Some reflections on the use and meaning of conflict in contemporary psychoanalysis

The author reflects on the concept of conflict in contemporary psychoanalysis, and especially in European psychoanalysis. In the latter, this concept does not seem to have aroused significant interest. This does not necessarily mean that conflict has been rejected or replaced; rather, there has been a greater focus on preconflictual stages of development. Indeed, conflict is generally implicit in psychoanalytic work, and, like many other concepts, it has very different and at times divergent meanings, both in various psychoanalytic schools of thought and within the same school. The author presents a clinical example to illustrate some of the possible choices of the analyst at work concerning the use of the concept of conflict.     

Some reflections on grammaticality

This paper presents a piece of philosophical analysis of the notion of grammaticality. It presents two notions of grammaticality and discusses some of their properties. The presuppositions of proofs of grammaticality are scrutinized. Finally, some remarks on grammaticality, poetry and isolated occurrences are presented.     

Some reflections on the individuation of events

Theories in physics require reference to manifolds of locations and events. Abstract versions of these manifolds, ‘space’, ‘time’ and ‘space‐time’ are frequently used as reference systems. Should they be included in the ontology of physics as well as the material manifolds from which they are abstracted? This problem can be approached through a study of the identity conditions of events. The argument is offered that neither an abstract ‘time’ of moments is viable, nor is the assumption that events are individuated by their locations necessary. Taken together these conclusions would require reinterpretation of relativity as a grammar of histories and of the Einstein—Podolski‐Rosen experiment as displaying the possibility of spatially distributed events.     

Brain reflections of words and their meaning

The neurobiological organization of meaningful language units, morphemes and words, has been illuminated by recent metabolic and neurophysiological imaging studies. When humans process words from different categories, sets of cortical areas become active differentially. The meaning of a word, more precisely aspects of its reference, may be crucial for determining which set of cortical areas is involved in its processing. Word-related neuron webs with specific cortical distributions might underlie the observed category-specific differences in brain activity. Neuroscientific principles can explain these differential topographies.     

Some reflections on Indian metaphysics

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Some reflections on religious knowledge

The essay that follows considers two topics. After dealing with relevant preliminaries, it asks: (a) what differences are there in what must be done in order to tell whether there is any religious knowledge if an internalist evidentialist account of knowledge is true, from what must be done in order to tell whether there is any religious knowledge if an externalist reliabilist account of knowledge is true; and (b) does the best current externalist reliabilist account of knowledge require (or perhaps already implicitly contain) an internalist evidentialist element? Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plant that is successfully aimed at truth … when a belief meets these conditions and does enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it enjoys depends on the strength of the belief, the degree of firmness with which S holds it. This is intended as an account of the central core of our concept of warrant … [Warranted Christian Belief, 156; implicit in reference to a design plan here is another feature—that the belief is subject to no undefeated defeaters; such a belief, if true, constitutes knowledge.]     

Some reflections on boredom.

Boredom is a complex mental phenomenon, incorporating both affective and cognitive components, which cannot be understood within the confines of conflict theory alone. The paucity of fantasy in the bored person may reflect a developmental ego defect as well as, or instead of, the commonly-cited impulse-defense conflicts. The need for externally-supplied stimulation characteristic of persons with a field-dependent cognitive style, and/or characterological passivity may be among the significant predisposing factors for the development of boredom, and phase-specific factors may encourage its occurrence at particular periods of life. Boredom in the analyst, too, is multiply determined; the analytic situation itself contains features that contribute to it.