ONE FALSE VIRTUE OF RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM,AND ONE NEW VICE

A common objection to Act Consequentialism (AC) is that it makes unreasonable demands on moral agents. Rule Consequentialism (RC) is often presented as a less demanding alternative. It is argued that this alleged virtue of RC is false, as RC will not be any less demanding in practice than AC. It is then demonstrated that RC has an additional (hitherto unnoticed) vice, as it relies upon the undefended simplifying assumption that the best possible consequences would arise in a society in which everyone followed the same rules. Once this “Homogeneity Assumption” is rejected, RC is unable to provide a workable alternative to AC.     

Love in the Time of Consequentialism

There are several powerful motivations for neutral value‐based deontic theories such as Act Consequentialism. Traditionally, such theories have had great difficulty accounting for partiality towards one's personal relationships and projects. This paper presents a neutral value‐based theory that preserves the motivations for Act Consequentialism while vindicating some crucial intuitions about reasons to be partial. There are two central ideas. The first is that when it comes to working out what you ought to do, your friends’ interests, the needs of your family, the significance of your own projects and ideals, etc. have more weight than the interests and needs of strangers. Your friends’ interests are not (thereby) more neutrally valuable than the interests of others. So there is a difference between the value of an outcome and its deontic significance. The second familiar idea is that reasons are modifiable. Reasons of partiality are reasons the weights of which are a function of the value of the relevant outcome modified by facts about the value of caring about the outcome in question. The resulting principle has various further explanatory advantages; in particular, it accounts for project‐ and relationship‐specific permissions and requirements, both at a time and across time.     

How Satisficers Get Away with Murder

Traditional Consequentialism is based on a demanding principle of impartial maximization. Michael Slote's 'Satisficing Consequentialism' aims to reduce the demands of Consequentialism, by no longer requiring us to bring about the best possible outcome. This paper presents a new objection to Satisficing Consequentialism. We begin with a simple thought experiment, in which an agent must choose whether to save the lives of ten innocent people by using a sand bag or by killing an innocent person. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that, if it is to avoid making unreasonable demands, Satisficing Consequentialism must allow such an agent to kill. It is argued that this result is much more counter-intuitive than the fact that Maximizing Consequentialism permits agents to kill in order to produce the best consequences. The conclusion is that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable moral theory.     

SLOTE'S SATISFICING CONSEQUENTIALISM

The article discusses Michael Slote's Satisficing Consequentialism, which is the view that moral agents are not required to maximise the good, but merely to produce a sufficient amount of good. It is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable alternative to Maximising Consequentialism. In particular, it is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism cannot be less demanding in practice than Maximising Consequentialism without also endorsing a wide range of clearly unacceptable actions. It is then argued that Slote's inability to provide adequate reasons for moral satisficing stems from a mistaken analogy between rationality and morals. The sense of ‘good enough’ which is relevant to morality is one which focusses on the effort an agent puts in, rather than on the outcome she produces. However, replacing outcomes with efforts would undermine Slote's Consequentialist project. Finally, it is suggested that similar problems will be faced by others who seek to construct essentially Consequentialist theories which are not unduly demanding.     

Psychoanalysis and the regulation of society

Multiple losses can be associated with both infertility and child sexual abuse. This work seeks to explore the ways in which such connections can affect a survivor who subsequently experiences infertility and who may choose to pursue medical treatment. The potential consequences of such mirroring are explored from the perspective of counselling practice under the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990).     

The Origins and Legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Purpose

This paper provides a historical review of the origins and legacy of the 1964 Civil Rights Act through the lens of the African American Civil Rights and the Women’s Rights Movements.

Design/Methodology/Approach

The historical narrative was developed using psychological, historical, and legal source material.

Findings

While the Civil Rights Act did not immediately change the landscape of equality in the American workplace, it signaled a fundamental shift in the treatment of racial and gender diversity. In concert with other social, legal, and political shifts, it paved the way for progress on issues like affirmative action, pregnancy discrimination, and sexual harassment.

Implications

Without an understanding of the historical development and consequences of the Civil Rights Act, it is easy to lose sight of how the act has shaped the understanding of equality in the American workforce. Further, the way in which rights movements evolved alongside each other illuminates a need to focus not only on equality between majority and minority groups but also on issues of equality among minority groups.

Originality/Value

Previous reviews of the Civil Rights Act and rights movements tend to focus narrowly on one issue or group, and approach that concern from a single academic discipline. In contrast, we provide a review of the roots and consequences of the Civil Rights Act based on the developments of two rights movements, and draw from sources in psychology, history, political science, and legal perspectives to provide a broader picture of this landmark legislation.     

Hutchesonian Inspired Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics

Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory is the inspiration for both act utilitarianism and a contemporary virtue ethics approach that Michael Slote calls agent‐based virtue ethics. In this essay, I look at other possibilities for ethical theory that spring from Hutcheson's writings and conclude that the landscape of sentimentalist inspired ethics is richer than many realize. I begin this article with a short explanation of Hutcheson's moral sense theory. I explain that Hutcheson proposes and embraces three distinct criteria of moral evaluation, one of which is concerned with the evaluation of motives and two of which are concerned with the evaluation of acts. Act utilitarianism adopts one of the criteria of act evaluation, and Slote's agent‐based virtue ethics adopts the remaining criterion of act evaluation and the criterion of motive evaluation. Then, after pointing out what I believe are shortcomings of Slote's agent‐based virtue ethics, I propose two Hutchesonian inspired theories, each of which is a compromise between act utilitarianism and agent‐based virtue ethics. The first, which I call hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics, adopts two of Hutcheson's three criteria and is similar structurally to a virtue ethics theory articulated by Rosalind Hursthouse and Linda Zabzebski. The second, which, for lack of a better name, I call Hutchesonian hybridism, adopts all three of Hutcheson's criteria and is a hybrid combination of Slote's actualist agent‐based virtue ethics and hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics. I argue that both hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics and Hutchesonian hybridism overcome the shortcomings (pointed out earlier in this essay) of Slote's actualist agent‐based virtue ethics, and that both of these theories are, therefore, worthy of further consideration.     

Dissociative Identity Disorder,Ambivalence, and Responsibility

If someone with dissociative identity disorder (DID) commits a wrongful act, is she responsible? If one adopts the Multiple Persons Thesis, it may seem that one alter cannot be responsible for the actions of another alter. Conversely, if one regards the subject as a single person, it may seem that she is responsible for any actions she performs. I will argue that this subject is a single person, but one who suffers from delusions of disownership and therefore does not fulfill ordinary requirements for responsible agency. This is because she suffers from extreme ambivalence: her deep‐seated needs and desires conflict, and she forms alter‐personalities as a way to cope with inner discord without abandoning any of these contradictory impulses. However, although the ability to exercise autonomous agency is eroded in such cases, the capacity for autonomous agency is preserved. The subject with DID is weakly responsible for her wrongful acts.     

Praise,blame, and demandingness

Consequentialism has been challenged on the grounds that it is too demanding. I will respond to the problem of demandingness differently from previous accounts. In the first part of the paper, I argue that consequentialism requires us to distinguish the justification of an act \(\varphi\) from the justification of an act \(\psi\), where \(\psi\) is an act of praise or blame. In the second part of the paper, I confront the problem of demandingness. I do not attempt to rule out the objection; instead, I argue that if certain plausible empirical claims about moral motivation are true, we morally ought not to blame people for failing to meet certain very demanding obligations. With this theory, we create a space in consequentialism for intuitions questioning the plausibility of demanding obligations. I conclude the paper by showing that separate justifications for \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\) may also give us a theoretical niche for intuitions about supererogation.     

COMBINING TELEOLOGICAL ETHICS WITH EVALUATOR RELATIVISM: A PROMISING RESULT

Abstract: Consequentialism is an agent‐neutral teleological theory, and deontology is an agent‐relative non‐teleological theory. I argue that a certain hybrid of the two – namely, non‐egoistic agent‐relative teleological ethics (NATE) – is quite promising. This hybrid takes what is best from both consequentialism and deontology while leaving behind the problems associated with each. Like consequentialism and unlike deontology, NATE can accommodate the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs. Yet unlike consequentialism and like deontology, NATE accords well with our commonsense moral intuitions.     

Impartial Reasons,Moral Demands

Consequentialism is often charged with demandingness objections which arise in response to the theory’s commitment to impartiality. It might be thought that the only way that consequentialists can avoid such demandingness objections is by dropping their commitment to impartialism. However, I outline and defend a framework within which all reasons for action are impartially grounded, yet which can avoid demandingness objections. I defend this framework against what might appear to be a strong objection, namely the claim that anyone who accepts the theory will be practically irrational.     

A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism

We best understand Rule Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the same type of circumstances. Plausible forms of Rule Consequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However, Rule Consequentialist theories are distinguished from other pluralist theories of pattern-based reasons by implausible claims about the relative importance of act-based and pattern-based reasons in different cases. Rule Consequentialists should give up these claims. They should either embrace some other pluralist pattern-based view, or reject pattern-based reasons altogether. Note, though, that these arguments apply only to compliance-based, rather than acceptance-based, versions of Rule Consequentialism. This suggests that these two kinds of theory are more different from each other than we might previously have realised.

The Relationship Between Psychological Needs,Self‐Determined Motivation,Exercise Attitudes,and Physical Fitness1

The primary purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between psychological need satisfaction (competence, autonomy, and relatedness), exercise regulations, and motivational consequences proposed by Self‐Determination Theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000). The secondary purpose was to explore changes in these constructs over the course of a 12‐week prescribed exercise program. Results indicated competence and autonomy were positively correlated with more self‐determined exercise regulations, which in turn were more positively related to exercise behavior, attitudes, and physical fitness. Multiple regression analyses revealed that exercise behavior mediated the relationship between self‐determined motives and physical fitness, and both identified and intrinsic exercise regulations contributed significantly to the prediction of attitudes. Paired‐sample t tests supported modest to large changes in need satisfaction constructs, as well as identified and intrinsic regulations over the 12‐week exercise program. These results suggest that SDT is a useful framework for studying motivational issues in the exercise domain.     

Pre‐school children's understanding of the emotional consequences for failures to act prosocially

This study compares 4‐ and 5‐year‐old children's assessment of the emotional consequences of failures to act prosocially with their assessment of the emotional consequences for prosocial and victimization situations. After listening to stories illustrating each of the socio‐moral situations, children rated the emotional consequences for an actor, recipient and observing teacher and justified their ratings. Findings show that pre‐school children's emotion ratings for failures to act prosocially differed from their emotion ratings for prosocial and victimization behaviours. Preschool children's ratings of an actor's emotions depended on the presence or absence of an observing teacher in prosocial and victimization situations, but not in failures to act prosocially. This study illustrates the complexity of young children's reasoning about failures to act prosocially and highlights the importance of contextual influences on children's understanding of socio‐moral emotions.     

Agent-Basing,Consequences, and Realized Motives

According to agent-based approaches to virtue ethics, the rightness of an action is a function of the motives which prompted that action. If those motives were morally praiseworthy, then the action was right; if they were morally blameworthy, the action was wrong. Many critics find this approach problematically insensitive to an act’s consequences, and claim that agent-basing fails to preserve the intuitive distinction between agent- and act-evaluation. In this article I show how an agent-based account of right action can be made sensitive to an act’s consequences. According to the approach which I defend, an action is right just in case it realizes an agent’s morally praiseworthy motive. Conversely, an action is wrong just in case it realizes a morally blameworthy motive. Specifying act-evaluation in terms of the realization, rather than the expression, of an agent’s motives allows an agent-based approach to distinguish between agent- and act-evaluation. This is because an agent may act from a morally praiseworthy motive, but fail (either through bad luck or poor judgment) to realize that motive. Her action will therefore not have been the right one, despite its being the expression of morally praiseworthy motives.     

Base‐rates of Negative Traits: Instructions for Use in Criminal Trials

Decision‐makers in institutional and non‐institutional contexts are sometimes confronted with the issue of whether to use generalisations expressing the statistical incidence of a negative trait in a disadvantaged and discriminated‐against social group in order to draw an inference concerning a member of that group. If a criminal court were confronted with such a question, what answer should it give? First, the article argues that, our qualms notwithstanding, morality does not demand that these generalisations be disregarded. In doing so, the article addresses the relationship between factual accuracy and the demands of morality in criminal trials. Second, the article considers the implications of this conclusion for the legal question as to whether the evidence at issue should be excluded, in particular, on grounds of unfairness — pursuant to section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.     

Comparing serial homicides to single homicides: A study of prevalence,offender, and offence characteristics in Sweden

Multiple and serial homicides constitute around 1.6% of all homicides but have unusually tragic outcomes. The aims of this study were to report the prevalence serial‐homicide offences and the characteristics of serial‐homicide offenders in a non‐North American context. The study included all convicted serial‐homicide offenders in Sweden from 1973 to 2012 (n = 25), as well as a population‐based control sample of single‐homicide offenders collected during 2007 and 2009 (n = 201). Similar to U.S. findings, approximately 1.6% of homicides could be attributed to serial‐homicide offenders. Serial offenders were more often diagnosed with personality disorders and autism‐spectrum disorders compared with single offenders; and serial offences more often involved victims who were female and unacquainted with the offender, as well as planning, sexual motives, and asphyxia as method of violence. One third of serial offences involved actions aimed at disguising the manner of death; such actions were considerably less common in single‐homicide offences. Few offenders displayed the traditional profile of a serial‐homicide offender; however, one third displayed sexual motives, a rate roughly 10 times higher than that in the single‐homicide group. The study concludes that serial‐homicide offenders should be subjected to forensic‐psychiatric examinations and that research involving cross‐contextual differences and similarities in serial‐homicide offenders is needed.     

Willpower Satisficing

Satisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as “good enough”. I propose a radical new willpower‐based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification of what counts as “good enough”.     

Refusing to apologize can have psychological benefits (and we issue no mea culpa for this research finding)

Despite an understanding of the perception and consequences of apologies for their recipients, little is known about the consequences of interpersonal apologies, or their denial, for the offending actor. In two empirical studies, we examined the unexplored psychological consequences that follow from a harm‐doer's explicit refusal to apologize. Results showed that the act of refusing to apologize resulted in greater self‐esteem than not refusing to apologize. Moreover, apology refusal also resulted in increased feelings of power/control and value integrity, both of which mediated the effect of refusal on self‐esteem. These findings point to potential barriers to victim–offender reconciliation after an interpersonal harm, highlighting the need to better understand the psychology of harm‐doers and their defensive behavior for self‐focused motives. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.