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1.
Claudia Welz 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(2):267-285
This paper develops the thesis that personal identity is neither to be taken in terms of an unchanging self-sufficient ‘substance’
nor in terms of selfhood ‘without substance,’ i.e. as fluctuating processes of pure relationality and subject-less activity.
Instead, identity is taken as self-transformation that is bound to particular embodied individuals and surpasses them as individuated entities. The paper is structured in three parts. Part I describes the experiential givenness
of conflicts that support our sense of self-transformation. While the first part develops an inter-subjective topography of
emotional movements, the second part pays attention to their temporal dimension. We work with conflicts and get transformed
by them also in the way we remember them. Part II focuses on the process of self-understanding that accompanies conflicts
and their metamorphosis in memory. Part III compares and discusses different models of a ‘relational ontology’ of the person,
which question the idea that we are defined only by how we define ourselves—just as they question the idea that one’s identity
is independent of how one relates to one’s having changed. 相似文献
2.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
3.
The present study manipulated participants’ narrative perspectives (1st-personal pronoun “I” and 3rd-personal pronoun “He/She”) to vary their field and observer visual perspectives that they took to retrieve autobiographical events and examine how the shifts in narrative perspective could influence the self-rated emotional intensity of autobiographical memory. Results showed that when narrative perspectives effectively shifted participants’ visual perspectives from field to observer, they felt attenuated emotional intensities of positive and negative autobiographical memories. However, this did not occur when narrative perspectives effectively shifted the visual perspectives from observer to field. Multiple mediator models further showed that the changes in psychological distance and imagery vividness (a distance-related construct) of autobiographical memory mediated the relationship between the narrative perspective shift from the 1st- to 3rd-person and the reduction in the intensities of negative and positive emotion. This provides support for the role of psychological distancing in reducing the emotional intensity of autobiographical memory. 相似文献
4.
The nature of the ‘self’ and self-referential awareness has been one of the most debated issues in philosophy, psychology
and cognitive neuroscience. Understanding the neurocognitive bases of self-related representation and processing is also crucial
to research on the neural correlates of consciousness. The distinction between an ‘I’, corresponding to a subjective sense
of the self as a thinker and causal agent, and a ‘Me’, as the objective sense of the self with the unique and identifiable
features constituting one’s self-image or self-concept, suggested by William James, has been re-elaborated by authors from
different theoretical perspectives. In this article, empirical studies and theories about the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ in cognition
and self-related awareness are reviewed, including the relationships between self and perception, self and memory, the development
of the self, self-referential stimulus processing, as well as related neuroimaging studies. Subsequently, the relations between
self and different aspects of consciousness are considered. On the basis of the reviewed literature and with reference to
Block’s distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, a neurocognitive hypothesis is formulated about ‘I’-related
and ‘Me’-related self-referential awareness. This hypothesis is extended to metacognitive awareness and a form of non-transitive
consciousness, characteristic of meditation experiences and studies, with particular reference to the notion of mindfulness
and other Buddhist constructs. 相似文献
5.
Tamar Schapiro 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(3):147-167
In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims
if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having
a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the
world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to show how this view is connected with a denial of any deep distinction
between reason and inclination. I then argue for an alternative view of what ‘having a desire’ involves, one according to
which it involves being focused both on the world and on ourselves. I show how this view fits naturally with the Kantian distinction
between reason and inclination, accounts for independent intuitions about ‘having a desire’, and supports the Incorporation
Thesis. I then make some further suggestions about how we might conceive of the object of incorporation. 相似文献
6.
Jordi Fernández (2015) discusses the possible benefits of two types of allegedly distorted memories: observer memories and fabricated memories. Fernández argues that even when memory does not preserve the past, some memories can still provide an adaptive benefit for the subject. I explore Fernández’s claims focussing on the case of observer perspective memories. For Fernández, observer perspectives are distorted memories because they do not preserve past experience. In contrast, I suggest that observer perspectives can accurately reflect past experience: observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted memories. By looking at the complexity of the relation between remembering trauma from an observer perspective and emotional closure, I also sound a note of caution against Fernández’s assertion that observer memories of trauma can be adaptively beneficial. Finally, I suggest that because observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted, but involve a distinct way of thinking about one’s past, such memories can be epistemically beneficial. 相似文献
7.
Sean Crawford 《Synthese》2008,160(1):75-96
Quine introduced a famous distinction between the ‘notional’ sense and the ‘relational’ sense of certain attitude verbs. The
distinction is both intuitive and sound but is often conflated with another distinction Quine draws between ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’
(or higher degree) attitudes. I argue that this conflation is largely responsible for the mistaken view that Quine’s account
of attitudes is undermined by the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Quine’s system
is also supposed to suffer from the problem of ‘suspended judgement with continued belief’. I argue that this criticism fails
to take account of a crucial presupposition of Quine’s about the connection between thought and language. The aim of the paper
is to defend the spirit of Quine’s account of attitudes by offering solutions to these two problems.
See also chapters four and five of Word and Object (Quine, 1960) and ‘Intensions Revisited’ (Quine, 1977). 相似文献
8.
9.
Jan Zwickel 《Psychonomic bulletin & review》2009,16(6):1089-1093
We tested whether processes that evoke agency interpretations and mental state attributions also lead to adoption of the actor’s
visuospatial perspective by the observer. Agency and mental state interpretations were manipulated by showing different film
clips involving two triangles (the Frith-Happé animations). Participants made speeded spatial decisions while watching these
films. The responses in the spatial task could be either the same or different when given from the perspective of the participant
versus the perspective of one of the triangles. Reaction times were longer when the perspectives of the participants and triangles
differed than when they were the same. This effect increased as the need to invoke agency interpretations in order to understand
the films increased, and it increased for those films that had previously been shown to evoke mental state attributions. This
demonstrates that processing of an agent’s behavior co-occurs with perspective adoption, even in the case in which triangles
are the actors. 相似文献
10.
In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’.
According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable
stipulative under-standing of what counts as moral evil which is sufficient for my argument. According to Nick Trakakis, I
seriously misunderstand the conception of freedom characteristic of free will theodicists. He suggests that my argument presupposes
compatibilism. I respond by showing that my argument does not presuppose the denial of the capacity to have done otherwise. 相似文献
11.
Two studies examined whether people's retrospective causal attributions might be mediated by the visual perspective from which events are recalled. In Study 1, pairs of Ss participated in "get-acquainted" conversations and made a series of attribution ratings for their performance. They returned 3 weeks later to rerate their performance on the same attribution scales and to indicate the perspective from which they remembered their earlier conversation. Ss reported either "observer" memories in which they could "see" themselves from the outside or "field" memories in which their field of view matched that of the original situation. Study 2 was identical to Study 1 with the exception that Ss' memory perspectives were manipulated via verbal instructions. In both experiments, conversations that were recalled from an observer's perspective were attributed more dispositionally. These results suggest that the different perspectives from which events can be recalled function much like the divergent visual perspectives available to actors and observers in immediate, everyday experience. Discussion of these results focuses on how they further understanding of the contradictory findings reported in the literature on temporal shifts in attributions. 相似文献
12.
Andrea Guardo 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(2):195-209
This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions
to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The
first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of
meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on
Lewis’ work in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to call attention to some intuitions about the nature of dispositions
that we all seem to share. In particular, I stress the role of what I call ‘Actuality Constraint’. The third section of the
paper maintains that the Actuality Constraint can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional
analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not exist (in so doing, I develop a suggestion put forward by Paul Boghossian).
This immediately implies that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work. The last section discusses a
possible objection to my argument. The point of the objection is that the argument depends on an illicit assumption. I show
(1) that, in fact, the assumption in question is far from illicit and (2) that even without this assumption it is possible
to argue that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not
exist. 相似文献
13.
Philip Ball 《Nanoethics》2010,4(2):129-132
“Van den Belt recently examined the notion that synthetic biology and the creation of ‘artificial’ organisms are examples
of scientists ‘playing God’. Here I respond to some of the issues he raises, including some of his comments on my previous
discussions of the value of the term ‘life’ as a scientific concept.” 相似文献
14.
University undergraduates undertook a series of manual tasks (e.g., shaping objects out of clay) and later recalled the experiences they had while doing so from either afield or anobserver vantage point. In the former case, the subjects mentally reinstated the original task environment as if they were seeing it again through their own eyes; in the latter condition, the original task environment was envisioned from the perspective of a detached spectator. Analysis of the subjects’ recollections revealed marked differences in the contents of field and observer memories. For instance, whereas field memories afforded richer accounts of the affective reactions, physical sensations, and psychological states that the subjects experienced as they performed the tasks, observer memories included more information about how the subjects looked, what they did, or where things were. Discussion focuses on prospects for future research whose aim would be to investigate the forensic and clinical implications of the field/observer distinction. 相似文献
15.
Heikki Kirjavainen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(2):75-88
In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term
‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this
presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and
Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification
and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus
two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices
and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory.
The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes. 相似文献
16.
Roger Harris 《Axiomathes》2010,20(4):461-478
There are, broadly, three sorts of account of intrinsicality: ‘self-sufficiency’, ‘essentiality’ and ‘pure qualitativeness’.
I argue for the last of these, and urge that we take intrinsic properties of concrete objects to be all and only those shared
by actual or possible duplicates, which only differ extrinsically. This approach gains support from Francescotti’s approach:
defining ‘intrinsic’ in contradistinction to extrinsic properties which ‘consist in’ relations which rule out intrinsicality.
I answer Weatherson’s criticisms of Francescotti, but, to answer criticisms of my own, I amend his account, proposing that
possession of an extrinsic property consists in a relation to one or more actual or possible distinct concrete objects. Finally I indicate ways to avoid some apparent objections to this account. 相似文献
17.
Kyoko Murakami 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2010,44(1):30-38
This essay traces my engagement with Michèle Grossen’s ideas of a dialogical perspective on interaction analysis (Grossen
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 1–22, 2009) and highlights a process account of self in interaction. Firstly I draw on Turner’s concept of liminality with respect to
the transformative, temporal significance in interaction. Secondly I explored further the conversation analytic concepts such
as formulation and reformulation as a viable analytical tool for a dialogical perspective. Lastly, I addressed the issue of
interaction in institutional settings, in particular with interactional asymmetries of interaction, whilst relativising the
I-position dialogical perspective. I explore insights from social anthropology as well as revisiting conversation analysis
and discursive psychology, concluding that a promising direction would be sought through a cross-fertilisation between dialogism
and other sibling perspectives concerning language use, communication, social action and discourse- and narrative-based analyses. 相似文献
18.
Marya Schechtman 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):65-79
Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity.
Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose
personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my
comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated
than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal
identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that
the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features
of memory that must be part of a complete account. 相似文献
19.
John Bishop 《Sophia》2009,48(4):419-433
Theistic religious believers should be concerned that the God they worship is not an idol. Conceptions of God thus need to
be judged according to criteria of religious adequacy that are implicit in the ‘God-role’—that is, the way the concept of
God properly functions in the conceptual economy and form of life of theistic believers. I argue that the conception of God
as ‘omniGod’—an immaterial personal creator with the omni-properties—may reasonably be judged inadequate, at any rate from
the perspective of a relationship ethics based on the Christian revelation that God is Love. I go on to suggest that a conception
of God as the power of love within the natural universe might prove more adequate, with God’s role as creator understood in
terms of final rather than efficient causation. 相似文献
20.
Jaysankar L. Shaw 《Sophia》2011,50(3):481-497
This paper explains some of the uses of the word ‘freedom’ in Western as well as in Indian philosophy. Regarding the psychological
concept of freedom or free will, this paper focuses on the distinction between fatalism, determinism, types of compatibilism,
and libertarianism. Indian philosophers, by and large, are compatibilists, although some minor systems, such as Śākta Āgama,
favor a type of libertarianism. From the Indian perspective the form of life of human beings has also been mentioned in the
discussion of free will. Regarding metaphysical freedom, I discuss the views of the Bhagavad Gītā and Swami Vivekananda in
Sect. III. K.C. Bhattacharyya, a neo-Advaita Vedāntin, has discussed degrees of freedom of the subject at several levels.
According to him, spiritual progress lies in the progressive realization of the freedom of the subject. I compare his view
with the classical Advaita concept of freedom. I have also addressed the question of whether freedom from suffering can be
realized at social and global levels. In this context I have mentioned some of the interpretations of the great saying ‘I
am Brahman,’ and how freedom can be realized at the global level by using the Advaita concept of ‘oneness.’ 相似文献