Tuomela on deductive explanation

Almost every formal model of explanation thus far proposed has been demonstrated to be faulty. In this paper, a new model, proposed by Raimo Tuomela, is also demonstrated to be faulty. In particular, one condition of the model is shown to be too restrictive, and another condition of the model is shown to be too permissive.This research was supported by a grant from the Killam Foundation, administered by the Canada Council.     

Morgan on deductive explanation: A rejoinder

This paper is mainly a response to Charles Morgan's criticisms (this journal, pp. 511–25) of the author's model of the (formal aspects of) explanation. It is claimed in the paper that with two modifications and some additional specifications the model withstands Morgan's criticisms.     

试论希克的宗教解释

约翰·希克是当代著名的宗教哲学家之一,宗教多元主义的积极倡导者.他通过对传统的宗教解释和自然主义的宗教解释的区分,试图做出一种综合性的宗教解释.他把宗教视为一种"家族相似"概念,并从人的认知规律和生活经验出发,对宗教的合理性做出某种辩护.他从神圣者因素和属人因素两方面来描述宗教,提出了他的"实在者"概念和救赎论结构,从而形成他的宗教多元时代里的宗教观.     

Knowledge and deductive closure

The question whether epistemological concepts are closed under deduction is an important one since many skeptical arguments depend on closure. Such skepticism can be avoided if closure is not true of knowledge (or justification). This response to skepticism is rejected by Peter Klein and others. Klein argues that closure is true, and that far from providing the skeptic with a powerful weapon for undermining our knowledge, it provides a tool for attacking the skeptic directly. This paper examines various arguments in favor of closure and Klein's attempted use of closure to refute skepticism. Such a refutation of skepticism is mistaken. But the closure principle is in any case false, so the skepticism that depends on it is undermined. The appeal of the closure principle derives from a failure to recognize an important feature of our epistemological concepts, namely, their context relativity.     

Anatomy of deductive reasoning

Much of cognitive research on deductive reasoning has been preoccupied with advocating for or against visuospatial (mental model theory) or linguistic/syntactic (mental logic theory) models of logical reasoning. Neuroimaging studies bear on this issue by pointing to both language-based and visuospatial systems being engaged during logical reasoning, and by raising additional issues not anticipated by these cognitive theories. Here, the literature on the neural basis of deductive reasoning from the past decade is reviewed. Although these results might seem chaotic and inconsistent, we identify several interesting patterns and articulate their implications for cognitive theories of reasoning. Cognitive neuroscience data point away from a unitary system for logical reasoning and towards a fractionated system dynamically reconfigured in response to specific task and environmental cues.     

On the eliminative explanation of social theories

The paper discusses eliminative explanation in which a (social) successor theory correctively explains and, as a consequence, eliminates its predecessor theory. Technical concepts and results from general logic are applied to the explication of corrective explanation, especially to the notion of framework translation that it involves.     

Individual differences in deductive reasoning

Three studies are reported, which examined individual differences in deductive reasoning as a function of intellectual ability and thinking style. Intellectual ability was a good predictor of logical performance on syllogisms, especially where there was a conflict between logic and believability. However, in the first two experiments there was no link between ability and performance on indicative selection tasks, in sharp contrast to previous research. This correlation did, however, return in the final study. Our data are consistent with the claim that the correlation with logical accuracy on abstract selection tasks is found primarily with participants of relatively high ability. At lower levels, pragmatically cued responses are given but those of slightly higher ability divorce the rule from the scenario and respond consistently (though incorrectly) across problems. Self-report questionnaires were generally poor predictors of performance, but a measure of the ability to generate alternative representations proved an excellent predictor. These results are consistent with a mental models approach to reasoning and also have implications for the debate about human rationality.     

Mental models in deductive reasoning

We report research investigating the role of mental models in deduction. The first study deals with conjunctive inferences (from one conjunction and two conditional premises) and disjunctive inferences (from one disjunction and the same two conditionals). The second study examines reasoning from multiple conditionals such as: If e then b; If a then b; If b then c; What follows between a and c? The third study addresses reasoning from different sorts of conditional assertions, including conditionals based on if then, only if, and unless. The paper also presents research on figural effects in syllogistic reasoning, on the effects of structure and believability in reasoning from double conditionals, and on reasoning from factual, counterfactual, and semifactual conditionals. The findings of these studies support the model theory, pose some difficulties for rule theories, and show the influence on reasoning of the linguistic structure and the semantic content of problems.     

Two concepts of deductive justification

Summary The term “deductive justification” is used either in the relative or absolute sense. In the first case, a sentence is deductively justified with respect to a class of premisses and may be more or less probable, depending on the degree of justification (eventually non-deductive) of the premisses. In the second sense, a sentence justified deductively in a language to which it belongs, is necessarily true, provided only the meaning postulated by the semantical rules of its expressions can be realized (i. e. if the denotata assigned to the expressions by the semantical rules do exist); in this second case, the statement justified deductively is analytic in the given language. Thus the explication of the latter concept of deductive justification requires an explication of the concept of an analytic statement in a language.