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HOPOS 2000. Call for Papers. THIRD INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE CONFERENCE

Call for Papers

HOPOS 2000. Call for Papers. THIRD INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE CONFERENCE     

Call for papers: Peirce and Education: The Conflicting Processes of Learning and Discovery

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Call for papers: Peirce and Education: The Conflicting Processes of Learning and Discovery     

Announcement

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Announcement     

SCiP 2002 Call for Papers

Notices and Announcements

SCiP 2002 Call for Papers     

Call for papers electronic archiving: Norms,stimuli, and data a special issue of<Emphasis Type="Italic">Behavior Research Methods,Instruments, &; Computers</Emphasis>

Notices and Announcements

Call for papers electronic archiving: Norms, stimuli, and data a special issue ofBehavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers     

Third International Conference on Spatial Cognition: “Dynamics in Spatial Interactions”. Rome - Perugia, Italy: September 12th–15th 2006. www.icsc2006.org - committee@icsc2006.org

Call for Papers

Third International Conference on Spatial Cognition: “Dynamics in Spatial Interactions”. Rome - Perugia, Italy: September 12th–15th 2006. www.icsc2006.org - committee@icsc2006.org     

Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?

Accoding to G.E. Moore, something's intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something's intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsic value. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView.     

What Pessimism about Moral Deference Means for Disagreement

Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustaining moral beliefs on the basis of others’ moral views. Call this claim pessimism about moral deference. Pessimism about moral deference, if true, seems to provide an attractive way to argue for a bold conclusion about moral disagreement: moral disagreement generally does not require belief revision. Call this claim steadfastness about moral disagreement. Perhaps the most prominent recent discussion of the connection between moral deference and moral disagreement, due to Alison Hills, uses pessimism about the former to argue for steadfastness about the latter. This paper reveals that this line of thinking, and others like it, are unsuccessful. There is no way to argue from a compelling version of pessimism about moral deference to the conclusion of steadfastness about moral disagreement. The most plausible versions of pessimism about moral deference have only very limited implications for moral disagreement.     

Moral responsibility for actions and omissions: a new challenge to the asymmetry thesis

This paper presents a new challenge to the thesis that moral responsibility for an omission requires the ability to do the omitted action, whereas moral responsibility for an action does not require the ability to do otherwise than that action. Call this the asymmetry thesis. The challenge arises from the possibility of cases in which an omission is identical to an action. In certain of such cases, the asymmetry thesis leads to a contradiction. The challenge is then extended to recent variations of the asymmetry thesis defended by John Martin Fischer and Carolina Sartorio. Finally, a possible objection to the challenge is addressed.     

Change,Difference, and Orthodox Truthmaker Theory

Call the thesis that, possibly, there are two times, t₁ and t₂, such that everything that exists at t₂ also exists at t₁, but some things that exist at t₁ do not exist at t₂ Temporal Change. Call the thesis that, possibly, there are two worlds, w and v, such that everything that exists at v also exists at w, but some things that exist at w do not exist at v Modal Difference. I argue that if either Temporal Change or Modal Difference is true, then Orthodox Truthmaker Theory—the theory that every truth requires a necessitating truthmaker—is false.     

Compound figures: priority and speech-act structure

Compound figures are a rich, and under-explored area for tackling fundamental issues in philosophy of language. This paper explores new ideas about how to explain some features of such figures. We start with an observation from Stern (2000) that in ironic-metaphor, metaphor is logically prior to irony in the structure of what is communicated. Call this thesis Logical-MPT. We argue that a speech-act-based explanation of Logical-MPT is to be preferred to a content-based explanation. To create this explanation we draw on Barker’s (2004) expressivist speech-act theory, in which speech-acts build on other speech-acts to achieve the desired communicative effects. In particular, we show how Barker’s general ideas explain metaphor as an assertive-act, and irony as a ridiculing-act. We use Barker’s notion of proto-illocutionary-acts to show how metaphorical-acts and ironic-acts can build one on the other. Finally, we show that while an ironic-act can build on a metaphorical-act, a metaphorical-act cannot build on an ironic-act. This restriction on how they can be composed establishes Logical-MPT via a different route.     

Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment

Subject‐sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person's knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person's environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject‐sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge‐attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This article argues that, insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are also good arguments for moral encroachment.     

Reliability of testimonial norms in scientific communities

Several current debates in the epistemology of testimony are implicitly motivated by concerns about the reliability of rules for changing one’s beliefs in light of others’ claims. Call such rules testimonial norms (tns). To date, epistemologists have neither (i) characterized those features of communities that influence the reliability of tns, nor (ii) evaluated the reliability of tns as those features vary. These are the aims of this paper. I focus on scientific communities, where the transmission of highly specialized information is both ubiquitous and critically important. Employing a formal model of scientific inquiry, I argue that miscommunication and the “communicative structure” of science strongly influence the reliability of tns, where reliability is made precise in three ways.