When message tailoring backfires: The role of initial attitudes in affect–cognition matching

This research explores when and how tailoring messages to attitudinal bases backfires. Study 1 demonstrated that for attitudes (toward education subsidies) that were based more on beliefs than emotions, recipients whose initial attitudes were incongruent with the message position (i.e., message opponents) showed mismatching effects, such that the affective message was more persuasive than the cognitive message. Study 2 replicated these mismatching effects among message opponents for attitudes (toward a rival university) that were primarily affective. Study 3 controlled for effects of initial attitude certainty and replicated the mismatching effects of Study 2 for affective attitudes toward an increase in tuition. Finally, Study 4 suggested a potential mechanism for mismatching effects, revealing that for attitudes (toward an online course management system) that were based more on beliefs than emotions, message opponents counter‐argued with the cognitive appeal more intensely than the affective appeal. Contrary to the notion in the extant literature that mismatching effects are relatively rare compared with matching effects, the current research suggests that mismatching effects occur for both primarily affective and cognitive attitudes when the recipient is highly opposed to the message position. The present findings also demonstrate the utility of examining attitudinal bases at the object level in the context of message tailoring. Implications for message tailoring and for affective versus cognitive attitudes are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Off‐Target? Changing Cognitive‐Based Attitudes

Researchers argue that the effectiveness of cognitive versus affective persuasive appeals depends in part on whether the appeal is congruent or incongruent with a primarily cognitive or affective attitude base. However, considerable research suggests that these persuasion effects may hold only for predominantly affective attitudes and not cognitive attitudes. Indeed, results of Experiment 1 show that the relative effectiveness of congruent relative to incongruent persuasion appeals holds for brands with predominantly affective associations, but not those with predominantly cognitive associations. Experiment 2 explores one reason for this anomalous finding: Cognitive attitudes may be relatively impervious to persuasive appeals because the probability of targeting the specific attribute on which the cognitive attitude is based is smaller. The results are supportive, showing that significant persuasion effects are found when the specific beliefs on which cognitive attitudes are based are taken into account. However, these effects only occur under conditions of low cognitive load and not high cognitive load where resources for the cognitive processing of the appeals are limited. We discuss the implications of the research for the role of attitude structure in understanding persuasion effects and the interplay of affective and cognitive elements in persuasion processes.     

Is affective material in attitudes more accessible than cognitive material? The moderating role of attitude basis

Verplanken, Hofstee, and Janssen (1998) found that the affective component of attitude is accessed more readily than the cognitive. Three studies further examined these findings in the light of two competing explanations: affective primacy, which states that emotional material is inherently more accessible than cognitive; and evaluative primacy, which states that emotional material is more accessible only if it is inherently more evaluative or supports the overall evaluative basis of attitude. Study 1 measured the accessibility of cognitive and affective traits while equalizing the evaluative nature of these traits. This study found a speed advantage for affective traits, but the attitude objects in this study turned out to be mainly affectively based. Studies 2 and 3, using a mixture of affectively and cognitively based objects, found that the speed advantage for affective terms was only found among affectively based objects; Study 3 also found a speed advantage for cognitive terms among cognitively based objects, and additionally found that individual differences in attitude basis explained part of this interaction. Collectively, these studies show that while affective material may be accessed more quickly than cognitive, this is most true when overall evaluation is based on affect rather than cognition. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personality and strength-related attitude dimensions: Between and within-person relationships

Examined personality variables as predictors and moderators of strength-related attitude dimensions (SRAD) using multilevel modeling. Results revealed significant person-level variation in attitude importance, extremity, and ambivalence across attitude objects. Study 1 found the personality variable of need to evaluate (NE) predicted extremity across attitude objects, and finding meaning in life (ML) was predictive of importance across objects. Study 2 revealed that neuroticism and state anxiety were significant predictors of ambivalence across attitude objects. Finally, the NE, the Need for Cognition, and Openness to Experience each moderated the within-person relationship between extremity and ambivalence across objects, with higher values on the individual difference variables being related to stronger within-person relationships. Implications for research on attitude strength and the relationships between personality variables and attitudes are discussed.     

Sometimes stories sell: When are narrative appeals most likely to work?

Research has demonstrated that narratives can be effective in eliciting attitude change, especially when recipients become transported into the narrative. In three studies, we addressed whether some people are predisposed to be influenced by narratives and whether narrative and rhetorical appeals are differentially effective for different people. In Study 1, participants read an experimental or a control narrative, and completed measures of attitudes, need for affect (NFA), need for cognition (NFC), transportation, and transportability. The results revealed that NFA and NFC were positively correlated with transportation and transportability. In Study 2, participants read either a narrative appeal or a rhetorical appeal about cervical cancer and completed a measure of attitudes and the individual difference constructs. Study 3 was a replication of Study 2 using a different topic (organ donation). In both studies, the results revealed a consistent pattern of correlations among the individual difference measures. Further, we found that although the narrative and rhetorical appeals were judged to be of equal efficacy, the persuasiveness of the narrative appeal differed as function of individual differences in NFA and NFC. The implications for narrative persuasion are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining the Attitude–Behavior Relationship in Prosocial Donation Domains

Positive attitudes have been identified across prosocial donation domains, but have not translated into a stable donor base. One explanation for this attitude‐behavior inconsistency is a failure to consider the affective and cognitive components of attitude. Studies were conducted to examine vested interest as a moderator of the attitude–behavior relationship in donation, while accounting for the multidimensional construction of attitude. Study 1 revealed a 3‐factor structure (stake, salience, self‐efficacy) for vested interest. Study 2 found no support for vested interest as a moderator of the attitude–behavior relationship, but revealed that self‐efficacy mediated the relationship between attitudes and behaviors for organ/tissue and blood donation. Results are discussed in terms of the usefulness of this research in crafting donation campaigns.     

Should persuasion be affective or cognitive? The moderating effects of need for affect and need for cognition

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that need for affect and need for cognition influence receptivity to affect- and cognition-based persuasive messages. Experiment 1 found that an affective message elicited more positive attitudes among individuals high in need for affect and low in need for cognition, whereas a cognitive message elicited more positive attitudes among individuals low in need for affect and high in need for cognition. Experiment 2 found that individual differences in need for affect influenced receptivity to an affect-based (but not cognition-based) message, whereas individual differences in need for cognition influenced receptivity to a cognition-based (but not affect-based) message. Experiment 3 found that individual differences in need for affect were associated with increased recognition of information from an affect-based (but not cognition-based) message, whereas individual differences in need for cognition were associated with increased recognition of information from a cognition-based (but not affect-based) message. Overall, the studies point to the importance of individual differences in need for affect and need for cognition in understanding how individuals respond to different types of persuasive messages.     

Individual differences in sensitivity to reward and punishment predict moral judgment

Dual process models of moral judgment propose that such judgments are produced by interacting neural systems: a controlled cognitive system and an automatic affective system. Individual differences in moral judgment may therefore arise from variation in cognitive control ability and/or from variation in affective sensitivity. Previous research indicates that individual differences in cognitive control, indexed by working memory capacity, predict moral judgment (Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). Here we replicate group level findings from Moore et al. (2008) and demonstrate that individual differences in sensitivity to reward and punishment are strong predictors of moral judgment. Higher reward sensitivity positively correlates with willingness to sacrifice one life to save multiple others and moderates the impact of self-interest on participants’ judgments. Higher punishment sensitivity negatively correlates with willingness to kill, particularly when negative affective information is present. These results help to revise current dual process models of moral judgment.     

Tracing Attitude Expressions: An Eye‐Tracking Study

Attitudes represent object evaluations, comprising complex underlying cognitive and affective knowledge structures. When people are asked to judge an object, they can use their primary response (i.e., the immediate object‐evaluation linkage) or underlying affective and cognitive knowledge structures. In many situations, a primary response satisfices, but if not, more elaboration is required. Both processes are fundamentally different but may lead to the same attitude. For monitoring underlying processes during attitude expression, we developed an innovative eye‐tracking procedure using eye‐gaze on response scale options. This procedure was applied in three studies to identify the extent to which elaboration differs for attitude objects with weak or strong, univalent or mixed object evaluations (i.e., univalent, neutral and ambivalent). In Study 1, the overall judgment preceded processing of more specific affective and cognitive linkage evaluations. In Studies 2 and 3, the order was reversed, and affective and cognitive bases were assessed prior to overall attitude outcomes. For attitude objects with strong univalent or strong mixed object evaluations, we found similar outcomes on underlying processes. For weak object evaluations, cognition was found to be more predictive and easily accessible if an overall judgment was required first; affect for these objects was more predictive if people had to elaborate on affect and cognition first. We concluded that both affective and cognitive attitudes may require substantial elaboration, albeit in different situations. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Job emotions and job cognitions as determinants of job satisfaction: The moderating role of individual differences in need for affect

Research has shown that job satisfaction is determined by both cognitions about the job and affect at work. However, findings from basic and applied attitude research suggest that the extent to which attitudes are based on affective and cognitive information is contingent on stable individual differences, in particular need for affect. Based on current conceptualizations of job satisfaction as an attitude toward the job, we hypothesized that job satisfaction depends more on affect and less on cognitions, the higher a person's need for affect is. To test these hypotheses, we conducted two correlational studies (N = 194 university employees; N = 134 employees from various organizations) as well as an experimental study (N = 191 university employees) in which the salience of positive versus negative job cognitions was varied. Results supported our hypotheses. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of these differences in affective and cognitive underpinnings of job satisfaction.     

Affective and cognitive meta-bases of attitudes: Unique effects on information interest and persuasion

The authors investigated the predictive utility of people's subjective assessments of whether their evaluations are affect- or cognition driven (i.e., meta-cognitive bases) as separate from whether people's attitudes are actually affect- or cognition based (i.e., structural bases). Study 1 demonstrated that meta-bases uniquely predict interest in affective versus cognitive information above and beyond structural bases and other related variables (i.e., need for cognition and need for affect). In Study 2, meta-bases were shown to account for unique variance in attitude change as a function of appeal type. Finally, Study 3 showed that as people became more deliberative in their judgments, meta-bases increased in predictive utility, and structural bases decreased in predictive utility. These findings support the existence of meta-bases of attitudes and demonstrate that meta-bases are distinguishable from structural bases in their predictive utility.     

I am against us? Unpacking cultural differences in ingroup favoritism via dialecticism

The authors proposed a novel explanation for cultural differences in ingroup favoritism (dialecticism) and tested this hypothesis across cultures/ethnicities, domains, and levels of analysis (explicit vs. implicit, cognitive vs. affective). Dialecticism refers to the cognitive tendency to tolerate contradiction and is more frequently found among East Asian than North American cultures. In Study 1, Chinese were significantly less positive, compared to European Americans, in their explicit judgments of family members. Study 2 investigated ingroup attitudes among Chinese, Latinos, and European Americans. Only Chinese participants showed significant in-group derogation, relative to the other groups, and dialecticism (Dialectical Self Scale) was associated with participants' in group attitudes. Study 3 manipulated dialectical versus linear lay beliefs; participants primed with dialecticism showed more negative, explicit ingroup attitudes. Although ingroup disfavoring tendencies were more prevalent among Chinese across studies, they may be a reflection of one's culturally based lay beliefs rather than deep-rooted negative feelings toward one's ingroup.     

Exploring the Attitudinal Structure of Partisanship

This study examined the structure of attitudes toward the political party an individual primarily identifies with and attitudes toward the other party with an emphasis on differentiating between the cognitive and affective components. Participants responded to a telephone survey that included measures of party identification, partisan attitudes, political information involvement activities, and voting behavior. Results indicated attitudes toward the parties were a function of both cognitive and affective components, although strong partisans had an attitudinal structure characterized as having a stronger cognitive component. Strong partisans were more polarized in their attitudes across parties. In addition, individuals with more cognitive‐affective ambivalence toward their own parties were less likely to vote, and their votes were less likely to be along party lines.     

Ideology is related to basic cognitive processes involved in attitude formation

Ideological orientation shapes the perception of the social world and conservatism is associated to an increased weighting of negative over positive information. In the present work we explored how this ideology-based difference is also related to basic cognitive processes involved in attitude formation. In particular, we hypothesized that conservatives, as compared to liberals, would show stronger illusory correlation effects when negative information is relatively infrequent. In Study 1 we employed the typical illusory correlation paradigm (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) and results confirmed the hypothesis: conservatives developed more negative impressions toward the minority group and showed consistent memory biases. In Study 2, positive information represented the infrequent dimension and in this case no ideology-based difference was observed. Overall, findings indicate that when exposed to numerically different novel groups and negative behaviors are infrequent, illusory correlation effects are accentuated among individuals embracing conservative rather than liberal views of the world. This result may help to understand why conservatives tend to form more negative attitudes toward social minorities.     

Relations between implicit and explicit measures of attitudes and measures of behavior: evidence of moderation by individual difference variables

The moderating role of individual difference variables (Self-Reported Habit Index [SRHI], Need for Cognition [NFC]) on relationships between implicit (Implicit Association Test [IAT], Extrinsic Affective Simon Test [EAST]) or explicit measures of attitude and behavior is assessed in two studies. A dissociation pattern is found on self-report diary measures of behavior. In Study 1, the EAST-behavior relationship is moderated by SRHI; explicit measures of the attitude-behavior relationship are moderated by NFC. In Study 2, the IAT-behavior relationship is moderated by SRHI; explicit measures of the attitude-behavior relationship are moderated by NFC. Higher levels of SRHI and NFC are associated with stronger relationships between the implicit or explicit measures of attitude and the measure of behavior. In Study 2, the SRHI x IAT interaction is replicated for an objective behavior measure. Implications for understanding the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of attitudes and measures of behavior are discussed.     

Accessibility of affective versus cognitive components of attitudes

Four studies investigated differences in accessibility of affective and cognitive components of attitudes. Accessibility was measured by response times on bipolar semantic differential evaluative adjectives (e.g. ‘positive–negative’) in response to how one felt and thought, respectively, about an attitude object. The evaluative items were accompanied by affective and cognitive context items, which were not analysed, but were meant to promote the retrieval of affective and cognitive evaluations respectively. Responses to affective evaluations were given faster than responses to cognitive evaluations, suggesting that affect-based evaluations are more accessible in memory than cognition-based evaluations. The results were obtained in two attitude domains, i.e. brand names and countries. The results support the validity of a two-component affect–cognition model of attitude. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Changing exercise through targeting affective or cognitive attitudes

Two studies investigated the impact of affective and cognitive messages compared to a no-message control on self-reported exercise. Students (Study 1, N = 383 and Study 2, N = 197) were randomly allocated to one of the three conditions (control - no message, affective message or cognitive message). Participants completed questionnaire measures tapping components of the theory of planned behaviour in relation to exercise and reported their level of exercise (3 weeks later). In Study 2, measures of need for affect (NFA) and need for cognition (NFC) were also completed. Results showed that affective messages consistently produced greater increases in self-reported level of exercise than the other conditions. In both studies, this effect was partly mediated by affective attitude change. Study 2 indicated these effects to be significantly stronger among those high in NFA or low in NFC. These findings indicate the value of affective messages that target affective attitudes in changing exercise behaviour.     

Understanding Public Attitudes Toward Tobacco Harm Reduction: The Role of Attitude Structure1

The present research examines whether and to what extent the underlying structure of attitudes toward harm reduction and specific reduced‐exposure products contributes to an understanding of public attitudes toward harm reduction. Past research has focused on the extent to which some attitude objects are primarily affective or cognitive. Using survey data from a 5‐state Upper Midwest sample, we tested the relevance of 4 pertinent properties of attitudes for predicting overall attitudes toward tobacco harm reduction: affective and cognitive bases of attitudes; knowledge; experience with smoking and reduced‐harm products; and affective/cognitive consistency. We found that feelings about harm reduction are most predictive of overall attitudes toward harm reduction and specific reduced‐harm products. Theoretical and policy implications are discussed.     

Cognitive and affective matching effects in persuasion: an amplification perspective

Past research suggests that cognitive and affective attitudes are more open to change toward cognitive and affective (i.e., matched) persuasive attacks, respectively. The present research investigates how attitude certainty influences this openness. Although an extensive literature suggests that certainty generally reduces an attitude's openness to change, the authors explore the possibility that certainty might increase an attitude's openness to change in the context of affective or cognitive appeals. Based on the recently proposed amplification hypothesis, the authors posit that high (vs. low) attitude certainty will boost the resistance of attitudes to mismatched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by cognitive messages) but boost the openness of attitudes to matched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by affective messages). Two experiments provide support for this hypothesis. Implications for increasing the openness of attitudes to both matched and mismatched attacks are discussed.     

The impact of affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation

We examined the effects of unobtrusive affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation. To induce focus, participants worked on a word-search puzzle consisting of either affective (e.g., emotion) or cognitive (e.g., reasoning) words. They then read positive and negative affective and cognitive information about a new attitude object. In the affective focus condition, evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the affective information than they were in the cognitive focus condition, where evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the cognitive information than they were in the affective focus condition. Affective focus also resulted in enhanced recall of affective information. The effects on evaluations remained stable over time, whereas effects on memory disappeared. Finally, affective focus was associated with faster response times, suggesting enhanced accessibility of affect-based attitudes. The present research shows that an affective or cognitive focus leads to the formation of different attitudes.