Moral Realism,Social Construction,and Realism,Social Construction,and Communal Ontology

The paper examines two forms of naturalistic moral realism, “Microstructure realism” (MSR) and “Reason realism” (RR). The latter, as we defend it, locates the objectivity of moral facts in socially constructed reality, but the former, as exemplified by David Brink’s model of naturalistic moral realism, secures the objectivity of moral facts in their micro-structure and a nomic supervenience relationship. We find MSR’s parity argument for this account of moral facts implausible; it yields a relationship between moral facts and their natural-scientific constitution that has a queer, slapped-together quality. We argue that the relationship needs to be spelled out by a process of social construction, involving collective intentionality and constitutive rules. We explain how our constructivist model of RR differs from a form of it defended by Michael Smith (1994), which analyzes moral facts by reference not to construction but rather to a hypothetical situation of full rationality. We agree with Smith, as against Bernard Williams, that a rational agent may have reasons for acting that go beyond the agent’s “subjective motivational set,” but we locate such reasons by reference to the agent’s membership in an actual community, and we explore the prospects for moral objectivity given this constraint on moral reasons.     

The Smuggler's Fallacy

Abstract: David Hume has warned us not to endeavor to derive an “ought” from an “is” (1990, 469–70), reprimanding those who attempt to draw value judgments from empirical facts. But Judith Jarvis Thomson refuses to accept that values and facts are logically disjoint in this manner, primarily because of her worry that such a partition of our moral values from the “facts” will place a grave limitation on any ethical system, namely, that its claims apparently cannot be proven. Consequently, Thomson is on the lookout for some provably true facts that can be used, contra Hume, to draw conclusions about moral values. Thomson begins by rejecting all generalist conceptions of the good (specifically, the utilitarian's identification of the good with pleasure) and proceeds to fracture the good into various kinds of “goodness in a way,” hoping to produce by this disintegration some moral facts that can be used to set ethics on an objective foundation. But I will argue that Thomson's so‐called objective facts are actually nothing but disguised moral claims, and that in attempting to sidestep the classic fallacy identified by Hume, she has blundered into another pitfall—the Smuggler's Fallacy, the offense of concealing her moral conclusions inside the premises of her argument.     

The long way to “extreme psychologism”

In “Clearing Space for Extreme Psychologism about Reasons”, Mitova argues against two main views about the ontology of reasons. Instead, she presents an argument by elimination for “extreme psychologism” as a prima facie superior alternative. I will argue for the following claims. First, the case against the Standard Story – the view that normative and motivating reasons are facts and psychological states, respectively – includes premises that are in need of support. Second, the critical examination of factualism – the view that normative and motivating reasons are facts – misses a relevant distinction between motivating and explanatory reasons. This distinction brings new resources to factualism to answer the raised worries. Third, the case for extreme psychologism rests on a requirement that is either too easy to threaten other alternatives, or so strong as to challenge extreme psychologism itself.     

A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame

Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: 1. One's blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent's wrongdoing. 3. One is warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the wrongdoing. 4. The target's wrongdoing is some of “one's business”. These conditions are often proposed as both conditions on one and the same thing, and as marking fundamentally different ways of “losing standing”. Here I call these claims into question. First, I claim that conditions (3) and (4) are simply conditions on different things than are conditions (1) and (2). Second, I argue that condition (2) reduces to condition (1): when “involvement” removes someone's standing to blame, it does so only by indicating something further about that agent, viz., that he or she lacks commitment to the values that condemn the wrongdoer's action. The result: after we clarify the nature of the non‐hypocrisy condition, we will have a unified account of moral standing to blame. Issues also discussed: whether standing can ever be regained, the relationship between standing and our “moral fragility”, the difference between mere inconsistency and hypocrisy, and whether a condition of standing might be derived from deeper facts about the “equality of persons”.     

Strategy use in question-answering: Memory strength and task constraints on fan effects

The time taken to recognize a studied fact increases as a function of the number of other previously studied facts sharing concepts with the test fact. The phenomenon, known as the “fan effect,” has been shown to disappear and sometimes even reverse itself when the set of facts are thematically related. The shift from interference toward facilitation occurs only when subjects can use a plausibility-like strategy. In this experiment, subjects learned variously sized sets of rehted facts about fictitious people. Subjects were asked to make either recognition judgments (“Did you study this fact?”) or consistency judgments (“Is this fact consistent with what you studied7”). Subjects made these judgments both the day the material was acquired and 2 days later. The research reported here supports the hypothesis that, with delay, there is a shift in tendency toward more use of the plausibility strategy, away from the careful strategy of searching for an exact match that produces the fan effect. The plausibility strategy produced either a speedup with greater fan or an increase in error rates when the strategy was inappropriate. Plausibility effects were larger at a delay, in both reaction time and error patterns, regardless of whether subjects were asked to make consistency judgments or recognition judgments. Also as predicted, response times became faster as the tendency to adopt the plausibility strategy without first trying direct retrieval increased.     

Fine's Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity

In “Tense and Reality”, Kit Fine ( 2005 ) proposed a novel way to think about realism about tense in the metaphysics of time. In particular, he explored two non‐standard forms of realism about tense (“external relativism” and “fragmentalism”), arguing that they are to be preferred over standard forms of realism. In the process of defending his own preferred view, fragmentalism, he proposed a fragmentalist interpretation of the special theory of relativity (STR), which will be our focus in this paper. After presenting Fine's position, we will raise a problem for his fragmentalist interpretation of STR. We will argue that Fine's view is in tension with the proper explanation of why various facts (such as the Lorentz transformations) obtain. We will then consider whether similar considerations also speak against fragmentalism in domains other than STR, notably fragmentalism about tense.     

Propositions,Properties and Relations: Wittgenstein's “Notes on Logic” and the Tractatus

Frege famously argued that truth is not a property or relation. In the “Notes on Logic” Wittgenstein emphasised the bi‐polarity of propositions which he called their sense. He argued that “propositions by virtue of sense cannot have predicates or relations.” This led to his fundamental thought that the logical constants do not represent predicates or relations. The idea, however, has wider ramifications than that. It is not just that propositions cannot have relations to other propositions but also that they cannot have relations to anything at all. The paper explores the consequences of this insight for the way in which we should read the Tractatus. In the “Notes on Logic” the insight led to Wittgenstein's emphasis on “facts” in any attempt to understand the nature of symbolism. This emphasis is continued in the Tractatus. It is central to his view that propositions are facts which picture facts which prevent us from construing such picturing as a relation between what pictures and what is pictured. It illuminates the importance of context principle with regard to the distinction between showing and saying to which Wittgenstein attached so much importance and it underlies the non‐relational view of psychological propositions which he advocates. Finally, if propositions by virtue of sense cannot have predicates or relations the paradox at the end of a work which consist largely of propositions about propositions becomes intelligible.     

Response to Requests for Abortion: The Influence of Guilt and Knowledge1

Participants who varied in their levels of sex guilt and sexual knowledge indicated the extent of their approval for abortion in response to 10 case histories of abortion applicants. The case histories were varied in terms of the circumstances under which conception had occurred. Sex guilt was significantly related to abortion decisions while sexual knowledge registered little effect. Low sex guilt students were more favorable toward abortion requests than were high sex guilt students, but both groups were more favorable toward abortion when conception was the result of failure of a contraceptive method than when it was due to the applicant's inconsistent use of the method. In addition, high sex guilt students' abortion decisions were significantly influenced by the relationship of the applicant to her coital partner. When the relationship was “steady,” they approved the request, whereas abortion was denied to the applicant who conceived with a casual partner. The results were discussed within the context of the debate over the morality of abortion and the problem of unwanted adolescent pregnancy. It was suggested that sex guilt may play a larger role in these issues than has been previously recognized, and that presenting the “facts” (sexual knowledge) may have little impact in abortion related decisions.     

Empirical Content and Rational Constraint

It is often thought that epistemic relations between experience and belief make it possible for our beliefs to be about or “directed towards” the empirical world. I focus on an influential attempt by John McDowell to defend a view along these lines. According to McDowell, unless experiences are the sorts of things that can be our reasons for holding beliefs, our beliefs would not be “answerable” to the facts they purportedly represent, and so would lack all empirical content. I argue that there is no intelligible conception of what it is for beliefs to be answerable to the facts that supports McDowell's claim that our empirical beliefs must be justified by experience.     

How apparent motion affects mental rotation: Push or pull?

Subjects were timed as they judged whether a small bar perpendicular to one side of a clockhand would point left or right if the hand was pointing upward (i.e., at the 12:00 position). The clockhand was shown in two successive orientations 30°apart, so that it was perceived to jump from one to the other, but the bar was included at only one of the two orientations. Analysis of reaction times as a function of angular orientation showed that the subjects “mentally rotated” the clockhand to the upright position before making their decisions. When the bar appeared on the second presentation, the jump had no significant influence on mental rotation but when it appeared on the first presentation, the estimated orientation from which the clockhand was mentally rotated was “dragged” in the direction of the jump.     

Psychoanalytic action explanation

Psychoanalysis is concerned with neurotic behaviour that counts as an action if one takes into account “repressed” mental states. Freud's paradigmatic examples are a challenge for philosophical theories of action explanation. The main problem is that such symptomatic behaviour is, in a characteristic way, irrational. In line with standard interpretations, I will recap that psychoanalytic action explanation is not in accordance with Davidson's classical reason-explanation model, and I will recall that Freud's unconsciousness is not a second mind with its own rationality but that it is non-propositional in character. However, I then will argue that this characterization is not discriminating enough to explain the dynamical unconscious and overlooks the crucial role of “counter-cathexis”. With counter-cathexis the relevant desire turns out to be a complex with two inseparable aspects (“double-aspect view”), so that the causing belief–desire pair is still part of the space of reasons, although it cannot rationalize the behaviour. Psychoanalytic action explanation is hence still Davidsonian, albeit in a modified way.     

Controlling the Past to Control the Future: Christian Nationalism and Mandatory Patriotic Education in Public Schools

Recent debates about whether educators should teach America's racist history have sparked activism and legislation to ensure students are taught American history in such a way that promotes “patriotism,” amplifying cherished national myths, emphasizing American exceptionalism, and erasing negative historical facts. Building on insights from both social dominance theory and Christian nationalism research, we propose Christian nationalism combines legitimizing myths that whitewash America's past with authoritarian impulses and thus seeks to enforce “patriotic” content in public school classrooms. We also theorize this connection varies across racial, partisan, and ideological identities. Data from a nationally-representative survey of Americans affirm Christian nationalism is by far the leading predictor Americans believe “We should require public school teachers to teach history in a way that promotes patriotism.” This association is consistent across race (possibly due to divergent meanings of both “Christian nationalism” and “patriotism” across groups), but varies by partisanship and ideological identity for whites. Specifically, Christian nationalism brings whites who identify with the ideological and political left into complete alignment with their conservative counterparts who are already more likely to support mandatory patriotic education. Our findings provide critical context for ongoing battles over public-school curricula and education's role in perpetuating social privilege.     

Blameworthiness,desert, and luck

Philosophers disagree about whether outcome luck can affect an agent's “moral responsibility.” Focusing on responsibility's “negative side,” some maintain, and others deny, that an action's results bear constitutively on how “blameworthy” the actor is, and on how much blame or punishment they “deserve.” Crucially, both sides to the debate assume that an actor's blameworthiness and negative desert are equally affected—or unaffected—by an action's results. This article challenges that previously overlooked assumption, arguing that blameworthiness and desert are distinct moral notions that serve distinct normative functions: blameworthiness serves a liability function (removing a bar to otherwise impermissible treatments), whereas desert serves a favoring function (contributing new value to states of affairs, or providing new reasons for responsive treatments). Having distinguished (negative) desert from blameworthiness, the article proposes a novel resolution to the outcome-luck debate: that results do not affect an agent's liability to blame, but do affect the amount and severity of blame to which the agent is justly liable, including by affecting the severity of blame that the agent deserves.     

Constructivism about Practical Reasons1

Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first‐order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assume constructive “norms of practical reasoning” which yield particular truths without assuming them. But philosophers often mistakenly assume that only “formal” norms of reasoning could fulfill this role. The paper describes a further possibility: norms of reasoning can be “situation‐specific” and yet retain truth‐independent authority. Though we might doubt whether such norms can be independently defended, we should not doubt the possibility or coherence of constructivism about practical reasons.     

Deciding Staged Battles of the Past: On the Rhetorics of Olaf Müller’s Historical Philosophy of Science

Since Plato’s massive critique of the Sophists rhetoric’s ill repute runs through the history of western philosophy denunciating methods of rhetoric as in large part dishonest persuasion strategies which are at most marginally interested in dealing with truths. This judgement falls way too short insofar as it distorts the historically grown stock labeled “rhetoric” not only in the Aristotelian work. With reference to Olaf Müller’s philosophical book (Mehr Licht: Goethe mit Newton im Streit um die Farben, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 2015) addressing the “controversy” between Goethe and Newton about the nature of light, I will study the different rhetorical models and methods used by Newton and Goethe and also Müller himself. It becomes apparent that even works attempting to decide who was right in the long run do far more than trying to evoke true “representations” of facts or truths in the reader. The specific use of language patterns provides deeper insight into an author’s mindset towards the subject area discussed in his work and generally speaking the investigation of the rhetoric of science and philosophy leads to a better understanding of different epistemic cultures both in philosophy and science.     

“A GREATEST MIRACLE”: STANLEY CAVELL,MORAL PERFECTIONISM,AND THE ASCENT INTO THE ORDINARY

What to make of “the ordinary,”“the everyday,” and their common “eventfulness”? What to think of what Veena Das, in her recent book Life and Words, prefaced by Stanley Cavell, has called our need to “descent into the ordinary”? Is there a parallel figure of “ascent,” again, into the same “ordinary,” that we might we want to juxtapose with it and that resembles the motif of “change,” even “conversion,” that Cavell analyzes at some length in The Claim of Reason and throughout his oeuvre as a whole? And what could be our reasons for doing so? This essay will draw on Cavell's reading of Ibsen's work in the volume Cities of Words to spell out what such an “ascent” might mean.     

Parents' disclosure of their own concerns to their adolescent children

This study examines middle-aged parents' disclosure about their own lives and current concerns, with their late-adolescent children. Three hundred seventy-two parents of college freshmen, averaging 47 years of age, participated by filling out an anonymous questionnaire that asked about 28 topics, varying in intimacy, of concern to adults. The subjects indicated whether they had discussed each topic with their child, and, if they had, the motivations that prompted them to do so. The data revealed that mothers disclosed more than did fathers, and they were more likely to cite “venting,”“asking advice,” and “seeking emotional support” as reasons for disclosure; fathers were more likely to cite “trying to change his/her behavior” as a rationale for disclosure. Child's gender did not affect disclosure rates, but sons and daughters were disclosed to for different reasons. Divorced parents disclosed more than did parents from continuously intact families, and they cited somewhat different reasons for disclosure.     

Duns Scotus on the metaphysics of virtue and conformity to right reason

For Duns Scotus, facts about moral psychology are ultimately reducible to facts about ontology. The created agent has a soul which includes as formal “parts” the intellect and will; the intellect and will, of course, are the seat of qualities (e.g. thoughts and volitions, respectively) and habits (e.g. virtues) that are related to one another in various ways. One of these ways is the conformity relation. From a metaphysical base of categorical being – whether Substance, Quality/Habit, or Relation – Scotus constructs an ethical theory which complements, though in some interesting ways departs from, the Aristotelian tradition of which he is a part. In this essay, our aim is twofold: first, to reconstruct the ontological status of virtue within Scotus's overall metaphysical framework. Second, we attend to the ways in which this metaphysic of virtue places constraints on how one is to understand the conformity relation that, according to Scotus, must exist between an agent's will and right reason whenever a morally good action results.     

Cheating among children: Temptation,loss framing,and previous cheating

Although early economic approaches to misbehavior merely compare the monetary utility of accessible options, self-concept maintenance models introduce moral considerations to the equation. These assume that people trade off possible gains to be made from moral transgressions with associated decreases in self-esteem. On the basis of the assumption that the development of moral values among children is weaker than in adults, we expected children's behavior to be close to that of the hypothetical homo economicus, with their decisions as to whether to cheat therefore being influenced by decision theory elements: normative elements such as temptation magnitude, and behavioral elements such as framing. As children should pay no heed to moral considerations in dynamic multiple task settings, behavior opposite to “moral cleansing” was expected, with a first lie predicting later lies. In addition to testing the above ideas, the present study adopted a novel methodology. Our hypotheses were tested in a lab-in-the-field study using a modified “roll a die” method in a naturalistic setting for children of ages 7 to 10. We modified the method to identify both true and declared values of die rolls (a novel DICE+ electronic die was used). As expected, children were sensitive to temptation and cheated more willingly for more attractive prizes. Girls (but not boys) lied more (in terms of both frequency and magnitude) to avoid losses (with loss framing) than to make gains (with gain framing). Previous lying correlated positively with lying on subsequent tasks.