Source ROCs are (typically) curvilinear: comment on Yonelinas (1999)

On the basis of his assumption that recollection is a threshold process, A. P. Yonelinas (1999) predicted linear source-identification receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) and recently reported data that were consistent with this prediction. In this article, the authors present data showing curvilinear source-identification ROCs across various encoding and test conditions. On the basis of the source-monitoring framework (e.g., M. K. Johnson, S. Hashtroudi, & D. S. Lindsay, 1993), the authors argue that curvilinearity of source-identification ROCs is a result of differences in the qualitative characteristics of memories rather than simply the influence of undifferentiated familiarity as the dual-process model might suggest.     

Toward a process-based framework for classifying personality tests: comment on Meyer and Kurtz (2006)

Meyer and Kurtz (2006) argued that the longstanding psychological test labels "objective" and "projective" have outlived their usefulness, and invited further work focusing on alternative terms for these measures. This Comment describes a framework for classifying personality tests based on the psychological processes that occur as people respond to test stimuli. Because an attribution process is involved in responding to both types of measures, those instruments formerly called "objective" tests are labeled self-attribution tests, and those formerly classified as "projective" tests are labeled stimulus-attribution tests. The possibility of extending the process-based framework beyond personality, to psychological tests in general, is also discussed. Clinical and empirical implications of a process-based framework are considered.     

Gender, ethnicity, and career trajectories: a comment on Woodward (2010)

Woodward (2010) argued that Maria Rickers-Ovsiankina, Eugenia Hanfmann, and Tamara Dembo constituted a group of Jewish emigré psychologists who received substantial help in America from a "Jewish network" of patronage. This comment focuses on the historiographic problems and pitfalls of essentialized ethnic identification. There was no evidence that Maria Rickers-Ovsiankina was a Jew or that Eugenia Hanffman, raised Russian Orthodox, identified herself as a Jew, in contrast to Tamara Dembo, who did so. We argue that these women were part of an active network of Gestaltists, topologists, and Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues leaders, and that any help that they received may be explained by the shared theoretical and disciplinary outlook of these groups as opposed to a "Jewish network."     

Selective attention and distractor frequency in naming performance: comment on Dhooge and Hartsuiker (2010)

E. Dhooge and R. J. Hartsuiker (2010) reported experiments showing that picture naming takes longer with low- than high-frequency distractor words, replicating M. Miozzo and A. Caramazza (2003). In addition, they showed that this distractor-frequency effect disappears when distractors are masked or preexposed. These findings were taken to refute models like WEAVER++ (A. Roelofs, 2003) in which words are selected by competition. However, Dhooge and Hartsuiker do not take into account that according to this model, picture-word interference taps not only into word production but also into attentional processes. Here, the authors indicate that WEAVER++ contains an attentional mechanism that accounts for the distractor-frequency effect (A. Roelofs, 2005). Moreover, the authors demonstrate that the model accounts for the influence of masking and preexposure, and does so in a simpler way than the response exclusion through self-monitoring account advanced by Dhooge and Hartsuiker.     

Recall,recognition, and the hippocampus: Reply to Yonelinas et al. (2004)

Two recent studies disagree about whether recall is more impaired than recognition (and recollection more than familiarity) in patients with damage limited to the hippocampus (Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire, 2003; Yonelinas et al., 2002). Wixted and Squire (2004) pointed out that the disagreement about recall and recognition stems entirely from an outlying recognition score obtained by 1 of 55 control subjects in Yonelinas et al. (2002). In their comment on our paper, Yonelinas et al. (2004) minimize the importance of this result and argue that the role of the hippocampus in recollection and familiarity is best studied using different methods that attempt to measure these processes directly. Here, we argue that the recall versus recognition comparison is the strongest test because it relies on the fewest controversial assumptions, and that the other approaches explored by Yonelinas et al. (2002) rely on questionable, theory-laden assumptions. We also rehearse the reasons for concluding that the patients studied by Manns et al. (2003) have damage limited to the hippocampal region (hippocampus proper, dentate gyrus, and subiculum), and we emphasize that important questions remain about the patients studied by Yonelinas et al. (2002), inasmuch as no neuroanatomical information and minimal neuropsychological information has been provided.     

Theoretical developments in decision field theory: comment on Tsetsos, Usher, and Chater (2010)

Tsetsos, Usher, and Chater (2010) presented several criticisms of decision field theory (DFT) involving its distance function, instability under externally controlled stopping times, and lack of robustness to various multialternative choice scenarios. Here, we counter those claims with a specification of a distance function based on the indifference and dominance dimensions. Using this distance function, we show that the instability problems do not arise when using the internally controlled stopping rule. In conclusion, we argue that the predictions of DFT do not conflict with the data presented and that the model yet provides a coherent and accurate account of multialternative choice phenomena.     

Cognitive adaptation: spatial memory or attentional processing. a comment on Furley and Memmert (2010)

This commentary considers the paper by Furley and Memmert (2010) who sought to test the respective validities of the specific processing and cognitive adaptation hypotheses. That they found no evidence of a difference between experienced basketball players and nonathletes on the Corsi block task, a measure of spatial memory, led them to infer support for the specific processing hypothesis, namely that differences between experts and novices manifest themselves only in processes related specifically to the domain of expertise. An alternative interpretation is offered, indicating possible confounds and referring to recent research that suggests Corsi block and dynamic spatial tasks depend upon different neuronal networks.     

Work-family conflict and job burnout among correctional staff: a comment on Lambert and Hogan (2010)1

Lambert and Hogan (2010) examined the relations between work-family conflict, role stress, and other noted predictors, on reported emotional exhaustion among a sample of 272 correctional staff at a maximum security prison. Using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, the authors found work-on-family conflict, perceived dangerousness of the job, and role strain to have positive relations with emotional exhaustion. However, contrary to expectation they found that custody officers reported lower exhaustion than did their noncustody staff counterparts. Suggestions are provided for follow-up efforts designed to extend this line of research and correct methodological issues.     

Depression, autonomic function, and cardiorespiratory fitness: comment on Hughes, et al. (2010)

A recent paper by Hughes and colleagues suggested that dysfunction of the autonomic nervous system in depressed cardiac patients was partly explained by reduced physical activity and fitness. Other data demonstrate that exercise training and improvements in fitness not only lead to improvements in autonomic function in coronary patients but also reduce depression and depression-related increased mortality.     

Three challenges (and three replies) to the ethics of belief

In this paper I look at three challenges to the very possibility of an ethics of belief and then show how they can be met. The first challenge, from Thomas Kelly, says that epistemic rationality is not (merely) a form of instrumental rationality. If this claim is true, then it will be difficult to develop an ethics of belief that does not run afoul of naturalism. The second challenge is the Non-Voluntarism Argument, which holds that because we cannot believe at will and because ought implies can, there can be no ethics of belief. The third challenge comes from Richard Feldman, who claims that there is no such thing as ought all-things-considered. He says, for example, that moral oughts can be weighed against other moral oughts and that epistemic oughts can be compared to each other, but that there is no way to weigh moral oughts against epistemic oughts. If this is true, then norms about what one ought to believe are not nearly as important as one might have hoped or as philosophers have traditionally thought. In answering these three challenges, I try to show how and why the project of developing epistemic norms might be a promising avenue of research, despite claims to the contrary.     

A misleading review of response bias: comment on McGrath, Mitchell, Kim, and Hough (2010)

In the May 2010 issue of Psychological Bulletin, R. E. McGrath, M. Mitchell, B. H. Kim, and L. Hough published an article entitled "Evidence for Response Bias as a Source of Error Variance in Applied Assessment" (pp. 450-470). They argued that response bias indicators used in a variety of settings typically have insufficient data to support such use in everyday clinical practice. Furthermore, they claimed that despite 100 years of research into the use of response bias indicators, "a sufficient justification for [their] use… in applied settings remains elusive" (p. 450). We disagree with McGrath et al.'s conclusions. In fact, we assert that the relevant and voluminous literature that has addressed the issues of response bias substantiates validity of these indicators. In addition, we believe that response bias measures should be used in clinical and research settings on a regular basis. Finally, the empirical evidence for the use of response bias measures is strongest in clinical neuropsychology. We argue that McGrath et al.'s erroneous perspective on response bias measures is a result of 3 errors in their research methodology: (a) inclusion criteria for relevant studies that are too narrow; (b) errors in interpreting results of the empirical research they did include; (c) evidence of a confirmatory bias in selectively citing the literature, as evidence of moderation appears to have been overlooked. Finally, their acknowledging experts in the field who might have highlighted these errors prior to publication may have prevented critiques during the review process.     

Task preparation and task inhibition: a comment on Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp (2010)

In their recent review article, Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17, 1-14, 2010) present compelling evidence for the role of inhibition in task switching, as measured by n-2 repetition costs. They promote the view that inhibition targets response-related processes of task performance rather than cue-based preparatory stages. In support of this distinction, they cite the finding in the literature that n-2 repetition costs are not reduced given longer preparation intervals. In this article, we advocate the analysis of whole reaction time distributions for investigating the influence of task preparation on task inhibition. We present such analyses from two of our published experiments that support the view that n-2 repetition costs can be reduced given sufficient preparation. The results suggest that cue-based processes do contribute to inhibition in task switching.     

Beyond "objective" and "projective": a logical system for classifying psychological tests: comment on Meyer and Kurtz (2006)

I present a formal system that accounts for the misleading distinction between tests formerly termed objective and projective, duly noted by Meyer and Kurtz (2006). Three principles of Response Rightness, Response Latitude and Stimulus Ambiguity are shown to govern, in combination, the formal operating characteristics of tests, producing inevitable overlap between "objective" and "projective" tests and creating at least three "types" of tests historically regarded as being projective in nature. The system resolves many past issues regarding test classification and can be generalized to include all psychological tests.     

Causal and conditional inferences: A comment on Cummins (1995)

Cummins (1995) offers an analysis of causal and truthfunctional sufficiency and necessity to predict and explain the effects on conditional inferences of two pragmatic factors: alternative causes and disabling conditions. However, the justification of these predictions is inconsistent. This note offers a modified analysis which puts her predictions on a sounder base: it is proposed that alternative causes and disabling conditions affect judgments of argument validity under three different models for the causal conditional.     

Pharmacological cognitive enhancers: comment on Smith and Farah (2011)

Smith and Farah (2011) provided a thought-provoking and perhaps deliberately provocative literature review of the use of stimulants to improve cognitive functioning in humans. They addressed the apparently increasing willingness of individuals mostly in the United States to use stimulants for this purpose and then summarized published literature that explores whether stimulants actually improve specific aspects of neurocognitive function. Although calling for more research, they tentatively concluded that stimulants indeed may be "smart pills" for some people under certain circumstances. This comment emphasizes that they never actually defined the desired qualities of a smart pill, seemed to accept the unproven axiom that slight improvements in specific tests constitute meaningful enhancement of intelligence, and failed to consider the possible costs to individuals and to society of promoting the use of this class of medications for such a purpose.     

Physical attractiveness and health: comment on Weeden and Sabini (2005)

Evolutionary behavioral biology suggests that certain characteristics of the human face and body are important for mate preferences and are therefore subject to sexual selection. J. Weeden and J. Sabini identify a number of weaknesses in the association between traits' attractiveness and health. In contrast, the authors argue that (a) studies on preferences for physical characteristics that rely on 1 trait permit only limited interpretation, (b) limitations placed on J. Weeden and J. Sabini's review exclude important associations, (c) there are misconceptions in their treatment of some traits, and (d) their selected literature provides an inaccurate picture regarding effect size. The authors suggest that future research in this field should seek conceptual and methodological constancy in trait selection and in the evaluation of attractiveness- and health-related traits.     

Genetics and human agency: comment on Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011)

Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) decried genetic essentialism without denying the importance of genetics in the genesis of human behavior, and although I agree on both counts, a deeper issue remains unaddressed: how should we adjust our cognitions about our own behavior in light of genetic influence, or is it perhaps not necessary to take genetics into account at all? I suggest that the genetics of behavior does have important implications for how we understand ourselves, the differences among us, and the ethical implications of our actions, but that the usual metric for these considerations, the heritability coefficient, is not the correct one. I propose an alternative.     

Visual perception of force: comment on White (2012)

White (2012) proposed that kinematic features in a visual percept are matched to stored representations containing information regarding forces (based on prior haptic experience) and that information in the matched, stored representations regarding forces is then incorporated into visual perception. Although some elements of White's (2012) account appear consistent with previous findings and theories, other elements do not appear consistent with previous findings and theories or are in need of clarification. Some of the latter elements include the (a) differences between perception and impression (representation of force; relationship of force and resistance; role and necessity of stored representations and of concurrent simulation; roles of rules, cues, and heuristics), (b) characteristics of object motion and human movement (whether motion is internally generated or externally generated and whether motion is biological or nonbiological; generalization of human action and the extent to which perceived force depends upon similarity of object movement to human patterns of movement), (c) related perceptual and cognitive phenomena (representational momentum, imagery, psychophysics of force perception, perception of causality), and (d) scope and limitations of White's account (attributions of intentionality, falsifiability).     

Confusion in philosophy: A comment on Williams (1992)

Patricia Williams made a number of claims concerning the methods and practise of cladistic analysis and classification. Her argument rests upon the distinction of two kinds of hierarchy: a divisional hierarchy depicting evolutionary descent and the Linnean hierarchy describing taxonomic groups in a classification. Williams goes on to outline five problems with cladistics that lead her to the conclusion that systematists should eliminate cladism as a school of biological taxonomy and to replace it either with something that is philosophically coherent or to replace it with pure methodology, untainted by theory (Williams 1992, 151). Williams makes a number of points which she feels collectively add up to insurmountable problems for cladistics. We examine Williams' views concerning the two hierarchies and consider what cladists currently understand about the status of ancestors. We will demonstrate that Williams has seriously misunderstood many modern commentators on this subject and all of her five persistent problems are derivable from this misunderstanding.

Nelson (1989, 67).