National identity and international giving: Irish adults' accounts of charitable behaviour

Research on helping behaviour has emphasized the importance of the group and particularly the nation in establishing the norms and boundaries of emergency helping. Less attention has been paid to the role of the national group in longer‐term routine helping such as charitable giving. This is particularly important given recent research on intergroup helping which points to the impact of power relations on willingness of national groups to give and receive aid. The present research examines people's accounts of charitable giving in their day‐to‐day lives in Ireland, a country which has recently undergone a transformation in economic development and international relations. Discursive analysis of five focus groups with 14 Irish university students illustrates how participants proactively invoke national identity to account for giving or withholding charity. Our findings demonstrate how Irish national identity can be strategically and flexibly used to manage participants' local moral identity in the light of Ireland's changing international relations and in particular how participants display concerns to be seen to intend ‘autonomous’ rather than ‘dependency’‐oriented helping. The findings suggest that both national identity and international relations provide resources for individuals negotiating the complex demands and concerns surrounding charitable giving. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Idealizing,Abstracting, and Semantic Dispositionalism

Abstract: According to certain dispositional accounts of meaning, an agent's meaning is determined by the dispositions that an idealized version of this agent has in optimal conditions. We argue that such attempts cannot properly fix meaning. For even if there is a way to determine which features of an agent should be idealized without appealing to what the agent means, there is no non‐circular way to determine how those features should be idealized. We sketch an alternative dispositional account that avoids this problem, according to which an agent's meaning is determined by the dispositions that an abstract version of this agent has in optimal conditions.     

Helping Following Natural Disasters: A Social‐Motivational Analysis1

The present investigation explores how judgments of responsibility influence affective and helping reactions toward natural‐disaster victims. Guided by Weiner's (1995, 2006 ) theory of social motivation, we hypothesized that judging victims responsible for a disaster would indirectly lead to low rates of helping. Two studies tested this hypothesis. In Study 1, a bogus earthquake was used to test experimentally the effects of responsibility judgments (low, high). In Study 2, we surveyed attitudes about the victims of Hurricane Katrina. Our results showed that Weiner's model was supported across studies. Responsibility judgments led to anger and sympathy, and sympathy led to helping intentions, which in turn led to helping behavior. Comparisons across studies and the relationship between helping intentions and behavior are discussed.     

Mencius and Dewey on Moral Perception, Deliberation, and Imagination

I argue against interpretations of Mencius by Liu Xiusheng and Eric Hutton that attempt to make sense of a Mencian account of moral judgment and deliberation in light of the moral particularism of John McDowell. These interpretations read Mencius??s account as relying on a faculty of moral perception, which generates moral judgments by directly perceiving moral facts that are immediately intuited with the help of rudimentary and innate moral inclinations. However, I argue that it is a mistake to identify innate moral inclinations as the foundational source of moral judgments and knowledge. Instead, if we understand that for Mencius an individual??s natural dispositions (xing ??) have a relational element, then the normativity of moral judgments can be seen as stemming from the relationships that constitute the dispositions of each individual. Finally, this essay elaborates on John Dewey's account of moral deliberation as moral imagination, an account which also takes the relational quality of natural dispositions as its starting point, in order to suggest the vital role of imagination for Mencius??s own account of moral deliberation.     

Fundamental motives: How evolutionary needs influence consumer behavior

Can we better understand modern consumer behavior by examining its links to our ancestral past? We consider the underlying motives for consumption and choice from an evolutionary perspective. We review evidence that deep-seated evolutionary motives continue to influence much modern behavior, albeit not always in obvious or conscious ways. These fundamental motives include: (1) evading physical harm, (2) avoiding disease, (3) making friends, (4) attaining status, (5) acquiring a mate, (6) keeping a mate, and (7) caring for family. We discuss how, why, and when these motives influence behavior, highlighting that many consumer choices ultimately function to help fulfill one or more of these evolutionary needs. An important implication of this framework is that a person's preferences, behaviors, and decision processes change in predictable ways depending on which fundamental motive is currently active. We discuss how consideration of evolutionary motives provides fertile ground for future consumer research, while also helping build bridges between consumer behavior, evolutionary biology, and other social sciences.     

BRICOLAGE AND THE PURITY OF TRADITIONS: Engaging the Stoics for Contemporary Christian Ethics

This essay is a response to C. Kavin Rowe's critique of my 2011 argument that certain dimensions of Roman Stoic ethics are at work in Jonathan Edwards's moral thought. Rowe raises questions about the act of selectively retrieving ideas from a philosophical tradition to support constructive work in another tradition. I argue for the importance of acknowledging how Christian thought has been shaped by what Jeffrey Stout describes as moral bricolage, the selective retrieval of ideas from various traditions, and I contend that this bricolage can continue to be a fruitful means through which Christian ethics engages external traditions. Moreover, the importance of Stoicism's retrieval in early modern philosophy makes the work of eighteenth‐century theologians such as Edwards a particularly valuable resource for exploring the plausibility of Christian engagement with the Stoics.     

When and How Does a Person's Relationship With Environments Begin and Continue to Play a Role in Psychological Functioning?: Reply to Paper and Commentaries by Bodnar and Roth

Bodnar and I urge therapists to understand and address not only a person's conflicted desires, which Roth advocates should be the only focus of psychoanalytic treatment, but also the role space and place play in a person's psychology. The psychoanalysts Bodnar cites, who advocate the importance of understanding environments, follow the positivistic assumptions of ecopsychology. I argue why the dialectical-relational model I outlined should be followed. From the viewpoint of this model, I discuss Bodnar's patients who are wasting environments and commend Bodnar for addressing the role body experiences with places and spaces play in the conflicts of these individuals. I explain why I disagree with Roth's opinion that Bodnar and I are romanticizing nature in our discussions of environments. I join Bodnar's challenge that treatment should include helping a person learn how he or she can repair and recover the ability to interact and negotiate with all environments. I also challenge therapists to understand the embodied metaphors they carry that give meaning to human and nonhuman environments and to explore why, when, and how therapy should be conducted in different environments.     

CHARACTER,PSYCHOANALYTIC IDENTIFICATION,AND NUMERICAL IDENTITY

Identification figures prominently in moral psychological explanations. I argue that in identification the subject has an ‘identity‐thought’, which is a thought about her numerical identity with the figure she identifies with. In Freud's psychoanalytic psychology character is founded on unconscious identification with parental figures. Moral philosophers have drawn on psychoanalysis to explain how undesirable or disadvantageous character dispositions are resistant to insight through being unconscious. According to Richard Wollheim's analysis of Freud's theory, identification is the subject's disposition to imagine, unconsciously, her bodily merging with the figure she identifies with. I argue that this explanation of identification is not adequate. Human character is held to be capable of change when self‐reflection brings unconscious identifications to conscious self‐knowledge. I argue that for self‐knowledge these identifications must be an intelligible part of the subject's self‐conception, and that Wollheim's ‘merging phantasy’ is not intelligible to the subject in this way. By contrast, the subject's thought that she is numerically identical to the figure she identifies with does provide an intelligible starting‐point for reflecting on this identification. This psychoanalytic account provides a clear conception of identification with which to investigate puzzle cases in the moral psychology of character.     

Moral phenomenology and a moral ontology of the human person

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ work implies four criteria that moral phenomenology must be capable of meeting if it is to be a viable field of study that can make a worthwhile contribution to moral philosophy. It must be (a) about a unifed subject matter as well as being, (b) wide, (c) independent, and (d) robust. Contrary to some scepticism about the possibility or usefulness of this field, I suggest that these criteria can be met by elucidating the very foundations of moral experience or what I call a moral ontology of the human person. I attempt to partially outline such an ontology by engaging with Robert Sokolowski's phenomenology of the human person from a moral perspective. My analysis of Sokolowski's thought leads me to five core ideas of a moral ontology of the human person: well-being, virtue, freedom, responsibility, and phronesis. Though I do not by any means boast a complete moral ontology of the human person, I go on to demonstrate how the account I have presented, or something like it, can go a long way to helping moral phenomenology meet the criteria it requires to be a viable and worthwhile pursuit.     

Examining the influence of anecdotal stories and the interplay of individual differences on reasoning

In two experiments, we explored whether anecdotal stories influenced how individuals reasoned when evaluating scientific news articles. We additionally considered the role of education level and thinking dispositions on reasoning. Participants evaluated eight scientific news articles that drew questionable interpretations from the evidence. Overall, anecdotal stories decreased the ability to reason scientifically even when controlling for education level and thinking dispositions. Additionally, we found that article length was related to participants' ratings of the news articles. Our study demonstrates that anecdotes can discourage scientific reasoning while also pointing to the potential influence of article length on judgements of quality.     

When and why does sense of power hinder self-reported helping behavior? Testing a moderated mediation model in Chinese undergraduates

Many studies on power and its influence on pro-social behavior have been conducted with Western samples. Little is known about whether the relevant research findings can be extended to other cultural settings. This study investigates the relationship between sense of power and self-reported helping behavior in Chinese culture. Using a sample of 388 undergraduate students, this study examines a moderated mediation model in which moral identity serves as a moderator and perspective taking serves as a mediator. The results show that sense of power is negatively associated with helping behavior, and this association is mediated by perspective taking. That is, sense of power exerts a negative effect on perspective taking, thereby decreasing people's tendency to help others. In addition, moral identity moderates the direct and indirect effect from sense of power to helping behavior. Specifically, when moral identity is low, sense of power exerts negative effects on perspective taking and helping behavior, but these effects become non-significant when moral identity is high. This study sheds new light on the understanding of sense of power by examining its profound role in influencing pro-social engagement in Eastern cultures. Our findings suggest that powerful people with lower levels of moral identity may be less willing to consider others' thoughts and feelings, and act less helping behavior. While high moral identity may buffer the negative effect of sense of power and enable powerful people to better play a role in promoting social harmony.     

Examining the role of moral foundations in promoting intergroup contact willingness

Improving people's motivation to seek meaningful intergroup contact is considered key to facilitating intergroup harmony. Based on moral foundations theory, this study examines how moral foundations as individual traits predict contact willingness with three minority groups (foreign domestic helpers, LGBT, and Chinese expats) and how moral emotions mediate such associations. We tested our hypotheses based on survey data across Hong Kong and Singapore. We found that care/harm foundation positively predicted contact willingness with foreign domestic helpers and LGBT people, mediated by compassion. Sanctity/degradation foundation negatively predicted contact willingness with LGBT people only in Singapore. Loyalty/betrayal foundation served as a positive predictor of willingness to contact Chinese expats. We also found care/harm foundation to be exclusively associated with compassion and promoted willingness to contact with helpers and LGBT people. Our findings highlight the influence of moral foundations, and possibly norms and intergroup dynamics at the societal level in predicting willingness to contact outgroups.     

The threat of moral refusers for one's self-concept and the protective function of physical cleansing

We investigated how people respond to moral threats and the consequences this has for one's moral self-concept. In two experiments, participants first tasted a sausage and were then confronted with a bogus participant who had refused to taste the sausage because of moral or non-moral reasons. People disliked the moral refuser more than the non-moral refuser. The self-threatening effect of having one's morals questioned was also reflected in specific patterns of cardiovascular responses and negatively affected participants' self-evaluations. We further show that the negative effects of a moral threat can be prevented by a simple intervention of physical cleansing: Participants who had cleansed their hands before being confronted with a moral refuser did not show the negative effects on self- and refuser evaluations. Importantly, the protective effects of physical cleansing were most pronounced for people with a strong moral identity. Taken together, these results underline the importance of one's self-concept when confronted with a moral refuser, and introduce an effective intervention to prevent these negative consequences.     

The Boundaries of Manners: Ritual and Etiquette in Early Confucianism and Stohr’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">On Manners</Emphasis>

Early Confucian philosophy affirms and lends support to Karen Stohr’s argument that manners are a primary means by which we express moral attitudes and commitments and carry out important moral goals. Indeed, Confucian views on ritual can extend her insights even further, both by highlighting the role that manners play in cultivating good character and by helping us to probe the conceptual boundaries of manners. The various things that we call etiquette, social customs, and rituals (all of which the Confucians saw as expressions of li 禮 “ritual”) do much of the same work for us, ethically, and this work not only expresses moral attitudes and commitments, but cultivates them as well. Accordingly, Confucian thinkers can help us to recognize how Stohr’s argument can be applied more broadly than etiquette, and how good manners both express and cultivate good character.     

Kant and the demandingness of the virtue of beneficence

We discuss Kant's conception of beneficence against the background of the overdemandingness debate. We argue that Kant's conception of beneficence constitutes a sweet spot between overdemandingness and undemandingness. To this end, we defend four key claims that together constitute a novel interpretation of Kant's account of beneficence: (1) For the same reason that we are obligated to be beneficent to others, we are permitted to be beneficent to ourselves; (2) we can prioritise our own ends; (3) it is more virtuous to do more rather than less when it comes to helping others; and (4) indifference to others is vicious. Finally, we explain how this represents a system of duties that gives our personal ends a moral standing without unacceptably moralising them.     

Blame,desert and compatibilist capacity: a diachronic account of moderateness in regards to reasons-responsiveness

This paper argues that John Fischer and Mark Ravizza's compatibilist theory of moral responsibility cannot justify reactive attitudes like blame and desert-based practices like retributive punishment. The problem with their account, I argue, is that their analysis of moderateness in regards to reasons-responsiveness has the wrong normative features. However, I propose an alternative account of what it means for a mechanism to be moderately reasons-responsive which addresses this deficiency. In a nut shell, while Fischer and Ravizza test for moderate reasons-responsiveness by checking how a mechanism behaves in a given time slice across other possible worlds, on my account we should ask how that mechanism behaves in this world over a span of time – specifically, whether it responds to reasons sufficiently often. My diachronic account is intended as a drop-in replacement for Fischer and Ravizza's synchronic account.     

Can Lonely People Behave Morally? The Joint Influence of Loneliness and Empathy on Moral Identity

We examine how loneliness moderates the effect of empathy on moral identity: the extent to which being a moral person is important to an individual's identity. Results of four studies show that only lonely people have increased moral identity when they have high (vs. low) empathy; empathy does not reliably increase moral identity for nonlonely people. We demonstrate these effects with psychological measures of moral identity as well as with downstream moral behaviors in various consumer settings. Our findings are consistent with the motivation theory of loneliness and empathy: Lonely people are capable, but are not motivated to empathize.     

Inferring Learners' Knowledge From Their Actions

Watching another person take actions to complete a goal and making inferences about that person's knowledge is a relatively natural task for people. This ability can be especially important in educational settings, where the inferences can be used for assessment, diagnosing misconceptions, and providing informative feedback. In this paper, we develop a general framework for automatically making such inferences based on observed actions; this framework is particularly relevant for inferring student knowledge in educational games and other interactive virtual environments. Our approach relies on modeling action planning: We formalize the problem as a Markov decision process in which one must choose what actions to take to complete a goal, where choices will be dependent on one's beliefs about how actions affect the environment. We use a variation of inverse reinforcement learning to infer these beliefs. Through two lab experiments, we show that this model can recover people's beliefs in a simple environment, with accuracy comparable to that of human observers. We then demonstrate that the model can be used to provide real‐time feedback and to model data from an existing educational game.     

Thinking about Morality and Moral Thinking: Is There a Distinction?

ABSTRACT A recent exchange with Shaffer (this issue) reveals several points of agreement underscoring the utility of our subject-based approach to understanding moral thought. Shaffer's latest reply raises the interesting question of whether thinking about morality, the focus of our study, constitutes moral thinking. Our response underscores how Shaffer's approach to studying moral thought differs from our own. More important, we emphasize how disagreements over what constitutes moral thinking can and should be settled empirically.