异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策的风险偏好

使用中国文化背景下修订的Beisswanger等人的异性交友决策问卷, 采用2种方法操纵自我-他人心理距离, 考察了男女大学生在后果严重性不同的异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策风险偏好的差异。实验1发现, 被试为具体和笼统他人决策时的风险偏好无显著差异, 在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。心理距离与决策者性别的交互作用显著：男性为具体他人决策更冒险, 而女性为笼统他人决策更冒险。实验2发现, 被试为不相似他人比为相似他人决策更冒险, 在后果不严重任务上比在后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。后果严重性与决策者性别交互作用显著：男性在后果严重和不严重任务上的风险偏好无显著差异, 而女性在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险。综合两个实验的结果, 可以得出以下结论：相对于具体和笼统他人的区分而言, 相似和不相似他人的区分是一种更加稳定和有效的区分自我-他人心理距离的方法。结合相关研究及理论对结果进行了讨论。     

Social comparison,coping and depression in people with spinal cord injury

The present study among 70 people with spinal cord injury examined the prevalence and correlates of identification (seeing others as a potential future) and contrast (seeing others in competitive terms) in social comparison as related to coping and depression. The most prevalent social comparison strategy was downward contrast (a positive response to seeing others who were worse-off), followed by upward identification (a positive response to perceiving better-off others as a potential future), downward identification (a negative response to perceiving worse-off others as a potential future), and upward contrast (a negative response to seeing others who were better-off). Those with less severe lesions reported the highest levels of upward contrast, coping through blaming others, and depression. Downward contrast was particularly related to constructive coping, and upward identification to wishful thinking. The less adaptive social comparison strategies, i.e., upward contrast and downward identification, were quite strongly related to wishful thinking and blaming others. Particularly upward contrast, i.e., feeling bad as response to seeing that others are better-off, was related to depression.     

Confusions of self with close others

This article explores the cognitive underpinnings of interpersonal closeness in the theoretical context of "including other in the self" and, specifically, the notion of overlap between cognitive representations of self and close others. In each of three studies, participants first rated different traits for self, close others (e.g., romantic partner, best friend), and less close others (e.g., media personalities), followed by a surprise source recognition task (who was each trait rated for?). As predicted, in each study, there were more source confusions between traits rated for self and close others (e.g., a trait rated for self recalled as having been rated for the close other) than between self (or close others) and non-close others. Furthermore, several results suggest that the greater confusions between self and close others are due specifically to interpersonal closeness and not to greater familiarity or similarity with close others     

Causal attributions and blame: associations with mothers' adjustment to the birth of a child with Down syndrome

The main purpose of this study is to explore the associations between causal attributions to others, blaming others and mothers' adjustment to the birth of a child with Down syndrome (DS). Participants (n?=?214) rated causal attributions to others and blaming others, and completed five measures of adjustment: anger, anxiety, depression, parenting stress, and attitudes towards the child. The adjustment of three groups of mothers was compared: (i) those who made no attributions to others (ii) those who made causal attributions but did not blame, and (iii) those who blamed others. Four years after the births of their children with DS, 16% of mothers blamed others and 17% made causal attributions but did not blame others for this outcome. Those who blamed others had higher levels of anger, anxiety, depression, parenting stress and more negative attitudes towards their children with DS than did those who made causal attributions but did not blame, and those who made who made no attributions to others. The adjustment of the latter two groups did not differ. Investigating blame rather than causal attributions may be a more fruitful area for future research aimed at understanding and facilitating adjustment to illness and other negative life events.     

Social connection enables dehumanization

Being socially connected has considerable benefits for oneself, but may have negative consequences for evaluations of others. In particular, being socially connected to close others satisfies the need for social connection, and creates disconnection from more distant others. We therefore predicted that feeling socially connected would increase the tendency to dehumanize more socially distant others. Four experiments support this prediction. Those led to feel socially connected were less likely to attribute humanlike mental states to members of various social groups (Experiments 1 and 2), particularly distant others compared to close others (Experiment 3), and were also more likely to recommend harsh treatment for dehumanized others (i.e., terrorist detainees, Experiment 4). Discussion addresses the mechanisms by which social connection enables dehumanization, and the varied behavioral implications that result.     

Can empathic concern be generalized from one person to others? Another positive side of the ‘one‐among‐others’ effect

Previous research on the one‐among‐others effect has shown that inducing empathic concern towards a victim presented among other individuals in need enhances: (1) awareness of these others and (2) the willingness to help them individually. In this work, we test that these outcomes are linked by an additional process: the generalization of empathic concern felt for the victim towards the others in need. Study 1 revealed that inducing empathic concern for a victim presented as one‐among‐others led to see the others as separate and different individuals, not as a unitary group. Study 2 showed that the one‐among‐others presentation (vs. only‐one‐victim) increased empathic concern towards those presented along with the main victim. Study 3 showed that the one‐among‐others presentation (vs. a single‐victim or a statistical presentation) increased the empathic concern felt for other individuals in need. Therefore, the one‐among‐others presentation does not weaken empathic concern but, instead, it leads to its generalization from one to others.     

How Self‐Image and Compassionate Goals Shape Intrapsychic Experiences

Self‐image goals focus on constructing, maintaining, and defending desired public and private images of the self, whereas compassionate goals focus on being supportive and not harming others. We suggest that these goals shape construals of others in relation to the self, which in turn, shape affective experiences. We review research showing that when people have self‐image goals, they construe others as competitors, which leads to feeling uneasy with others (i.e., conflicted, confused, and fearful), and that when they have compassionate goals, they construe others as collaborators and have more constructive approaches to interpersonal problems, which leads to feeling at ease with others (i.e., peaceful, clear, and loving) and less upset with them. Thus, interpersonal goals shape construals of others, which in turn shape intrapsychic experiences of the world and of the self.     

Pursuing Goals with Others

This article explores motivation in a social context: how people pursue goals with others, with information on others, and for the self and others. As people incorporate close others into their extended selves (Aron et al., 1991 ), they begin to treat others' actions and outcomes as partially their own. This tendency, in turn, has implications for coordinating goal pursuits with others and for the preference for actions that maximize the total benefits for the self and others. To demonstrate these principles – coordination and joint‐benefits maximization – we first explore coordination in pursuing goals with others (i.e., working in teams), showing that people respond to others' actions and lack of action similarly to how they respond to their own actions and lack of action. We next explore coordination in pursuing goals with information on others, showing that people conform to others' preferences and attitudes yet choose actions that complement others' actions. Finally, we review research on pursuing goals for the self and others, showing that people wish to maximize the total benefits for the group.     

Asymmetry in the estimation of interpersonal distance and identity affirmation

An asymmetry effect is known to exist in the estimation of interpersonal distance, depending on whether the point of reference for the estimation is the subject (‘How far are the others from you?’) or the others How far are you from the others?). It looks as though, through the effect of a self-centring schema, subjects feel that others occupy their own space more than they occupy the space of others. A self-centring schema has also been found in many other processes involving judgment or comparison of oneself and others. It is generally interpreted as a sign of the affirmation and defence of personal identity. The three experiments reported here attempt to relate the asymmetries in the distances perceived between persons represented on a map to the following three areas in which one's sense of personal or group identity is involved: (1) in the perception of one's own specificity with respect to others (or of the specificity of the group to which one belongs with respect to other groups) (experiment 1), (2) in one's ability to put oneself in the place of others (exocentrism) (experiment 2). and (3) in the individuation of oneself by others (experiment 3). The results of these three experiments lead us to believe that it is indeed the processes of identification and affirmation of personal and group identity - along with the underlying categorization processes — that are the source of the asymmetries observed in interpersonal distance estimation. The consistency of the data obtained in different situations also validates the technique used for estimating interpersonal distance.     

Accuracy of estimates in the social comparison of abilities

An experiment was conducted to test the proposition that comparison with others similar to oneself in performance affords more accurate self-evaluations than comparison with dissimilar others. A previous study presumably demonstrating this effect (R. Radloff, 1966, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Suplement, 1, 6–26) was reinterpreted. It was suggested that in that particular experiment, performance dissimilarity of comparison others may have been confounded with subjects' disconfirmed expectancies concerning own performance. In the present experiment, similarity of comparison others (manipulated via performance extremity relative to others in the group) was orthogonally manipulated to consistency (versus inconsistency) with an expectancy. As predicted, inconsistency with expectancy exerted adverse effects on the accuracy of self-evaluations whereas dissimilarity from comparison others did not. Significance of the findings for social comparison processes was discussed.     

4岁儿童对他人记忆的评判与错误信念理解的关系

从观点采择的角度考察儿童对他人记忆的评判及其与错误信念理解的关系。与他人分享记忆时,个体需要同时处理自我与他人对过去的表征和看法;而要顺利完成错误信念任务,个体需要同时加工自我的真实信念与他人的错误信念。因此个体对他人记忆的评判能力可能会与其对错误信念的理解相关。40名4岁儿童完成一系列错误信念任务和评判他人记忆是否正确任务,情境包括视觉、意图解释和情绪解释。结果表明,控制年龄、语言和记忆能力等因素后,被试评判他人记忆的成绩仍然可以预测其对错误信念的理解。这些结果为幼儿在回忆叙述中谈及他人越多,其心理理论越好提供了进一步的证据和可能的解释     

The persistence of loneliness: Self and other determinants1

Four studies (total n= 469) examined correlates of loneliness in order to explore explanations for the persistence of loneliness among college students. Self-report and attitude scales, ratings of others following dyadic interactions, and self and other ratings at two points during an extended period of group interactions indicated that lonely students (a) rated themselves more negatively and reported deficits in social skills and self-concept, (b) rated specific others and people-in-general more negatively and were more alienated and externalized, (c) expected others to rate them negatively, but (d) in general were not differentially rated by others except in the initial phase of group interactions and by lonely others following dyadic interactions. Results suggested that loneliness may be perpetuated by its cognitive and affective concomitants, with some evidence for gender differences, whereas inconclusive evidence was found regarding responses of others to the lonely person.     

Whose Life Task Is It Anyway? Social Appraisal and Life Task Pursuit

The study uses a social contextual framework to examine how others are represented in individuals' life task appraisals and how such appraisals are related to strategies to pursue those life tasks. The extent to which life tasks nominated by 81 college students (45 females) were appraised as shared with others and pursued collaboratively was examined through a questionnaire. Participants listed five life tasks, indicated if each life task was theirs alone, indirectly shared (others were impacted by their life task pursuit), or directly shared (another person might also nominate the life task as theirs) with others in their lives, described three activities used to pursue their life tasks, and coded how others were involved inthese activities. Results indicated that the majority of college students' life tasks were appraised as involving others, that directly shared appraisals were found more frequently in the relationship domain, and that directly shared appraisals were associated with collaborative life task pursuit strategies. In addition, appraising life tasks as directly shared did not appear to reflect aspects of anxiety or compensation. A content analysis of the strategies coded as involving other individuals revealed diverse ways in which others are involved in life task pursuit ranging from active engagement of others to cognitive strategies where others are implied. The findings have implications for research on life tasks and other goal structures in that the structures may involve the social context in adaptive ways.     

Perceptions of morality and competence in (non)interdependent games

Individuals’ actions and their stated beliefs affect how others perceive them. In a prisoner’s dilemma, a defector who expects others to cooperate is perceived as less moral than a defector who expects others to defect; a cooperator who expects others to defect is perceived as less competent than a cooperator who expects others to cooperate (Experiment 1). This pattern suggests that in a context of interdependence, a stated expectation that the behavior of others will resemble one’s own may protect one’s social reputation. When outcomes are not interdependent, expectations do not moderate the effects of behavior on reputation (Experiment 2). In such a context, inductive reasoning is sufficient to explain social projection. Both types of results are replicated in a modified N-person social dilemma (Experiment 3), further validating the inductive-reasoning hypothesis.     

Subjectivity uncertainty theory of objectification: Compensating for uncertainty about how to positively relate to others by downplaying their subjective attributes

Why do people sometimes view others as objects rather than complete persons? We propose that when people desire successful interactions with others, yet feel uncertain about their ability to navigate others' subjectivity, they downplay others' subjective attributes, focusing instead on their concrete attributes. This account suggests that objectification represents a response to uncertainty about one's ability to successfully interact with others distinct from: instrumentalizing others in response to power; dehumanizing others in response to threat; and simplifying others in response to general uncertainty. Supporting this account: When uncertainty about navigating women's subjectivity was salient, men showed increased sexual objectification to the extent that they desired successful interactions with women (Study 1) and were primed to view such interactions as self-esteem relevant (Study 2). In a workplace scenario, participants made uncertain about their managerial ability felt less confident about their ability to navigate employees' subjectivity and, consequently, role-objectified employees (Study 3).     

Reconsidering research on self-humanizing: The importance of mean comparative judgments

Self-humanization is defined as the tendency to view oneself as more essentially human than others. Researchers have claimed that people attribute human nature traits more strongly to themselves than to others, but not uniquely human traits. In this article we suggest that such claims are based on the misinterpretation of results. Most studies have not presented mean comparative judgments, making it impossible to determine whether people thought they possessed characteristics less strongly or more strongly than the average person. We found that people (N = 256) in Poland, Italy, and Korea perceived themselves as possessing desirable human nature and uniquely human characteristics more than others, as possessing undesirable uniquely human traits less than others, and as similar to others in terms of undesirable human nature characteristics. It seems that being more human than others means possessing some traits more than others and possessing some traits less than others.     

Through the looking glass clearly: accuracy and assumed similarity in well-adjusted individuals' first impressions

Do well-adjusted individuals have particularly accurate insight into what others are like or are they biased, primarily seeing their own characteristics in others? In the current studies, the authors examined how psychologically adjusted individuals tend to see new acquaintances, directly comparing their levels of distinctive accuracy (accurately perceiving others' unique characteristics), normative accuracy (perceiving others as similar to the average person), and assumed similarity (perceiving others as similar to the self). Across two interactive, round-robin studies, well-adjusted individuals, compared with less adjusted individuals, did not perceive new acquaintances' unique characteristics more accurately but did perceive new acquaintances, on average, as similar to the average person, reflecting an accurate understanding of what people generally tend to be like. Furthermore, well-adjusted individuals had a biased tendency to perceive their own unique characteristics in others. Of note, both pre-existing perceiver adjustment and target-specific liking independently predicted greater accuracy and assumed similarity in first impressions. In sum, well-adjusted individuals see through the looking glass clearly: although they erroneously see others as possessing their own unique characteristics, they accurately understand what others generally tend to be like.     

The relationship between the adult attachment and the tendency to judge others as liars

The relationship between 2 dimensions (anxiety and avoidance) of adult attachment and tendency to judge others as liars was examined in this study. We measured 308 participants' adult attachment and tendency to judge others as liars in self‐, other‐, or relationship‐oriented situations. Results supported our hypotheses by showing that (a) anxiety positively predicted the tendency to judge others as liars in self‐oriented situations and (b) avoidance moderated the relationship between anxiety and the tendency to judge others as liars in other‐ and relationship‐oriented situations. Attachment anxiety could positively predict the tendency to judge others as liars only when participants' avoidance was high. Theoretical implications and suggestions for future studies were discussed.     

Egocentrism versus protocentrism: the status of self in social prediction

In this article, the author discusses the limitations of the egocentric view of self in which self serves as an automatic filter, inhibiting access to alternative representations of others' thoughts and feelings. The author then outlines a protocentric model, the self-as-distinct (SAD) model, in which generic representations of prototypic others serve as the default; representations of self, specific others, or categories encode only distinctiveness from generic knowledge about prototypic others. Thus, self-knowledge is distributed both in generic representations in which self and prototypic others are undifferentiated and in a self-representation that encodes distinctiveness. The self-representation does not serve to make predictions about others because it encodes how self differs from the generic representation of others. Predictions that are the same about self and others are protocentric, based on generic knowledge that serves as the default. The SAD model parsimoniously accounts for many inconsistent findings across various domains in social cognition.