Computer-based instruction and the practical aspects of memory

This article examines the relationship between basic memory research and computer-based instruction (CBI). The results of basic memory research have helped determine the current directions of computer-assisted instruction (CAI) research and development. These directions have included examining the utility of such learning systems for facilitating memory outcomes and developing CBI systems based on cognitive instructional principles. Examples of such systems include the emerging generation of hypermedia and artificial tutoring systems. Inconclusive results, however, have been found regarding CBI's effects on memroy phenomena. The CBI literature has thus not established the utility of any memory theory for naturally occurring phenomena. Several plausible reasons for this “null finding” are discussed.     

The role of autobiographical memory in competence need satisfaction

Motivation and Emotion - The present investigation examined whether autobiographical memory can function to regulate competence need satisfaction. Across two experiments, we examined how...     

The effect of strategies and contexts on memory for movement patterns

Two experiments on memory for movement patterns examined possible motor aspects of this memory type. None of the experiments found any evidence for motor effects. The first experiment showed lower memory with induced motor strategies than with any of the other induced strategies. The second experiment demonstrated stronger context effects under retrieval than under encoding conditions. The results are discussed in terms of functional and structural conceptions of episodic short-term memory of motor information.     

The mazes of practicing and the horizons

Teaching must take account of young people's individual needs and talents; it must develop their desire for criticism and effort. The spiritual framework must therefore rest on values of rationality and sensitivity. Morality must rest on the notion of personal dignity. In this way, we shall be able to create a horizon, a goal which can inject meaning into life.     

The need for power,brain norepinephrine turnover,and memory

Subjects were classified according to whether they were high or low in the need for Power and high or low in gain in 3-methoxy-4-hydroxyphenylglycol (MHPG), a putative index of brain norepinephrine (NE) turnover, after engaging in some tasks that involved memory for story content. Subjects who were high inn Power and in the index of brain NE turnover showed better recall of power-related facts than subjects low on both these characteristics, confirming an earlier finding, which suggests that the need for Power is subserved by a noradrenergic reward system in the brain.     

The need to dominate

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

The need to explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.     

The need to explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.     

Goal-relevant events need not be rare to boost memory for concurrent images

In the attentional boost effect, memory for images presented at the same time as unrelated targets (e.g., an orange square) is enhanced relative to images presented at the same time as distractors (e.g., a blue square). One difficulty in understanding the nature of this enhancement is that, in most experiments demonstrating the attentional boost effect, targets have been less common than distractors. As a result, the memory enhancement associated with target detection may have been driven by differences in the relative frequencies of targets and distractors. In four experiments, participants encoded images into memory at the same time that they monitored a second, unrelated stimulus stream for targets. In some conditions, targets were as common as distractors (1:1 ratio); in others, targets were rare (1:6 ratio). The attentional boost effect was present when the target and distractor frequencies were equated, ruling out oddball and distinctiveness effects as explanations. These effects were observed when targets required a buttonpress and when they were covertly counted. Memory enhancements were not observed for images presented at the same time as rare distractor stimuli. We concluded that selectively attending to events that require an overt or covert response enhances the processing of concurrent information.     

The eye movement measure of memory and its relationship with explicit measures

This study examined whether the eye movement can be used to measure memory of past events and its relationship with the explicit measures. In Experiment 1, after studying a list of Chinese characters, the participants received a recognition memory test. For each trial the participants had to indicate, among one studied character and two nonstudied homonyms, which character they had studied. Participants’ eye movements were monitored while they viewed the three-character test display. Both the time-course and response-locked measures showed that participants viewed the studied character longer than the nonstudied character regardless of their explicit response. Experiment 2 used a wagering task to assess participants’ conscious awareness and found that wagering points predicted viewing time for the target better than the recognition accuracy did. These findings suggest that the effect of memory on viewing time occurs automatically and is weakly associated with subsequent conscious awareness of the studied event.     

Disrupting attention: The need for retrieval cues in working memory theories

Sometimes in conversation, something is said that causes us to want to comment, but before our impending but implicit thoughts can be expressed, the conversation is disrupted. Later, we cannot recall what we wanted to say, but still later, we can. We used the extralist cuing task to model this phenomenon, and across experiments we varied the strength, direction, and directness of the relationship between the retrieval cues and the targeted information. Disruption was varied by switching attention to a different task before testing and by changing the testing context. Such disruptions reduced recall for the target and its implicitly activated memories. Following a disruption, stronger cues that were related to the target or to both the target and its implicit memories were more effective than those that were related to implicit memories. The findings were consistent with a model of long-term working memory that attributes forgetting to a loss of access to what has been activated, which loss is relative to the strength of the retrieval cue. Decay alone does not explain the results, indicating that many models of working memory need to be revised to take the nature of retrieval cues into account.     

A working memory workout: how to expand the focus of serial attention from one to four items in 10 hours or less

Five individuals participated in an extensive practice study (10 1-hr sessions, 11,000 trials total) on a self-paced identity-judgment (1)n-back task (n ranging from 1 to 5). Within Session 1, response time increased abruptly by about 300 ms in passing from n = 1 to n > 1, suggesting that the focus of attention can accommodate only a single item (H. Caravan, 1998; B. McElree, 2001). Within Session 10, response time was dramatically reduced and increased linearly with n for n < or = 4, with a slope of about 30 ms. The data suggest that working memory consists of a focus of attention governed by a limited-capacity search, expandable through practice, and a content-addressable region outside the focus of attention.     

The body as narrator: Body movement memory and the life stories of holocaust survivors

The present study explores the interaction between two narrative worlds of substance: verbal life stories and body movement expressions among Holocaust survivors. A narrative phenomenology approach was used to investigate the way in which people organize their lives, granting them meaning through their life stories and narratives. Sixteen Holocaust survivors participated in this study: men and women aged 73–93. Qualitative open and unstructured interviews were conducted and videotaped. Six major clusters were found. Each cluster presents unique characteristics of verbal and movement expressions: activity, passivity, arousal, self-reassurance, deadlock, and suffocation. These findings shed new light on the survivors’ traumatic life stories.     

Developmental aspects of memory for spatial location

The purpose was to show whether or not the encoding of location met criteria defining an automatic process (L. Hasher & R. T. Zacks, 1979, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 108, 356-388; 1984, American Psychologist, 39, 1372-1388). Among other criteria, automatic processes are not expected to show developmental changes beyond an early age, to be unrelated to intelligence level, and to be unaffected by instructions. In the first experiment preschool through sixth-grade children were compared on a 40-picturebook task following incidental (remember the names of pictures) or intentional (remember location) instruction. Subjects viewed and named pictures in sets of four, arranged in quadrants in the opened book, and then attempted to recall names of the objects pictured and to relocate pictures on blank pages. In the second experiment, second and sixth graders, college students, elderly persons, and mentally retarded persons were compared on a 60-picturebook task following either incidental or semantic incidental instructions (give the function of objects pictured). Memory for location was invariant across age groups and intelligence level. The only exception was that 3 and 4 year olds were more accurate following intentional instructions. Otherwise there were no differences between intentional and incidental instructions. Semantic instructions resulted in slightly more accurate locations. The results were interpreted as supportive of the Hasher and Zacks' automaticity hypothesis.     

Verbal working memory and planning: learning to compare movement durations of objects

Relations between duration judgments and verbal or visual working memory, between duration judgments and effect of learning to plan the processing of information about such judgments were investigated. A computer monitor was used to present images of two cars traveling in the same direction for various durations and distances. Participants (N=30) were asked to identify the car that had traveled for the longer duration. Then, participants learned how to solve Piagetian tasks logically. After the learning, they tried to solve the duration judgments task again. Finally, their verbal and visual working memory capacities were assessed. Results indicated the following: (a) numbers of correct answers on the Piagetian tasks were correlated with verbal and visual working memory capacity; (b) the correlations did not significantly decrease after the participants learned how to solve the Piagetian tasks.