On two arguments for the indeterminacy of personal identity

Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, A=B and A=C have no truth value. In the other, a series or spectrum of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that A=B is clearly true; at the other end, A and B are such that the identity is clearly false. In between, normal criteria of identity leave the truth or falsehood of A=B undecided, and it is argued that in these circumstances A=B has no truth value.These arguments are to be understood counterfactually. My claim is that, so understood, neither establishes its conclusion. The first involves a pair of counterfactual situations that are equally possible or tied. If A=B and A=C have no truth value, a counterfactual conditional with one of them as consequent and an antecedent that is true in circumstances in which either is true should have no truth value. Intuitively, however, any such counterfactual is false. The second argument can be seen to invite an analogous response. If this is right, however, there is an important disanalogy between this and the classical paradox of the heap. If the disanalogy is only apparent, the argument shows at most that the existence of persons can be indeterminate.     

Gender identity,interactionism, and politics: A reply to Rogers and Walsh

This article is a reply to a recent article by Rogers and Walsh (Sex Roles, 1982, 8, 269–281). We disagree with some of their interpretations and criticisms of the psychomedical research on the development of sex differences. Thus, there is a discussion of the reasoning and strategies of the biological approach in this research area. However, we also support and extend some of their suggestions relevant to gender and sex.     

The sin of subjectivism: A reply to Shapiro

Shapiro criticises our book on two grounds. He first outlines a series of mistakes. None of them we believe, in fact, have been made and this is usually quite clear from our book. His second criticism rejects our ‘subjectivist’ approach to measurement. We argue that he misrepresents our methods and fails to grasp their ability both to collect accurate data and deal adequately with possible sources of bias. Indeed in these, in its attention to the dating of both independent and dependent variables, and in the flexibility of its approach to the respondent, we feel our approach is better equipped than other existing instruments to tackle the problem of the aetiological role of psycho-social factors in illness.     

The indeterminacy of computation

Synthese - Do the dynamics of a physical system determine what function the system computes? Except in special cases, the answer is no: it is often indeterminate what function a given physical...     

The contract ground: A reply to Jesse Kalin

Philosophical Studies -     

The missing link: A reply to Joseph Rychlak

We oppose Rychlak's (1991a, 1991b) claim that the view of mind entailed in artificial intelligence (AD and cognitive psychology is fundamentally at odds with Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory. Kelly's model and Al have much in common: They both are centrally concerned with representation, cognitive processes and their structure, and are ultimately empirical in their methodology. Many Al researchers have usefully embraced personal construct theory as a working conceptual framework, in this article, we examine Rychlak's assertions and identify several mistakes.     

The General Factor of Personality: A reply to Muncer

In previous studies we have shown that a General Factor of Personality (GFP) occupies the apex of the hierarchy of personality as well as the apex of the personality disorders in the same way that g, the general factor of mental ability, occupies the apex in the organization of cognitive abilities (Rushton & Irwing, 2011). In a critique, Muncer (2011) re-analyzed one of our data sets and concluded there was no evidence for a GFP. He also argued against the evolutionary theory we had proposed for the origin of the GFP. In this rejoinder I rebut Muncer’s conclusion and describe how directional selection can explain the GFP.     

The virtues of scientific psychology: A reply to Harzem

Harzem recently expressed the opinions that, beginning in the 1960s, the progress of scientific psychology has been deferred and that psychological research has failed to address important social issues. He proposed that progress be resumed by taking up, anew, the experimental analysis of behavior. The present reply provides evidence inconsistent with Harzem's assertions regarding the state of contemporary, scientific psychology and questions the wisdom of disregarding the significant body of data and theory that currently are available to pursue the, as yet, unfulfilled promises of the experimental analysis of human behavior.     

Schizophrenia and indeterminacy: The problem of validity

The paper attempts to account for the confusion over the validity of the concept of schizophrenia in terms of two closely related aspects of conceptual indeterminacy. Firstly, it is identified on the basis of a breakdown in intelligibility, but what constitutes such a breakdown is indeterminate. Secondly, the concept sits between the categories of natural disease or illness on the one hand, and character trait or moral failing or gift on the other. This entails an indeterminacy in attempting to define the role that physiological explanation could have. Light may be thrown on the concept by exploring a distinction between a life story in which the schizophrenic condition emerges as the conclusion of the story and a causal process in which the condition is the end result or final consequence.