Preferred Difficulty and Subjective Probability in Different Action Phases

Drawing on Gollwitzer's deliberative–implemental mindset distinction (P. M. Gollwitzer, 1990), it was predicted that people who are deliberating on different actions or goals would be more cautious or more realistic in their expectation of success in subsequent tasks than people who are going to implement a chosen action or goal. Participants were given a choice between different test-materials. They were interrupted before (deliberative) or immediately after decision-making (implemental). They then either had to choose between various levels of difficulty within one type of task (Experiment 1) or they had to predict their own future performance (Experiment 2). The results showed that deliberative participants preferred less difficult tasks and overestimated their probability of success less than implemental participants. In addition, deliberative participants referred more than implemental participants to their past performance when selecting levels of difficulty or predicting future performance; however, the two groups did not differ in actual performance. Taken together, the findings suggest that people are more realistic in a deliberative than in an implemental state of mind. The present studies extend prior research because for the first time they document mindset effects on peoples' estimates concerning their future performance in the achievement domain.     

Action Phases and Goal Setting: Being Optimistic After Decision Making Without Getting into Trouble

According to Gollwitzer's mindset theory, people in postdecisional action phases, who are about to implement a chosen action or goal, are supposed to be more optimistic than people in predecisional action phases, who are deliberating on different actions or goals (P. M. Gollwitzer, 1990). The present experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that postdecisional people are optimistic in a way that does not set them up for failure and disappointment. In three experiments it is shown that people who are in an implemental mindset neither set more demanding goals than do deliberative people nor do they inflate their performance predictions. Instead, they are more confident in reaching their goals and more cautious when predicting future performance. This behavior is interpreted in terms of a strategy that allows people to hold optimistic beliefs without facing the danger of exaggerated goal setting or a disconfirmation of their beliefs.     

Mindsets and pre-conscious open-mindedness to incidental information

Mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 1990) proposes that deliberative mindsets are marked by more open-minded processing of information, whereas implemental mindsets are characterized by more closed-minded processing. Accordingly, deliberative and implemental mindsets should differ in selective processing of incidental information when performing a central task. In three experiments, participants in deliberative and implemental mindsets performed a computer task while randomly presented incidental, unavoidable words. A subsequent recognition memory test assessed selective processing of these incidental words. Results revealed that deliberative mindsets led to superior recognition memory, suggesting increased open-mindedness to processing incidental information. Implications for mindset and goal theories are discussed.     

The Volitional and Strategic Effects of Planning on Task Performance and Goal Commitment

This study integrates action-control theory and goal-setting theory research on planning by examining whether the volitional (e.g., implementation intention and implemental mind-set) and intellectual (e.g., strategic) benefits of planning have independent and interactive effects on performance and goal commitment. Results show that individuals who formed implementation intentions performed better than individuals who did not form implementation intentions, even after controlling for strategy variables. In addition, the volitional and strategy variables interacted to predict performance, suggesting that the volitional benefits of planning depend, in part, on strategy quality. Although the implemental mind-set and implementation intention manipulations did not influence goal commitment, strategy quality was positively related to goal commitment.     

从“想”到“做”——卢比孔模型的解释力和应用

卢比孔模型包括四个阶段(前决策、前行动、行动和后行动)、三种意向(目标、执行和评价)及调控机制,旨在勾画愿望如何转换为具体行动。过往的研究聚焦于心理定势和执行意向,近年则扩及于消费和健康心理学等领域中。透过对照何谓好理论的准则及检视其他动机理论的局限,卢比孔模型的优点呈现为建构上的简约,能区分动机和意志过程并体现其复杂性,且应用广泛。针对此模型的拓展,可就往昔被忽略的环节进行更细致的研究。     

The effects of an implemental mind-set on attitude strength

The authors investigated whether an implemental mind-set fosters stronger attitudes. Participants who made a decision about how to act (vs. those who held off) expressed a more extreme attitude toward an issue unrelated to the decision (Experiment 1). Participants who planned the implementation of a decision (vs. deliberated vs. control) exhibited less ambivalent (Experiment 2) and more accessible (Experiment 3) attitudes toward various objects unrelated to the decision. Moreover, an attitude reported by planning participants better predicted self-reported behavior 1 week later (Experiment 4). Finally, results suggest that the effect of an implemental mind-set on attitude strength toward unrelated objects is driven by a focus on information that supports an already-made decision (Experiment 5). Implications for attitudes, goals, and mind-sets are discussed.     

The effects of mindset on behavior: self-regulation in deliberative and implemental frames of mind

The effects of deliberative and implemental mindsets--cognitive and motivational states associated with predecisional and postdecisional frames of mind, respectively--were examined in the context of the self-regulation of behavior. Participants who had been induced to deliberate the merits of participating in a specified task formulated more pessimistic expectations about this task than did participants who had been induced to imagine implementing a plan to complete the task. Moreover, participants in the deliberation condition underperformed relative to the participants in the implemental condition, demonstrating that deliberative and implemental thinking can influence behavior as well as cognition.     

The role of motivation and volition in economic decisions: Evidence from eye movements and pupillometry

Economic decisions usually involve high stakes, real consequences, and some degree of personal risk. This article explores the impact of motivational and volitional states on economic decision processes in an incentivized lottery choice task. We investigated the patterns of decision time, choice, information search, and pupil dilation dependent on an experimental manipulation of motivation and volition, that is, the deliberative and the implemental mindset. The results indicated that choice preferences in economic decisions were robust and remained unaffected by motivational and volitional states, but decision processes were notably impacted. Decision makers in a deliberative state of mind searched for information more extensively and made slower decisions than the baseline. The implemental mindset was associated with more attention paid to the probability attributes of the gambles relative to the deliberative mindset. Furthermore, we observed that gamble outcomes that entailed no win at all (i.e., zero outcomes) played an important role for information search. These outcomes were largely disregarded in terms of predecisional information search but elicited pupillary responses similar to very high outcome lotteries. These results inform the current debate about the zero effect in risky choice. We also discuss the potential of eye-tracking studies of risky choice to dissolve ambiguities concerning the contributions of effort and arousal to modulating pupillary response. Implications for theoretical advances in decision research are discussed.     

Compensatory conviction in the face of personal uncertainty: going to extremes and being oneself

Study 1 participants' self-integrity (C. M. Steele. 1988) was threatened by deliberative mind-set (S. E. Taylor & P. M. Gollwitzer, 1995) induced uncertainty. They masked the uncertainty with more extreme conviction about social issues. An integrity-repair exercise after the threat, however, eliminated uncertainty and the conviction response. In Study 2, the same threat caused clarified values and more self-consistent personal goals. Two other uncertainty-related threats, mortality salience and temporal discontinuity, caused similar responses: more extreme intergroup bias in Study 3, and more self-consistent personal goals and identifications in Study 4. Going to extremes and being oneself are seen as 2 modes of compensatory conviction used to defend against personal uncertainty. Relevance to cognitive dissonance and authoritarianism theories is discussed, and a new perspective on terror managenment theory (J. Greenberg, S. Solomom, & T. Pyszczynski, 1997) is proposed.     

Keeping it real: self‐control depletion increases accuracy,but decreases confidence for performance

We propose that egotism about one's abilities may be related to good self‐regulation and a lack of self‐control may reduce estimations of aptitudes. Self‐control depletion should lead to more accurate and therefore less lofty predictions of future performances. In two experiments, self‐control depletion was manipulated by having participants either resist tempting cookies or by inhibiting thoughts about a white bear. In both cases, nondepleted participants made bolder predictions about their future performance on a video game than their depleted counterparts. Instead, depleted participants were more modest in their predictions and more accurate in their predictions than nondepleted participants. These findings suggest that depletion undermines self‐assurance in oneself, which may have implications for theories of depressive realism, accuracy, confidence, and goal setting.     

Goals need implementation intentions: The model of action phases tested in the applied setting of continuing education

In the present study, the model of action phases (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) was applied to the area of continuing education. A subsample of 136 East German participants in the larger study "Active Actions in a Radical Change Situation" rated the expected value of further education, indicated whether they had taken a decision to continue their education (goal intention) and whether they were planning goal-directed actions (implementation intention). Two years later, it was ascertained whether participants had initiated vocational retraining. Findings support the core assumptions of the model. Postdecisional participants endorsed the positive aspects of further education more strongly (implemental mindset) than predecisional participants, who looked at its pros and cons impartially (deliberative mindset). Second, participants were more successful in initiating vocational retraining when they had a goal intention that was additionally furnished with an implementation intention. Findings are discussed with respect to theoretical and practical implications of the distinction between goal setting and goal implementation.     

Reconstruing intolerance: abstract thinking reduces conservatives' prejudice against nonnormative groups

Myrdal (1944) described the "American dilemma" as the conflict between abstract national values ("liberty and justice for all") and more concrete, everyday prejudices. We leveraged construal-level theory to empirically test Myrdal's proposition that construal level (abstract vs. concrete) can influence prejudice. We measured individual differences in construal level (Study 1) and manipulated construal level (Studies 2 and 3); across these three studies, we found that adopting an abstract mind-set heightened conservatives' tolerance for groups that are perceived as deviating from Judeo-Christian values (gay men, lesbians, Muslims, and atheists). Among participants who adopted a concrete mind-set, conservatives were less tolerant of these nonnormative groups than liberals were, but political orientation did not have a reliable effect on tolerance among participants who adopted an abstract mind-set. Attitudes toward racial out-groups and dominant groups (e.g., Whites, Christians) were unaffected by construal level. In Study 3, we found that the effect of abstract thinking on prejudice was mediated by an increase in concerns about fairness.     

Mindset effects on information search in self‐evaluation

Research on mindset theory (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999 ) observed that people in an implemental mindset show an orientation towards positive illusionary self‐evaluations, whereas people in a deliberative mindset opt for accurate self‐evaluations. In the present study, we tested whether these self‐evaluative orientations and the associated search for certain types of self‐relevant information (feedback) are moderated by low versus high self‐views. With high self‐view participants we observed the hypothesized mindset effects on information search, but we obtained the reverse pattern for low self‐view participants. The latter finding points to self‐defensiveness in low self‐view individuals. Implications are discussed in terms of the consequences of accurate versus positive illusionary self‐evaluations for the successful control of goal pursuits, and individual differences in mindset effects. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The implications of counterfactual mind-sets for the functioning of implementation intentions

Two experiments explored how counterfactual mind-sets interact with implementation intentions and affect their flexibility. Participants engaged in a subtractive mind-set, an additive mind-set, or a control condition and were subsequently given either goal intentions or implementation intentions that facilitated cue detection (Experiment 1) or the goal-directed response (Experiment 2). Dependent variables were the number of targets specified in the intentions and the legitimate alternatives to the targets (flexibility measure). In Experiment 1, the implementation intention (versus goal intention) group were better at detecting specified cues, but worse on alternatives, regardless of mind-set. In Experiment 2, an interaction emerged. For both specified and alternative responses, the subtractive mind-set paired with an implementation intention versus goal intention performed better. This pattern was reversed for additive mind-set conditions. Hence, how counterfactual mind-sets affect the flexibility of planning is dependent on the particular mind-set used and the specific operations of plan.     

Deliberation versus intuition: Global versus local processing in judgment and choice

Decisions and judgments made after deliberation can differ from expert opinion and be more regretted over time than intuitive judgments and decisions. We investigated a possible underlying process of this phenomenon, namely global versus local processing style. We argue that deliberation induces a local processing style. This processing style narrows conceptual attention and can have detrimental effects on judgment and decision-making. Study 1 showed that intuitive judgments of quality of modern paintings were more accurate than were more deliberate, reasoned judgments. Study 2 showed that local versus global processing style is associated with accuracy of quality judgments of paintings, and Study 3 replicated this finding with an experimental manipulation of processing style. Finally, Study 4 showed that the effect of intuitive versus deliberative decision mode on quality judgments of poems is mediated by processing style.     

The Effect of Construal Level on Subjective Probability Estimates

ABSTRACT— In a series of studies, we examined novel predictions drawn from a conceptualization of probability as psychological distance. Manipulating construal level in a number of different ways and examining a variety of probability judgments, we found that participants led to adopt a high-level-construal mind-set made lower probability assessments than did those led to adopt a low-level-construal mind-set. Moreover, this occurred even when construal level was manipulated in a context separate from the judgment task and the manipulation was unrelated in content to the events being judged. These findings suggest that broad processing variables can exert a widespread influence on probability judgment.     

Witnesses’ memories for lineup fillers postdicts their identification accuracy

Witnesses who have quick, automatic recognition experiences when viewing a lineup tend to make more accurate decisions than witnesses who engage in slower, more deliberative processes. A novel postdictor of identification accuracy is predicted from these findings: memories for lineup fillers should be stronger among inaccurate, rather than accurate, witnesses. Undergraduate students (N = 320) viewed a mock crime, made a lineup identification decision, and were given a surprise test for their memory for the lineup fillers. Consistent with predictions, better memories for lineup fillers postdicted mistaken identifications and the suspect's innocence. Information gain analyses showed that under some conditions, memory for lineup fillers provided as much information about the suspect's guilt as a lineup identification. Findings are consistent with the idea that postdictors of eyewitness accuracy are valuable to the extent that they measure the automaticity or deliberativeness of the witness's experience when viewing the lineup.     

Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children's explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N=24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant "explanation advantage" for children's reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

Social class, contextualism, and empathic accuracy

Recent research suggests that lower-class individuals favor explanations of personal and political outcomes that are oriented to features of the external environment. We extended this work by testing the hypothesis that, as a result, individuals of a lower social class are more empathically accurate in judging the emotions of other people. In three studies, lower-class individuals (compared with upper-class individuals) received higher scores on a test of empathic accuracy (Study 1), judged the emotions of an interaction partner more accurately (Study 2), and made more accurate inferences about emotion from static images of muscle movements in the eyes (Study 3). Moreover, the association between social class and empathic accuracy was explained by the tendency for lower-class individuals to explain social events in terms of features of the external environment. The implications of class-based patterns in empathic accuracy for well-being and relationship outcomes are discussed.     

The Motivational Impact of Perceived Control on Behavioral Intentions

This research explores the moderated influence of perceived control and its underlying motivational processes. Perceptions of control can change one's motivation to engage in deliberative or nondeliberative processing when forming a behavioral intention. Studies were designed to test the moderated relationships of perceived control on decision theoretic variables (Study 1), to provide experimental evidence of differences in processing relative to levels of perceived control (Study 2), and to examine how levels of control induce motivation to engage cognitive resources toward a decision (Study 3). Findings support predictions that lower vs. higher levels of control result in the formation of behavioral intention based on deliberative rather than nondeliberative processing. Theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.