Personality Process-Structure Duality: Reply to Two Commentaries

In two commentaries, Kostromina and Grishina (2018) and Mironenko (2018) offered constructive thoughts and questions in response to an article by Giordano (2018, Culture & Psychology, 23, 502–518) on the merits of an approach to understanding individual personality that focuses on the processes rather than structures of personality. In this reply, the authors seek to clarify some of the points made in the original article. The authors also describe a personality process-structure duality, whereby personality is conceptualized in terms of processes or structures based on the methods used to study it. If the goal is to understand the dynamic and emergent properties of individual personality, the authors continue to argue for the merits of a process-centric approach and the avoidance of structural thinking.     

Self-Regulation: Reminders and Suggestions from Personality Science

La littérature sur l’autorégulation est couramment accusée de faiblesse théorique. Il est possible que les avancées dans les recherches sur la personnalité puissent ouvrir des horizons dans ce secteur. Notre objectif est double. Nous rappelons d’abord des distinctions conceptuelles qui, bien que parfois négligées, sont essentielles dans les études contemporaines sur la personnalité et incontournables pour accéder au niveau théorique dans la littérature sur l’autorégulation. Nous disons ensuite que ceux qui font des études fondamentales et appliquées sur l’autorégulation auraient intérêt à assimiler les progrès récents concernant la dynamique et la structure de la personnalité intra‐individuelle. Nous passons en revue la théorie de base et les recherches sur l’architecture des systèmes de la personnalité intra‐individuelle, ainsi que les retombées de ce travail dans trois domaines d’application: la psychologie du travail/industrielle/organisationnelle, la psychologie clinique et la santé. The self‐regulation literature commonly is said to lack theoretical order. This paper explores the possibility that advances in personality science may foster clarity in this literature. Our goals are two‐fold. We remind readers of conceptual distinctions that are central to contemporary personality science, that are necessary to the attainment of theoretical order in the self‐regulation literature, yet that sometimes are overlooked. Secondly, we suggest that basic and applied students of self‐regulation would profit by capitalising on recent advances in personality science that explore intra‐individual personality structure and dynamics. We review theory and research on the architecture of intra‐individual personality systems and applications of this work to three domains: health, clinical, and work/industrial/organisation psychology.     

Personality Science, Self-Regulation, and Health Behavior

In their paper, Cervone, Shadel, Smith, and Fiori (2006 ) present a thorough analysis of self-regulatory behavior, understood as the most genuine expression of the agentic and purposive nature of human beings. Therefore, we can expect that research on personality could shed light on our understanding of self-regulatory processes and behavioral expressions. With this aim, Cervone et al. have carried out an updated analysis of personality psychology theory and research, resuming the debate between variable and person-centered approaches, and commenting on the contributions the Knowledge-and-Appraisal Personality Architecture (KAPA) can make to the design of idiosyncratic tools and strategies for personality assessment and to the understanding of the role of the personality system in different contexts of applied psychology, such as health, clinical and industrial/organisational psychology. Here, I would like to examine two topics, to which Cervone et al. pay substantial attention in their paper: self-regulation and personality dynamics, and the role of personality science in addressing central questions in health psychology.     

Personality Science and Self-Regulation: Personal Projects as Integrative Units

Cervone, Shadel, Smith, and Fiori (2006 ) make a strong case for enhancing theoretical coherence in the study of self-regulation by examining recent advances in personality science. I extend their line of argument, reframe their philosophical reminders and strategically shift their suggestions. My goal is to provide an augmented base from which personality science and self-regulation research and practice can derive mutual benefit. Consensus seems to be emerging that personality science can be usefully conceptualised as a multi-tier structure, each floor of which focuses on different units of analysis. I focus on Tier I (trait units) and Tier II (PAC units (personal action constructs)). I suggest that Tier II is the home of both the social cognitive theorists and social ecological theorists and that they seem to have colluded to ignore each other. I use Cervone et al.'s timely article as a stimulant to do some renovation work on this floor. Focusing on personal projects I suggest that they provide an integrative function for personality science that augments the contributions of their close neighbors doing CAPS and KAPA research. By some minor renovations we find ourselves able to speak to the narrative theorists in the loft above and even to the trait theorists below. The resulting conversational potential, I suggest, is salutary for both personality science and the study of self-regulation.     

Reply to Commentaries

The following response to discussions by Benjamin and by Fonagy and Target focuses on several issues raised, including linearity versus multiplicity in the assessment of developmental capacities, the complex interplay of shame and subjectivity in an intersubjective field, the notion of surrender in resolving therapeutic impasse, and some thoughts on the concept of the third, as they are exemplified in this case material.     

Reply to Commentaries

In reply to my discussants, I take up their questions on the subjects of foolishness, the analyst's dreams, and the unnamed patient. My responses to them bring me back to my own father to ask questions that had not been asked yet about my mother's release; back to the return of my patient after years of absence, and the additional history I learned then; and back to Lacan's seminar and my Lacanian analytic training to question that approach to the treatment of madness.     

Reply to Commentaries

In my response to the commentaries, I take up Dr. Cushman's concerns about my use of the term “empathy,” grounding my use in the term's changing definitions over time. I take up Dr. Harris's concerns by elaborating on my views about the complexity of identifications and the fluidity of both subjective agency and power structures.     

Reply to Commentaries

In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from social cognition. The underlying mechanisms of metacognitive development are then elucidated in terms of interaction patterns. Finally, we consider measures of metacognition and suitable methods for investigating it. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reply to Commentaries

The author examines the gendered Oedipal dynamics in Steven H. Cooper’s discussion and the notion of the “phallic collapse” in the context of recruiting a “third.” By comparison, the developmental thrust of Jody Messler Davies’s commentary is examined, specifically the idea of the various registers located in particular self-other configurations and the primacy of sensory experience in unlocking the impasse.     

Reply to Commentaries

In this brief reply to commentaries from Professor Etzel Cardeña and Professor Anssi Peräkylä on my paper, I try to extend some of the themes they raise, and sketch areas for subsequent research. In particular, I focus on Peräkylä’s observation that poetic confluence may serve a range of socio-relational functions, and Cardeña’s remarks on the metaphorical dimensions of mind. My discussion is developed around a brief consideration of a case that, while retaining key features of poetic confluence, departs from the pattern described in my paper.     

Reply to Commentaries

In this reply to Adrienne Harris and Cleonie White's discussions of my article “Language and Intersubjectivity: Multiplicity in a Bilingual Treatment,” I further explore the psychodynamics of bilingualism primarily in relation to implicit communication through spoken and unspoken language(s), affect, the body and unformulated experience. I also examine the intrapsychic and relational impact of multiple early attachments and consider the emergence of my own multicultural identity formed in the context of a primary cross-racial attachment in which I first learned to speak French.     

Reply to Commentaries

Each discussant approached my paper on embedded levels of illusion from a different perspective, representing schools as diverse as those derived from Jung and Bion. It is interesting that, although my paper was not primarily about dreams or how to interpret them, but rather about the way in which multiple levels of illusion may open a potential space in treatment, each discussant centered his comments around a dream that I had reported in one of my cases. In this reply, I compare the discussants' approaches to the dream with mine. I also wonder whether the dream itself represents an embedded level of illusion within my paper. If so, it may function as a transitional space in which we may entertain different viewpoints around not only the nature of dream work, but also around questions including the nature of the mind and the therapeutic process.     

Reply to Commentaries

Questions of historical context resonate with an Independent view of the importance of history. The historical backgrounds of North American and British psychoanalysis are relevant. Some American analysts may be seen as belonging to the Independent tradition, and the relation between Independent analysis in Britain and Relational analysis in America needs further consideration. I ask how far Relational analysis is taking on an institutional identity, and link this to Poland's discussion of “outsiderness.” Responding to Bass's and Berman's comments on my clinical examples I discuss why I sometimes do think analysts need to ascribe meaning to a patient's material. In other instances an analyst will invite the patient more into the process by which meaning evolves between them. To move freely between these positions is central to my view of clinical technique. I express doubts about analysts asking patients for their emotional reaction to an analyst's interventions. This risks being intrusive, and may tend to keep the exchange at the conscious level of a patient's mind. The analytic relationship is an interpersonal one between real people, but the analyst needs also to remain symbolically available as an object of unconscious fantasy and projection.     

Reality Bytes: Reply to Commentaries

The author discusses Danielle Knafo’s paper, “Guys and Dolls,” from the developmental perspective of transitional space and the interplay of intersubjectively constructed spontaneous gestures, in the co-construction of a new narrative in the process of psychoanalytic treatment.     

Relational Trouble: Reply to Commentaries

This reply to the commentaries by Corbett, Hansell, and Stern explores whether Lacan's concept of the real can—or should—be translated into more readily recognizable terms. It extends our previous discussion of impossibility by arguing that not all ideas and experiences can be brought within the realm of the known and familiar. We suggest that impossibilities of meaning should not be understood primarily in phenomenological terms, and we demur from the assessment that our concept of impossibility offers nothing for clinical work. Claiming that what resists meaning also impedes relationality, we encourage relational theorists to address the nonrelational processes that subtend relationality, including the relation between analyst and patient. We acknowledge that the theory of impossibility—or what we now call “negative mediation”—raises a fundamental challenge to relational theory, but we insist that disruptions of relationality need not be considered pathological. Taking into account the nonrelational may enhance rather than impoverish relational psychoanalysis.     

Dialectics Forever: Reply to Commentaries

The dialectic between repetition and transformation, an inherent aspect of the therapeutic dialogue, is elaborated. Dialectic refers to an ever-present tension within a process, a pull by opposite tendencies in contradictory directions. Checks and balances between repetition and transformation are crucial. Too great a tilt toward transformation can bring the system into disorganization and instability. Too great a tilt toward repetition and the system can stagnate. The term “dialectic” is also used to refer to the tension between an emphasis on process and an emphasis on content or outcome. The massive challenges to traditional psychoanalytic treatment that stem from the empirical infant research, self psychology, general systems theory, and motivational systems are discussed. Their contributions are of particular relevance to the nonverbal dimension of the analyst-patient interaction.     

Searching for the Ethical: Reply to Commentaries

In replying to the commentaries I challenge the notion that the analyst can remain an apolitical or dehistoricized subject. As relational analysts our work is to keep broadening our reach, and expanding our thinking including addressing the ethical imperatives of our times. I raise the philosophical issue of collective responsibility which deals with moral rather than causal responsibility and the concept of metaphysical guilt, guilt based on who one is rather than what one has done. I also address the need for more innovative forms of writing in psychoanalysis, and my own style of writing in which language attempts to perform the theory. In creating a more narrative driven style of writing I hope that the reader will be able to experience from the inside, rather than solely from a theoretical position, the concepts I am exploring.     

From the Same Planet: Reply to Commentaries

This reply offers clarification of the author's thesis. What was originally a reciprocal, pleasurable experience for each sex of mutual interpenetration with the preoedipal mother devolves into a split, gendered polarity. The specific form this takes for a boy—repudiation of identification with the mother and with maternal qualities—is seen to be detrimental to male development. I theorize a culturally normative, gender-specific neurosis caused not by maternal care but by the difficulty in male development of continuing to incorporate the surplus pleasures of maternal penetration given a problematic model of masculinity. My aim in “Unlawful Entry” is not to reverse gendered power relations but to forward their elimination.