Replicated alternatives and the role of confusion,chasing, and regret in decisions from experience

The current paper explores choice among alternatives that can be classified into distinct classes. All the members of a particular class were ‘replicated alternatives’: they promised the same payoff distribution. Information to decision makers was limited to feedback concerning the realized (obtained and foregone) payoffs. Experiment 1 demonstrates that increasing the number of replicated alternatives creates confusion (which facilitates random choice) and changes the implications of the tendency to chase recent returns (i.e., select the alternative with the best recent outcomes). This effect, termed ‘confused chasing,’ facilitates risk seeking even when this behavior impairs expected earnings. Experiment 2 reveals that increasing the number of replicated alternatives can reduce (but does not eliminate) the tendency to underweight rare events. Experiment 3 shows that the relative importance of chasing and confusion is sensitive to the likelihood of realizing lower payoffs than the forgone payoffs. The main results are summarized with a simple model assuming that payoff sensitivity decreases with experienced regret. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The choices and preferences of nursery school children

After a period of equal reinforcement for choices of any job revealed which of 10 jobs each of 24 preschool children preferred and did not prefer, token payment became dependent on particular choices. Some children received tokens only for choosing previously non-preferred jobs, others for choosing previously preferred jobs. When tokens depended on choosing the nonpreferred jobs, those came to be preferred. When tokens depended on choosing the preferred jobs, the preferences were strengthened. The effects were replicated both within and between subjects, except in the case of one boy who consistently avoided token pay.     

Application of a cognitive-distance model to learning in a simulated travel task

A cognitive-distance model for choice, obtained by specializing a general class of models for categorization, was tested in a situation simulating the task of controlling speed of a vehicle in tasks defined by different relations between speed and probability of delay. Subjects exhibited significant learning whenever delay schedules permitted greater-than-chance performance, but on the average they did not approach optimal performance in the sense of choosing speeds so as to maximize distance attained in allowed time. Evidence was obtained that subjects encoded information about probabilities of delay and distributions of distance attained at different speeds quite accurately in memory and that suboptimal performance was due primarily to imperfect discrimination among representations of choice alternatives on a cognitive scale of expected distance.     

Mixing virtue and vice: combining the immediacy effect and the diversification heuristic

Many of the most significant choices that people make are between vices, which exchange small immediate rewards for large delayed costs, and virtues, which exchange small immediate costs for large delayed rewards. We investigate the consequences of making a series of such choices either simultaneously or sequentially. We made two predictions. First, because many alternatives chosen under simultaneous choice will only be experienced following a delay, and because hyperbolic time discounting predicts that people will prefer delayed virtues but immediate vices, we predicted that people would choose more virtues in simultaneous than sequential choice. Second, due to the tendency to diversify portfolios of choices, we predicted a greater mix of virtues and vices in simultaneous than sequential choice. These predictions were confirmed in two experiments involving real choices; one between ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ movies, and the other between ‘instant‐win’ and ‘prize‐draw’ lottery tickets. We conclude by posing the question of whether simultaneous or sequential choice results in decisions that more closely approximate what people ‘really’ want. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social comparisons and pay evaluations: Preferences for same-sex and same-job wage comparisons

This research examined women's and men's social comparison preferences when evaluating the fairness of pay. Subjects were assigned randomly to work on a job described as masculine, feminine, or sex neutral and were told that they would be paid for their work. After working on the job and privately receiving identical payment, subjects rank ordered their preference for seeing the average male, average female, and average combined-sex wage paid in each of the three jobs. Despite the availability of the combined-sex wage, subjects preferred to maximize similarity in their wage comparisons, with the majority choosing to see the pay of a same-sex and same-job group first. Regardless of the sex linkage of their job assignment, subjects selected a same-job comparison first. Sex linkage of job did affect same-sex preferences; whereas subjects in sex-appropriate and sex-neutral jobs showed a significant preference for seeing the pay of same-sex others first, subjects in sex-inappropriate jobs did not. Results also indicated that both men and women assigned to the feminine job expected somewhat less pay and thought their obtained pay was more fair than did those assigned to the masculine job. Furthermore, women thought they deserved less pay for their work than did men, regardless of their job assignment. Implications of these results for gender differences in outcome evaluations are discussed.     

Reasons for sequence preferences

Much research shows that when it comes to preferences over sequences of money, such as a monthly paycheck, people do not always maximize present value. Rather, they often choose the lower‐valued of a pair of sequences, especially when it has attractive properties such as an increasing trend. To unearth the reasons for sequence preferences we conducted a verbal‐protocol analysis of choices between money sequences, including lifetime and one‐year earnings and one‐year lottery winnings, as well as lifetime health sequences. Participants thought aloud while choosing between visual representations of sequences. Their verbalizations contained reference to a wide range of previously hypothesized, as well as new, reasons for choice. These reasons were also correlated in sensible ways with the choices made. There was some evidence of solid economic reasoning (which we called maximization), although this was largely restricted to choices for one‐year earnings. More commonly, respondents did not distinguish between earnings and consumption, and thought about money as if they would automatically spend it at the rate it was received. This meant the most frequently given reason was what we called appropriateness—how well the money received at a given point matched the desired consumption at that point. Other common explanations include the expectedness of a sequence (we argue this is mediated by appropriateness), the way that parts of the sequence constitute reference points for other parts, and the ease with which incoming money can be managed (convenience). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Matching in a network

Pigeons were given practice choosing between pairs of alternatives yielding different frequencies of reinforcement. Four individual alternatives were set into four pairwise choices. Averaged over subjects, the distribution of responses in each choice approximated matching. The four individual alternatives were then presented, two by two, in two pairwise choices for which there had been no initial practice. No further reinforcement was given during the tests with the new pairs. Transfer to the two test pairs deviated systematically from matching in most cases by exaggerating the preference for the alternative that had had the higher frequency of reinforcement.     

Performance of an unpleasant task: Effects of over- vs under-payment on perception of adequacy of rewards and task attractiveness

Subjects who came to an experiment expecting to receive a moderate amount of money for performing a task were then told, either before or after performing it, that their pay would be higher than, equal to, or less than they had expected. When the actual payment was announced after the task was performed, subjects' evaluations of the task increased with the amount they were paid; however, they estimated a higher rate of pay to be appropriate if they received either more or less than they expected than if they received what they expected. When the actual payment was announced before the task was performed (and before subjects made their decision to perform it), a different pattern emerged. Subjects rated the task more attractive when they were offered either more or less than the expected amount, while their judgments of the appropriateness of the pay offered increased with the amount of the offer. Implications of the results for incentive and dissonance theories as well as self-perception and equity theories are discussed.     

Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Both social cooperation and self‐control require reciprocation. In social cooperation situations a single person's cooperative act, if not reciprocated by others, would be unreinforced both immediately and in the long term. Similarly, a single act of self‐control (refusing a single cigarette, for example), if not followed up by other such acts, would also be unreinforced immediately and in the long term. The present experiments varied probability of reciprocation in a prisoner's dilemma‐like game that could resemble a social cooperation or a self‐control situation. Participants earned points by playing against a computer. The computer offered the participant a choice between 5 or 6 points (‘cooperation’ by the computer) or between 1 or 2 points (‘defection’ by the computer). The participant's choice of the lesser alternative (‘cooperation’) or the greater alternative (‘defection’) on the current trial led, respectively, to cooperation or defection by the computer on the next trial with a probability (probability of reciprocation, PR) which could vary. When PR was greater than 63%, consistent cooperation maximized the participant's earnings. When PR was less than 63%, defection maximized earnings. Three conditions were studied: PR signaled by spinners; PR unsignaled; PR unsignaled with participants believing that they were playing with another person, not the computer. With PR = 100% (‘tit‐for‐tat’) and PR = 50%, the modal participant maximized earnings under all three conditions. With PR = 75%, participants maximized earnings only when PR was signaled. These results indicate that differences between people's tendency to cooperate with other people (social cooperation) and their tendency to cooperate with their own future interests (self‐control) may lie in differences in subjective PR. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Melioration behaviour in the Harvard game is reduced by simplifying decision outcomes

Self-control experiments have previously been highlighted as examples of suboptimal decision making. In one such experiment, the Harvard game, participants make repeated choices between two alternatives. One alternative has a higher immediate pay-off than the other, but with repeated choices results in a lower overall pay-off. Preference for the alternative with the higher immediate pay-off seems to be impulsive and will result in a failure to maximize pay-offs. We report an experiment that modifies the Harvard game, dividing the pay-off from each choice into two separate consequences—the immediate and the historic components. Choosing the alternative with the higher immediate pay-off ends the session prematurely, leading to a loss of opportunities to earn further pay-offs and ultimately to a reduced overall pay-off. This makes it easier for participants to learn the outcomes of their actions. It also provides the opportunity for a further test of normative decision making by means of one of its most specific and paradoxical predictions—that the truly rational agent should switch from self-control to impulsivity toward the end of the experimental sessions. The finding that participants maximize their expected utility by both overcoming impulsivity and learning to switch implies that melioration behaviour is not due to the lure of impulsivity, but due to the difficulty of learning which components are included in the pay-off schedules.     

Choice in transition: A comparison of melioration and the kinetic model

Transition-state choice behavior of pigeons was examined in two experiments designed to test predictions of melioration and the kinetic model. Both experiments began with an initial training condition during which subjects were maintained on concurrent variable-interval schedules. In Experiment 1, subjects were then exposed to concurrent variable-ratio schedules, whereas in Experiment 2, subjects were then exposed to concurrent extinction. Contrary to the predictions of melioration, but consistent with the kinetic model, acquisition of preference on concurrent variable-ratio schedules followed a negatively accelerated logistic trajectory, and preference remained stable in concurrent extinction. Predictions made by the kinetic model concerning rates of switching between alternatives were also supported.     

Fair and dependent versus egoistic and free: effects of semantic and evaluative priming on the ‘Ring Measure of Social Values’

Two experiments investigated the influence of priming trait concepts associated with cooperation versus competition on cooperative choices in the ‘Ring Measure of Social Values’. While models of associative memory explain priming effects on immediate associative responses, they fail to provide a sufficient account for the impact of priming on deliberate, voluntary behaviours, because the same activated concepts (e.g. ‘strong’, ‘profit’, ‘success’) may foster opposite behavioural tendencies (i.e. raise competitive impulses or remind the individual of a cooperation norm). The hypothesis is proposed and tested that the evaluative component of the prime stimuli moderates the behavioural tendency (approach versus avoidance) elicited by the semantic priming component. Accordingly, Experiment 1 shows that both positively toned concepts linked to cooperation as well as negatively toned concepts linked to competition lead to increased cooperative choices. Experiment 2 demonstrates that simple, invariant properties of the prime stimuli are more readily extracted than more complex, interactive prime relations. In general, the priming effects are confined to subjects who lack a consistent, pre-experimental value orientation. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the evaluation of one-sided evidence

We examine predictions and judgments of confidence based on one-sided evidence. Some subjects saw arguments for only one side of a legal dispute while other subjects (called ‘jurors’) saw arguments for both sides. Subjects predicted the number of jurors who favored the plaintiff in each case. Subjects who saw only one side made predictions that were biased in favor of that side. Furthermore, they were more confident but generally less accurate than subjects who saw both sides. The results indicate that people do not compensate sufficiently for missing information even when it is painfully obvious that the information available to them is incomplete. A simple manipulation that required subjects to evaluate the relative strength of the opponent's side greatly reduced the tendency to underweigh missing evidence.     

Pseudodiagnosticity

Subjects selected data in order to decide from which of two ‘islands’ an ‘archeological find’ had come. The results replicated two established phenomena in cognitive psychology: (1) the tendency to ignore base rate data given individuating information, and (2) the tendency to seek confirmatory evidence.The major outcome of the study was, however, to reveal a new phenomenon in information search. Subjects displayed a surprising and strong tendency to seek diagnostically worthless information. They then altered their conclusion based on that information. For example, subjects who had already obtained P(D₁/H₁) selected P(D₂/H₁) when P(D₁/H₂) was equally easily available, and when they had no relevant experience to bring to bear on the estimation of P(D₁/H₂). This phenomenon, which appears to be a wholly dysfunctional cognitive tendency, was labeled pseudodiagnosticity.     

文化差异影响彝、白、纳西和汉族大学生对黑白的认知

以彝族、白族、纳西族和汉族的大学生为被试,采用颜色相似性判断和颜色再认任务,考察了彝族、白族、纳西族和汉族的大学生对于黑色和白色的认知,意在探究不同民族的黑、白文化是否影响人们对黑、白颜色的认知。结果发现：⑴彝族、白族、纳西族和汉族的黑、白文化影响四个民族的大学生对于黑色和白色的认知;⑵语言和文化对于颜色认知的影响包括间接效应和直接效应。整个研究表明,语言和文化对颜色认知有重要影响     

Switching behaviour as a function of number of options: How much is too much for consumer choice decisions?

The number of alternatives for consumers in almost all purchase situations is increasing at an extremely rapid pace. Although more choices may have many benefits to the consumers, recent studies on choice overload have found that choosing from large alternatives may lead to negative consequences. Majority of the choice overload research has compared only two groups of small versus large assortment size. In extant literature, there is no clarity as to what are small and large assortment sizes. Assortment size used as small in one study has been used as large in some other studies. Small assortment size varied from 2 to 60 choices and large assortment size from 3 to 300 choices in past studies, and the presence of choice overload has been reported at completely different levels of assortment sizes. This study has used an array of six choice sets from 6 to 36 options as compared to just two groups of small versus large assortment. Switching likelihood of consumers was used to capture the choice overload effect in this study. The probability of consumers switching their earlier choice was plotted as a function of number of options using binary logistic regression. Results showed that probability of switching was almost a linearly increasing function of assortment size from 6 to 36 options. The graph of predicted probabilities from 2 to 300 options showed a sharp increase in switching behaviour initially and subsequent flattening of the curve when options became very large.     

Which Is Better: Simultaneous or Sequential Choice?

The term "diversification bias" refers to the tendency for people to take more variety when choosing several items simultaneously than when choosing them sequentially. In this article, we investigate whether this really is a bias by measuring evaluations of sets chosen simultaneously or sequentially. In Experiment 1 participants made two choices between audio tracks for consecutive consumption. Participants liked low-variety sets most and were more likely to choose high-variety sets in simultaneous choice. In Experiment 2 participants chose between three gambles which varied in the probability of winning and their expected value. Again, simultaneous choices seemed worse than sequential ones: The simultaneous-choice groups took far more low expected value gambles than did sequential-choice subjects and rated their enjoyment as lower. We conclude that simultaneous choice often leads to outcomes that are worse than sequential choice and discuss the circumstances when this is likely to be true.     

MENTAL ROTATION AND TYPICAL VIEWS: A HEURISTIC EXPERIMENT

Subjects were presented either with models set at an angle or with photographs of such models. They were required to remember the orientation (or the depicted orientation) and to reproduce it using similar models placed on a turntable. It was found that the subjects showed a systematic tendency to reproduce the settings of the depicted models as being closer to the one of the two ‘typical’ settings (profile and face on) than they really were. The continuum between the two ‘typical’ settings appeared to be divided into two unequal zones and the sense of the error made was dependent on the zone from which the stimulus originated. No similar effects were observed in the responses made to models.