An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts

We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP ^r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A?∧?O ～A, O A?∧?P ～A or even O A?∧?～O A. On the other hand, DP ^r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP ^r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are verified unconditionally by DP ^r , others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of DP ^r .     

An Intuitionistic Reformulation of Mally’s Deontic Logic

In 1926, Ernst Mally proposed a number of deontic postulates. He added them as axioms to classical propositional logic. The resulting system was unsatisfactory because it had the consequence that A is the case if and only if it is obligatory that A. We present an intuitionistic reformulation of Mally’s deontic logic. We show that this system does not provide the just-mentioned objectionable theorem while most of the theorems that Mally considered acceptable are still derivable. The resulting system is unacceptable as a deontic logic, but it does make sense as a lax logic in the modern sense of the word.     

Wishful Thinking about the Future: Does Desire Impact Optimism?

The notion that desire for an outcome inflates optimism about that outcome has been dubbed the desirability bias or wishful thinking. In this paper, we discuss the importance of distinguishing wishful thinking from the more general concept of motivated reasoning, and we explain why documenting overoptimism or correlations between preferences and optimism is not sufficient to infer a desirability bias. Then, we discuss results from a review and meta-analysis of the experimental literature on wishful thinking. These findings, in conjunction with more recent work, not only highlight important moderators and mediators of the desirability bias but also point out limitations of the empirical research on the bias. These results also reveal an important difference between how likelihood judgments and discrete outcome predictions respond to desirability of outcomes. We conclude by presenting avenues for future research useful for understanding wishful thinking's manifestation in everyday environments and its integration with related phenomena.     

Informed consent—Wishful thinking?

This article is concerned with the concept of “informed consent” as applied both in biomedical research involving human subjects and in clinical medicine in general. The current crisis over the elaboration and interpretation of the concept will be examined, along with the broader question of whether “informed consent” is any longer meaningful or viable as a criterion for complex bioethical policy-making. Finally, I will attempt to sketch a prognosis for the concept in doctor-patient relations, even if it is only wishful thinking.     

Logic or rhetoric in law?

One of the most crucial questions in the philosophy of law deals with the very nature of legal reasoning. Does this reasoning belong to logic or to rhetoric? This debate, increasingly centered on rhetoric, is not merely a question of language use; it covers and indicates a more basic choice between formal legalism — focusing on rational deduction from the law — and pragmatic judiciarism — focusing on reasonable debate in the court. Today, it is necessary to circumscribe the respective fields of logic and rhetoric in the language of law, while showing how they are sometimes complementary in the resolution of legal problems. But, even when we have acknowledged the need for a rhetoric accompanied by logic, we have to define that rhetoric cautiously. I confront a narrow rhetoric, often called argumentation, with a wider one of interrogative nature. There are two conceptions of rationality at stake. Their comparison enables us to raise the question of the foundation of law, as a locus to use arguments, as well as to solve social problems.     

Forcing in Łukasiewicz Predicate Logic

In this paper we study the notion of forcing for Łukasiewicz predicate logic (Ł∀, for short), along the lines of Robinson’s forcing in classical model theory. We deal with both finite and infinite forcing. As regard to the former we prove a Generic Model Theorem for Ł∀, while for the latter, we study the generic and existentially complete standard models of Ł∀. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Resonance and Ambiguity—about Metaphorical Thinking

This presentation is based on the theory, presented by the author, of the development of the mind and its psychoanalytic treatment as a stage-specific continuum, applicable in principle to all levels of disturbed and arrested mental development. This paper focuses on the nature of attainment and mediation of understanding with psychotic, borderline and neurotic patients, and the significance of successful conveyance of understanding as related to the general goal of psychoanalysis, to achievement of a structural change in the analysand's representational world and, finally, to the question of the main curative factor in psychoanalytic treatment. After discussing all these questions, the author ends up giving the conveyance of stage-specific and individual understanding a central place in all of them. The goals of understanding and psychoanalysis in general seem to be more-or-less identical. Starting and continuing new structuring internalizations in the patient's world of experience is primarily motivated by conveyance of the analyst's stage-specific and individual understanding, and thereby leading to alleviation or elimination of consequences of the developmental arrest. It seems thus warranted to conclude that conveyance of the stage-specific and individual understanding seems to be the central curative element in the psychoanalytic interaction.     

Consequence and Interpolation in ?ukasiewicz Logic

Building on Wójcicki??s work on infinite-valued ?ukasiewicz logic ?_??, we give a self-contained proof of the deductive interpolation theorem for ?_??. This paper aims at introducing the reader to the geometry of ?ukasiewicz logic.     

The ‘Two Worlds’ Theory in the Phaedo

At least in some dialogues, Plato has been thought to hold the so-called Two Worlds Theory (TW), according to which there can be belief but not knowledge about sensibles, and knowledge but not belief about forms. The Phaedo is one such dialogue. In this paper, I explore some key passages that might be thought to support TW, and ask whether they in fact do so. I also consider the related issue of whether the Phaedo argues that, if knowledge is possible at all, we can have it only when discarnate.     

Two dimensional Standard Deontic Logic [including a detailed analysis of the 1985 Jones–P?rn deontic logic system]

This paper offers a two dimensional variation of Standard Deontic Logic SDL, which we call 2SDL. Using 2SDL we can show that we can overcome many of the difficulties that SDL has in representing linguistic sets of Contrary-to-Duties (known as paradoxes) including the Chisholm, Ross, Good Samaritan and Forrester paradoxes. We note that many dimensional logics have been around since 1947, and so 2SDL could have been presented already in the 1970s. Better late than never! As a detailed case study illustrating the power of 2SDL, we examine the system DL of Deontic Logic of Andrew Jones and Ingmar P?rn offered in 1985 to solve the Chisholm paradox of Contrary to Duties. The critical examination is done using logics and methods available in 1985 and solutions are proposed using what was available in 1985.     

False Though Partly True – An Experiment in Logic

We explore in an experimental spirit the prospects for extending classical propositional logic with a new operator P intended to be interpreted when prefixed to a formula as saying that formula in question is at least partly true. The paradigm case of something which is, in the sense envisaged, false though still partly true is a conjunction one of whose conjuncts is false while the other is true. Ideally, we should like such a logic to extend classical logic – or any fragment thereof under consideration – conservatively, to be closed under uniform substitution (of arbitrary formulas for sentence letters or propositional variables), and to allow the substitutivity of provably equivalent formulas salva provabilitate. To varying degrees, we experience some difficulties only with this last (congruentiality) desideratum in the two four-valued logics we end up giving our most extended consideration to.     

Wishful thinking impairs belief-desire reasoning: a case of decoupling failure in adults?

Subjects were presented with a scenario that described how a certain type of opinion poll can be manipulated by respondents to put one particular political party (the threatened party) at a disadvantage. In a first experiment, people supporting this party but pretending to oppose it were found to be as likely to say that they would manipulate the poll as people who actually opposed it. In a second experiment, the threat embodied in the scenario was made more direct. It was also more salient because the study was carried out at a time of heightened political awareness when supporters of the threatened party were genuinely concerned about its future. People supporting the threatened party but pretending to oppose it were now about half as likely to say that they would manipulate the poll as those who actually opposed it. Two explanations for this breakdown in the belief-desire reasoning subserving pretense are considered.