Expectations and interpretations during causal learning

In existing models of causal induction, 4 types of covariation information (i.e., presence/absence of an event followed by presence/absence of another event) always exert identical influences on causal strength judgments (e.g., joint presence of events always suggests a generative causal relationship). In contrast, we suggest that, due to expectations developed during causal learning, learners give varied interpretations to covariation information as it is encountered and that these interpretations influence the resulting causal beliefs. In Experiments 1A-1C, participants' interpretations of observations during a causal learning task were dynamic, expectation based, and, furthermore, strongly tied to subsequent causal judgments. Experiment 2 demonstrated that adding trials of joint absence or joint presence of events, whose roles have been traditionally interpreted as increasing causal strengths, could result in decreased overall causal judgments and that adding trials where one event occurs in the absence of another, whose roles have been traditionally interpreted as decreasing causal strengths, could result in increased overall causal judgments. We discuss implications for traditional models of causal learning and how a more top-down approach (e.g., Bayesian) would be more compatible with the current findings.     

Estimating causal strength: the role of structural knowledge and processing effort.

The strength of causal relations typically must be inferred on the basis of statistical relations between observable events. This article focuses on the problem that there are multiple ways of extracting statistical information from a set of events. In causal structures involving a potential cause, an effect and a third related event, the assumed causal role of this third event crucially determines whether it is appropriate to control for this event when making causal assessments between the potential cause and the effect. Three experiments show that prior assumptions about the causal roles of the learning events affect the way contingencies are assessed with otherwise identical learning input. However, prior assumptions about causal roles is only one factor influencing contingency estimation. The experiments also demonstrate that processing effort affects the way statistical information is processed. These findings provide further evidence for the interaction between bottom-up and top-down influences in the acquisition of causal knowledge. They show that, apart from covariation information or knowledge about mechanisms, abstract assumptions about causal structures also may affect the learning process.     

Blickets and babies: the development of causal reasoning in toddlers and infants

Previous research has suggested that preschoolers possess a cognitive system that allows them to construct an abstract, coherent representation of causal relations among events. Such a system lets children reason retrospectively when they observe ambiguous data in a rational manner (e.g., D. M. Sobel, J. B. Tenenbaum, & A. Gopnik, 2004). However, there is little evidence that demonstrates whether younger children possess similar inferential abilities. In Experiment 1, the authors extended previous findings with older children to examine 19- and 24-month-olds' causal inferences. Twenty-four-month-olds' inferences were similar to those of preschoolers, but younger children lacked the ability to make retrospective causal inferences, perhaps because of performance limitations. In Experiment 2, the authors designed an eye-tracking paradigm to test younger participants that eliminated various manual search demands. Eight-month-olds' anticipatory eye movements, in response to retrospective data, revealed inferences similar to those of 24-month-olds in Experiment 1 and preschoolers in previous research. These data are discussed in terms of associative reasoning and causal inference.     

Moral judgment and the development of causal schemes

The present study investigated (i) the relationship between blame and perceived causality; (ii) the effect of the nature of causes on causal inference. Seventy-two persons from three age groups (5, 9 years and adults) responded to behavioural events which varied in outcome intensity, the nature of the cause (internal/external) and its presence (present/absent). The latter two factors had a marked effect on attributed blame and inferred causes as an age × nature × presence of cause interaction was found in both cases. However, inferred causes were not systematically related to attributed blame. Outcome severity led to more extreme blame ratings in all groups but only affected the causal scheme used by adults. The results are discussed in terms of over-attribution to persons and a more precise criterion for the use of the multiple sufficient cause scheme is evaluated.     

Testing causal models of job characteristics and employee well‐being: A replication study using cross‐lagged structural equation modelling

This study re‐evaluated causal relationships between job characteristics (demands, autonomy, social support) and employee well‐being (job satisfaction, emotional exhaustion) in a methodological replication of De Jonge et al. 's (2001) two‐wave panel study. The principal difference was the 2‐year time lag between measurements in this study versus a 1‐year time lag in the original study. Three competing causal models were compared: regular causation (job characteristics influence well‐being); reverse causation (well‐being influences job characteristics); and reciprocal causation (combining regular and reverse causation). As in the original study, regular causation offered the best account. Regarding specific longitudinal paths there were some between‐study differences, which are considered in relation to exposure‐time models of stressor‐strain relations.     

A theory of causal learning in children: causal maps and Bayes nets

The authors outline a cognitive and computational account of causal learning in children. They propose that children use specialized cognitive systems that allow them to recover an accurate "causal map" of the world: an abstract, coherent, learned representation of the causal relations among events. This kind of knowledge can be perspicuously understood in terms of the formalism of directed graphical causal models, or Bayes nets. Children's causal learning and inference may involve computations similar to those for learning causal Bayes nets and for predicting with them. Experimental results suggest that 2- to 4-year-old children construct new causal maps and that their learning is consistent with the Bayes net formalism.     

Rewards and organizational commitment across structural characteristics: A meta-analysis

This article uses meta-analysis to summarize previous empirical studies which examine the relationship between actual income/pay satisfaction and organizational commitment (OC) across different structural settings. Twenty-one studies with correlational data on the relationship between OC and income, and 27 studies dealing with OC and pay satisfaction are examined; these studies include 23 and 31 independent samples, respectively. The findings reveal a moderator effect related to type of occupation in the OC-income relationship, and to sector in the OC-pay satisfaction relationship. The findings also show the moderating effect of measurement of OC on pay satisfaction. Theoretical and methodological considerations pertaining to the OC-rewards relationship are discussed. Directions for future research and practical implications are indicated.The authors would like to thank HelenJane Shawyer and Marion Lupu for their editorial assistance.     

Thought-action fusion as a causal factor in the development of intrusions

Thought-action fusion refers to the tendency to treat thoughts and actions as equivalents. Some authors (e.g., Rachman, 1997; Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 793-802) have suggested that thought-action fusion plays a role in the etiology of obsessive intrusions. The present study sought to test this idea. Subjects (n = 19) in the experimental condition underwent a bogus EEG recording session. They were informed that the apparatus was able to pick up the word 'apple' and that thoughts of that word could result in the administration of electrical shocks to another person. After having spent 15 minutes in the EEG laboratory, experimental subjects and controls (n = 26) completed a short questionnaire containing items about characteristics of the target thought (e.g., frequency, aversiveness). Results indicate that thought-action fusion, indeed, promotes intrusive thinking in that it results in a higher frequency of target thoughts, more discomfort, and more resistance. Thus, the current findings support the idea that thought-action fusion may contribute to the development of obsessive intrusions.     

Associative and causal reasoning accounts of causal induction: Symmetries and asymmetries in predictive and diagnostic inferences

Associative and causal reasoning accounts are probably the two most influential types of accounts of causal reasoning processes. Only causal reasoning accounts predict certain asymmetries between predictive (i.e., reasoning from causes to effects) and diagnostic (i.e., reasoning from effects to causes) inferences regarding cue-interaction phenomena (e.g., the overshadowing effect). In the experiments reported here, we attempted to delimit the conditions under which these asymmetries occur. The results show that unless participants perceived the relevance of causal information to solving the task, predictive and diagnostic inferences were symmetrical. Specifically, Experiments 1A and 1B showed that implicitly stressing the relevance of causal information by having participants review the instructions favored the presence of asymmetries between predictive and diagnostic situations. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that explicitly stressing the relevance of causal information by stating the importance of the causal role of events after the instructions were given also favored the asymmetry.     

Critical periods and catastrophic interference effects in the development of self-organizing feature maps

The use of self-organizing feature maps (SOFM) in models of cognitive development has frequently been associated with explanations of critical or sensitive periods. By contrast, error-driven connectionist models of development have been linked with catastrophic interference between new knowledge and old knowledge. We introduce a set of simulations that systematically evaluate the conditions under which SOFMs demonstrate critical/sensitive periods in development versus those under which they display interference effects. We explored the relative contribution of network parameters (for example, whether learning rate and neighbourhood reduce across training), the representational resources available to the network, and the similarity between old and new knowledge in determining the functional plasticity of the maps. The SOFMs that achieved the best discrimination and topographic organization also exhibited sensitive periods in development while showing lower plasticity and hence limited interference. However, fast developing, coarser SOFMs also produced topologically organized representations, while permanently retaining their plasticity. We argue that the impact of map organization on behaviour must be interpreted in terms of the cognitive processes that the map is driving.     

The development of global coherence in life narratives across adolescence: temporal, causal, and thematic aspects

Extending the study of autobiographical narratives to entire life narratives, we tested the emergence of globally coherent life narratives in adolescence, as hypothesized by McAdams (1985). Participants were 102 children and young adults (ages 8, 12, 16, and 20 years) who narrated their lives twice. Between narrations, half of each age group participated in tasks designed to train autobiographical reasoning; the other half participated in control tasks. Coherence was measured by the relative frequency of local temporal, causal, and thematic linguistic indicators identified qualitatively at the level of propositions, as well as by quantitative global rating scales measuring the impressions of the listeners. Coherence increased across the age span. Overall, repeated narrating and training did not increase coherence. Crystallized and fluid intelligence, number of negative life events, and frequency of biographical practices and confiding in others did not contribute substantially to the prediction of coherence beyond age. Results are interpreted in the context of adolescent identity development.     

Processing speed, intelligence, creativity, and school performance: Testing of causal hypotheses using structural equation models

According to mental speed theory of intelligence, the speed of information processing constitutes an important basis for cognitive abilities. However, the question, how mental speed relates to real world criteria, like school, academic, or job performance, is still unanswered. The aim of the study is to test an indirect speed-factor model in comparison to rivaling models explaining the relationships between different mental abilities and performance. In this speed-factor model, basic cognitive processing is assumed to influence higher mental abilities (IQ and creativity). Intelligence and creativity themselves should be valid predictors of school performance. We computed bivariate correlations and structural equation models to test this hypothesis, using indicators of processing speed [Zahlen-Verbindungs-Test (ZVT) and Coding Test], psychometric intelligence [Kognitiver Fähigkeits-Test (KFT) and Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM)], creativity [Verbaler Kreativitäts-Test (VKT) and Verwendungs-Test (VWT)] and school performance (grades). In a sample of 271 students from German gymnasiums (Class Levels 9 to 11) the speed-factor model can reproduce at best the empirical relationships between processing speed, intelligence, creativity, and school performance: It assumes that processing speed influences higher mental abilities (intelligence and creativity), which, in the sequel, influence school performance. Therefore, processing speed seems to have no direct effect on school performance; the effect is indirect as it operates via mediation through higher cognitive abilities.     

Knowing who dunnit: Infants identify the causal agent in an unseen causal interaction

Preverbal infants can represent the causal structure of events, including distinguishing the agentive and receptive roles and categorizing entities according to stable causal dispositions. This study investigated how infants combine these 2 kinds of causal inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 9.5-month-olds used the position of a human hand or a novel puppet (causal agents), but not a toy train (an inert object), to predict the subsequent motion of a beanbag. Conversely, in Experiment 3, 10- and 7-month-olds used the motion of the beanbag to infer the position of a hand but not of a toy block. These data suggest that preverbal infants expect a causal agent as the source of motion of an inert object.     

Kant and Hegel on freedom: Two new interpretations

Can Kant's theory of freedom be defended in contemporary ‘incompatibilist’ terms, as Henry Allison believes, or is it vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms of the ‘compatibilist’ sort that Allen Wood presents? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, and that there is a third option, namely that Kant's real theory of freedom is not as well off as Allison contends, nor as weak as Wood claims. Allison tries to save Kant's theory of freedom from both what he takes to be traditional and improper interpretations ‐ notably including Hegel's and Wood's ‐ of what that theory means, as well as from traditional and improper objections to its defensibility. I argue in part with Wood (and Hegel) against Allison on the issue of the meaning of Kant's theory, and in part with Allison against Wood (and Hegel) on the issue of the defensibility of Kant's theory.     

Motivation,steady-state,and structural development

Stagner's homeostatic-discrepancy theory integrates a wide range of theory and data concerning the mobilization of energy in human motivation. It does not, however, deal directly with energetic and motivational bases for developmental changes in the level of organization of psychological structures or for the persistence of organisms in pursuing particular paths of individual development despite repeated negative external reinforcement. A broader conceptual model is therefore proposed in which both level and path of structural development are themselves treated as steady states. The homeostatic assumptions of motivational psychology and the structural assumptions of developmental psychology are thus seen as but different aspects of a single set of explanatory assumptions. Stagner's model then becomes that special case in which both level and path of structural development are held constant. The works of Freud, Werner, and Piaget and those of Prigogine, Waddington, and Thom are considered insofar as they bear upon these issues.This work was supported in part by a sabbatical leave grant from Wayne State University and in part by the University of Michigan-Wayne State University Institute of Gerontology. I wish to express my appreciation to Prof. Ross Stagner for his critical comments on his conceptualization of homeostasis as I have discussed it in this paper. His comments resulted in a significant clarification of my understanding of his position on the basic issues involved in this critique. Prof. Joel Ager and Ms. Kathryn Domurath also offered useful suggestions. However, I alone am solely responsible for the contents of this paper and especially for any deficiencies or inaccuracies that still remain.     

Locus of causality and the use of information in the development of causal attributions1

Two studies were conducted to examine whether attributions made about events may be influenced by individual assumptions regarding causation that are age related. In Study 1, 96 subjects at three age levels (four and five years, eight and nine years, and college students) observed a target actor on videotape select an item from an unseen array, and four other actors either agree (high consensus) or disagree (low consensus) with the choice. Subjects were asked to decide why the actor liked the chosen object best—because of something about the actor (person attribution) or because of something about the item (entity attribution). The results showed that perceived locus of causality shifted from entity to person attributions with age. In addition, subjects at all ages were able to utilize the consensus information when they had no opportunity to form their own impressions about the items in the array. In Study 2, 126 subjects at four age levels (five and six years, seven and eight years, nine and ten years, and high school students) chose an item from among an array for themselves and responded to a person (self)/entity attribution question regarding the locus of their own choice. The entity to person shift with age was again found and was supported by additional measures. The results are discussed in terms of children's causal reasoning capacities and social environmental factors affecting developmental change in social judgments.