The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle

Book Information The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle. The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann, ed. Gordon Baker, London : Routledge, 2003, 528, US$100 (cloth) Edited by Gordon Baker. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. and Friedrich Waismann. Routledge. London. Pp. 528. US$100 (cloth:),     

Toward a Perspicuous Presentation of “Perspicuous Presentation”1

Gordon Baker in his last decade published a series of papers (now collected in Baker 2004 ), which are revolutionary in their proposals for understanding of later Wittgenstein. Taking our lead from the first of those papers, on “perspicuous presentations,” we offer new criticisms of ‘elucidatory’ readers of later Wittgenstein, such as Peter Hacker: we argue that their readings fail to connect with the radically therapeutic intent of the ‘perspicuous presentation’ concept, as an achievement‐term, rather than a kind of ‘objective’ mapping of a ‘conceptual landscape.’ Baker's Wittgenstein, far from being a ‘language policeman’ of the kind that often fails to influence mainstream philosophy, offers an alternative to the latent scientism of Wittgenstein's influential ‘elucidatory’ readers.     

Hertz,Wittgenstein and Philosophical Method1

There have recently appeared claims that the influence Heinrich Hertz exerted over Wittgenstein's later work was far more abiding than previously recognised. I critically evaluate such claims by Gordon Baker and Allan Janik. I first show that Hertz was indeed concerned with the same feature, clarity, which often exercised Wittgenstein. But I then argue that Wittgenstein should not be seen as having adopted the conception of philosophical method, which Hertz deployed in The Principles of Mechanics. I show that Hertz ‘clarifies’ the concept of force only in the sense that he alters that concept, and that he is not using the sort of ‘contrastive’ methods characteristic of Wittgenstein's later works.     

Pictures in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

The word “picture” occurs pervasively in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Not only does Wittgenstein often use literal pictures or the notion of mental pictures in his investigations, but he also frequently uses “picture” to speak about a way of conceiving of a matter (e.g. “A picture held us captive” at Philosophical Investigations§115). I argue that “picture” used in this conceptual sense is not a shorthand for an assumption or a set of propositions but is rather an expression of conceptual bedrock on the model of an organising myth. This reading builds primarily on work by Gordon Baker and Stanley Cavell.     

Sztompka's philosophy of social Science

It is argued in this article that the concept of practice is one of the key concepts in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It partly replaces his earlier talk about the inexpressible. ‘The practice has to speak for itself, as Wittgenstein succinctly puts it. The concept of practice not only points to the ways in which the unity of our concepts are underpinned, as Gordon Baker has it, it also comprises the skills involved in handling the conceptualized phenomena, our prereflective familiarity with them, expressed in the sureness in our behaviour towards them, and the judgmental power exercised in applying or withholding a given concept on a particular occasion. These factors are all relevant to the establishment of knowledge, but they cannot themselves be fully and straightforwardly articulated by verbal means. Nevertheless, they represent what we go by when we apply concepts and other types of rules. To follow a rule is what Wittgenstein calls a practice. The sketched analysis of this concept makes us understand better how it is possible to apply a rule without the support of another rule. It also makes us realize in what sense one is justified in talking about tacit knowledge in connection with the application of concepts and rule‐following in general. Quite a lot hangs on seeing the world aright at this point.     

Simple Objects of Comparison for Complex Grammars: An Alternative Strand in Wittgenstein's Later Remarks on Religion

The predominant interpretation of Wittgenstein's later remarks on religion takes him to hold that all religious utterances are non‐scientific, and to hold that the way to show that religious utterances are non‐scientific is to identify and characterise the grammatical rules governing their use. This paper claims that though this does capture one strand of Wittgenstein's later thought on religion, there is an alternative strand of that thought which is quite different and more nuanced. In this alternative strand Wittgenstein stresses that religious utterances and beliefs can come in both scientific and non‐scientific varieties. More than that, he claims that the grammar of religious utterances, and the logic of religious beliefs, is often complex – in that individual utterances and beliefs will often be mixed between, indeterminate between, or fluid between being scientific and being non‐scientific. This complexity means that it will often be unhelpful to try to pin down one particular grammar or logic for a given utterance or belief. Wittgenstein therefore suggests a new method of grammatical and logical investigation, which is less likely to distort complex grammars or logics by being overly simplistic or rigid. This method is to use simple examples of utterances and beliefs as objects of comparison, so as to illuminate the different aspects of the more complex actual utterances and beliefs under examination. This alternative strand in Wittgenstein's later remarks on religion is a manifestation of a broader strand of Wittgenstein's later thought as a whole, which was first described by Friedrich Waismann, and later developed by Gordon Baker and Oskari Kuusela. The paper concludes by providing examples of religious beliefs which are logically mixed, indeterminate, and fluid, and showing how simple objects of comparison can be used to illuminate them.     

The philosophy of science at the turn of the millenium

Abstract

Central to a new, or ‘resolute’, reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus is the idea that Wittgenstein held there an ‘austere’ view of nonsense: the view, that is, that nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give words a meaning, and so that there are no logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Resolute readers tend not only to ascribe such a view to Wittgenstein, but also to subscribe to it themselves; and it is also a feature of some readings which in other respects are clearly not Resolute. This paper forms part of a reply to Hans-Johann Glock’s work in which he argues (in part) that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus held a view of nonsense other than the austere view. Instead, Glock argues, Wittgenstein there held that there are many logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Here, I outline and defend the austere view, together with its attribution to the early Wittgenstein, against a number of Glock’s criticisms, and focussing especially on Wittgenstein’s reformulation in the Tractatus of Frege’s context-principle.     

The Standard Metre in Paris

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that we can neither say of the standard One Metre in Paris that it is a single metred length, nor that it is not. Kripke's reply to the puzzle is well known: the sentence expressing the assertion that the standard One Metre is one metre in length (at time t₀) is a true, a priori and contingent sentence. In this paper, I would like to show the nature of the intuition that runs behind Kripke's reply to the puzzle, and why, in the final analysis, it is not satisfactory, with respect to the point made by Wittgenstein. In addition, I will show that the case of the One Metre in Paris exemplifies the radical break Wittgenstein makes with traditional concepts of meaning. I then draw a general lesson that shows that the structure of concepts and functions (measures) in Wittgenstein is given by the idea of an arbitrary choice of “an object of comparison.” Concepts and functions (measures) are materialised and internalised in the form of objects that are arbitrarily sampled from a sample space of same logical‐type objects.     

Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: There – Like our Life – Rush RheesThe Third Wittgenstein: The Post‐Investigations Works – Danièle Moyal‐SharrockUnderstanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty – Edited by Danièle Moyal‐Sharrock

Books reviewed: Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: There – Like our Life, D. Z. Phillips (ed.), (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 195 pp. incl. Index; $29.95; referred to in the text as Rhees. Danièle Moyal‐Sharrock, The Third Wittgenstein: The Post‐Investigations Works (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 225 pp. incl. Index; $99.95; referred to in the text as Third Witt. Danièle Moyal‐Sharrock (ed.), Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), 250 pp. incl. Index; $75.00; referred to in the text as M‐S.
Reviewed by Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge
Louisiana 70803
USA     

Wittgenstein on Understanding as a Mental State

In trying to make clear whether understanding is a mental state Wittgenstein asks a series of questions about the timing and duration of understanding. These questions are awkward, and they have posed a great challenge for commentators. In this paper I review the interpretations by Mole and by Baker and Hacker, and point out their problems. I then offer a new interpretation which shows (1) that a “mental state” in this context means a state of consciousness, (2) that Wittgenstein's questions are intended to elicit the grammars of the words “understand” and a “state of consciousness”, (3) that, in this way, he clearly shows that understanding is not a state of consciousness and (4) that he also provides a therapy to dissolve the problem.     

The Influence of Einstein on Wittgenstein's Philosophy

On the basis of historical and textual evidence, this paper claims that (i) after his Tractatus, Wittgenstein was actually influenced by Einstein's theory of relativity and, (ii) the similarity of Einstein's relativity theory helps to illuminate some aspects of Wittgenstein's work. These claims find support in remarkable quotations where Wittgenstein speaks approvingly of Einstein's relativity theory and in the way these quotations are embedded in Wittgenstein's texts. The profound connection between Wittgenstein and relativity theory concerns not only Wittgenstein's “verificationist” phase (more closely connected with Schlick's work), but also Wittgenstein's later philosophy centred on the theme of rule‐following.     

REVIEWS

Book reviews in this article. Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? by Norman Malcolm Logic and Sin in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, by Philip R. Shields. D.Z. Phillips. Wittgenstein and Religion. Cosmopolis. The hidden agenda of modernity, by Stephen Toulmin Simone Weil's Philosophy of Culture, ed. Richard H. Bell     

Reviews

Gaukroger, Stephen Descates: an intellectual biography
Jolley, Nicholas (Ed) The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz
Lowe, E.J. Locke on Human Understanding
Pappas, Nickolas Plato and the Republic
Grayling, A.C. (Ed) Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject
Stern, David Wittgenstein on Mind and Language
Bouveresse, Jacques Wittgenstein Reads Freud
Brill, Susan B. Wittgenstein and Critical Theory
Dahlbom Bo (Ed) Dennett and his Critics
Bennett, Jonathan The Act Itself
Strawson, Galen Mental Reality
Höffe, Otfried Political Justice     

REVIEWS

The Later Wittgenstein by S. Stephen Hilmy.
COLOUR: Some Philosophical Problems from Wittgenstein by Jonathan Westphal
Review of Wittgenstein A.C. Grayling     

REVIEWS

Michael Biggs, Alois Pichler, Wittgenstein: Two Source Catalogues and a Bibliography, Working Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. Peter Philipp, Richard Raatzsch, Essays on Wittgenstein, Working Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. Erich Ammerpller St John's C.nlleoe. Grandpont Papers, The Past and the Present: Problems of Understanding James Guetti, Wittgenstein and the Grammar of Literary Experience Peter Johnson, Frames of Deceit. A Study of the Loss and Recovery of Public and Private Trust Anne Maclean, The Elimination of Morality: Reflections on Utilitarianism and Bioethics B.R. Tilghman: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion Oxford     

Wittgenstein on Essence

In the Investigations, #s 371 and 373, Wittgenstein said: “Essence is expressed by grammar” and “Grammar tells what kind of object anything is …”. Those passages, which commit Wittgenstein to holding that things have essences and which offer an account of what essences consist in, have been ignored by commentators, chiefly because it is thought that in #65ff (family resemblances) Wittgenstein rejected essentialism. The aim of this paper is to straighten out the story of Wittgenstein's thought on the subject of essence and to show that he produced (somewhat following in Kant's footsteps) a major change in the conception of an essence.     

‘Meaning-dawning’ in Wittgenstein’s Notebooks: a Kierkegaardian reading and critique

In this paper, I am going to propose a new reading of Wittgenstein’s cryptic talk of ‘accession or loss of meaning’ (or the world ‘waxing and waning’ as a whole) in the Notebooks that draws both on Wittgenstein’s later work on aspect-perception, as well as on the thoughts of a thinker whom Wittgenstein greatly admired: Søren Kierkegaard. I will then go on to argue that, its merits apart, there is something existentially problematic about the conception that Wittgenstein is advocating. For the renunciation of the comforts of the world that Wittgenstein proposes as a way of coping with the brute contingencies of life seems only to come as far as what Kierkegaard calls ‘infinite resignation’, and this falls far short of the joyful acceptance of existence that appears necessary for inhabiting what Wittgenstein calls a happy world. That is to say, I will show that what Wittgenstein’s proposal lacks is a way of reconnecting with the finite after one has renounced it – the kind of transformation of existence achieved by the person Kierkegaard calls the ‘knight of faith’.     

Necessity and Language: The Gap Is Still Very Real

In my previous paper “Has the later Wittgenstein accounted for necessity?” I argued against the conventionalist account of necessity proposed by Wittgenstein and his followers. Glock has addressed some of my objections in his paper “Necessity and Language: In Defence of Conventionalism”. This brief rejoinder considers Glock's replies to three of those objections. In the course of doing so, I revisit Wittgenstein's explanation of the special status of necessary propositions, the supposedly arbitrary nature of colour‐grammatical propositions, and the relation between rules and modality.     

Wittgenstein and Scepticism Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Books reviewed:
Wittgenstein and Scepticism , Denis McManus (ed.). London & New York: Routledge, 2004. xi, 305 pp. $50 hb. Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS , Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer (eds.). London & New York: Routledge, 2004. xxix, 263 pp. $50 hb. Reviewed by William H. Brenner, Old Dominion University Philosophy Department Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA 23529-0083, USA wbrenner@odu.edu