comparative risk judgements consistent across time and events?

Research reveals pervasive optimism in people's comparative risk judgements such that people believe they are less likely than others to experience negative events. Two studies explored the extent to which people are consistent in their comparative risk judgements across time and events. Both studies found strong evidence for consistency across time and some evidence for consistency across events. The consistency across time and events was moderated by experience. Specifically, when viewed together, the studies suggest that experience produces an initial decrease in the consistency of comparative judgements (Study 2), followed by greater consistency in subsequent judgements (Study 1). The discussion focuses on reconciling evidence demonstrating consistency with evidence demonstrating variability.     

The bias in the bias: Comparative optimism as a function of event social undesirability

We present a new event-level predictor of comparative optimism: comparative optimism is larger for more socially undesirable events. A meta-analysis shows that event social undesirability predicts comparative optimism effect sizes reported in the literature, over and above the effects of other known predictors. Four experiments corroborate this finding and demonstrate the key role played by respondents’ impression management motives. The effect of social undesirability decreases with stronger than usual anonymity assurances, increases with greater impression management tendencies, and reverses when people want to make a negative impression. Because social undesirability is correlated to other known predictors of comparative optimism (e.g., controllability, severity), it is important to take its effects into account when assessing the effect of other event characteristics. The current research adds to, and bridges, the literatures on event-level predictors and impression management in comparative optimism.     

When and why people are comparatively optimistic about future health risks: The role of direct and indirect comparison measures

The goal of the current research was to test whether direct versus indirect measures of comparative optimism yield different results as a function of health risk severity and prevalence. A random-digit sample of community residents (N?=?259) responded to interview questions about perceived vulnerability using both direct (i.e. self-to-peer risk) and indirect comparison measures (i.e. separate questions about self and peer risk). Responses to direct comparison measures were more affected by prevalence, whereas indirect comparison measures were more affected by severity. These results may offer guidance to researchers and practitioners about when it may be more appropriate to use direct versus indirect measures of comparative health risk.     

Perceptual negativity predicts greater reactivity to negative events in daily life

Reinforcement sensitivity theory includes the idea that people differ in their sensitivity to negative events, but relevant process-based assessments have not been developed. The present studies assessed sensitivity to negative events in terms of the extent to which negative word stimuli were perceived to be larger than neutral word stimuli. There was a general tendency to overestimate the size of negative relative to neutral words, but individuals differed substantially in this form of what is termed perceptual negativity. Of more importance, two studies (total N = 151) found systematic relationships between individual differences in perceptual negativity and reactivity to negative events in daily diary protocols. Study 1 found that within-person variations in the occurrence of daily negative events undermined goal-related optimism to a greater extent at higher, relative to lower, levels of perceptual negativity. Study 2 conceptually replicated this interaction in the context of within-person associations between the occurrence of daily negative events and antisocial behavior. These findings are important in advancing reinforcement sensitivity theory, in operationalizing a particular component of it, and in extending it to reactivity processes in daily life.     

Comparative optimism for severity of negative health outcomes

People tend to be comparatively optimistic (i.e., believe that negative outcomes are less likely for themselves than for typical others) regarding their susceptibility to negative health outcomes. The present study investigates the extent to which perceptions of the severity of these health outcomes show similar comparative optimism. A student sample (study 1; N = 200) and a healthy non-student adult sample (study 2; N = 257) completed self-report measures of susceptibility, severity, worry, control and experience in relation to negative health outcomes. Participants in both studies demonstrated significant levels of comparative optimism for both perceived likelihood and severity of health outcomes. Comparative optimism concerning severity was very strongly associated (r = 0.85 to 0.89) with comparative optimism concerning susceptibility. In addition to being comparatively optimistic over their chances of experiencing negative health outcomes, people are also comparatively optimistic regarding how severe the health outcomes will be.     

被动性社交网站使用与错失焦虑症：压力知觉的中介与乐观的调节

本研究为考察被动性社交网站使用对移动社交媒体环境下大学生错失焦虑症的预测,以及压力知觉的中介作用、乐观的调节作用与性别差异,选取443名大学生进行问卷调查。结果表明：（1）被动性社交网站使用通过直接预测与压力知觉的中介作效应两种方式作用于错失焦虑症;（2）乐观调节中介模型的直接路径,在低乐观水平下,被动性社交网站使用对错失焦虑症的预测作用显著;在高乐观水平下,该预测作用不显著;（3）中介效应与调节效应存在性别差异：在女生群体中,压力知觉的中介效应大于男生群体;而乐观的调节效应仅存在于男生群体中。     

Biases in social comparisons: Optimism or pessimism?

Social comparisons typically lead to two kinds of biases: A comparative optimism bias (i.e., a tendency for people to view themselves as more likely than others to be the beneficiaries of positive outcomes) or a comparative pessimism bias (i.e., a tendency for people to view themselves as less likely than others to be such beneficiaries); rarely are people fully calibrated in terms of how they compare to others. However, there is little systematic research on the factors that determine when a comparative optimism versus pessimism bias will occur, how they can be attenuated and whether such attenuation is always desirable. In this paper, we report four studies which demonstrate the following key results: First, we show that perceived level of control over the outcome drives whether a comparative optimism or pessimism bias will occur (Study 1). Second, an increase in perceived similarity between self and a comparison target person attenuates the comparative optimism bias in domains that people view as highly controllable (Study 2a) and attenuates the comparative pessimism bias in domains that people view as less controllable (Study 2b). Finally, we show that people are willing to work harder when they experience more comparative optimism in higher control scenarios and when they experience less comparative pessimism in lower control scenarios, illustrating that motivating people to strive harder for positive outcomes can result from exacerbated or attenuated bias, depending on the context (Study 3).     

Egocentrism and focalism in unrealistic optimism (and pessimism)

People tend to overestimate their comparative likelihood of experiencing a rosy future. The present research suggests that one reason for this error is that when people compare their likelihood of experiencing an event with that of the average person, they focus on their own chances of experiencing the event and insufficiently consider the likelihood of the average person experiencing the event. As a consequence, people tend to think that they are more likely than the average person to experience common events and less likely than the average person to experience rare events. This causes unrealistic optimism in the case of common desirable events and rare undesirable events, but unrealistic pessimism in the case of rare desirable events and common undesirable events (Studies 1 and 2). Study 2 further suggests that both egocentrism and focalism underlie these biases. These results suggest that unrealistic optimism is not as ubiquitous as once thought.     

What do people think about when answering questionnaires to assess unrealistic optimism about skin cancer? A think aloud study

There is little information concerning what people think about when completing questionnaires that assess perceptions of risk, and even less for questionnaires assessing unrealistic optimism. The thoughts of 40 participants who displayed unrealistic optimism about risks of skin cancer were elicited using think aloud methods, when completing both direct and indirect ratings of unrealistic optimism. The most common thoughts overall concerned exposure to the sun, and features such as skin colouring. Thoughts concerning prevalence, reasons for risky behaviour and admissions of ignorance were more common for indirect measures of unrealistic optimism than for direct measures. The direct unrealistic optimism measures yielded more optimistic ratings for those participants who did not mention symptoms or signs of skin damage, and those who mentioned thoughts about prevalence. Participants seem to be drawing upon different sources of information when completing superficially similar direct and indirect measures of unrealistic optimism, which may explain why these measures are usually only modestly associated. People do not seem to think about numerical probabilities when estimating risk, but instead appear to focus on issues such as exposure to risk, and concrete bodily symptoms and signs. This may at least partially explain why attempts to influence behaviour by providing probabilistic information are generally unsuccessful.     

Risk perception as a function of risk exposure amongst rock climbers

ObjectivesThe first objective was to examine the extent to which climbers' climbing safety perceived competence (CSPC) and perceived own absolute (POAR) and comparative (PCR) risk of getting seriously injured whilst climbing is related to risk exposure. The second objective was to examine which variables influence POAR and PCR.MethodTwo hundred and thirty-five climbers (M = 32, SD = 10.2 years of age) completed the following questionnaires: a CSPC scale specifically developed to assess perceived ability to practice climbing safely; indirect measures of PCR, consisting in the subtraction of the participants' assessment of their own risks from their assessment of other climbing referents' risks; and the Life Orientation Test-Revised, measuring dispositional optimism (DO). Participants were approached in their practices sites from Mediterranean regions, and were divided into groups based on their climbing practice's risk exposure; that is, high risk: traditional climbing (TRAD; n = 42); moderate risk: leading (LEAD; n = 89); and low risk: either top-roping (TOP; n = 51) or indoor bouldering (IND; n = 53).ResultsAnalyses of variance showed that TRAD expressed higher CSPC and higher POAR than the other groups. PCR also differed amongst the groups. More specifically, TRAD expressed comparative pessimism and LEAD expressed comparative optimism, as their POAR was, respectively, higher and lower than their perceived average climber's risk. TOP and IND perceived their own risk in a similar way to that of the average climber. Regression analyses showed that DO did not influence POAR or PCR. Past injury episode was positively related to POAR and negatively related to the propensity to express comparative optimism, though only amongst TRAD and LEAD.ConclusionsClimbers' risk perception accurately reflected their risk exposure. Climbers whose climbing modality involves higher risks acknowledged so when evaluating their own absolute and comparative risks of getting seriously injured whilst climbing.     

A pessimistic view of optimistic belief updating

Received academic wisdom holds that human judgment is characterized by unrealistic optimism, the tendency to underestimate the likelihood of negative events and overestimate the likelihood of positive events. With recent questions being raised over the degree to which the majority of this research genuinely demonstrates optimism, attention to possible mechanisms generating such a bias becomes ever more important. New studies have now claimed that unrealistic optimism emerges as a result of biased belief updating with distinctive neural correlates in the brain. On a behavioral level, these studies suggest that, for negative events, desirable information is incorporated into personal risk estimates to a greater degree than undesirable information (resulting in a more optimistic outlook). However, using task analyses, simulations, and experiments we demonstrate that this pattern of results is a statistical artifact. In contrast with previous work, we examined participants’ use of new information with reference to the normative, Bayesian standard. Simulations reveal the fundamental difficulties that would need to be overcome by any robust test of optimistic updating. No such test presently exists, so that the best one can presently do is perform analyses with a number of techniques, all of which have important weaknesses. Applying these analyses to five experiments shows no evidence of optimistic updating. These results clarify the difficulties involved in studying human ‘bias’ and cast additional doubt over the status of optimism as a fundamental characteristic of healthy cognition.     

The psychological costs of painless but recurring experiences of racial discrimination

When studying discrimination, it is important to examine both perceived frequency and stress associated with these experiences, as well as the interplay between these two dimensions. Using data from Latino/a participants (N = 168), we found an interaction effect of the reported frequency and reported stressfulness of discrimination on psychological distress (depression and anxiety), such that frequency predicted greater psychological distress for low-stress events, but high-stress events were associated with greater distress regardless of frequency. In addition, using the constructs of "stated" and "derived" stressfulness, we found that the frequency of experiences of discrimination that were rated as less stressful were, in fact, correlated with greater psychological distress. Discrimination events not experienced as stressful nonetheless may have negative implications for the target, especially if they occur frequently.     

Heart attack risk perception biases among hypertension patients: the role of educational level and worry

Risk biases such as comparative optimism (thinking one is better off than similar others) and risk inaccuracy (misestimating one's risk compared to one's calculated risk) for health outcomes are common. Little research has investigated racial or socioeconomic differences in these risk biases. Results from a survey of individuals with poorly controlled hypertension (N=813) indicated that participants showed (1) comparative optimism for heart attack risk by underestimating their heart attack risk compared to similar others, and (2) risk inaccuracy by overestimating their heart attack risk compared to their calculated heart attack risk. More highly educated participants were more comparatively optimistic because they rated their personal risk as lower; education was not related to risk inaccuracy. Neither race nor the federal poverty level was related to risk biases. Worry partially mediated the relationship between education and personal risk. Results are discussed as they relate to the existing literature on risk perception.     

Why It Can't Happen to Me: The Base Rate Matters,But Overestimating Skill Leads to Underestimating Risk1

Undergraduates (N = 330) estimated their risk for aversive events (e.g., motor vehicle accident), in which we varied personal control (e.g., driver = self or other) and bogus base rates (high vs. low). Base rate data influenced risk estimates, but people underestimated their risk if they were the agent (e.g., the driver) rather than if another person was the agent. Justifications for estimates suggested that the base rate was perceived to be the risk for the average person. Most people then adjusted their estimates for a negative outcome downward because they believed that they were better than average on a skill (e.g., driving skill) that was perceived to be causally related to the event.     

Risk perception and behavior: Pessimism,realism, and optimism about aids-related health behavior

Abstract

This study investigates the perceived risk of becoming infected with HIV for heterosexuals with multiple sexual partners, examines cognitive and motivational antecedents of biases in risk perception, and relates these biases to behavior. We obtained a moderate degree of optimism in a longitudinal study based on a sample of 535 visitors of a STD clinic. Further analyses—after classifying subjects as “pessimists”, “realists”, or “optimists”—revealed that pessimists were extremely pessimistic and optimists remarkably optimistic. Optimism increased with perceived control and decreased with prior experience, supporting a cognitive explanation of optimism. The data also provided some support for a motivational explanation: optimists who scored higher on a defensive coping style were more optimistic about their risks. Contrary to other findings, we found a positive relation between optimism and intentions to reduce risks. Furthermore, results revealed that optimists showed lower levels of subsequent behavioral risk. It was concluded that optimists were not unrealistically optimistic about their personal vulnerability. but rather that pessimists were unrealistically pessimistic. Previous behavior was found to be the best predictor of subsequent behavior. Although measures of perceived risk were also related to subsequent behavior, their predictive power was rather modest.