Scaffolding agency: A proleptic account of the reactive attitudes

This paper examines the methodological claim made famous by P. F. Strawson: that we understand what features are required for responsible agency by exploring our attitudes and practices of holding responsible. What is the presumed metaphysical connection between holding responsible and being fit to be held responsible that makes this claim credible? I propose a non‐standard answer to this question, arguing for a view of responsible agency that is neither antirealist nor straightforwardly realist. It is instead “constructivist.” On the “Scaffolding View” I defend, reactive attitudes play an essential role in developing, supporting, and thereby maintaining the capacities that make for responsible agency. Although this view has relatively novel implications for a metaphysical understanding of capacities, its chief virtue, in contrast with more standard views, is in providing a plausible defense of why so‐called “responsible agents” genuinely deserve to be treated as such.     

“Being Religious” or “Being Spiritual” in America: A Zero‐Sum Proposition?

Recent discussions of religious attitudes and behavior tend to suggest—and in a few cases, provide evidence—that Americans are becoming “more spiritual” and “less religious.” What do people mean, however, when they say they are “spiritual” or “religious”? Do Americans see these concepts as definitionally or operationally different? If so, does that difference result in a zero‐sum dynamic between them? In this article, we explore the relationship between “being religious” and “being spiritual” in a national sample of American Protestants and compare our findings to other studies, including Wade Clark Roof’s baby‐boomer research (1993, 2000), 1999 Gallup and 2000 Spirituality and Health polls, and the Zinnbauer et al. (1997) study of religious definitions. In addition to presenting quantitative and qualitative evidence about the way people think about their religious/spiritual identity, the article draws implications about modernity, the distinctiveness of religious change in the recent past, and the deinstitutionalization of religion.     

Religion,Cultural Clash,and Muslim American Attitudes About Politically Motivated Violence

Does adherence to Islam predict attitudes about “suicide bombing” among American Muslims? This study examines the effects of religious and political factors on views of politically motivated violence (PMV). We draw from diverse scholarship, emphasizing arguments that are inspired by Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations perspective, as well as recent work in the sociology of Islam. Using a measure that gauges support for “suicide bombing” from the 2007 Pew Survey of American Muslims, results from logistic regression models suggest that political views and religious factors have a minimal effect on Muslim American attitudes toward suicide bombing. Furthermore, we find that Qur’ānic authoritativeness (i.e., the view that the Qur’ān is the word of God and not written by men) is associated with lower odds of supporting this form of PMV. We discuss the implications of our findings for the often anecdotal and alarmist accounts that link Muslim religiosity to support for “radical” extremism. We close with study limitations and avenues of future research.     

Gender,Steroids, and Fairness in Sport

This article examines and defends the claim that whether or not to cheat can be a genuine moral dilemma within the ethics of team sports. That is, although there is always something morally wrong in cheating there may also be moral reasons in its favour and thus some (and perhaps an overriding) duty to cheat. This is based on the duty that players have of not letting down their teammates by failing to make sufficient effort to achieve victory. In considering the normative limits to such efforts, it is argued that players could reasonably be morally criticised for not cheating where this is of a kind commonly practised in their sport. Evidence is found in the attitudes to cheating of those connected with sport to suggest that some of it is regarded as part of the game, though in a sense that does not undermine its status as genuine cheating. In conclusion a brief consideration is given to the implications for the education, training and character of players, given a belief in there being moral reasons for cheating.     

Dissonance motivation: Its nature,persistence, and reinstatement

This paper examines whether arousal is a necessary component of the motivation to reduce dissonance. Alternative responses to attitude-behavior inconsistency include attitude change, explaining the behavior by a consonant cognition (i.e., low choice), and attributing the dissonance-induced state to an alternative source, such as the purported side effects of an ingested “drug.” For conditions in which there are few consonant cognitions (i.e., high choice), a comparison of different “drug” conditions in which attitude change does or does not occur was expected to clarify which components of the dissonance-induced state mediate attitude change. Attitude change occurred in high choice conditions where the “drug” was described as pleasant, but not in high choice conditions where the “drug” was described as unpleasant or in a low choice condition. In addition, when the “drug” was descibed as arousing there was, if anything, more attitude change than when the “drug” was described as nonarousing. These results suggest that unpleasantness and not arousal per se is the motivating factor in dissonance reduction. The effects of the passage of time and reinstating the counterattitudinal behavior on the alternative responses to attitude-behavior inconsistency were also examined. Subjects returned 2 weeks later, stated their attitudes, recalled their original counterattitudinal essay, and again stated their attitudes. Although there was a general decrease in attitude change during this period, the pattern of attitude change remained basically the same. Attitude change following reinstatement increased from its original level only in those conditions where it had been initially attenuated through misattribution or a consonant cognition.     

The subject of “We intend”

This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind (“I intend”) and the plural kind (“we intend”) are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, attitudes of the form “we intend” are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical “spookiness” of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind –singular and plural – are subjective.     

On the Decision to Explore New Alternatives: The Coexistence of Under‐ and Over‐exploration

The decision whether to explore new alternatives or to choose from familiar ones is implicit in many of our daily activities. How is this decision made? When will deviation from optimal exploration be observed? The current paper examines exploration decisions in the context of a multi‐alternative “decisions from experience” task. In each trial, participants could choose a familiar option (the status quo) or a new alternative (risky exploration). The observed exploration rates were more sensitive to the frequent outcome from choosing new alternatives than to the average outcome. That is, the implicit decision whether to explore a new alternative reflects underweighting of rare events: Over‐exploration was documented in “Rare Disasters” environments, and insufficient exploration was evident in “Rare Treasures” environments. In addition, the results reveal a decrease in exploration of new alternatives over time even when it is always optimal and some exploration even when it is never reinforcing. These results can be captured with models that share a distinction between “data collection” and “outcome‐driven” decision modes. Under the data collection mode, the decision maker collects information about the environment, to be used in future choices. Under the outcome‐driven mode, the decision maker relies on small samples of previous experiences with familiar versus unfamiliar alternatives, before the selection of a specific alternative. The predictive value of a two‐parameter “explorative sampler” quantification of these assumptions is demonstrated. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Culture Marker Versus Authority Marker: How Do Language Attitudes Affect Political Trust?

Is public trust in government representatives (i.e., bureaucrats, police, public servants) affected by the language they use? The conventional theory holds that, in a multilingual society, people favor government representatives who speak the listeners' dialects because it indicates a shared cultural identity, that is, the “culture-marker” effect. This article offers an alternative mechanism in which people's attitudes can be affected by the government designating the official language as a marker of political authority. Listeners will then project their respect for the political authority to the government representatives who speak this marker language. This mechanism is named an “authority marker” effect. Using a set of adjusted matched-guise experiments in China, this study examines the culture-marker and authority-marker effects. The results support the authority-marker effect by showing that listeners have significantly more trust in the bureaucrats who speak the official language than in those who speak the dialects of the listeners. The study also finds that this is a unique effect for speakers when they represent the government. Without that political identity, listeners will still respond more positively to speakers of their own dialects.     

Shame and Its Sons: Black Men,Fatherhood, and Filicide

Few passages of Scripture are more revered than the parable of the prodigal son. Whether through quotidian biblical readings or fiery Sunday morning sermons, the evocative images that it conjures up—the most prominent of which is that of a forlorn son returning home to a beneficent father—often causes those who encounter this story of redemption, believer and non-believer alike, to be enraptured in the ardor of spiritual ecstasy. It is a quintessential feel-good story. And yet, one must ask, how many prodigal sons are able to return to their fathers’ houses in like manner? Is it not troubling to consider the lack of such a welcome home for the countless prodigal sons among us? This interdisciplinary study examines such questions by underscoring not only the failed “return,” but, even more so, the lack of a “home” (a veritable place of return, so to speak) for black men who suffer from the inherent prodigality, the desire to spend all, of patriarchal manhood. It is for this reason that anatomizing the parable itself, which is done by utilizing the works of such scholars as Henri Nouwen, is not sufficient to address our concerns. Other interlocutors are needed, scholars of a different but not better perspicacity, who can speak to the deleterious intergenerational effects that a lack of home can have on a black man’s development, be it psychosocially, spiritually, or otherwise. The chosen participants for this somewhat uncommon dialogue are psychoanalyst John Bowlby and African American author Ernest Gaines. Both of these authors enunciate the ways in which the inability to return or, in some instances, retreat to what Bowlby calls a “secure base” traps a man within a deadly web of negative affect, such as shame, within which he entangles his sons as well. This is an unfortunate act of filicide.     

Affect,Moral Intuition,and Risk

The natural way to deal with moral issues involving risk is to rely on our intuitive feelings. “How bad is it? Well, how bad does it feel?” We can also rely on reason to determine right and wrong but, as Jonathan Haidt has demonstrated, intuition comes first and dominates our responses unless we make an effort to critique and, if necessary, override it. We argue that our intuitive feelings are insensitive to large losses of life and thus mislead us in the face of natural disasters or human disasters associated with poverty, disease, and violence. Our intuitions seduce us into calmly turning away from these catastrophes, when we should be driven by outrage or sorrow to act. We propose ways to overcome this insensitivity through new forms of education and communication coupled with reliance on moral deliberation aimed at designing laws and institutions that compel attention to such problems.     

The Religious Context of Welfare Attitudes

This article examines the influence of three dimensions of religion—belonging (faith tradition membership), behaving (frequency of service attendance), and context (one's relationship to aggregate population characteristics)—on attitudes toward multiple forms of state‐provided social protection, or welfare attitudes. To do so, this article uses data from 17 countries surveyed in the 2006 “Role of Government” wave of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Results from mixed effects regression show that contextual effects are highly predictive of welfare attitudes. Nations that are more religiously heterogeneous are less supportive of state protection, while nations that are more homogeneous, particularly Catholic nations, are more supportive. Results hold net of fractionalization, political institutional measures, and economic characteristics. At the individual level, all three dimensions of religiosity are predictive of welfare attitudes. These patterns suggest that in rich Western democracies, religion continues to play an important role in structuring the moral economies.     

Partner's understanding of affective–cognitive meta‐bases predicts relationship quality

Knowledge that partners have about each other's attitudes are consequential for relationship quality. This article extends prior research and examines whether knowledge regarding a partner's meta‐attitudinal bases, or subjective perceptions of how one's attitudes are driven, can influence relationship quality. Given how meta‐bases are reflective of information‐processing goals, we hypothesized that partner understanding of meta‐attitudinal bases would positively predict relationship quality. Self and partner ratings of how relationally relevant attitudes were driven, as well as perceptions of relationship quality, were assessed. Results revealed that a partner's knowledge of one's meta‐bases positively predicts one's own reported relationship quality. Results remained significant when controlling for relationship duration and meta‐bases similarity. Implications of meta‐bases understanding for close relationship functioning are discussed.     

EVOLUTION,NATURALISM, AND THE WORTHWHILE: A CRITIQUE OF RICHARD JOYCE'S EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORALITY

Abstract: In The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce argues there is good reason to think that the “moral sense” is a biological adaptation, and that this provides a genealogy of the moral sense that has a debunking effect, driving us to the conclusion that “our moral beliefs are products of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, … we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these beliefs.” I argue that Joyce's skeptical conclusion is not warranted. Even if the moral sense is a biological adaptation, developed moralities (such as Aristotelian eudaimonism) can “co‐opt” it into new roles so that the moral judgments it makes possible can come to transcend the evolutionary process that is “entirely independent of their truth.” While evolutionary theory can shed much light on our shared human nature, moral theories must still be vindicated, or debunked, by moral arguments.     

The role of personal practice in therapist skill development: a model to guide therapists,educators, supervisors and researchers

Prior to 2000, personal practice (PP) for therapists mostly meant personal therapy. Recently a new landscape of PPs has emerged, with meditation-based programs and therapy self-practice/self-reflection (SP/SR) programs playing an increasing role in training and personal/professional development. The challenge now for practitioners and researchers is to refocus on the role of PPs in training and professional development. Are PPs of value - or not? Do they have a role in therapist development? How might PPs enhance therapist skilfulness? Do different PPs act in similar or different ways? Currently, the PP literature lacks a theoretical framework to guide practitioners in their choice of PPs or researchers in their choice of research questions and measures. The purpose of this article is to provide such a framework, the Personal Practice (PP) model. The PP model proposes primary impacts of PPs in four domains: personal development/wellbeing, self-awareness, interpersonal beliefs/attitudes/skills and reflective skills. The model also suggests a secondary impact on therapists’ conceptual/technical skills when therapists use reflection to consider the implications of their PP for their “therapist self”. We offer some suggestions to enhance the quality of future research, and conclude that PPs may play an important and perhaps unique role in therapist training.     

THE “SCIENTIFIC MIRACLE OF THE QUR’ĀN,” PSEUDOSCIENCE,AND CONSPIRACISM

This article, after tracing a precise classification of the exegetical trend known as i?jāz ?ilmī, summarizes and discusses the criticism leveled at it and examines how the “scientific interpretation” of the Qur’ān is liable to blend with pseudoscience and conspiracy theories to the detriment of a solid harmonization of science and religion and of a genuine appreciation of natural science. Furthermore, the article offers some practical ideas that can be implemented in order to effectively and fairly address i?jāz ?ilmī in the Muslim world.     

The politics of refugees’ non integration: the dilemma of Palestinians in Lebanon

This study was designed to investigate Lebanese respondent’s attitudes toward an imposed Palestinian settlement in the country. Specifically, the study focuses on two research questions: (a) What is the extent of support for an imposed settlement and its underlying dimensions? That is, the belief that such a policy would damage Lebanese society, that it would lead to a renewal of the civil war and that it would lead to intergroup conflict; and (b) What are the predictors of these attitudes? The results based on a sample of 1,073 respondents indicated a discrepancy between attitudes toward resettlement and its underlying dimensions. Furthermore, the concept of “tolerance for Palestinians” and sectarian affiliation were found to be significant predictors of all the resettlement variables. The implications of these findings for Lebanon are discussed.     

Resources,Rules, and Oppression

There is a large and growing literature on communal interpretive resources: the concepts, theories, narratives, and so on that a community draws on in interpreting its members and their world. (They’re also called “hermeneutical resources” in some places and “epistemic resources” in others.) Several recent contributions to this literature have concerned dominant and resistant interpretive resources and how they affect concrete lived interactions. In this article, I note that “using” interpretive resources—applying them to parts of the world in conversation with others—is “a rule‐governed activity”; and I propose that in oppressive systems, these rules are influenced by the rules of oppression. Section I clarifies some rules governing the use of resources. Section II draws on work by Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. and others to suggest that according to the present rules of our oppressive system, it is permissible for dominantly situated speakers to dismiss interpretive resources developed in marginalized communities. Section III appeals to Charles Mills’s work on White ignorance to propose, further, that our system’s rules make it impermissible and deserving of punishment to use resistant resources. The conclusion enumerates several further points about such rules governing the use of interpretive resources, their social effects, and some philosophical literatures.