Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition

The success of a piece of behaviour is often explained by its being caused by a true representation (similarly, failure falsity). In some simple organisms, success is just survival and reproduction. Scientists explain why a piece of behaviour helped the organism to survive and reproduce by adverting to the behaviour's having been caused by a true representation. That usage should, if possible, be vindicated by an adequate naturalistic theory of content. Teleosemantics cannot do so, when it is applied to simple representing systems (Godfrey-Smith 1996). Here it is argued that the teleosemantic approach to content should therefore be modified, not abandoned, at least for simple representing systems. The new 'infotel-semantics' adds an input condition to the output condition offered by teleosemantics, recognising that it is constitutive of content in a simple representing system that the tokening of a representation should correlate probabilistically with the obtaining of its specific evolutionary success condition.     

Ahistorical Teleosemantics: An Alternative to Nanay

The dominant view in teleosemantics is that semantic functions are historically determined. That reliance on history has been subject to repeated criticism. To sidestep such criticisms, Nanay has recently offered an ahistorical alternative that swaps out historical properties for modal properties. Nanay's ahistorical modal alternative suffers, I think, serious problems of its own. I suggest here another ahistorical alternative for teleosemantics. The motivation for both the historical view and Nanay's is to provide a naturalistic basis to characterize some item as possessing a function independent of its actual performance and, thereby, provide a grip on intentional inexistence and misrepresentation. I suggest that attending to the logic of mechanistic explanation suffices to provide the sought for naturalistic basis. The key advantage to the approach offered here is its relative parsimony: unlike its alternatives, it requires no substantive existential commitments, for example, commitments to natural selection, copying relations, or fitness‐enhancing modal properties, to naturalize semantic content.     

筛选性决策和选择性决策的信息利用

在构像理论中,用来证明决策分为筛选和选择两个独立阶段的证据存在于：筛选阶段的信息在选择阶段不再被使用。本研究以构像理论为基础,设计实验室模拟实验,以实验情境中越来越苛刻的限制条件,迫使决策者在选择决策阶段不利用筛选信息,以此来检验决策者在选择决策阶段是否利用筛选信息,以及利用的程度和条件。实验情境的设计遵循这样一个原则：从信息最容易获得,记忆负荷最小的决策情境,过渡到信息最难以获得,记忆负荷最大的决策情境。研究得到以下结论：（1）筛选信息在大部分决策者进行选择性决策的时候得到了利用,用以选择最终的备择项;（2）随着选择决策过程中对于筛选信息的记忆负荷,以及认知负荷的增加,筛选信息在选择阶段被利用的可能性有所减少。     

Information and Closure

Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph J?ger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an information-based account of knowledge an effective tool in answering the skeptic.