The role of action effects in infants’ action control

In adults, the selection and the planning of actions are influenced by the anticipation of desired action effects. However, the role of action effects for action control in infants is still an unresolved issue. One important prerequisite for infants action control is that infants are able to relate certain movements to certain effects. To test this assumption, it was investigated how infants action control is affected by action effects. By applying an imitation paradigm, we studied 12- and 18-month-old infants who first observed an adult experimenter demonstrating a three-step action sequence on a toy bear. In three experimental groups, the second action step, the third action step, or no action step elicited an arbitrary sound as an additional acoustic action effect. It was coded how often each of the target actions was performed by the infant in a subsequent 90-s test phase. As predicted, the frequency of the infants target action varied depending on which action step elicited the action effect. In both age groups, the target action that was combined with an acoustical effect was not only produced more often but also occurred with lower latency and was in most cases the first target action shown by the infants. These results are interpreted as evidence of the important role of action effects in infants action control.     

The development of co-representation effects in a joint task: Do children represent a co-actor?

When two adults jointly perform a task, they often show interference effects whereby the other’s task interferes with their own performance (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). The current study investigated whether these co-representation effects can be observed in young children. This phenomenon can be used as a criterion for adult-like joint action in children, which has been under debate in existing literature due to the difficulty in identifying what mechanisms underlie the behaviours observed (Brownell, 2011). In Experiment 1, two children performed an adapted Bear Dragon task (Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996), where children were required to point to a picture when instructed to do so by one puppet and to inhibit pointing when instructed to by the other. In the Same Task condition, both children in a pair were asked to respond to the same puppet, whereas in the Different Task condition, they were asked to respond to different puppets. Children made more errors in the Different Task condition than the Same Task, suggesting that they were experiencing interference from their partner’s task rule. In Experiment 2 children in Different and Same task conditions began with the same task as in Experiment 1 and then switched which puppet to respond to. Switch costs were lower in the Different task condition, consistent with children having already represented the alternative task rule on behalf of their partner during the pre-switch phase. Experiment 3 replicated the effect of Task in a novel computer-based paradigm with children between 4 and 5 years, but not younger. These data provide the first direct evidence that children as young as 4 years co-represent a partner's task during a joint activity, and that younger children may not be capable of co-representation.     

Do blushing phobics overestimate the undesirable communicative effects of their blushing?

Previous research indicated that blushing has socially threatening revealing effects in ambiguous situations. To explain blushing phobics' fearful preoccupation with blushing, we tested the hypothesis that blushing fearful individuals overestimate its revealing effects. High (n = 20) and low (n = 20) blushing fearful individuals read vignettes describing prototypical mishaps and ambiguous social events. Participants were prompted in the perspective of the actor, and were asked to indicate their expectations of the observers' judgments (meta-perceptions). Blushing fearful individuals overestimated the probability and the costs of undesirable outcomes. However, this judgmental bias was not inflated by displaying a blush. Thus, the results provide no evidence to support the idea that fear of blushing is fuelled by a biased conception of its communicative effects.     

Potentiation in young infants: The origin of the prior knowledge effect?

In two experiments with 6-month-old infants, we found that prior learning of an operant task (remembered for 2 weeks) mediated new learning of a modeling event (remembered for only 1 day) and increased its recall. Infants first learned to associate lever pressing with moving a toy train housed in a large box. One or 2 weeks later, three target actions were modeled on a hand puppet while the train box (a retrieval cue) was in view. Merely retrieving the train memory strengthened it, and simultaneously pairing its retrieved memory with the modeled actions potentiated their learning and recall. When paired 1 week later, deferred imitation increased from 1 day to 4 weeks; when paired 2 weeks later, it increased from 1 day to 6 weeks. The striking parallels between potentiated learning in infants and the prior knowledge effect in adults suggests that the prior knowledge effect originates in early infancy.     

The week after: Do the effects of imagined contact last over time?

The vast majority of studies assessing the prejudice reduction properties of imagined contact have focused so far on the immediate effects of the intervention. In an attempt to contribute to the literature examining the long‐term effects of imagined contact, the two studies reported in this paper tested the immediate and long‐term effects of imagined contact on outgroup attitudes, intergroup anxiety, and behavioral intentions in Experiment 1, and also on contact self‐efficacy in Experiment 2. Both studies were conducted in a context of entrenched intergroup conflict, Cyprus. The results supported the effectiveness of imagined contact in eliciting more positive attitudes, lower levels of anxiety, more positive behavioral intentions, and higher contact self‐efficacy when these were measured immediately after contact. However, evidence for the endurance of these effects was systematically found only for outgroup attitudes and intergroup anxiety. While these results speak to the ability of imagined contact to lead to long‐term changes in important and commonly studied intergroup outcomes, lack of consistent evidence regarding its ability to yield lasting changes on variables pertaining to intended behavior toward the outgroup compose a challenge for the intervention.     

Do infants have a sense of fairness?

Two experiments examined infants' expectations about how an experimenter should distribute resources and rewards to other individuals. In Experiment 1, 19-month-olds expected an experimenter to divide two items equally, as opposed to unequally, between two individuals. The infants held no particular expectation when the individuals were replaced with inanimate objects, or when the experimenter simply removed covers in front of the individuals to reveal the items (instead of distributing them). In Experiment 2, 21-month-olds expected an experimenter to give a reward to each of two individuals when both had worked to complete an assigned chore, but not when one of the individuals had done all the work while the other played. The infants held this expectation only when the experimenter could determine through visual inspection who had worked and who had not. Together, these results provide converging evidence that infants in the 2nd year of life already possess context-sensitive expectations relevant to fairness.     

Do production patterns influence the processing of speech in prelinguistic infants?

The headturn preference procedure was used to test 18 infants on their response to three different passages chosen to reflect their individual production patterns. The passages contained nonwords with consonants in one of three categories: (a) often produced by that infant (‘own’), (b) rarely produced by that infant but common at that age (‘other’), and (c) not generally produced by infants. Infants who had a single ‘own’ consonant showed no significant preference for either ‘own’ (a) or ‘other’ (b) passages. In contrast, infants’ with two ‘own’ consonants exhibited greater attention to ‘other’ passages (b). Both groups attended equally to the passage featuring consonants rarely produced by infants of that age (c). An analysis of a sample of the infant-directed speech ruled out the mothers’ speech as a source of the infant preferences. The production-based shift to a focus on the ‘other’ passage suggests that nascent production abilities combine with emergent perceptual experience to facilitate word learning.     

Do big-brained animals play more? Comparative analyses of play and relative brain size in mammals

It has been hypothesized that play is more likely to be present in larger brained species. We tested this hypothesis in mammals using independent contrasts, a method that controls for phylogenetic relatedness. Comparisons across 15 orders revealed that the prevalence and complexity of play was significantly correlated with brain size, with larger brained orders having more playful species. Three orders, Rodentia, Marsupialia, and Primates, were used for within-order comparisons among species and, where possible, among families. The comparisons were not significant for rodents or primates, and those for marsupials yielded inconsistent results. Therefore, although a strong relationship is present at the highest taxonomic level of comparison, it diminishes or evaporates at lower level comparisons.     

Adolescents’ and their friends’ sexual behavior and intention: Selection effects of personality dimensions

Using simulation investigation for empirical network analyses (in RSiena) we examined how personality and sexual behavior and intention were related to peer processes in Dutch adolescents. Our main research questions were: (a) do adolescents cluster together in friendship networks based on personality, sexual behavior, and/or sexual intention? And (b), do adolescents influence each other in their sexual behavior and intention? Results showed that adolescents clustered together based on dissimilarity in agreeableness, and similarity in gender and sexual intention. Further, we found that adolescents with lower levels of emotional stability had friends with more similar levels of sexual intention. The limited variance and low base rates of sexual behavior and intention did not allow us to explicitly test socialization effects.     

Do infants possess innate knowledge structures? The con side

The central question of development is how new forms are made, how some structure, or behavior, or competence that was not there before, arises. This essay argues for a mechanistic answer to the question of the origins of new forms. And, in so doing, the essay argues that the so-called ‘innate versus learned’ dichotomy is logically flawed since ‘innate’ has no specifiable and mechanistic meaning. The essay considers first, a clear case of ‘innate’ structure: the origins of fingers and toes in embryology. The real-time mechanisms which create fingers and toes, however, are general, probabilistic, emergent and distributed across several levels of analyses. The idea of ‘innate’– even though certainly applicable – has no substantive content and yields no predictions about the nature of these mechanisms. The essay considers second, a clear case of a ‘learned’ structure: the origins of the shape bias in children’s early noun learning. Again, the developmental mechanisms are general, probabilistic, emergent and distributed across several levels of analyses. Several criticisms of the argument against ‘innate ideas’ are considered and rebutted.     

Development of mother–infant interaction in tickling play: The relationship between infants’ ticklishness and social behaviors

This study examined the development of mother–infant tickling interaction and the relationship between infants’ ticklishness and social behaviors including infants’ looking at mothers’ face, mothers’ narrative tickling, and mothers’ laughter. Twenty-two Japanese infants aged 5 months (n = 10, five girls) and 7 months (n = 12, four girls) and their mothers were videotaped. Results revealed that the mothers’ narrative tickling was more frequent at 7 than at 5 months and the infants’ strong ticklishness showed the same tendency. The infants’ strong ticklishness was linked with the occurrence of other social behaviors. In conclusion, infants’ ticklishness was heavily connected with social behaviors. The mode of the tickling interaction at 7 months was different from that at 5 months especially in the increase of mother’s narrative tickling. A possible function of such mother’s narrative tickling to facilitate infant active communication at a higher cognitive level including anticipation, was discussed.     

Do corporations have minds of their own?

Corporations have often been taken to be the paradigm of an organization whose agency is autonomous from that of the successive waves of people who occupy the pattern of roles that define its structure, which licenses saying that the corporation has attitudes, interests, goals, and beliefs which are not those of the role occupants. In this essay, I sketch a deflationary account of agency-discourse about corporations. I identify institutional roles with a special type of status function, a status role, in which the collectively accepted function is expressed in part through its occupier’s intentional expression of her agency in that role (where the occupier is part of the group whose collective acceptance underwrites her having the relevant function in social transactions). I identify institutions as systems of status roles and show how this is compatible with seeing the agency of institutions generally, even over time periods in which there is complete change in role occupiers, as a matter of the contributions only of individual agents. I explain how the reduction of the institution to its members is compatible with its potentially having had a completely different membership. I show in the case of the corporation in particular that, once we see its origins and function, the surface features of legal discourse about corporate agency are misleading and are compatible with a deflationary account of corporate agency. I show in connection with this that the corporation is to be identified with its shareholders, and that where a corporation separates ownership and control, its managers and employees are proxy agents of the shareholders doing business under the corporate form. Finally, I canvass the legitimate ways of construing ordinary talk about corporate intention, belief, and so on, in light of this, none of which support the attribution of genuine agency or intentionality to any group per se associated with the corporation.     

The role of emotion in bridging the intention–behaviour gap: The case of sports participation

ProblemPsychological models of sports participation frequently draw on the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) in order to predict health-behaviour-related intentions. While these models commonly show high predictive power with respect to intention, they often fall short in the prediction of behaviour (the ‘intention–behaviour gap’). The present study contends that integrating emotional processes into TPB can substantially improve the model's predictive power over and above traditional cognitive predictors.MethodIn a longitudinal study structural equation modelling was employed to test a traditional model (based on TPB) and an extended model including emotion associated with the intention to exercise as a mediator variable. A community sample (N = 237) completed a questionnaire measuring the components of a traditional TPB model. Prior to each of 16 expected exercise sessions (over 8 weeks) intention to exercise and emotion associated with the intention were measured.ResultsResults confirmed a substantial increase of 17% in explained variance of exercise frequency and 20% in exercise duration for the extended model. Emotional appraisal of the intention to exercise thus appears to mediate the traditional intention–behaviour relationship, suggesting that emotionally based interventions aimed at increasing sports participation may be helpful.ConclusionIt is concluded that emotion variables should be added to traditional TPB models in order to predict health behaviour more fully.     

Do features of stimuli influence IAT effects?

The Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is a categorization task intended to measure the strength of associations between concepts. The present research investigated the influence of individual stimuli on IAT effects. Exploring implicit attitudes of East and West Germans, we systematically manipulated relatedness of target stimuli to the attribute dimension and, simultaneously, relatedness of attribute stimuli to the target dimension. Two experiments demonstrate the influence of stimulus associations as one source that drives IAT effects. Depending on the strength and the direction of these cross-category associations, the result was either stronger IAT effects or a decline of IAT effects. Implications for theoretical models as well as for the interpretation of IAT effects are discussed.     

Can unpredicted outcomes be intended? The role of outcome-beliefs in children's judgments of intention

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one's action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding outcome. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inaccurate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.