Unemployment: The Living Death?

Unemployment can be viewed as a “living death” because the majority of unemployed persons participating in this study went through five stages that parallel the five stages through which a terminally ill patient passes. Stress caused by unemployment resulted in a loss of income and a loss of the individual's self-image.     

New interpretative styles: Progress or contamination? Psychoanalysis and phenomenological psychopathology1

Psychoanalysis has started to recoup, often quite implicitly, a more phenomenological stance, ever since psychoanalysts have started working with borderline and psychotic patients. As many of these patients have commonly been through traumatic experiences, psychoanalysts have been using an approach that questions the role of traditional psychoanalytical interpretation and pays more attention to the patient's inner conscious experiences; this approach is characteristic of a specifi c form of contemporary psychiatry: phenomenological psychopathology, founded by Karl Jaspers in 1913 and developed into a form of psychotherapy by Ludwig Binswanger, with his Daseinsanalyse. If what we could call a phenomenological ‘temptation’ has been spreading over psychoanalysis, so too has a psychoanalytical ‘temptation’ always been present in phenomenological psychopathology. In fact, even though this branch of psychiatry has led us towards a deeper understanding of the characteristics of psychotic being‐in‐the‐world, its therapeutic applications have never been adequately formalised, much less have they evolved into a specifi c technique or a structured psychotherapeutic approach. Likewise, phenomenological psychotherapy has always held an anaclitic attitude towards psychoanalysis, accepting its procedures but refusing its theoretical basis because it is too close to that of the objectifying natural sciences. Psychoanalytic ‘temptation’ and phenomenological ‘temptation’ can thus be considered as two sides of the same coin and outline a trend in psychoanalytic and phenomenological literature which points out the fundamental role of the patient's inner conscious experiences in the treatment of borderline and psychotic patients.     

Sex bias in psychological research. Progress or complacency?

A total of 4,952 articles published in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 in the areas of developmental, clinical, physiological, and social psychology were reviewed for the purpose of assessing various indicators of sexism in human psychological research. Significant changes in sex of first author, sex of participants, sexist language, and inappropriate generalization indicated that sexism has clearly diminished in the past two decades. Despite these improvements, however, the data revealed continued evidence of discriminatory practices, suggesting that efforts to eliminate sexism must be strengthened if psychology is to be a nonsexist discipline.     

Does Scientific Progress Consist in Increasing Knowledge or Understanding?

Bird (2007) argues that scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge. Dellsén (2016a) objects that increasing knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress, and argues that scientific progress rather consists in increasing understanding. Dellsén also contends that unlike Bird’s view, his view can account for the scientific practices of using idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against Bird’s view fail, and that increasing understanding cannot account for scientific progress, if acceptance, as opposed to belief, is required for scientific understanding.     

Support for the Death Penalty and Rehabilitation: Question Order or Communication Effect?1

Response‐effects research has shown that survey questions shape and channel public opinion. Our study examines the degree to which the variance in people's cognitions about and attitudes toward crime policy proposals is a methodological artifact and the degree to which it represents media effects. Four different forms of a survey were used to manipulate the order of the proposal (death penalty vs. rehabilitation) and criterion (cognition vs. attitude). Results show that experimental manipulations affected cognitions or attitudes only for the death penalty. Respondents who were asked the cognition measure first showed a high level of consistency between the net valence of their arguments and their attitudes. Respondents who were asked their attitudes first reported relatively more affective arguments, a phenomenon that we label affective priming. Exposure and attention to specific media content influenced cognitions and attitudes differentially.     

Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees: A Flawed Paradigm or Work in Progress?

In his challenging article, Steneck (1997) criticized the creation of the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) system established by the 1985 amendments to the Animal Welfare Act. He saw the IACUC review and approval of biomedical and behavioral research with animals as an unnecessary "reassignment" of duties from existing animal care programs to IACUC committees. He argued that the committees are unable to do the work expected of them for basically three reasons: (a) the membership lacks the expertise in matters relevant to animal research and care, (b) there exists an inherent and disabling conflict of interest, and (c) the committee's operational base of authority is alien to academic culture and violates essential aspects of academic freedom. In addition, he found that the system is burdensome, requiring enormous expenditures of time and money that inappropriately diverts resources away from the business of scientific discovery. We dispute several aspects of Steneck's historical account and the coherence of his proposals. We believe his proposals, if followed, would be a step back into a failed past.     

Christianity and the Death Instinct: Perfect Together?

This article is a fictional letter. This “letter” is the fourth fictional letter published by the author. In each letter, I take on a different persona and address issues and questions of theological students at Princeton Seminary, all of whom I imagine to be in their early or mid-twenties, because that is when I attended Princeton Seminary (Carlin 2004, 2006a, 2006b). By doing so, I am endorsing the introspective method in the psychology of religion, which I’ve learned from Donald Capps (1997). This letter is also a reflection on a passage found in the work Erik Eriksons (1962), which is the below epigram. In this letter, a seminarian writes to his mother during his second year of seminary, shortly before Thanksgiving break. The purpose of his letter is to inform his mother—from whom he received his Christianity—about some of his latest thoughts, particularly about the doctrine of the atonement. He has come to believe that the doctrine is problematic for society and he seeks a way to (re)make Christianity into a force for good. Perhaps strangely, he concludes by calling for the death of God, apparently oblivious to this forgotten debate in theological circles. This article raises a number of questions, but perhaps most importantly this one: How far can we take the lament?     

The Pessimistic Meta-induction: Obsolete Through Scientific Progress?

Recently, Fahrbach and Park have argued that the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) about scientific theories is unsound. They claim that this very argument does not properly take into account scientific progress, particularly during the twentieth century. They also propose amended arguments in favour of scientific realism, which are supposed to properly reflect the history of science. I try to show that what I call the argument from scientific progress cannot explain satisfactorily why the current (best) theories should have reached a degree of success that excludes their future refutations and allows the inference to their truth. I further argue that this line of argumentation dismisses the burden of proof in a rather unfair manner by using a delaying tactic to postpone the question about the validity of the PMI in the future.     

Passion or Perjury: Center or Circumference?

Are all transcendental claims a lost cause because they can have no objective empirical truth? Or does the transcendent still move among us as immanent, and, if so, how so? The question of ultimacy and the validity of the symbolic is considered through the views of Paul Ricoeur and Carl Jung.     

An Essay on the Houston Conference Policy Statement: Static Yet Incomplete or a Work in Progress?

Ardila (Neuropsychol. Rev. 12: 3, 2002) criticizes the Policy Statement from the Houston Conference on Specialty Education and Training in Clinical Neuropsychology (Hannay et al., Arch. Clin. Neuropsychol. 13: 157–250, 1998) as possessing deficiencies in the training of clinical neuropsychologists in three fundamental knowledge areas: the history of the discipline, neuropsychological syndromes, and neuropsychological theory. These problems are seen here as a result of a more pervasive problem associated with the Houston Conference training model's emphasis on technical skill over science and the attempt to micromanage the training of the clinical neuropsychologist at the administrative level.     

Guest Editorial: Who's Afraid of Life After Death?

The evidence for an afterlife is sufficiently strong and compelling that an unbiased person ought to conclude that materialism is a false theory. Yet the academy refuses to examine the evidence, and clings to materialism as if it were a priori true, instead of a posteriori false. I suggest several explanations for the monumental failure of curiosity on the part of academia. First, there is deep confusion between the concepts of evidence and proof. Second, materialism functions as a powerful paradigm that structures the shape of scientific explanations, but is not itself open to question. The third explanation is intellectual arrogance, as the possible existence of disembodied intelligence threatens the materialistic belief that the educated human brain is the highest form of intelligence in existence. Finally, there is a social taboo against belief in an afterlife, as our whole way of life is predicated on materialism and might collapse if near-death experiences, particularly the life review, were accepted as fact.     

Gurus and Devotees: Guides or Gods? Pathology or Faith?

This research investigated whether individuals who were members of a religious group in which they participated in a guru-devotee relationship differ in particular psychological and developmental ways (the need to be mirrored, the need to idealize, and retrospective perceptions of styles of having been parented) from individuals who were members of other groups, religious or non-religious. One hundred and eight subjects were drawn from three groups: (a) a Hindu based guru-devotee group, (b) a Unitarian Universalist Church with a non-hierarchical polity, and (c) a non-religious group, a computer company. Subjects were men and women ranging in age from 23 to 83. Each completed the Goal Instability and Superiority Scales (GIS) the Parental Authority Questionnaire (PAQ) and a demographics questionnaire. Results demonstrated no statistically significant differences among the groups on the measures of idealizing, mirroring, and perceived styles of having been parented, thus challenging the conventionally held belief that guru-devotee involvement is indicative of pathology. Private practice in     

Theology: Reduction or Autonomy?

Issues of the nature and task of theology remain important to the science-theology dialogue. This paper lays out a framework for understanding the nature of theology in relation to the other sciences. In particular, I argue that the primary question remains one of autonomy and reduction. If theology is a genuine academic discipline, then it should be an autonomous field with its own subject matter and norms. Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that theology is the science of God, but I suggest that theology be more broadly understood as the science of meaning. If we recognize this, the modes of interaction between theology and the other sciences becomes clearer.     

Envy: One or many?

This paper reports conceptual and clinical research about envy. It consists of an examination and comparison of Klein's points of view of 1952, where the feeling of exclusion from the envious object is stressed, and of 1957, based on the split death instinct that is projected onto the envied object. These two approaches are contrasted with the point of view of the author, where envy is understood as the result of a particular kind of object relation, in which the subject registers an asymmetry with its peer, that he considers unfair, due to the biased action of an idealized omnipotent object, on whom the subject depends and that gives to the envied one, and deceives the envious one, leading to experiencing a compound of emotions: hatred, love, sense of unfairness, wish of revenge, helplessness and incapacity of the subject to provide for himself. The mental state just described emerges from clinical observations, and is illustrated with the passage from the Bible where Abel, the envied one, is killed by Cain, the envious one, showing their relationship with Jehovah, biased in his preferences, a situation designated by the author as 'Cain's complex'. In this paper some considerations are also made concerning the modalities of envy: penis envy in women, the relationship between envy and narcissism, the difference between envy and jealousy, and the interpretative handling of envy. To answer the question posed in the title, the conclusion is that envy presents a central nucleus with different elaborative branches.     

Presentism: Foreigner-Friendly or Xenophobic?

I argue that, for all we know, there are perfectly ordinary actual entities that are temporal in the usual sense and yet never present, past, or future. This epistemic fact requires us to modify the theses of presentism and eternalism. More importantly, it generates three new and quite serious objections to presentism, which I formulate and partially evaluate in this paper.