Forward

This paper explicates the philosophical and epistemological background of the MIRRORS project, which is the starting point of the various contributions in this issue. Developments in the philosophy of science will be discussed, especially the watershed work of Kuhn, in order to analyze further developments in the sociology of science, particularly starting from the Strong Programme. Finally, it will be shown how a multidisciplinary approach in Science & Technology (S&T) studies, as opposed to an interdisciplinary one, is to be preferred. Specifically, the connection between this approach and the modelling and idealizational approaches to science is stressed and defended as the best available approach for the formation of a conscientious democratic knowledge-based society.     

Nesselroade and Molenaar's Measurement Concerns and Proposals: An Introduction

In this special section Nesselroade and Molenaar (N & M) propose a provocative new approach to measurement invariance. When measures are collected repeatedly over time (e.g., daily diary studies), a potentially unique measurement model relating the items to the underlying construct can be created for each individual. If hypothesized causal paths specified between constructs (e.g., frustration → aggression) can be constrained to be equal across the individuals, a model with idiographic measurement of the constructs, but with nomothetic structural relationships can be specified. Three commentaries react to N & M's proposal. Revelle and Wilt challenge the priority given by N & M to unique individual measurement structures, arguing that between subjects differences in structural relationships are empirically important and meaningful. Markus's uses David Hume's framework to raise philosophy of science challenges for N & M's approach. Maydeu-Olivares challenges the incremental validity of N & M's approach, arguing that N & M's approach is unlikely to improve the prediction of between subjects criteria. Finally, N & M present a rejoinder to the three commentaries.     

EZ does it! Extensions of the EZ-diffusion model

In this rejoinder, we address two of Ratcliff’s main concerns with respect to the EZ-diffusion model (Ratcliff, 2008). First, we introduce “robust-EZ,” a mixture model approach to achieve robustness against the presence of response contaminants that might otherwise distort parameter estimates. Second, we discuss an extension of the EZ model that allows the estimation of starting point as an additional parameter. Together with recently developed, user-friendly software programs for fitting the full diffusion model (Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2007; Voss & Voss, 2007), the development of the EZ model and its extensions is part of a larger effort to make diffusion model analyses accessible to a broader audience, an effort that is long overdue.     

Philosophy of Science in the Twenty‐First Century

Philosophy of science in the past half century can be seen as a reaction against logical empiricism's focus on modern logic as the format in which debates should be expressed and on physics as the canonical science. These reactions have resulted in a fragmentation of the field. Although this provides ways forward for disparate philosophies of various sciences, it threatens the very possibility of general philosophy of science. The debate that most obviously continues to be conducted at the general level—the debate about scientific realism—only does so because of a dangerous naïveté. Nevertheless, this article suggests that there is a place for general work not by starting at the highest level of abstraction but instead by abstracting general lessons from actual science.     

A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES: DISSONANCE IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF RATIONALITY

Abstract. The relation between rationality in science and rationality in moral discourse is of interest to philosophers and sociologists of science, to educators and moral philosophers. Apparently conflicting conceptions of rationality can be detected at the core of two current socio-educational controversies: the creationievolution controversy and that concerning "moral education." This paper takes as its starting point the recorded views of participants in these controversies; exhibits the contradictions and their effect on the public; relates these contradictions to developments in the philosophy and history of science; and suggests, in a preliminary way, one approach for dealing with the problem.     

Untangling the Debate: The Ethics of Human Enhancement

Human enhancement, in which nanotechnology is expected to play a major role, continues to be a highly contentious ethical debate, with experts on both sides calling it the single most important issue facing science and society in this brave, new century. This paper is a broad introduction to the symposium herein that explores a range of perspectives related to that debate. We will discuss what human enhancement is and its apparent contrast to therapy; and we will begin to tease apart the myriad intertwined issues that arise in the debate: (1) freedom & autonomy, (2) health & safety, (3) fairness & equity, (4) societal disruption, and (5) human dignity.

READING DUNS SCOTUS: FROM HISTORY TO PHILOSOPHY

One cannot insert Duns Scotus directly into contemporary debates of theology without first of all recalling and recounting his place in the history of metaphysics understood as a transcendental science. It is only then, and starting from philosophical arguments, that one will be able to engage thoughts about God—i.e., do "theology"—in such as way as not to betray God's transcendence.     

Kuhn and the science of religion

Ever since the challenge to the ‘received’ view of the philosophy of science—a view epitomized by Karl Popper and Carl Hempel—the status of science has been questioned. If radical critics of the received view—critics including Kuhn, Laudan, Feyerabend, the Edinburgh Strong Programme, and Latour—are right, can science, which means natural science, still be considered objective? Can it still be deemed the model of objectivity to be emulated by the social sciences and even by the humanities? Because religious studies is commonly assumed to fall short of the standards of objectivity of the natural sciences and even of the social sciences, what bearing does criticism of conventional philosophy of science have on it? Specifically, can the religionist approach to religion, the approach that purports to be the sole appropriate one for religious studies, be defended? Does radical philosophy of science, by challenging the objectivity of scientific claims, make the world safe for religious ones? This article will focus on the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn and will seek to determine what use defenders of religious studies can make of it.     

Center-periphery relations and transformation of post-soviet science

The republics of the former USSR need a new science and technology (S&T) policy. The main question concerns the relevance of innovation studies and practical recommendations in developed countries to S&T policy in the new independent states. The participation of the republics of the USSR in scientific research has been of a dual nature. Sharing the independent S&T policy of the superpower, they were the periphery dependent on the center (in Moscow). Now, the S&T sphere of the former republics should be dependentnot on the political center of the Soviet Union, but on the world science center. The inversion urges an adequate change in the objectives, resources, and mechanism of the transformation of post-Soviet science. Moreover, new S&T policy must be based on the specific socioeconomic situation, including the traditions of the social organization of science. His research interests include sociology of science and science and technology policy.     

A Type Hierarchy of Selection Processes for the Evaluation of Evolutionary Analogies

In this paper I propose a type-hierarchy approach to provide an intersubjective framework for the evaluation of evolutionary analogies. This approach develops David Hull’s and others’ attempts to provide full generalisation for selection processes, in order to show that sociocultural development and, particularly, scientific change can be considered as an instance of Darwinian selection. I argue that the recent work by Eileen Cornell Way on type hierarchies can offer the kind of generalisation needed to solve the main problems that still affect Hull’s theory and to show that the evolutionary analogy is, after all, only a particular way of grouping phenomena together. If Hull’s main objective is a unified theory of selection, which supports the idea that science selection and natural selection obey the same laws, I also argue that the type hierarchy approach to models shows that this objective is unsustainable as it stands, and is in need of further development. I will firstly introduce the general outline of the type hierarchy approach to models. Then, after a brief recapitulation of Hull’s main points and difficulties, I will try and construct a hierarchy for a general abstraction of selection processes. Finally I will introduce the main criticisms that Hull’s work has faced from philosophers and scientists, and show how they compare with my proposal.     

The Tacit Epistemology of the GMO Debate: A Case Study

The issue of biotechnology has been chosen in the MIRRORS project in order to analyze the sometimes uneasy relationship between science and society. After analyzing the situation of biotechnology regarding the GMO debate in Spain, France and Italy during a previous MIRRORS Workshop (This MIRRORS Workshop is entitled European Policies and Knowledge Society, held in Catania on December 15th 2008, during the which the undersigned, Anna Benedetta Francese and Cinzia Rizza discussed three papers about this topic [see the MIRRORS website www.mirrors-project.it]), in this essay I have tried to tackle the relationship science–society, focalizing my attention on the epistemological and methodological problems behind the biotechnology debate that are often not clearly expressed, remaining mainly tacitly presupposed. I will take as a starting point some questions about the role of science in society and about the way science is used by policy makers in decision-making processes. These questions are fundamental in order to analyze (and possibly to propose salvation strategies) the existing problems of the relationship between science and society which has assumed, especially nowadays, more conflictual aspects. Our Research Team firmly holds that it is not possible to tackle this topic without an in-depth discussion of the most significant epistemological questions regarding research, discussions, and methods of biotechnology.     

A prior predictive loss function for the evaluation of inequality constrained hypotheses

In many types of statistical modeling, inequality constraints are imposed between the parameters of interest. As we will show in this paper, the DIC (i.e., posterior Deviance Information Criterium as proposed as a Bayesian model selection tool by Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Van Der Linde, 2002) fails when comparing inequality constrained hypotheses. In this paper, we will derive the prior DIC and show that it also fails when comparing inequality constrained hypotheses. However, it will be shown that a modification of the prior predictive loss function that is minimized by the prior DIC renders a criterion that does have the properties needed in order to be able to compare inequality constrained hypotheses. This new criterion will be called the Prior Information Criterion (PIC) and will be illustrated and evaluated using simulated data and examples. The PIC has a close connection with the marginal likelihood in combination with the encompassing prior approach and both methods will be compared. All in all, the main message of the current paper is: (1) do not use the classical DIC when evaluating inequality constrained hypotheses, better use the PIC; and (2) the PIC is considered a proper model selection tool in the context of evaluating inequality constrained hypotheses.     

The harms of ignoring the social nature of science

In this paper I argue that philosophers of science have an obligation to recognize and engage with the social nature of the sciences they assess if those sciences are morally relevant. Morally-relevant science is science that has the potential to risk harm to humans, non-humans, or the environment. My argument and the approach I develop are informed by an analysis of the philosophy of biology literature on the criticism of evolutionary psychology (EP), the study of the evolution of human psychology and behaviour. From this literature, I tease out two different methods of scientific critique. The first I call the “truth-detectional” approach. Those who take this approach are first and foremost concerned about the truth of EP claims as that truth can be determined by evidence. The second I call the “social-dimensional” approach. Those who take this approach talk about the production and truth of EP claims but within a social framework. On this account, the legitimacy and perceived legitimacy of EP claims are not separate from the institutional and social processes and values that lend to their production. I show that the truth-detectional approach risks harms to society and to the philosophy of science, but that the social-dimensional approach avoids these harms. Philosophers of science, therefore, should take a social-dimensional approach to the assessment of morally-relevant science.

     

Lessons on the utilization of research from nine case experiences in the natural hazards field

Research-funding organizations and research investigators can take several steps to improve the utilization of scientific research. These steps were derived from nine case studies of research projects in the natural hazards field, representing three academic fields of study: physical science, social science, and architecture. The case studies investigated the extent to which these projects corroborated the conditions associated with specific theories of research utilization. Following a replication research design, the cross-case conclusions were that greater utilization will result where research investigators and users maintain a rich set of professional communications over time, leading to research that is: academically excellent, addresses practical problems, can be modified in the early stages to be responsive to users’ needs, and produces usable products. Robert K. Yin is President of COSMOS Corporation, which specializes in both social science research and in information systems development. Dr. Yin also serves as a visiting professor, department of Computer Science and Information Systems, American University, Washington, D.C. 20016. Gwendolyn B. Moore is a senior manager for Nolan, Norton, & Co., an information technology affiliate of Peat Marwick. She specializes in information technology and strategic planning projects, and holds an MBA in Business Policy from the University of Massachusetts.     

The Relationship of Temperament Scores to the Way Young Adults Adapt to Change

Temperament has been suggested as affecting the way individuals adapt to changes. This study examined the relationship of temperament, as measured by the Dimensions of Temperament Scale (Lerner, Palermo, Spiro, & Nesselroade, 1982), to three aspects of adaptation for 167 students starting post-secondary education. Loneliness was measured using Schmidt and Sermat's (1983) Differential Loneliness Scale, involvement was measured using Scales of Satisfaction and Activity (Vinsel, Brown, Altman, & Foss, 1980), and affect was measured using the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965a). In the sample, feelings of loneliness were related to temperament differentially with regard to friends, romantic-sexual relationships, groups, and family. Involvement was best predicted by the approach/withdrawal dimension, whereas affect was best predicted by the dimensions of mood. The results are consistent with earlier work with children and lend support to the view of temperament as an active mechanism by which the individual adapts to life changes.     

The Ontology of Mutualism

Abstract

The homeokinetic approach to behavior (applied to humans, the approach is described in Iberall & McCulloch, 1969; and more generally in Soodak & Iberall, 1978) is extended in this article to argue that free will is exercised at a temporal scale of approximately 6 s. The homeokinetic theory of complex physical systems, including living systems, analyzes activity into component sets of oscillators, action modes, each with a characteristic time scale. A full set of nested time scales involved can be thought of as a spectrum. In this article, I argue that a survey of human action modes, as a spectral analysis, allows for the free election of acts only at the 6-s scale.

Intention (per Hebb, see Wolman, 1973, p. 437): central guidance of behavior by an enduring system that maintains its independence despite sensory input. Volition: act of willing or choosing.

This article is concerned with establishing a physical foundation for such actions in mammals, particularly human.     

God in the Hands of Future Science

There is reasonable evidence suggesting that humans have an innate tendency toward being religious. Consequently, religion is unlikely to disappear; the question then is how this feature will impact on future society. Three scenarios are discussed: One, science will dominate; two, religion will dominate; and three, the present conflict between the two is resolved. The latter scenario may happen through a realization that religion has the potential for doing more good than bad, in terms of individual quality of life and in improving society. Obtaining maximum benefit of religion will require a concept of God that is compatible with science, and that can be accepted as a common core for the various faiths. Science may help in this endeavor.     

Science and technology development in the third world: Competing policy perspectives

A planned strategy of engagement, in order to benefit from, and contribute to Western science and technology, should be the major focus of science and technology policy in the Third World. What is needed is a strategy of vigorous and innovative engagement which will be based on an open approach to Western science and technology, a dynamic model of science development integration and institutional reforms for qualitative improvements in the social structure of science in the Third World. Reprinted from Knowledge and Policy: The International Journal of Knowledge Transfer and Utilization, Spring 1990, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 3–20. His research interests include comparative science and technology policy, organizational behavior, and sociology of change and modernization.     

Social machines: a philosophical engineering

In Weaving the Web (2000), Berners-Lee defines Social Machines as biotechnologically hybrid Web-processes on the basis of which, “high-level activities, which have occurred just within one human’s brain, will occur among even larger more interconnected groups of people acting as if the shared a larger intuitive brain” (201–202). The analysis and design of Social Machines has already started attracting considerable attention both within the industry and academia. Web science, however, is still missing a clear definition of what a Social Machine is, which has in turn resulted in several calls for a “philosophical engineering” (Halpin 2013; Hendler & Berners-Lee 2010); Halpin et al. 2010). This paper is a first attempt to respond to this call, by combining contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science with epistemology. The idea of philosophical engineering implies that a sufficiently good conception of Social Machines should be of both theoretical and practical advantage. To demonstrate how the present approach can satisfy both objectives it will be used in order to address one of Wikipedia’s (the most famous Social Machine to date) most worrying concerns—i.e., the current and ongoing decline in the number of its active contributors (Halfacker et al. 2012).     

Adding Deleuze to the mix

In this article I will suggest ways in which adding the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze to the mix can complement and extend the 4EA approach to cognitive science. In the first part of the paper, I will show how the Deleuzean tripartite ontological difference (virtual/intensive/actual) can provide an explicit ontology for dynamical systems theory. The second part will take these ontological notions and apply them to three areas of concern to the 4EA approaches: (a) the Deleuzean concept of the virtual will clarify the ontological status of perceptual capacity as sensorimotor skill; (b) the Deleuzean concept of “intensive individuation” will clarify the ontological status of the genesis of perceptually guided behavior; (c) the Deleuzean critique of confusing the actual and the virtual will enable us to intervene in the realism/idealism debate. These aspects will not be addressed sequentially but will be interwoven into an unfolding argument.