The future of the American Group Psychotherapy Association: whither we goest?

The author describes his perspective about what the future holds for the American Group Psychotherapy Association (AGPA). Utilizing Nitsun's (1996) construct of the "anti-group" as an organizing metaphor, he delineates the destructive forces both within and outside the organization that are currently affecting it, and then describes how they can be transformed into instruments for positive development. He suggests that the AGPA can and must continue to provide a "holding environment" (Winnicott, 1960) for professionals interested in working with people in groups. In addition, he asserts that the organization will build upon its remarkable response to the September 11, 2001 debacle in the United States to expand its services to those who have been traumatized. Beyond this, he underscores the importance of the AGPA consolidating and expanding its various educational offerings into a coherent package that will meet the needs of any and all who are interested in learning about how to work effectively with groups. In these and other ways, he contends that the AGPA will thereby confirm Nitsun's assertion that anti-group forces can be transformed, and that organizations that confront these forces constructively can not only survive but thrive.     

We are driven

Is metapsychology out-or in again? Is it a millstone tied around our necks-or is it an intriguing Freudian witch whom we can even dance with? Is the concept of drives an outmoded oddity-or an indispensable companion, inspiring our understanding of the patient's material and even opening new windows for further development? Can we proceed with the concept of structures and object relationships alone -or do we need the concept of drives in order to understand what these object relationships are all about? The author clearly opts for the second option in each of these pairs of alternatives. Musing on the sophisticated metapsychology debate that unsettled psychoanalysis in the United States for many years, she reviews some of the most frequently quoted objections to the concept of drives. Further, she offers an introduction to modern drive theory with the new duality of sexual and preservative drives, as well as a different concept of aggression, and explains how drives relate to structures-specifically, to the representations of self and object.     

The Idea of Practice and Why It Matters in the Teaching of Preaching

Abstract. The concept of practice helps us better understand how preaching works, as well as how we can teach that practice more effectively. This essay develops a compact but wide‐ranging view of practices, reflecting the current scholarly discussion. It also argues that preaching is a particular instance of this larger concept of practices. Understanding preaching as a practice gives new perspectives on what preaching is and allows us to consider how to employ broadly recognized standards of excellence to evaluate particular instances of students’ preaching. Further, this essay explores how the teaching of preaching is a practice in its own right. The value of this insight is that it allows us then to explore how the character of the teaching and the character of what is taught can be consonant with one another, and in ways that can guide. This essay is from “Teaching Preaching as a Christian Practice,” edited by Thomas G. Long and Nora Tisdale. Used by permission of Westminster John Knox Press.     

THE WHOLE BRAIN AS THE BASIS OR THE ANALOGICAL EXPRESSION OF GOD

Abstract. As human beings we inevitably try to explain our experience. In philosophical language, we deal with transcendent assertions and aspirations. The issue, then, is: how can we talk about what matters, given the structures inherent in language and basic to the way we are made? Instead of the philosophical category of Being, I advance a case for giving the human brain privileged status as an analogical expression of God, the symbol-concept of what matters most, and then suggest the illumination which can come with using that analogical expression, especially as that analogy connects us with the environment at the limbic level and constructs our world at the cerebral level.     

Countertransference and the Erotic

Eros is like a huge spark that ignites our passion and then confronts us with the problem of living out this fire in ordinary space and time. What do we each know of this spark, this flame? Who or what was it’s object? Where have we felt this force for unity in ourselves, with another person, with life itself? Where are we unlived erotically? Where are the chinks in our erotic life? In focusing on the erotic in clinical work, we usually begin with the analysand’s transference. I want to explore eros in the life of the analyst for our relation to eros influences the clinical work we do. When eros is constellated, two possibilities of relationship present themselves: to an actual other who must be reckoned with as real, and to a psychic content, equally real, which we do not invent or control. How do we experience this electricity? What is our desire like? What does it take us back to, and toward what unseen purpose does it propel us? Eros brings with it a sense of purpose, of going somewhere important, something that enlists body, soul, and spirit.     

What is a chemical property?

Despite the currently perceived urgent need among contemporary philosophers of chemistry for adjudicating between two rival metaphysical conceptual frameworks—is chemistry primarily a science of substances or processes?—this essay argues that neither provides us with what we need in our attempts to explain and comprehend chemical operations and phenomena. First, I show the concept of a chemical property can survive the abandoning of the metaphysical framework of substance. While this abandonment means that we will need to give up essential properties, contingent properties can give us all the stability we need to account for chemical continuity as well as change. I then go on to show that this attention to clusters of contingent properties does not force us into the arms of an alternative process metaphysical framework either. Finally, I sketch a view I call particularism with respect to chemical properties on analogy with moral particularism. I conclude by sketching some of the implications for the field of philosophy of chemistry of my proposal that we abandon our interest in the metaphysical question of what chemistry is primarily about in favor of a broadly scientific particularism with respect to kinds and properties.     

The Meaning of Life Sub Specie Aeternitatis

Several philosophers have argued that if we examine our lives in context of the cosmos at large, sub specie aeternitatis, we cannot escape life's meaninglessness. To see our lives as meaningful, we have to shun the point of view of the cosmos and consider our lives only in the narrower context of the here and now. I argue that this view is incorrect: life can be seen as meaningful also sub specie aeternitatis. While criticizing arguments by, among others, Simon Blackburn, Nicholas Rescher, and Thomas Nagel, I show that what determines assessments of the meaning of a life are the standards of meaningfulness one endorses rather than the size of the context in which that life is assessed. Employing non-demanding standards of meaningfulness to assess a life is compatible with examining it in the context of the cosmos at large. That is also the case if we accept Nagel's claim that to examine a life sub specie aeternitatis is to examine it externally, impersonally and objectively: life can be evaluated as meaningful also when under these perspectives if the standards of meaningfulness we adopt are not overly challenging. Nor does the contingency of our existence, realized sub specie aeternitatis, render our life meaningless. Contrary to a commonly accepted view, then, examining our lives sub specie aeternitatis does not necessitate that we see them as meaningless.     

The numinous and immanent nature of the psychoanalytic subject

In the Freudian and Kleinian conception of unconscious mental life, credence is given to the existence and functioning of peremptory instinctual drives as the putative causation of all mental life, yet they are denied an organization or a personality. It is especially when we come to the notion of how dreams are created or how the free associations of an analytic hour are orchestrated that we begin to wonder about the hidden order, the cryptic intelligence or presence, that seems to cohere our chaos and present it to us in mystically encoded forms for us to translate.
In this contribution it is posited that there is a numinous or ineffable subject of the unconscious which organizes our mental life and which unconsciously registers everything that happens to us. Mysteriously connected with this is the immanent subject of conscious/preconsciousness which registers the impact of stimuli from the external world but which has contact with the numinous subject.     

In search of meaningful participation: Making connections between emotions and learning

Research on participation has advanced our understanding of children's everyday lives by increasingly bringing into focus what society perceives as ‘meaningful’. This piece is driven by a desire to extend this investigation by sharing a creative research journey. Here, we have combined our theoretical musings, initial conversations with children, and evolving methodological approaches to show how our research approach has changed as we seek meaningful ways to involve children. Accordingly, this paper highlights the positive consequences of a reflective research process that focuses on children's emotions as we consider children's capacities as learners. We argue that by critically engaging with what is meaningful in the context of participation, we can demonstrate the value of children's voices, challenging dominant discourses about children's competence.     

Optimistic Naturalism: Scientific Advancement and the Meaning of Life

Naturalist theories of the meaning of life are sometimes criticised for not setting the bar high enough for what counts as a meaningful life. Tolstoy’s version of this criticism is that Naturalist theories do not describe really meaningful lives because they do not require that we connect our finite lives with the infinite. Another criticism of Naturalist theories is that they cannot adequately resolve the Absurd—the vast difference between how meaningful our actions and lives appear from subjective and objective viewpoints. This article proposes a novel view, Optimistic Naturalism, in order to refute these criticisms. Optimistic Naturalism is the view that scientific and technological advancement might allow us to lead Truly Meaningful lives in a purely physical universe by enabling our actions, which we find meaningful partly because they might have particular infinite consequences, to actually have infinite consequences for life. The central tenets of Optimistic Naturalism are Infinite Consequence and Scientific Optimism. By explaining how the correct connection of the subjective and objective meaning of actions can result in True Meaning, Infinite Consequence provides a theoretical blueprint for resolving the Absurd. Scientific Optimism provides reason to think that it is possible to follow that blueprint in a purely physical universe. Therefore, when taken together, these two principles provide relatively plausible reasons to think that at least one kind of Naturalist theory can connect the finite with the infinite in a meaningful way and resolve the Absurd.     

How successfully can we measure well-being through measuring happiness?

Happiness is currently the topic of a wide range of empirical research, and is increasingly becoming the focus of public policy. The interest in happiness largely stems from its connection with well-being. We care about well-being – how well our lives are going for us. If we are happy it seems that, to some extent, we must be doing well. This suggests that we may be able to successfully measure well-being through measuring happiness. The problem is that both happiness and well-being are elusive and their measurement is far from uncontroversial. What exactly does information about happiness tell us about well-being? Is there more to well-being than happiness? If so, to what extent is happiness connected to well-being? These are controversial questions, but answers to them must be given if we are to make progress in the measurement of well-being. I argue that we should view happiness as an indicator of changes in well-being. I call this the Indicator View. According to this view, someone can be doing badly yet be happy insofar as their well-being is improving (and vice versa). More precisely, the Indicator View is the view that happiness is a defeasible indicator of local changes in well-being. Thus, we can successfully measure an important aspect of well-being through measuring happiness. I argue in favour of this view on the basis of an understanding of well-being that is widely acceptable. The Indicator View, therefore, has the potential to unite divided opinion over what happiness research can tell us about well-being.     

Something-We-Know-Not-What,Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley,Meaning and Minds

It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea of it, then one cannot speak meaningfully of it. But if this is Berkeley’s position, then there is a puzzle, because Berkeley also explicitly claims that it is impossible to perceive/have ideas of minds. So if he is relying on a criterion on which terms get their meaning by referring to ideas, then, just as Berkeley rejects talk of material substance, so, too, must he reject talk of mental substance. Famously, however, Berkeley insists that there is no parity between the cases of material and mental substance. It is typically suggested that the disparity between matter and minds rests on the fact that although one cannot strictly speaking perceive minds, nonetheless Berkeley thinks that one can have experiential access to minds via reflection, and that this access allows for meaningful talk of minds. Of course, one can only have reflective experience of one’s own mind. But what of other minds, which one cannot reflectively experience? Here the usual tactic is to suppose that, although one cannot have direct reflective experience of other minds, nonetheless one can indirectly experience such minds via analogy to our own minds, and that this indirect experience grounds the meaningfulness of talk of other minds. In this paper, I argue that the reasoning behind Berkeley’s ‘likeness principle,’ that an idea can only be like another idea, can be generalized to argue against this experience-based account of our access to other minds. I claim instead that Berkeley allows for the meaningfulness of talk of other minds by expanding the criterion of meaning in a different way. I argue that Berkeley holds a criterion of meaning on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies either an object of experience or an object that one has reason to posit on the basis of experience, i.e., an object that is necessary to explain our experiences. When an object is neither experienced nor explains our experiences, then and only then is Berkeley willing to reject it as meaningless. Thus he writes of “the word matter,” that “it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us: and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about we know not what, and we know not why” (Principles, §77.) The word is not meaningless merely because we do not know what matter might be; it is meaningless because we also do not know why it should be. Correspondingly, I argue that the term ‘mind’ is meaningful because although we have no experience of minds, nonetheless they play an important role in explaining our experiences.     

THE STORIED ANALYST: DESIRE AND PERSUASION IN THE CLINICAL VIGNETTE

Beginning with the quintessentially psychoanalytic tales of Freud, the case history has held a privileged position in the history and practice of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysts grow up with, grow into, and grow out of these narratives as clinical practitioners. Alongside the representational aspects of these case histories, there is a rhetorical or persuasive force that significantly influences us. The author contends that the theory of narrative and rhetoric can inform the how, the why, and the “so what?” of our relationship to these stories of psychoanalysis.     

Reflections on the use of patient records: Privacy,ethics, and reparations in the history of psychiatry

One of the most common questions we get asked as historians of psychiatry is “do you have access to patient records?” Why are people so fascinated with the psychiatric patient record? Do people assume they are or should be available? Does access to the patient record actually tell us anything new about the history of psychiatry? And if we did have them, what can, or should we do with them? In the push to both decolonize and personalize the history of psychiatry, as well as make some kind of account or reparation for past mistakes, how can we proceed in an ethical manner that respects the privacy of people in the past who never imagined their intensely personal psychiatric encounter as subject for future historians? In this paper, we want to think through some of the issues that we deal with as white historians of psychiatry especially at the intersection of privacy, ethics, and racism. We present our thoughts as a conversation, structured around questions we have posed for ourselves, and building on discussions we have had together over the past few years. We hope that they act as a catalyst for further discussion in the field.     

Ethical dilemmas in context: Some preliminary questions

I have tried to build on O'Neill's thought-provoking paper by examining two influences that shape and define ethical dilemmas in the community: our personal agendas and the broader context. The first influence is the way in which our personal and professional values shape our agendas for community work. The way these agendas frame the choices for action are a force to be recognized separate from the question of who constitutes our community constituency. Our values may push us into proactive roles and we must face the way our actions make personal/political statements. The broader context of the community situation and the ways in which resource limitations frame the ethical question also need to be actively recognized. Otherwise there is a danger of making the psychologist the victim by posing the ethical dilemma as a question of how they alone should find a solution. The nature of our personal agenda must be clear before we ask “responsible to whom?” The broader context must be considered before we ask “responsible for what?”     

THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

By Chinese philosophy I mean the main streams of traditional Chinese philosophy such as Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism and the contemporary reconstruction of the philosophical insights of these schools. Are they still meaningful for us today? Before I can answer the question, first of all I would like to give a very brief review of the conditions that led to our present situation, and then we may find ourselves in a position to give a proper assessment of the contemporary significance of Chinese philosophy in our journey towards the post-modern era.     

How Opposites (Should) Attract: Humility as a Virtue for the Strong

This article first examines pervasive present‐day attitudes toward humility (‘The Contemporary Distaste for Humility’) before turning to Thomas Aquinas and Zhu Xi for their more positive treatments of this disposition (‘Thomas Aquinas and Zhu Xi on Humility’). It then considers their ideas about how humility is related to our human limitations (‘Humility Grounded in Our Finite Nature and Knowledge’), before surveying how they think it should be expressed in our relationships with our neighbours (‘Humility in Community’). The article looks at what Thomas and Zhu have to say about excessive pride in rulers (‘Humility and Authority’) before closing in the Conclusion with some thoughts about the viability of humility as a virtue for the strong, and its especial importance in contemporary politics.     

Wu Wei (Non-doing) and the Negativity of Depression

The anxiety of being drives us to the quest for security and certainty. The question emerges, “what is the Way?” In an attempt to find the Way through cognitive process, we are further removed from It. This parallel process takes place when depressed individuals struggle with the negativity of depression. Wu wei is an invitation to return to the Way and to the self. The self that embraces negativity is able to rest in itself.     

In Praise of Natural Philosophy: A Revolution for Thought and Life

Modern science began as natural philosophy. In the time of Newton, what we call science and philosophy today ?C the disparate endeavours ?C formed one mutually interacting, integrated endeavour of natural philosophy: to improve our knowledge and understanding of the universe, and to improve our understanding of ourselves as a part of it. Profound, indeed unprecedented discoveries were made. But then natural philosophy died. It split into science on the one hand, and philosophy on the other. This happened during the 18th and 19th centuries, and the split is now built into our intellectual landscape. But the two fragments, science and philosophy, are defective shadows of the glorious unified endeavour of natural philosophy. Rigour, sheer intellectual good sense and decisive argument demand that we put the two together again, and rediscover the immense merits of the integrated enterprise of natural philosophy. This requires an intellectual revolution, with dramatic implications for how we understand our world, how we understand and do science, and how we understand and do philosophy. There are dramatic implications, too, for education, and for the entire academic endeavour, and its capacity to help us discover how to tackle more successfully our immense global problems.     

Fracturing drive or fracturing connections—relational considerations commentary on paper by Paul Williams

We tend to conceive of mourning primarily in intrapsychic terms. In this commentary I highlight how Harvey Peskin’s paper (this issue) helps us to appreciate that grief is not only the product of the individual mind but is also constituted relationally. Both what we experience in our grieving and how we express it is shaped by and through those around us whose grief we bear witness to, as we ourselves grieve and are witnessed by them.

I elaborate further on Peskin’s view of the role of witnessing during grieving and mine another profound implication in his discourse by pointing to the bidirectional influence between mourning and relationality. Not only is mourning fostered through relational engagement, but our grieving together can provide the mortar for the building and sustaining of community.