The durations of attention to alternatives and re-evaluation in choices with two and three alternatives

In two experiments on choice the durations of attention to the alternatives were measured. In experiment 1 each subject chose one from two pictures; in experiment 2 the choice was one from three pictures. In both experiments the subjects understood that they would acquire the picture that they selected. In each experiment higher and lower conflict conditions were induced by offering subjects a choice between alternatives that had been evaluated either equally or disparately. In both experiments a significant relationship appeared between duration of attention and preference order with most subjects looking longest at the alternative that was preferred. In the comparison between conditions this effect was found to be stronger under lower conflict than under higher conflict; this difference reached a significant level in experiment 2. These results are contrary to findings by Gerard (1967), and this matter is discussed. The relevance of the results to other theories is examined. Inferences were drawn from dissonance theory about re-evaluation effects after decision, and evaluation changes were measured in the experiments. After adjustment for measurement regression, the data failed to reveal a significant chronic re-evaluation effect. Contrary to dissonance theory, the re-evaluation effect was weaker in the three-alternative choice experiment than in the two-alternative choice experiment.     

Choice ambiguity, dissonance, and defensiveness

Female repressors and sensitizers were presented with a choice between two pens of different colors from five which they had previously rated on a relative-attractiveness scale Following choice, they rerated the pens under one of two conditions (a) where the choice had unequivocal implications for their femininity or (b) where it had equivocal implications for femininity Attractiveness ratings of the pens before and after choice constituted the major dependent variable Repressors tended to show greater average change in ratings than sensitizers under low ambiguity but not under high ambiguity Skin conductance measurements did not show interpretable dissonance effects, but there was evidence of R-S differences in skin conductance and self-report measures of tension     

On the propositional nature of cognitive consistency: Dissonance changes explicit, but not implicit attitudes

Two studies investigated the influence of cognitive dissonance on explicit and implicit attitudes. Employing the induced compliance paradigm, participants wrote a counterattitudinal essay under conditions of either high or low perceived situational pressure; control participants did not write an essay. Consistent with dissonance theory, results indicated a more favorable explicit attitude toward the initially counterattitudinal position when perceived situational pressure was low, but not when it was high. Implicit attitudes, however, were unaffected by dissonance manipulations. Moreover, explicit attitudes were significantly related to implicit attitudes under high perceived situational pressure and control conditions, but not when perceived situational pressure was low. Results are discussed in terms of associative versus propositional modes of information processing.     

Self-consistency for low self-esteem in dissonance processes: the role of self-standards

The self-consistency revision of cognitive dissonance theory predicts that people with low self-esteem are less likely to experience dissonance arousal compared to people with high self-esteem. Two experiments investigated how the accessibility of different self-standards in the context of a dissonant act activates the consistency role of self-esteem in the process of cognitive dissonance arousal. In Experiment I, after participants wrote a counter-attitudinal essay, priming personal self-standards caused more attitude change for those with high compared to low self-esteem, whereas priming no standards or priming normative self-standards caused the same level of attitude change among both self-esteem groups. Experiment 2 showed that the self-consistency effect for low self-esteem participants only occurred among those who were high in self-certainty when personal self-standards were primed. The importance of self-standards for understanding the role of self-esteem in dissonance processes is discussed.     

Cognitive dissonance and self-monitoring: A matter of context?

In Study 1, high and low self-monitors wrote counterattitudinal essays. For some, we made it salient that they would be endorsing an opinion contrary to that of their peers. For others, no context was provided. Post-essay attitudes of high, relative to low, self-monitors were more consistent with essay topic after opposing peers. Post-essay attitudes of low and high self-monitors did not differ significantly in the no-context condition. In Study 2, high and low self-monitors wrote counterattitudinal essays in the context of opposing either their peers' beliefs or their own values. Post-essay attitudes of low, relative to high, self-monitors tended to conform more to their essays when they believed that they had written in opposition to their values. When writing in opposition to their peers, however, post-essay attitudes of high and low self-monitors did not differ significantly. We discuss the results in terms of the role that self-concept plays in the initiation of dissonance processesStudy 2 is based on the senior honors thesis of the second author conducted under the supervision of the first author, and both studies were supported by a Faculty Research Grant from Union College to the first author. We would like to thank Alice M. Isen, Mark Snyder, Hugh Foley, and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this article, and Nicole Audette, Amy Goldstein, Suzanne Shaker, and Courtney Shapiro for their assistance in collecting and analyzing data.     

Sex role identity and the decision to regain control among women: a learned helplessness investigation

In an investigation focusing on women's attempts to regain control of their environments, women from four sex role identity groups underwent either an initial loss of control (helpless) or control (nonhelpless) experience. Subsequently, they were allowed to choose their role in a team problem-solving task. They could either (a) have total control over the team's decisions, (b) have no control over the team's decisions, or (c) not participate in the task. Compared to women low on masculinity, women high on masculinity chose to be in control of team problem-solving in both the helpless and nonhelpless conditions. Particularly striking, none of the 14 feminine-sex-typed women chose to control the team's decisions in the helpless condition, whereas 10 of the 14 masculine-sex-typed women made this choice. Results are discussed relative to the high rates of depression among women.     

跨情境下集群行为的动因机制

群体性事件是当下我国典型的集群行为。本研究通过实验室情景设计的方法, 考察了跨情境下群体相对剥夺如何通过群体认同作用于集群行为, 及群体愤怒和群体效能对集群行为的影响。结果表明：1) 同一触发情境下, 群体认同调节群体相对剥夺－集群行为(意向)之间的关系。一般群体认同凸显的个体在高群体相对剥夺水平下有更强烈的集群行为参与(意向)。这源自群体认同对群体相对剥夺不同水平下群体效能与集群行为意向之间的二次调节。对于特定群体认同凸显的个体, 无论群体相对剥夺水平的高低, 都有较高的集群行为参与(意向)。这当中, 群体愤怒起到了部分中介的作用。2) 不同触发情境下, 群体认同对群体相对剥夺与集群行为意向的调节作用出现差异。该调节作用仅出现在利益无关情境中。此外, 群体愤怒与群体效能对集群行为意向的影响在不同情境下有区别：在利益无关情境中, 群体愤怒的影响显著大于群体效能; 在利益相关情境中, 群体效能与群体愤怒的影响无显著差异。本研究扩展了集群行为的双路径模型, 并为政府预防和化解群体性事件提供思路。     

Practicing and arguing for abstinence from smoking: A test of the double forced compliance paradigm

An experiment was conducted within a new paradigm for Festinger's theory of dissonance (1957): the double forced compliance paradigm (Joule, 1986a). Double compliance was used to test dissonance reduction following the execution of not just one, as in the classical paradigm, but two forced compliance behaviours. The first behaviour involved abstinence from smoking, and the second, writing a text for or against smoking. Based on the radical conception of the theory of dissonance (Beauvois and Joule, 1981; Joule, 1986b), subjects were expected to find tobacco deprivation more difficult after having written a text against smoking than before, and easier after having written a text in favour of smoking. The results confirmed these predictions.     

The Efficiency of the Group Rorschach Test in the Psychiatric Screening of Marine Corps Recruits

In a study to extend the theory of cognitive dissonance into the area of person perception, 108 male freshmen dormitory students were led to believe that they either would or would not be sharing a room in the future with a negative other. They were also informed that they were either low, moderate, or high in similarity to this negative other. The major response measure was the extent to which the negative first impression changed in a more positive direction. A 2 × 3 ANOVA showed that both the proximity and similarity manipulations had the predicted effect. However, the trend in similarity was not linear, as hypothesized. Similarity was also found to be a more salient source of dissonance than proximity.     

The effect of commitment on relative left frontal cortical activity: tests of the action-based model of dissonance

The action-based model of dissonance and recent advances in neuroscience suggest that commitment to action should cause greater relative left frontal cortical activity. Two experiments were conducted in which electroencephalographic activity was recorded following commitment to action, operationalized with a perceived choice manipulation. Perceived high as compared to low choice to engage in the action, regardless of whether it was counterattitudinal or proattitudinal, caused greater relative left frontal cortical activity. Moreover, perceived high as compared to low choice caused attitudes to be more consistent with the action. These results broaden the theoretical reach of the action-based model by suggesting that similar neural and motivational processes are involved in attitudinal responses to counterattitudinal and proattitudinal commitments.     

The effects of ambient temperature and insult on the motivation to retaliate or escape

In order to investigate the impact of high ambient temperature on the motivation of angered persons, 48 men were either insulted or not insulted under normal or excessively hot conditions. The men received ratings from a partner that conveyed a negative or neutral personality evaluation, ostensibly as part of an impression-formation task. During this time, the participants were exposed to normal or excessively hot temperatures in an experimental room while their partners were in a normal temperature room. The subjects were subsequently given the opportunity to choose between two tasks for the next part of the study. One task, described as tedious, permitted their leaving the situation earlier than did the other task, described as involving administration of white noise to their partner. The results revealed that the insulted relative to noninsulted men more often chose to participate in a potentially aggressive interaction in the normal conditions whereas insulted relative to noninsulted men chose more often to participate in a nonaggressive task in the hot conditions. The design of the study precluded a shared stress interpretation of the data. Supplementary data were interpreted as supporting a negative affect rather than an attributional interpretation of the results.     

Selective exposure to information and cognitive dissonance

Despite numerous attempts, the selective exposure prediction of Festinger's (A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957) theory of cognitive dissonance has not been consistently demonstrated. In previous studies, this failure can be attributed to design deficiencies, and other related problems. The present study manipulated dissonance by having subjects write a counterattitudinal essay under conditions of high or low choice. Information in the form of pamphlets and discussion groups was offered to the subjects such that they could choose information that was consonant and dissonant with the decision to write the essay. The information was offered either before or after an attitude measure on the essay topic, as the attitude measure could also be a source of dissonance reduction. The results indicate that the high choice manipulation yielded greater attitude change than the low-choice manipulation. High-choice subjects desired consonant information more and dissonant information less than did low-choice subjects. This effect was found for both measures of information desire (pamphlets and discussion groups). Low-choice subjects who received the attitude questionnaire before the information measures wanted information more than if offered the information before the attitude questionnaire, implying a sensitizing effect produced by the attitude questionnaire for the low-choice subjects. The various effects are discussed as providing support for predictions from Festinger's dissonance theory.     

Relative deprivation and referent cognitions

Determinants of relative deprivation were examined in a laboratory experiment. Discontent associated with relative deprivation was hypothesized to be a function of likelihood, or the perceived probability of actually obtaining a desired outcome under existing circumstances, and referent cognitions, which involve the subjunctive probability of obtaining that outcome under alternative (hypothetical) circumstances. Male and female undergraduates discovered that their alleged chances of receiving experimental credit were either poor (low likelihood) or good (high likelihood). They also learned that if a different procedure had been used, their chances of receiving credit would have been either poor (low referent) or good (high referent). Responses to a subsequent questionnaire indicated that whereas discontent did not differ by referent conditions under high likelihood, greater discontent was shown by low-likelihood/high-referent subjects than by low-likelihood/low-referent subjects. This low- versus high-referent difference under low likelihood was also found in two conceptual replications designed to eliminate any influence of social comparison. The relevance of this model to other findings and theoretical formulations is discussed.     

The effect of self-attribute relevance on how self-esteem moderates attitude change in dissonance processes

An experiment was conducted to examine the conditions under which self-esteem operates as an expectancy, as a resource, or does not influence cognitive dissonance processes. Based on the self-standards model of dissonance (Stone & Cooper, 2001), it was predicted that following a high-choice counter-attitudinal behavior: (a) priming positive self-attributes that were relevant to the discrepant behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report more attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, (b) priming positive self-attributes that were irrelevant to the behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report less attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, and (c) priming neutral self-attributes would eliminate self-esteem moderation of attitude change. The results of the attitude change measure supported the predictions. The discussion explores different processes by which the accessibility of cognitions about the self mediate dissonance arousal and reduction.     

Preference of dissonance reduction modes as a function of their order,familiarity and reversibility

Two central hypotheses of the original version of the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) (1) that dissonance is to be conceived of as a primary drive and (2) that in order to reduce dissonance less resistant cognitions will be changed more than highly resistant ones led to hypotheses which were confirmed by two experiments. In Experiment I, a 2 × 3 factorial design, order and familiarity of dissonance reduction modes were manipulated. After receiving a dissonant information the subjects were offered a relatively low and a relatively high resistant cognition for dissonance reduction, each being placed first (series I, high-low resistance) or last (series II, low-high resistance) respectively. Subjects did (known) or did not (unknown) read these modes before reacting to them. Under the unknown condition dissonance will be reduced more with a specific mode if it is placed first than last. With known reduction modes the order of presentation does not have an effect. Under series I condition the first-placed, higher-resistant cognition will be changed more in the unknown condition than in the known condition. Under the series II condition the first-placed, lower-resistant cognition will be changed equally in the known and unknown condition. In short, the higher-resistant cognition will be changed more, only when it is placed first and when the following modes are not known. Two explanations for these results are possible: (1) The more dissonance is reduced by changing a more or a less resistant congnition, the less further reduction is necessary; (2) dissonance will be reduced in an internally consistent way. Experiment II excluded the first explanation. Subjects were allowed to revise their original way of reducing dissonance. First, subjects in one condition received series I unknown and subjects in the other condition received series II unknown. Reacting to the dissonance reduction modes the second time, there was more revision when the high-resistant congition was placed first (series 1 revision) than when placed last (series II revision). These results support the hypothesis that dissonance reduction by changing a less-resistant congnition more and changing a high-resistant one less is preferred. Implications of the results of the two experments for the stability of dissonance reduction, the method and interpretation of dissonance experiments are discussed.     

Experiences that motivate moral development: The role of cognitive dissonance

It has been found in previous research concerning Kohlberg's stages of moral development that engagement in a “real-life” moral dilemma sometimes leads to an advance in an individual's level of moral thought. It is argued in this study that such moral growth is often motivated by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance, which, it is suggested, frequently accompanies choice and commitment in moral contexts. Subjects in the present study delivered counterattitudinal messages that contained arguments that were either 1 stage higher or 1 stage lower than their characteristic level of moral reasoning. Half of the subjects freely chose to deliver these messages, and half did not. Afterwards, subjects' attitudes toward the issues discussed in their messages and their tendency to conceptualize moral issues in terms of the higher or lower levels of reasoning contained in their messages were assessed. The subjects who (a) had freely chosen to deliver the message, and (b) had delivered the message containing higher level arguments used significantly more advanced moral reasoning after their counterattitudinal advocacy than they had before it. These subjects showed greater change in their attitudes regarding the topic discussed in their message than other subject groups. These results suggest that moral behavior will be likely to promote moral growth (a) if it occurs under circumstances that promote cognitive dissonance (e.g., free choice) and (b) if advanced moral ideas are made salient during the dissonance reduction process.     

Accent trumps race in guiding children's social preferences

A series of experiments investigated the effect of speakers' language, accent, and race on children's social preferences. When presented with photographs and voice recordings of novel children, 5-year-old children chose to be friends with native speakers of their native language rather than foreign-language or foreign-accented speakers. These preferences were not exclusively due to the intelligibility of the speech, as children found the accented speech to be comprehensible, and did not make social distinctions between foreign-accented and foreign-language speakers. Finally, children chose same-race children as friends when the target children were silent, but they chose other-race children with a native accent when accent was pitted against race. A control experiment provided evidence that children's privileging of accent over race was not due to the relative familiarity of each dimension. The results, discussed in an evolutionary framework, suggest that children preferentially evaluate others along dimensions that distinguished social groups in prehistoric human societies.     

The reinstatement of dissonance and psychological discomfort following failed affirmations

The research in this article examined the consequences of a failed attempt to reduce dissonance through a self‐affirmation strategy. It was hypothesized that disconfirming participants' affirmations would reinstate psychological discomfort and dissonance motivation. In Experiment 1, high‐dissonance participants who affirmed on a self‐relevant value scale and received disconforming feedback about their affirmations expressed greater psychological discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994) than either affirmation‐only participants or low‐dissonance/affirmation disconformed participants. In Experiment 2, disconfirmation of an affirmation resulted in increased attitude change. The results of both experiments suggested that a failed attempt to reduce dissonance reinstates psychological discomfort and dissonance motivation. We discuss how the reduction of psychological discomfort may play a role in the success of affirmations in reducing dissonance‐produced attitude change. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The mechanisms underlying attributive projection1

The experiment investigated the validity of the cognitive dissonance reduction and stimulus generalization explanations of attributive projection. Subjects in a high dissonance condition were informed that they possessed considerable hostility (a negative trait), while those in a low dissonance condition were told that they possessed a great deal of assertiveness (a desirable trait). The dissonance mechanism received support in that (a) subjects' reports of their anxiety indicated that an ego threat was produced only in the high dissonance condition, as expected; and (b) hostility was projected onto others to a significantly greater degree than was assertiveness. The existence of only a weak relationship between degree of ego threat produced by the personality feedback and subsequent amount of projection, however, throws into question the validity of the hypothesized defensive function of projection. No support for the generalization mechanism was obtained since the subjects did not project a greater amount of either trait onto the similar targets (college students) than onto the relatively dissimilar targets (middleaged lawyers); possible reasons for this negative result were discussed, as well as suggestions for future research.     

Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view of each theory's proper domain of application

The literature concerning the controversy between dissonance and selfperception theories is reviewed. It is proposed that the two theories be regarded not as “competing” formulations but as complementary ones and, furthermore, that each theory is applicable only to its own specialized domain. Self-perception theory, it is suggested, accurately characterizes attitude change phenomena in the context of attitude-congruent behavior and dissonance theory attitude change in the context of attitude-discrepant behavior. Attitude-congruent is defined as any position within an individual's latitude of acceptance; attitude-discrepant as any position in the latitude of rejection. An experimental test of these notions produced confirming evidence. Subjects who were given an opportunity to misattribute any potential dissonance arousal to an external stimulus did not change their attitudes, relative to low choice subjects, if they were committed to endorsing a position in their latitude of rejection. If the commitment concerned a position in the latitude of acceptance, however, these subjects did exhibit attitude change relative to low choice subjects.