Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.     

A stage is a stage is a stage: a direct comparison of two scoring systems

L. Kohlberg (1969) argued that his moral stages captured a developmental sequence specific to the moral domain. To explore that contention, the author compared stage assignments obtained with the Standard Issue Scoring System (A. Colby & L. Kohlberg, 1987a, 1987b) and those obtained with a generalized content-independent stage-scoring system called the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System (T. L. Dawson, 2002a), on 637 moral judgment interviews (participants' ages ranged from 5 to 86 years). The correlation between stage scores produced with the 2 systems was .88. Although standard issue scoring and hierarchical complexity scoring often awarded different scores up to Kohlberg's Moral Stage 2/3, from his Moral Stage 3 onward, scores awarded with the two systems predominantly agreed. The author explores the implications for developmental research.     

Carol Gilligan's theory of sex differences in the development of moral reasoning during adolescence

Gilligan's work, which focuses on sex differences in moral reasoning, the perception of violence, the resolution of sexual dilemmas and abortion decisions, poses a major challenge to Kohlberg's theory by introducing a feminist perspective of moral development. Kohlberg had shown that the average female attained a moral judgment rating of stage three (good boy-nice girl), while adolescent males score at level four (law and order) and are more likely to move on to postconventional levels. Gilligan suggests that these findings reveal a gender bias, not that females are less mature than boys. Men and women follow different voices. Men tend to organize social relationships in a hierarchical order and subscribe to a morality of rights. Females value interpersonal connectedness, care, sensitivity, and responsibility to people. Kohlberg's scoring criteria give the interpersonal care orientations of females lower ratings than the principled justice orientation. Hence, Gilligan identifies different developmental stages for females. However, she does not claim that one system is better; both are equally valid. Only by integrating these complementary male (justice) and female (care) orientations will we be able to realize our full human potential in moral development.     

A Stage Is a Stage Is a Stage: A Direct Comparison of Two Scoring Systems

L. Kohlberg (1969) argued that his moral stages captured a developmental sequence specific to the moral domain. To explore that contention, the author compared stage assignments obtained with the Standard Issue Scoring System (A. Colby & L. Kohlberg, 1987a, 1987b) and those obtained with a generalized content-independent stage-scoring system called the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System (T. L. Dawson, 2002a), on 637 moral judgment interviews (participants' ages ranged from 5 to 86 years). The correlation between stage scores produced with the 2 systems was .88. Although standard issue scoring and hierarchical complexity scoring often awarded different scores up to Kohlberg's Moral Stage 2/3, from his Moral Stage 3 onward, scores awarded with the two systems predominantly agreed. The author explores the implications for developmental research.     

Structural flexibility of moral judgment.

One of the central assumptions of Kohlberg's theory of moral development--that moral judgment is organized in structures of the whole--was examined. Thirty men and 30 women were given 2 dilemmas from Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, a 3rd involving prosocial behavior, and a 4th involving impaired driving. Half the Ss responded to the prosocial and impaired-driving dilemmas from the perspective of a hypothetical character, and half responded from the perspective of the self. No sex or perspective differences in moral maturity were observed. Ss scored highest in moral maturity on Kohlberg's dilemmas, intermediate on the prosocial dilemma, and lowest on the impaired-driving dilemma. In partial support of Kohlberg's contention that his test assesses moral competence, there was a negative linear relationship between scores on his test and the proportion of Stage 2 judgments on the 2 other dilemmas. An interactional model of moral judgment is advanced.     

Interpersonal Moral Conflicts Between Couples: Effects of Type of Dilemma, Role, and Partner's Judgments on Level of Moral Reasoning and Probability of Resolution

Forty-two male–female couples completed Kohlberg's test of moral development and made moral judgments about the most recent interpersonal moral conflict they had experienced in their everyday lives. Participants made lower stage moral judgments about their interpersonal moral conflicts than about the dilemmas on Kohlberg's test. The type of interpersonal moral conflict participants experienced and their role in the conflict were related to the types of moral judgments they made. Participants who reported philosophical conflicts made more mature moral judgments than participants who reported antisocial conflicts, especially if their role in the antisocial conflict was that of a transgressor. Conflicts were most likely to be resolved when partners' moral judgments about their conflict were similar in moral maturity. The implications of these findings for models of moral judgment are discussed.     

Reasoning about the self and relationships in maturity: an integrative complexity analysis of individual differences

This study examined age (35-55 versus 65-85), gender, and self-concept-orientation differences in reasoning about the self, relationships, and morality, on the basis of the theorizing of Gilligan (1982). Participants were interviewed about general relationship issues, a specific relationship, and about the self. Reasoning was scored for integrative complexity (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977). Life experience measures and the standard Kohlberg justice reasoning index were obtained. Results showed gender differences in the connectedness of the self-concept for middle-aged, but not older, adults. No age or gender differences in the complexity of relationship reasoning or in justice reasoning were found. Those with more connected self-concepts reasoned in more complex ways about relationships and about the self.     

Sex Differences in Adult Moral Orientations

ABSTRACT Gilligan's (1982) hypotheses regarding sex differences in moral reasoning orientation were investigated in two samples of adults In Study 1, adults ages 18 to 75 were interviewed about both hypothetical and personal moral dilemmas Women were more likely than men overall to show Gilligan's care orientation as expected, particularly in personal reasoning However, these sex differences were not as pervasive as Gilligan argues, and were influenced by subject age, subject stage level on Kohlberg's measure of moral reasoning, and the type of real-life dilemma content recalled by subjects for discussion
Study 2 focused on the role of adult parental status as mediator of personal moral orientation differences in mid-life Consistent with the theorizing of Gutmann (1985), adult parents were shown to be sex-role differentiated in both selfconcept and moral orientation, whereas married nonparents were not Further-more, sex differences in reasoning orientations were again found to be linked to differences in the dilemma content presented by men and women These studies partly support Gilligan's theorizing, but indicate less pervasive sex differences in some groups of adults than hypothesized     

Moral judgment and self-reported moral events in adulthood

As part of a 13-year study of the development of reasoning about the Good Life and moral judgment, 29 middle-class, well-educated adults, ranging in age from 18 to 80 years, were interviewed twice, 4 years apart on Standard Form Moral Judgment interviews and were asked to describe their own moral events that occurred recently. Both times, the average moral judgment score on the hypothetical dilemmas was about stage 4. The reasoning in the spontaneously reported moral events was significantly lower, although the two scores were highly correlated. Difference scores between the two were not related to scores on the hypothetical dilemmas. While there were no significant gender differences in scores on the hypothetical dilemmas, there were in scores on spontaneously reported events favoring males. The philosophic quality of the reported events could be easily categorized by traditional moral-philosophic categories; about half of the events contained traditional deontic moral content (moral right); the other half contained material defined as the moral good. The context of most events was interpersonal as opposed to societal. The most frequent issue discussed concerned honesty about financial issues, particularly income tax evasion. Ways to expand the research on adult moral experience are discussed.     

Gender differences in moral development

Sixty-nine Midwestern middle-class children and adolescents were tested on justice and care orientations when reasoning abstract and interpersonal moral dilemmas. Nona Lyons' (“Two Perspectives on Self, Relationships and Morality,” Harvard Educational Review, 1983, 53, 125–145) scoring method was used to score subjects' responses. A 2(sex)×2(age) analysis of variance run on the total justice and care scores, as well as each individual dilemma, supported Carol Gilligan's (In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) theory that two distinct ways of thinking about moral problems exist — justice and care — and are differentially related to gender. Girls emphasized the morality of care significantly more than justice. Contrary to Gilligan (1982) and Lyons (1983), however, boys in both age groups emphasized the morality of justice and care equally. Data from the interpersonal dilemmas using Lyons's (1983) coding scheme are consistent with J. Piaget (The Moral Judgement of the Child, New York: Free Press, 1966) and Lawrence Kohlberg [“The Cognitive-Developmental Approach,” in D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969]: older subjects became more justice oriented and younger subjects emphasized the morality of care. Sex differences on Kohlberg's stage theory were not significant and the protagonist's gender in the Heinz dilemma had no effect on moral reasoning.     

An attempt to induce lower moral reasoning under hypnotic and task-motivated age regression

In this study, we attempted to partially replicate and extend the findings of the Page (1985) study of hypnotic age regression and moral reasoning. The Kohlberg (1976) Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) was used to assess the initial stage of moral reasoning in 32 adults who were preselected on the basis of their hypnotic susceptibility. Subjects were hypnotized and age regressed to two of four possible ages (16, 13, 10, and 7), or were given task-motivation instructions before being age regressed. All were then administered the MJI, which involves the resolution of certain dilemmas. Both groups were able to lower their moral reasoning scores when given age regression instructions, but no significant differences were found between groups. Thus the results of this study are inconsistent with those of Page (1985), but are consistent with those of O'Brien et al. (1977). Reasons for the failure to reaffirm the earlier results of Page (1985) are discussed.     

Personality correlates of logical and sociomoral judgment

This study examined the relation of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) to stages of logical and sociomoral judgment. Logical judgment was measured using adaptations of the pendulum and correlations tasks of Inhelder and Piaget; moral judgment was scored using the standard Kohlberg interview. In a sample of 143 adults, logical and sociomoral judgment were correlated .30 to .50 with most of the Class I (Factor 2) CPI scales, those capturing social poise and interpersonal adequacy, and Class III (Factor 3) CPI scales, those capturing achievement potential and intellectual efficiency. The findings offer support for a cognitive interpretation of competence and ego development.     

The relationship of moral judgment, self-awareness, and sex to complicance behavior

Sixty male and sixty female college students, representing three of Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment, were exposed to a complicance situation in which their personal count of a series of metronome clicks was contradicted by a unanimous group. Group differences were either one or two steps from veridical. For half of the subjects self-awareness was experimentally increased. The results indicated that subjects in moral judgment Stages 3 and 4 complied significantly more than Stage 5 subjects. The self-awareness manipulation produced a complex pattern of results in the form of a three way interaction with moral judgment and type of compliance. Finally, sex differences in compliance behavior were significant, with females complying more than males. The results were discussed in terms of a cognition-behavior relationship.     

Moral Development and Higher States of Consciousness

This paper discusses possible relationships between the cognitive–moral development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg and Charles Alexander's life-span model. Central to Alexander's model is the role which levels of mind and higher states of consciousness play throughout the general periods of development. Parallel to Kohlberg's cosmic perspective Stage 7—which goes beyond the representational logic and reasoning identified by Piaget's highest stage—are the postrepresentational stages of development, described by Vedic psychology and Alexander's model as "higher states of consciousness"—transcendental consciousness, cosmic consciousness, God consciousness, and unity consciousness. Research indicates that EEG brainwave coherence is associated with the development of higher states of consciousness and Kohlberg's Stage 7. Studies on the Transcendental Meditation (TM) and TM-Sidhi programs as effective technologies for promoting moral development are further discussed.     

Multiplicity of Emotions in Moral Judgment and Motivation

Multiple moral emotions were examined from a dynamic motivational framework through two hypothetical dilemmas that originate from the cognitive-developmental research program in morality. A questionnaire based on recognition task measurement of moral motivation and emotions was administered to 546 college students. As part of the dynamic complexity of moral motivation, intrapersonal operation of multiple emotions were expected and found toward each emotion target in each judgment context. Compassion and distress were among the most important moral emotions. Relatively strong degrees of anger and hate were reported toward the victimizers in ways that distinguished judgment choices. Participants distinguished a variety of positive emotions from anger and hate through differential associations with judgment choices. The study revealed orderly patterns of variability in the multiplicity of moral emotional experience based on relations with specific emotion targets, judgment choices, and developmental quality of moral motivation. The overall developmental quality of moral motivation was negatively associated with hate and positively associated with anger toward the victimizers. Emotional awareness was also found to be positively related to the developmental quality of moral motivation. Exploring the intrapersonal multiplicity of moral emotional experience has important implications for understanding the complexity of moral decision making and motivation.     

Systematic variability in the quality of moral action, as defined in two formulations

Whether the often-reported, low level correlations among moral scores for different situations are due to systematic variations in both contexts and persons' functioning was investigated within two moral systems: Kohlberg's (1981) and an interactional formulation (Haan, 1978). The sample was 119 university students, members of 15 naturally existing friendship groups. First they were individually interviewed; then, as friendship groups, they took part in five sessions of about 3 hr each; 10 groups played moral games, whereas 5 groups discussed hypothetical dilemmas. The students were reinterviewed individually, soon after the five sessions, and again 3-4 months later. Thus eight moral scores were secured for each moral system. Measures of characteristic ego functioning and friends' sociometric evaluations were obtained before the sessions along with situationally evoked ego functioning and the groups' functioning during the sessions. Inconsistent moral performance occurred according to both systems, but variations could be attributed to systematic situational effects of contextual stress, contents of dilemmas, and operational style of friendship groups, and to individual differences in the students' characteristic and situationally evoked ways of resolving conflict. Differences between the two systems in the effects of ego strategies were most striking.     

Moral motivation of college students through multiple developmental structures: Evidence of intrapersonal variability in a complex dynamic system

This study is based on a broad conception of moral motivation by applying self-determination theory and dynamic systems perspectives. Accordingly, not only moral action, but also moral judgment is motivated. We carried out a detailed exploration of intrapersonal variability as a central aspect of moral motivation. Kohlberg’s six stages of moral development are reconceptualized as dynamic process structures of motivation that operate together within person simultaneously in different degrees. A total of 546 college students responded to a new instrument to assess moral motivation using a recognition task. Findings provided support for the notion that individuals use multiple motivational structures in different degrees as they make moral judgments. The majority of correlations between within-person operation degrees of motivational structures were significant. Variations in these correlations are explained to a large extent by developmental proximity of stage pairs. Results revealed both variability and developmental order in moral motivation. Implications of a dynamic developmental perspective are discussed in terms of understanding the complexity of moral motivation in ways that are sensitive to both intrapersonal and contextual variability.