Culture wars: American moral divisions across the adult lifespan

Sociologists have argued that the public moral debate in contemporary America is characterized by a “culture war,” pitting “orthodox” and “progressivist” groups against one another (Hunter, 1991). This study addressed whether the culture war is evident in the moral thinking of ordinary Americans, and whether age-related patterns exist. Sixty fundamentalist Baptists (orthodox) and 60 mainline Baptists (progressivist) evaluated and reasoned about moral issues such as divorce and abortion. Each group was divided evenly into three age groups copsisting of young, midlife, and older adults. Moral reasoning was analyzed in terms of Shweder's (1990) ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity. Within all three age groups, progressivists used the ethic of, autonomy more than orthodox participants. Orthodox participants used the ethic of divinity more than progressivists. Orthodox and progressivist groups did not differ much in their use of the ethic, of community. Very few age group differences were found within the orthodox and progressivist groups. It is concluded that morality is conceived of in markedly different wasy by orthodox and progressivist groups, and that these conceptions are consistent across age groups.     

Children's interpretive understanding,moral judgments,and emotion attributions: Relations to social behaviour

The study investigated interpretive understanding, moral judgments, and emotion attributions in relation to social behaviour in a sample of 59 5‐year‐old, 123 7‐year‐old, and 130 9‐year‐old children. Interpretive understanding was assessed by two tasks measuring children's understanding of ambiguous situations. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were measured using two moral rule transgressions. Social behaviour was assessed using teachers' ratings of aggressive and prosocial behaviour. Aggressive behaviour was positively related to interpretive understanding and negatively related to moral reasoning. Prosocial behaviour was positively associated with attribution of fear. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were related, depending on age. Interpretive understanding was unrelated to moral judgments and emotion attributions. The findings are discussed in regard to the role of interpretive understanding and moral and affective knowledge in understanding children's social behaviour.     

Task-dependent evaluative processing of moral and emotional content during comprehension: An ERP study

Recently, we showed that when participants passively read about moral transgressions (e.g., adultery), they implicitly engage in the evaluative (good–bad) categorization of incoming information, as indicated by a larger event-related brain potential (ERP) positivity to immoral than to moral scenarios (Leuthold, Kunkel, Mackenzie, & Filik in Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience, 10, 1021–1029, 2015). Behavioral and neuroimaging studies indicated that explicit moral tasks prioritize the semantic-cognitive analysis of incoming information but that implicit tasks, as used in Leuthold et al. (Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience, 10, 1021–1029, 2015), favor their affective processing. Therefore, it is unclear whether an affective categorization process is also involved when participants perform explicit moral judgments. Thus, in two experiments, we used similarly constructed morality and emotion materials for which their moral and emotional content had to be inferred from the context. Target sentences from negative vs. neutral emotional scenarios and from moral vs. immoral scenarios were presented using rapid serial visual presentation. In Experiment 1, participants made moral judgments for moral materials and emotional judgments for emotion materials. Negative compared to neutral emotional scenarios elicited a larger posterior ERP positivity (LPP) about 200 ms after critical word onset, whereas immoral compared to moral scenarios elicited a larger anterior negativity (500–700 ms). In Experiment 2, where the same emotional judgment to both types of materials was required, a larger LPP was triggered for both types of materials. These results accord with the view that morality scenarios trigger a semantic-cognitive analysis when participants explicitly judge the moral content of incoming linguistic information but an affective evaluation when judging their emotional content.     

Do community and autonomy moral violations elicit different emotions?

According to one important set of theories, different domains of immorality are linked to different discrete emotions—panculturally. Violations against the community elicit contempt, whereas violations against an individual elicit anger. To test this theory, American, Indian and Japanese participants (N = 480) indicated contempt and anger reactions (with verbal rating and face selection) to both the types of immorality. To remedy method problems in previous research, community and autonomy violations were created for the same story‐frame, by varying the target to be either the community or an individual. Community and autonomy violations did not differ significantly in the emotion elicited: overall, both types of violations elicited more anger than contempt (and more negative emotion of any kind than positive emotion). By verbal rating, Americans and Indians reported more anger than contempt for both types of violation, whereas Japanese reported more contempt than anger for both types. By face selection, the three cultural groups selected anger more than contempt for both types of violation. The results speak against defining distinct domains of morality by their association with distinct emotions.     

Moral responsibility and respect for autonomy: meeting the communitarian challenge.

The principle of respect for autonomy has come under increasing attack both within health care ethics, specifically, and as part of the more general communitarian challenge to predominantly liberal values. This paper will demonstrate the importance of respect for autonomy for the social practice of assigning moral responsibility and for the development of moral responsibility as a virtue. Guided by this virtue, the responsible exercise of autonomy may provide a much-needed connection between the individual and the community.     

Judging Yourself as You Judge Others: Moral Development and Exculpation

This study investigated two main issues: Whether people's judgments about real-life moral transgressions are affected by the role they play in them and whether self-serving biases in such judgments vary with level of moral development. One-hundred twenty university students took Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) test of moral judgment and made open-ended and rating-scale judgments about three real-life transgressions they considered moral in nature. As expected, participants made more exculpatory judgments about transgressions they committed than they did about transgressions others committed, but participants did not judge transgressions committed against them more harshly than they judged transgressions committed against others. The higher participants scored on Kohlberg's test the less they externalized and excused their moral transgressions. Contrary to expectation, this relation also applied to moral judgments about transgressions committed by others against others. These findings have important implications for models of moral development and social cognition.     

Compassion and purity: the ethics and boundary-making of Christian evangelicals

The paper explores the ethical attitude of Christian evangelicals in a church in Britain and how it affects boundary-making of their community. Evangelicals in the case study seek to be accepting of the person and to refrain from being judgemental. The paper distinguishes between the person-centred ‘ethic of compassion’ and the norm-centred ‘ethic of purity’. The ethic of compassion consists in accepting another and recognising the dignity of another based on shared humanity. It is a frame of mind that combines moral intention with the emotions of empathy and sympathy. In contrast, the ethic of purity privileges adherence to the moral order of the group over considerations for the person. The ‘compassionate’ frame of mind weakens boundaries, while the ‘pure’ frame of mind reinforces them. The boundaries of a community result from the interplay of the two ethics.     

On the role of attention and emotion in morality: attentional control modulates unrelated disgust in moral judgments

The emotion of disgust can influence people's moral judgments, even if this emotion objectively is unrelated to the moral judgment in question. The present work demonstrates that attentional control regulates this effect. In three studies, disgust was induced. In an unrelated part of the studies, participants then judged a moral transgression. Disgust resulted in more severe moral judgments when attentional control (either measured by means of individual predisposition or manipulated with experimental control) was weak as opposed to strong (Studies 1-3). Findings further showed that attentional control mediated the positive relation between the intensity of participants' disgust responses and the severity of their moral judgments (Study 2). Moreover, attentional control has its effects through the regulation of affective processing (Study 3). Taken together, the findings suggest that unrelated influences of disgust on moral judgments are contingent on the attention system.     

GLOBAL ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A REFLECTION

This paper examines the contributions that the international human rights community can make to the definition and framing of a practically effective global ethic, especially in light of ongoing concerns about social and economic justice, environmental issues, and systematic abuses of vulnerable populations. The principal argument is that the human rights movement in all of its dimensions (moral, legal, political) provides the pivotal foundation for a practicable global ethic now and for the foreseeable future. Evidence for the truth of this claim is discerned in the movement's contemporary efforts to intersect explicitly with other areas of international law and politics. Examples adduced include developments with respect to the rights of indigenous peoples, decision making about the environment, and transitional justice.     

Emotional granularity and borderline personality disorder

This study examined the affective dysregulation component of borderline personality disorder (BPD) from an emotional granularity perspective, which refers to the specificity in which one represents emotions. Forty-six female participants meeting criteria for BPD and 51 female control participants without BPD and Axis I pathology completed tasks that assessed the degree to which participants incorporated information about valence (pleasant-unpleasant) and arousal (calm-activated) in their semantic/conceptual representations of emotions and in using labels to represent emotional reactions. As hypothesized, participants with BPD emphasized valence more and arousal less than control participants did when using emotion terms to label their emotional reactions. Implications and future research directions are discussed.     

Evaluations of moral and conventional intergroup transgressions

To investigate children's understanding of intergroup transgressions, children (3–8 years, N = 84) evaluated moral and conventional transgressions that occurred among members of the same gender group (ingroup) or members of different gender groups (outgroup). All participants judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. However, when asked to make a judgment after being told an authority figure did not see the transgression, younger participants still judged that moral violations were less acceptable than conventional transgressions, but judged both moral and conventional transgressions with an outgroup victim as more acceptable than the corresponding transgressions with an ingroup victim. Older children did not demonstrate the same ingroup bias; rather they focused only on the domain of the transgressions. The results demonstrate the impact intergroup information has on children's evaluations about both moral and conventional transgressions.     

Guilty feelings, targeted actions

Early investigations of guilt cast it as an emotion that prompts broad reparative behaviors that help guilty individuals feel better about themselves or about their transgressions. The current investigation found support for a more recent representation of guilt as an emotion designed to identify and correct specific social offenses. Across five experiments, guilt influenced behavior in a targeted and strategic way. Guilt prompted participants to share resources more generously with others, but only did so when those others were persons whom the participant had wronged and only when those wronged individuals could notice the gesture. Rather than trigger broad reparative behaviors that remediate one's general reputation or self-perception, guilt triggers targeted behaviors intended to remediate specific social transgressions.     

The importance of what they care about

Many forms of contemporary morality treat the individual as the fundamental unit of moral importance. Perhaps the most striking example of this moral vision of the individual is the contemporary global human rights regime, which treats the individual as, for all intents and purposes, sacrosanct. This essay attempts to explore one feature of this contemporary understanding of the moral status of the individual, namely the moral significance of a subject’s actual affective states, and in particular her cares and commitments. I argue that in virtue of the moral significance of actual individuals, we should take actual cares and values very seriously—even if those cares and values are not expressions of the person’s autonomy—as partially constituting that individual as a concrete subject who is the proper object of our moral attention. In particular, I argue that a person’s actual cares and values have non-derivative moral significance. Simply because someone cares about something, that care is morally significant. In virtue of this non-derivative moral significance of cares, we ought to adopt of a commitment to accommodate others’ cares and a commitment not to frustrate their cares.     

塑造公民诚信人格的具体目标

个体诚信修养是个体实现从诚信规范的他律向自律的转化,确立高尚的诚信人格的主体性活动。塑造公民的诚信人格具体而言就是做一个道德认识求真知、道德情感求真挚、道德信念求真诚、道德意志求真笃、道德行为求真切的诚信公民。     

Cognitive Impairment and Its Relationship to Psychopathic Tendencies in Children with Emotional and Behavioral Difficulties

This study investigated whether performance on the card playing task (Newman, Patterson, & Kosson, 1987) and the moral/conventional distinction measure predict level of childhood conduct problems as indexed by the Psychopathy Screening Device (Frick & Hare, in press). The card-playing task indexes the child's sensitivity to changes in reinforcement rate. The moral/conventional distinction measure indexes the child's sensitivity to the difference between moral transgressions which result in harm to another from conventional transgressions which more usually result in social disorder. The Psychopathy Screening Device indexes a behavioral syndrome that consists of two dimensions: affective disturbance and impulsive and conduct problems. Thirty-nine children with emotional and behavioral difficulties were presented with both measures. Performance on both measures did predict extent of behavioral disturbance. Moreover, there was a significant association between performance on the card playing tasks and the moral/conventional distinction. The results are interpreted within the response set modulation and violence inhibition mechanism models and by reference to recent work at the anatomical level.     

中国当代研究生情感素质的潜在类别分析

情感素质在促进学生全面发展中占有举足轻重的地位,而研究生作为高层次人才的重要输出来源,其本身的情感素质值得关注。本研究对10056名研究生的情感素质进行潜在类别分析,结果表明：研究生情感素质总体发展尚好,但存在水平差异,且各水平间情感素质内部维度的发展规律不一致;性别和专业会影响研究生情感素质的发展。此外,本研究基于潜在分类的结果,得到了《中国大学生情感素质问卷》划界分数,实现对研究生情感素质的直观评价。     

Social Closeness and Decision Making: Moral, Attributive and Emotional Reactions to Third Party Transgressions

Decisions involving moral vectors are inherently social. This paper investigates social closeness to others as one of the important factors that mediate our evaluations of moral infractions. The influence of social closeness on participants?? third-party evaluations of moral transgressions was measured across development. Participants?? intentional attributions, punitive sentiments, moral judgments, and emotional reactions were measured using responses to hypothetical vignettes that describe socio-moral transgressions involving theft. Participants?? attribution judgments, punitive decisions, and emotional reactions differed when their social relationship with the perpetrator (Study One), and alternatively with the victim (Study Two), of the transgression was varied. Evidence is provided for the supposition that morality is a construct of social cooperative exchange and that social closeness influences socio-moral evaluations and judgments.