Remembering Early Childhood: How Much, How, and Why (or Why Not)

In this article, we consider recent research on three questions about people's memories for their early childhood: whether childhood amnesia is a real phenomenon, whether implicit memories survive when explicit memories do not, and why early episodic memories are sketchy. The research leads us to form three conclusions. First, we argue that childhood amnesia is a real phenomenon, as long as the term is defined clearly. Specifically, people are able to recall parts of their lives from the period between ages 2 and 5 years, but they recall less from that period than from other periods. Second, we conclude that implicit memories from early childhood may be evident even when explicit memories are not, a finding that suggests early experience may affect behavior in ways that people do not consciously recognize. Third, we argue that although young children are well known to be wonderfully efficient learners of semantic information, they have difficulty in either encoding or retrieving the interlinked aspects of events that lend them their autobiographical character. Although more evidence is needed, the relative lack of episodic memories of early childhood may be linked to maturation of prefrontal cortex.     

道德修养与压力应对:传统儒家应对观及其现代意义

传统儒家应对观包含了压力源、应对资源和应对方式三个部分。首先,儒家认为压力的来源就是道德方面的缺陷;而儒家的应对资源是以道德修养为基础的理想人格;儒家对压力的认知和应对也充满了道德因素。纵观儒家压力应对的全过程,儒家既注重个人内在的道德修养,又注重道德修养的外在表现。传统儒家应对观不仅具有理论意义,而且还具有指导实践的现实意义,既可以提高个体的自我效能感,还能提高个人完成目标、克服困难的动机,也给予个体更多的自我调节的方法。     

Why Brains Are Not Computers,Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism,and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.     

A Bad Disease, a Fatal Cure: Why Sterilization is Permissible and the Autonomy of Medicine is Not

The debate in this issue regarding the Roman Catholic condemnationof the morality of sterilization is puzzling for Protestants.As I will argue the puzzlement arises on two grounds. First,why would anyone object to direct sterilization for the cureor prevention of disease? Second, if one wanted to challengesuch an objection on moral grounds why would one turn to medicineto do so? For Christian ethics there is nothing wrong in principlewith direct sterilization when there are good reasons for precludingthe possibility of an additional pregnancy; and it is a serioustheological mistake to treat medicine as an independent moralauthority.     

Confucian Democracy as Pragmatic Experiment: Uniting Love of Learning and Love of Antiquity

This paper argues for the pragmatic construction of Confucian democracy by showing that Chinese philosophers who wish to see Confucianism flourish again as a positive dimension of Chinese civilization need to approach it pragmatically and democratically, otherwise their love of the past is at the expense of something else Confucius held in equal esteem, love of learning. Chinese philosophers who desire democracy for China would do well to learn from the earlier failures of the iconoclastic Westernizers, and realize that a Chinese democracy cannot come about by ignoring or dismissing such an important part of China's history, its Confucian tradition. The best chances for democracy in China lie in transforming that tradition without destroying it. Eagerness to learn from others must be united with a proper appreciation of one's own past to nurture democracy as a way of life.     

Atheism and Morality,Guilt and Shame: Why the Moral Complacency of the New Atheism is a Mistake

When it comes to morality, the New Atheists appear to think that their rejection of religion, except for the removal of fundamentalist distortions, changes nothing. We think that this is because they have not thought things through. Atheism might not be a threat to shame morality, but it is certainly a threat to guilt morality. Given that there are reasons to doubt the viability today of shame morality, we face a far greater problem if atheism triumphs than the New Atheists admit.     

Values Education: Why the Teaching of Values in Schools is Necessary,But Not Sufficient

In recent years, a growing demand by educators, governments, and the community for the teaching of values in public schools has led to the implementation of values education. As acknowledged by the 2010 Living Skills Values Education Program, values education is an essential part of schooling. In the public school system, there have been attempts to construct and implement a values-based curriculum that reflects a naturalistic or social morality. Despite prudential credibility to values education, no naturalistic theory has within it a sufficient moral obligation with which to persuade humans from their natural self-interest. As it stands, values education as taught in schools has a grounding problem—it cannot point to a sufficient basis for validation. Values education is too individualistic, relativistic, and ultimately subversive of a serious moral commitment. This article argues that a sufficient case can be made for the explicit teaching of values but only on a theistic foundation. The discussion concludes that ultimately the most defensible grounding for values education is in the narrative given to humans by a transcendent being (in the Christian tradition, God).     

Privacy Rights,and Why Negative Control is Not a Dead End: A Reply to Munch and Lundgren

Lauritz Munch and Björn Lundgren have recently replied to a paper published by us in this journal. In our original paper, we defended a novel version of the so-called ‘control theory’ of the moral right to privacy. We argued that control theorists should define ‘control’ as what we coined ‘Negative Control’. Munch and Lundgren have recently provided a range of interesting and challenging objections to our view. Independently of each other, they give almost identical counterexamples to our definition of Negative Control. In this comment, we show that while the counterexamples are genuine counterexamples, they do not force us to abandon the idea of Negative Control. Furthermore, we reply to two additional objections raised by Lundgren. One of these replies involves giving a new account of what the relation is between the concept of privacy and the right to privacy.

     

Nagative Attributes,Partitions, and Rational Decisions: Why Not Speak Notspeak

Philosophical Studies -     

Morality is Not Like Mathematics: The Weakness of the Math‐Moral Analogy

In both the early modern period and in contemporary debates, philosophers have argued that there are analogies between mathematics and morality that imply that the ontology and epistemology of morality are crucially similar to the ontology and epistemology of mathematics. I describe arguments for the math‐moral analogy in four early modern philosophers (Locke, Cudworth, Clarke, and Balguy) and in three contemporary philosophers (Clarke‐Doane, Peacocke, and Roberts). I argue that these arguments fail to establish important ontological and epistemological similarities between morality and mathematics. There are analogies between the two areas, but the disanalogies are more significant, undermining the attempt to confer on morality the same ontological and epistemological status that mathematics possesses.     

Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters

It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations (Rowlands 2011, 2012, 2017). In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2004, 2007), we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails a harm that cannot be fully explained in terms of hedonistic welfare. We explore the implications of this idea for the assessment of current practices involving animals.     

Aristotle's De Anima: On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities

Although it is common for interpreters of Aristotle's De Anima to treat the soul as a specially related set of powers of capacities, I argue against this view on the grounds that the plausible options for reconciling the claim that the soul is a set of powers with Aristotle's repeated claim that the soul is an actuality cannot be unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that there are good reasons to be wary of attributing to Aristotle the view that the soul is a set of powers because this claim conflicts with several of his metaphysical commitments, most importantly his claims about form and substance. I argue that although there are passages in the De Anima in which Aristotle discusses the soul in terms of its powers or capacities, these discussions do not establish that the soul is a set of capacities.     

The Ethics of Economic Sanctions: Why Just War Theory is Not the Answer

Res Publica - On 24 December 2017, the UN Security Council imposed its toughest sanctions yet on North Korea. The measures, intended to thwart nuclear ambitions, are some of the most extensive...