Should Moore have Followed his Own Method?

I discuss Soames’s proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore’s moral philosophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be self-evident. The method in Moore’s epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In review of the distance between something’s being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames’s proposal is mistaken.     

Can a trained subject judge his auditory sensitivity?

Auditory thresholds were measured daily on three subjects over an extended period of time, and the subjects postdicted whether the level and variability of the day's measured thresholds were higher or lower than on the preceding day, without their having knowledge of their performance. It was found that their judgments agreed with the obtained psycho-physical data better than would have been expected on the basis of chance alone. These results raise the question of the possibility that a subject's understanding of, or hypothesis concerning, the experimental outcome may influence his behaviour.     

James kirsch and his extended family 1901–1989

Women Who Run With the Wolves: Myths and Stories About the Wild Woman Archetype by Clarissa Pinkola Estés from the Jungian Storyteller Series

The Radiant Coat: Myths and Stories About the Crossing Between Life and Death by Clarissa Pinkola Estés from the Jungian Storyteller Series

Journey Into Creativity: Myths and Stories About the Creative Fire by Clarissa Pinkola Estés From the Jungian Storyteller Series

The Boy Who Married An Eagle: Myths and Stories About Male Individuation by Clarissa Pinkola Estés from the Jungian Storyteller Series

Wanning the Stone Child: Myths and Stories About Abandonment and the Unmothered Child by Clarissa Pinkola Estés from the Jungian Storyteller Series     

Why did Leibniz fail to complete his dynamics?

Leibniz’s ‘new science of dynamics’ is typically taken to have been completed in the late monadological metaphysics. On this view, stemming from Martial Gueroult and continuing in the recent interpretations of Robert Adams and Pauline Phemister, Leibniz accomplished his dynamics in his later account of physical forces as merely phenomenal modifications of monadic, metaphysical forces. This paper argues, by contrast, that Leibniz considered the dynamics to be an unfinished project: this is evident in statements from throughout his mature period until his final months. Two possible reasons for the non-completion of the dynamics are discussed. The first is that his encounter with the superior physics of Newton’s Principia caused Leibniz to continually defer his own contribution. I argue, however, in favour of a second reason: that there are philosophical difficulties inherent in the science of dynamics that prevented its completion. These difficulties are found in the relation of dynamics to metaphysics, and in the more fundamental split within dynamics, into the doctrine of primitive and derivative forces. Through three late exchanges with de Volder, Wolff and Des Bosses, I show that the relation of primitive and derivative forces remained an unsolved – although not in principle unsolvable – problem for Leibniz.     

W. Horsley Gantt—A legend in his time

This article, reprinted by permission of Johns Hopkins University Press, originally appeared inThe Johns Hopkins Medical Journal, Vol. 139 No. 3, September 1976, pgs. 121–126.     

Charles Gützlaff: his secret and sacred services

Karl (Charles) Friedrich August Gützlaff (1803–1851) was probably the most controversial and colourful missionary who ever stepped onto the shores of China during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. No one doubted his passion and sincerity in bringing Christianity to China, but many were critical of the way he did it. Thus Gützlaff’s life and work have been vilified and maligned by many scholars. Many critics dismissed him as the archetypal skeleton in the missionary cupboard. Gützlaff was described as a cross between parson and pirate. At the same time, others, such as Alfred Broomhall, regarded him as a heroic and innovative missionary. In this article, I shall attempt to portray a more balanced understanding of Gützlaff.     

A semantical investigation into Leśniewski's axiom of his ontology

A structure A for the language L, which is the first-order language (without equality) whose only nonlogical symbol is the binary predicate symbol , is called a quasi -struoture iff (a) the universe A of A consists of sets and (b) a b is true in A ([p) a = {p } & p b] for every a and b in A, where a(b) is the name of a (b). A quasi -structure A is called an -structure iff (c) {p } A whenever p a A. Then a closed formula in L is derivable from Leniewski's axiom x, y[x y u (u x) u; v(u, v x u v) u(u x u y)] (from the axiom x, y(x y x x) x, y, z(x y z y x z)) iff is true in every -structure (in every quasi -structure).     

A conflict between van Inwagen’s metaontology and his ontology

Peter van Inwagen has in recent decades made significant and influential contributions to metaphysics. In his Material Beings he advanced a novel ontology according to which chairs and other medium-sized dry goods don’t really exist. He went on to make important contributions to metaontology. Parts of his Ontology, Identity, and Modality and Existence: Essays in Ontology defend a broadly Quinean conception of existence questions and how to address them. I argue that the metaontology articulated in those later works is in fact inconsistent with his defense of his ontology advanced in his earlier work.

     

Do boys prefer daddy or his physical style of play?

Fathers typically adopt a more physically active style of play with their young sons than mothers, and boys often react more positively to play with fathers than with mothers. The current study examined whether differences in children's reactions were related to differences in parental play style or to parent per se. Eighteen 3-year-old boys were observed as they played with each parent in each of two playrooms — one conducive to the maternal style of play and one to the paternal play style. Both parents were highly flexible in adopting the play style typical of the other parent in the appropriate playroom. The boys reacted more positively to both parents when their play style was more physical and active, resembling the typical paternal style. Differences between parents were smaller than differences related to play environment, but were consistent with existing literature: fathers were more actively involved, took more initiative, and played more physically with their sons than did mothers.This research was supported by a research grant and leave fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We thank Kathleen Bloom, Anat Ninio and Michael Ross for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Analysis versus laws boole’s explanatory psychologism versus his explanatory anti-psychologism

This paper discusses George Boole’s two distinct approaches to the explanatory relationship between logical and psychological theory. It is argued that, whereas in his first book he attributes a substantive role to psychology in the foundation of logical theory, in his second work he abandons that position in favour of a linguistically conceived foundation. The early Boole espoused a type of psychologism and later came to adopt a type of anti-psychologism. To appreciate this invites a far-reaching reassessment of his philosophy of logic     

The “Cogwheeling” of Don Browning: Examining his Eriksonian perspective

Pastoral theologian Don Browning's assessment of recently deceased psychoanalyst Erik H. Erikson's developmental theories is traced chronologically through three of Browning's major works. Browning reaches the conclusion that Erikson espouses a normative vision of how good persons should live, which Browning critiques insofar as Erikson is unconscious of his intent. A series of critiques and observations about Browning's perspective is offered, including the suggestion that Browning's academic work may mirror the cog-wheeling theme so prevalent in Erikson.     

Gods and giants: Cudworth’s platonic metaphysics and his ancient theology

ABSTRACT

The Cambridge Platonists are modern thinkers and the context of seventeenth-century Cambridge science is an inalienable and decisive part of their thought. Cudworth’s interest in ancient theology, however, seems to conflict with the progressive aspect of his philosophy. The problem of the nature, however, of this ‘Platonism’ is unavoidable. Even in his complex and recondite ancient theology Cudworth is motivated by philosophical considerations, and his legacy among philosophers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries should not be overlooked. In particular we will draw on the scholarship of the German Egyptologist Jan Assmann in order to reassess the significance of Cudworth’s theory of religion for later philosophical developments.     

Wundt as chemist? A fresh look at his practice and theory of experimentation

Mid-19th-century chemistry constituted a practically and theoretically important resource for experimental psychology as conceived by Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920). In the early 1850s, Wundt began working in Gustav Herth's private chemical laboratory in Heidelberg. The experimental work Wundt conducted under Herth's direction provided the practical model for the psychological methods advocated in Wundt's pioneering publication on visual perception in 1862. With respect to theory, Wundt relied on John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, a book often referring to the chemical writings by Justus Liebig. Wundt not only read and quoted Mill's logic but also was personally acquainted with its German translator, the former Liebig student Jacob Schiel. Thus, in various ways, chemistry influenced Wundt's early theory and practice of experiment.     

Russellizing Russell: A reply to his “A critique of Lehrer's coherentism”

Conclusion Russell's attempt to demonstrate the insufficiency and nonnecessity of Lehrer's epistemology fails on both counts. His modified Nogot example does not constitute a counterexample to Lehrer's theory, though it does establish the insufficiency of (RTK). The relevant versions of both of his counterexamples to necessity occasion radically conflicting intuitions and, as a result, are far from decisive. Moreover, if they work against Lehrer's theory, and it is by no means obvious that they do, then they also demonstrate the nonnecessity of Russell's theory. In the final analysis, we may conclude that if Russell's three counterexamples demonstrate anything, they demonstrate that Lehrer's epistemology is superior to (RTK).     

Of Levinas’ ‘structure’ in address to his four ‘others’

It has long been accepted that one of Levinas’ major concerns is to establish an ethics of responsibility for the ‘other.’ Yet it has been deemed for decades, even by Levinasians, that his approach to that concern is ‘unsystematic’ and ‘not consistent.’ That situation arose because Levinas’ four terms for ‘other’ are difficult to translate, so his terms were first addressed by adopting English conventions. Such conventions have furthered Levinas scholarship, but our aim is to consider Levinas’ consistency: Hence we undertake the first English-language assessment of the rigour of Levinas’ approach in 1961 to the ‘other’ by means of all four terms. To do so, we follow a ‘formal structure’ that Levinas develops from the tradition of phenomenological logic—mostly Husserl’s. We hope the result will palliate worries about Levinas’ rigor, and allow new ways to engage with his work.     

Husserl’s Foundation of the Formal Sciences in his “Logical Investigations”

This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts are given to us in a categorical abstraction.