Form of redundancy as a determinant of tachistoscopic word recognition

Single letters and redundant CVCs and CCCs were presented at threshold durations and followed by a pattern mask. Performance on three-letter stimuli was greater than on single letters. The increased performance was consistent with a state model of perceptual independence. Conditional redundancy increased the frequency with which all three letters were accurately reported as compared to correlational redundancy. Meaning and pronounceability had little effect on performance.     

The impact of subjective recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing tree approach

The recognition heuristic (RH) theory states that, in comparative judgments (e.g., Which of two cities has more inhabitants?), individuals infer that recognized objects score higher on the criterion (e.g., population) than unrecognized objects. Indeed, it has often been shown that recognized options are judged to outscore unrecognized ones (e.g., recognized cities are judged as larger than unrecognized ones), although different accounts of this general finding have been proposed. According to the RH theory, this pattern occurs because the binary recognition judgment determines the inference and no other information will reverse this. An alternative account posits that recognized objects are chosen because knowledge beyond mere recognition typically points to the recognized object. A third account can be derived from the memory-state heuristic framework. According to this framework, underlying memory states of objects (rather than recognition judgments) determine the extent of RH use: When two objects are compared, the one associated with a “higher” memory state is preferred, and reliance on recognition increases with the “distance” between their memory states. The three accounts make different predictions about the impact of subjective recognition experiences—whether an object is merely recognized or recognized with further knowledge—on RH use. We estimated RH use for different recognition experiences across 16 published data sets, using a multinomial processing tree model. Results supported the memory-state heuristic in showing that RH use increases when recognition is accompanied by further knowledge.     

Models of ecological rationality: the recognition heuristic

One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counterintuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences.     

Change in perceptual form attenuates the use of the fluency heuristic in recognition

Four experiments (total N=295) were conducted to determine whether within-modality changes in perceptual form between the study and the test phases of an experiment would moderate the role of the fluency heuristic in recognition memory. Experiment 1 showed that a change from pictures to words reduced the role of fluency in recognition memory. In Experiment 2, the same result was found using counterfeit study lists that supposedly consisted of pictures or words. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that changes in the font used to present the study and test words also attenuated the contribution of fluency to the recognition decision when font change was manipulated between subjects, but not within subjects. Results suggest that the fluency heuristic is subject to metacognitive control, since participants' attributions of perceptual fluency depend on the perceived usefulness of fluency as a cue to recognition.     

Fluency heuristic: a model of how the mind exploits a by-product of information retrieval

Boundedly rational heuristics for inference can be surprisingly accurate and frugal for several reasons. They can exploit environmental structures, co-opt complex capacities, and elude effortful search by exploiting information that automatically arrives on the mental stage. The fluency heuristic is a prime example of a heuristic that makes the most of an automatic by-product of retrieval from memory, namely, retrieval fluency. In 4 experiments, the authors show that retrieval fluency can be a proxy for real-world quantities, that people can discriminate between two objects' retrieval fluencies, and that people's inferences are in line with the fluency heuristic (in particular fast inferences) and with experimentally manipulated fluency. The authors conclude that the fluency heuristic may be one tool in the mind's repertoire of strategies that artfully probes memory for encapsulated frequency information that can veridically reflect statistical regularities in the world.     

On the primacy of the brain

It is well established that emotion is a product of complex interactions among the biological subsystems of the organism. The human nervous system must play a fundamental role in organizing and controlling the manifestation of these interactions. Since emotional disturbance is one of the major phenomena underlying maladaptive behavior, a solid understanding of its nature and mechanisms is essential for enhancing therapeutic practices. Although an increasing number of scholars now advocate the notion of the dependence of emotion on antecedent cognitive processes (e.g., Lazarus, 1982, 1984), and the relevance of both central and peripheral processes of the nervous system to emotional behavior (e.g., Panksepp, 1988; Pribram, 1984), Zajonc (1984) views emotion as independent of cognitive processes. This paper provides a critical evaluation of the basis of Zajonc’s (1984) argument from a neurobiological and psychotherapeutic point of view.     

On the primacy of the brain

It is well established that emotion is a product of complex interactions among the biological subsystems of the organism. The human nervous system must play a fundamental role in organizing and controlling the manifestation of these interactions. Since emotional disturbance is one of the major phenomena underlying maladaptive behavior, a solid understanding of its nature and mechanisms is essential for enhancing therapeutic practices. Although an increasing number of scholars now advocate the notion of the dependence of emotion on antecedent cognitive processes (e.g., Lazarus, 1982, 1984), and the relevance of both central and peripheral processes of the nervous system to emotional behavior (e.g., Panksepp, 1988; Pribram, 1984), Zajonc (1984) views emotion as independent of cognitive processes. This paper provides a critical evaluation of the basis of Zajonc’s (1984) argument from a neurobiological and psychotherapeutic point of view.     

On the binary quality of recognition and the inconsequentiality of further knowledge: two critical tests of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic is claimed to be distinguished from notions of availability and fluency through its categorical or “binary” treatment of information and the “inconsequentiality” of further knowledge to inferences based on recognition. Using the city‐size task of Goldstein and Gigerenzer ( 2002 ) we demonstrate that: (1) increasing the validity of other information in the environment decreases the reliance on recognition; (2) cities that are both recognized and have other information known about them (e.g. they have a soccer team) are chosen more often than those which are simply recognized; and (3) there is a negative correlation between the time taken to identify a city and the proportion of times it is selected as the larger of a pair. None of these results is predicted by the process model of the recognition heuristic. The implication of the results for the distinction between the recognition, availability and fluency heuristics is discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Empirical tests of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic postulates that individuals should choose a recognized object more often than an unrecognized one whenever recognition is related to the criterion. This behavior has been described as a one‐cue, noncompensatory decision‐making strategy. This claim and other assumptions were tested in four experiments using paired‐comparison tasks with cities and other geographical objects. The main results were (1) that the recognized object was chosen more often than the unrecognized one when the recognition cue was valid; (2) that participants' behavior did not reflect the recognition validity of their own knowledge; (3) that a less‐is‐more effect (i.e., better performance with less knowledge) was either absent or of only small size; and (4) that judgments were influenced by further knowledge, which could even compensate for the recognition cue. In sum, the recognition cue represents an important piece of knowledge in paired comparisons, but apparently not the only one. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When the brain decides: a familiarity-based approach to the recognition heuristic as evidenced by event-related brain potentials

Humans can make fast and highly efficient decisions by using simple heuristics that are assumed to exploit basic cognitive functions. In the study reported here, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to disclose the psychological mechanisms underlying one of the most frugal decision rules, namely, the recognition heuristic. According to this heuristic, whenever two objects have to be ranked by a specific criterion and only one object is recognized, the recognized object is ranked higher than the unrecognized object. Using a standard recognition-heuristic paradigm, we predicted participants' decisions by analyzing an ERP correlate of familiarity-based recognition occurring 300 to 450 ms after stimulus onset. The measure remained a significant predictor even when later ERP correlates were taken into account. These findings are evidence for the thesis that simple heuristics exploit basic cognitive processes. Specifically, the findings show that familiarity--that is, recognition in the absence of recollection--contributes to decisions made on the basis of such heuristics.     

Aging and strategic retrieval processes: reducing false memories with a distinctiveness heuristic

The authors show that a strategic retrieval process--the distinctiveness heuristic--is a powerful mechanism for reducing false memories in the elderly. Individuals studied words, pictures, or both types of items and then completed a recognition test on which the studied items appeared once, whereas the new words appeared twice. After studying either pictures only or a mixture of pictures and words, both younger and older adults falsely recognized fewer repeated new words than did participants who studied words. Studying pictures provided a basis for using a distinctiveness heuristic during the recognition test: Individuals inferred that the absence of memory for picture information indicates that an item is "new."     

On the use of psychology in evaluating software documentation

Recent research evaluating the usefulness of program documentation has borrowed techniques used in psychology to define the variables of interest and to measure those variables. The results of the research suggest that (1) using a branching or sequential program design language (PDL) produces performance that is superior to that found with other formats (such as flowcharts), and (2) using a detailed design written in a PDL leads to superior coding performance over other formats due, in part, to the small amount of translation that is required in mapping from the design to the code. These conclusions are based primarily on time and accuracy data. This paper discusses the research conducted in this area and the conclusions drawn. The influence of the methodology used to conduct these experiments on the evaluation of programmer performance is also discussed.     

On the importance of cognitive evaluation as a determinant of interpersonal attraction

Three studies examined a model of attraction in which the cognitive evaluation of the target individual was the primary determinant of interpersonal attraction. In Study 1, the cognitive evaluation of the target individual mediated the influence of attitude similarity on interpersonal attraction. In Study 2, a path analysis revealed significant indirect effects of (a) similarity on cognitive evaluation via the valence of information implied by attitudes and (b) the valence of information implied by attitudes on attraction via cognitive evaluation of the target. Study 3 provided empirical and theoretical support for the uniqueness of interpersonal attraction from cognitive evaluation. The implications of these data for existing attraction theory are discussed, and a new model of interpersonal attraction is described.     

Mood and the reliance on the ease of retrieval heuristic

Four studies investigate the relationship between individuals' mood and their reliance on the ease retrieval heuristic. Happy participants were consistently more likely to rely on the ease of retrieval heuristic, whereas sad participants were more likely to rely on the activated content. Additional analyses indicate that this pattern is not due to a differential recall (Experiment 2) and that happy participants ceased to rely on the ease of retrieval when the diagnosticity of this information was called into question (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 shows that reliance on the ease of retrieval heuristic resulted in faster judgments than reliance on content, with the former but not the latter being a function of the amount of activated information.     

Retrieval conditions and false recognition: testing the distinctiveness heuristic

High levels of false recognition are observed after people study lists of semantic associates that all converge on a nonpresented lure word. In previous experiments, we have found that orienting participants to encode distinctive information about study list items by presenting them as pictures as opposed to words produces marked reductions in false recognition. We have suggested that these reductions reflect the operation of a distinctiveness heuristic: Participants demand access to detailed pictorial information in order to support a positive recognition decision. The present experiments provide additional evidence on this point and allow us to distinguish between the distinctiveness heuristic account and an alternative account based on the impoverished encoding of relational information that occurs when one is studying pictures. In Experiment 1, even when only half of the items in a study list were presented as pictures, a general suppression of false recognition was observed that could be attributable to impoverished encoding of relational information. Experiment 2 provided a critical test of the distinctiveness heuristic account: We manipulated test instructions and found that differences in false recognition rates between picture and word encoding were attenuated in a retrieval condition that did not encourage reliance on a distinctiveness heuristic.