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1.
The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic
reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise
Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections
I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my
line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in
the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
2.
I show how the 'inner–sense' (quasi–perceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from self–blindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be self–blind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and self–knowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is third–person evidence available to the self–blind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises. 相似文献
3.
Moore's paradox arises from the logicaloddity of sentences of the form`P and I do not believe that P'or `P and I believe that not-P'. Thiskind of sentence is logically peculiarbecause it is absurd to assert it, although it isnot a logical contradiction. In this paperI offer a new proposal. I argue that Moore's paradox arises because there is a defaultprocedure for evaluating a self-ascribed belief sentence and one is presumptivelyjustified in believing that one believes a sentence when one sincerely assents to it. 相似文献
4.
This essay offers a critique of contemporary popular spirituality, specifically by focusing on Thomas Moore's best-selling book Care of the Soul . Moore's perspective is juxtaposed with Bernard of Clairvaux's Sermons on the Song of Songs, displaying the widely divergent views of God, the self, and the practices of spiritual living. The essay also sketches several reasons which help to explain the popularity of generic spirituality such as Moore's, and it concludes by responding to some potential objections to the account offered in the essay. Overall, the essay displays the marked contrasts between disciplined practices of Christian spirituality and the simulacra of consumer spirituality. 相似文献
5.
I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore's paradox. Moore's paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one's own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one's own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis. 相似文献
6.
Jessica Brown contends that Keith DeRose's latest argument for contextualism fails to rule out contextualism's chief rival, namely, classic invariantism. Still, even if their position has not been ruled out, classic invariantists must offer considerations in favour of their position if they are to show that it is superior to contextualism. Brown defends classic invariantism with a warranted assertability manœvre that utilizes a linguistic pragmatic principle of relevance. I argue, however, that this manœvre is not as effective as it might be. I propose a different warranted assertability manœvre, which utilizes a pragmatic principle of strength, affords a more successful defence of classic invariantism, and helps to establish that classic invariantism is superior to contextualism. 相似文献
7.
Moore's 'Proof of an External World' has evoked a variety of responses from philosophers, including bafflement, indignation and sympathetic reconstruction. I argue that Moore should be understood as following Reid on a variety of points, both epistemological and methodological. Moreover, Moore and Reid are exactly right on all of these points. Hence what I present is a defence of Moore's 'Proof', as well as an interpretation. Finally, I argue that the Reid-Moore position is useful for resolving an issue that has recently received attention in epistemology, namely, how is it that one knows that one is not a brain in a vat? 相似文献
8.
Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddnessagainst the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions tothe problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But``consistency' is a theory-laden concept, having different contours indifferent semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriateonly if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning withtruth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate whenit comes to analzying epistemic modality. I show that a theory whichaccounts for a wide variety of semantic data about epistemic modals(Update Semantics) buys us a solution to Moore's paradox as a corollary.It turns out that Moorean propositions, when looked at through the lenseof an appropriate semantic theory, are inconsistent after all. 相似文献
9.
This paper distinguishes two interpretations of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities, which says that the intrinsic value of a whole need not equal the sum of the intrinsic values its parts would have outside it. A holistic interpretation, which was Moore's own, says that parts retain their values when they enter a whole but that there can be an additional value in the whole as a whole that must be added to them. The conditionality interpretation, which has been defended by Korsgaard, says that parts can change their values when they enter wholes, so no additional value is needed. The paper shows that the two interpretations, which differ on such apparently important issues as the nature of intrinsic value, can always yield the same conclusions about the overall value in a state of affairs, so there is in that sense nothing to choose between them. At the same time, though, the differences between the interpretations make sometimes one and sometimes the other more appropriate for expressing a given evaluative view. In this last connection the paper considers views about beauty, posthumous achievement, vices of disproportion, deserved and compassionate pain, and undeserved and malicious pleasure. 相似文献
10.
It is widely thought that sceptical arguments, if correct, would show that everyday empirical knowledge-claims are false. Against this, I argue that the very generality of traditional sceptical arguments means that there is no direct incompatibility between everyday empirical claims and sceptical scenarios. Scepticism calls into doubt, not ordinary empirical beliefs, but philosophical attempts to give a deep ontological explanation of such beliefs. G. E. Moore's attempt to refute scepticism (and idealism) was unsuccessful, because it failed to recognise that philosophical scepticism operates on a different level from that on which we make – or doubt – particular empirical claims. And, as I argue with specific reference to work by Nozick and Fogelin, Moore's basic confusion is still widely shared in contemporary discussions of scepticism. 相似文献
11.
Abstract Temporal Externalism is the view that future events can contribute to determining the present content of our thoughts and utterances. Two objections to Temporal Externalism are discussed and rejected. The first is that Temporal Externalism has implausible consequences for the epistemology of biology and other taxonomic sciences (Brown, 2000). The second is that it is committed to implausible claims about dispositions. 相似文献
12.
An experiment concerning the influence of the scale of stimulus values upon the perception of heat-pain is reported in which it is found that the value of the threshold stimulus is dependent upon the size of the steps between successive stimuli.
The results are analysed in the light of a paper by Brown and Cane (1959) in which they point out that the value of a sensory threshold yielded by the Limiting Method is mathematically dependent upon the size of the steps between successive values of the variable stimulus. The threshold values reported here are found to be dependent on the step-size between stimuli to a greater extent than that which would be predicted by Brown and Cane.
In view of these results, an attempt is made to explain the wide variety of pain threshold values reported in the literature. 相似文献
13.
G.E. Moore's problem is to explain what is odd about sentences such as 'It is raining but I do not believe it'. This sentence is unbelievable whether read commissively as ' p & B ˜/sup> p ', or omissively as ' p & ˜/sup> B p '. However, this symmetry is broken when the belief operator is iterated many times. Whereas the commissive ' p & BBBBBBBBBB˜ p ' preserves the oddity Moore first noted, ' p & ˜BBBBBBBBBB p ' is believable and assertable. The usual explanations of what is odd about Moore's sentences use recursive rules. Hence they uniformly extend the prediction of oddity when the belief operator is iterated. My project is to show how the asymmetry of the iterated version can be respected. 相似文献
14.
The problems we deal with concern reasoning about incomplete knowledge. Knowledge is understood as ability of an ideal rational agent to make decisions about pieces of information. The formalisms we are particularly interested in are Moore's autoepistemic logic (AEL) and its variant, the logic of acceptance and rejection (AEL2). It is well-known that AEL may be seen as the nonmonotonic KD45 modal logic. The aim is to give an appropriate modal formalization for AEL2. 相似文献
15.
The logic of acceptance and rejection (AEL2) is a nonmonotonic formalism to represent states of knowledge of an introspective agent making decisions about available information. Though having much in common, AEL2 differs from Moore's autoepistemic logic (AEL) by the fact that the agent not only can accept or reject a given fact, but he/she also has the possibility not to make any decision in case he/she does not have enough knowledge. 相似文献
16.
There are two widely held views in the literature as regards Wittgenstein's philosophy. One says that Wittgenstein in his later work appeals to ordinary language in his effort to show how the philosophical problems can be dissolved, and the other says that his investigation is a grammatical one. This paper undertakes to examine what is meant by a grammatical investigation, especially in view of the fact that this investigation relies on empirical facts that have to do with linguistic usage. The examination is carried out by concentrating on what Wittgenstein has to say on the issue of knowledge – in particular, how the way we use the word contributes to the dismissal of Moore's answer to the challenge of scepticism. The conclusion is that Wittgenstein's resort to ordinary language is not typically empirical. The examples of ordinary usage that he cites may be contingent, but they could not have been different given the language games they are part of. The correct use of words Wittgenstein appeals to is not fixed by some kind of essence, but neither is it decided by a majority rule. It gets entrenched in a complex nexus of practices. Wittgenstein's reference to "use" instead of 'usage"and to "linguistic facts" instead of "sociological facts" lends support more to a logical than to an empirical investigation. 相似文献
17.
Abstract: Susana Nuccetelli discusses critically my account of Moore's Proof of the External World. Noah Lemos takes up my views on skepticism and my distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Otávio Bueno focuses on my treatment of dream skepticism. In this article I offer replies to my three critics. 相似文献
18.
Psychologists testified at the trials of Brown v. Board of Education and helped write briefs that were submitted to the Supreme Court on appeal. Psychologists were once proud of what they did in Brown but are now seen as liberal reformers who masked their political wishes in the guise of social science. The argument that psychologists involved with Brown were social reformers rather than objective scientists dates to the segregationist critique of Brown. The author traces the history of the critique of the Brown psychologists from its segregationist origins to its acceptance by mainstream social scientific and historical scholars. The author concludes that the critique is based on a misreading of what the Brown psychologists did during the litigation. 相似文献
19.
In Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, Jessica Brown identifies a number of problems for the so-called knowledge view of justification. According to this (unorthodox) view, we cannot justifiably believe what we do not know. Most epistemologists reject this view on the grounds that false beliefs can be justified if, say, supported by the evidence or produced by reliable processes. We think this is a mistake and that many epistemologists are (mistakenly) classifying beliefs as justified because they have properties that indicate that something should be excused. Brown thinks that previous attempts to make this case have been unsuccessful. While the difficulties Brown points to are genuine, I think they show that attempts to explain a classificatory judgment haven't been successful. Still, I would argue that the classification is correct. We need a better explanation of this classificatory judgment. (The situation is similar to the one in which we correctly distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge but then embarrass ourselves trying to explain what this difference consists in.) I will try to clarify the justification-excuse distinction and explain why it's a mistake to insist that beliefs that violate epistemic norms might be justified. Just as it's possible for a rational agent to act without justification in spite of her best intentions (e.g., by using force or violence in trying to defend another from a merely apparent threat), it's possible that a rational thinker who follows the evidence and meets our expectations might nevertheless believe without sufficient justification. If our justified beliefs are supposed to guide us in deciding what to do, we probably should draw on discussions from morality and the law about the justification/excuse distinction to inform our understanding of the epistemic case. 相似文献
20.
On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which the believer can have no non-overridden evidence. the arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein's views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta-epistemological implications. 相似文献
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