Incarnational Christian psychology and psychotherapy: What do we believe and what do we do?

The following paper proposes a viewpoint regarding the working assumptions, theology and practice for an “incarnational” psychology or “Christian psychology,” particularly with regard to psychotherapy. This essay is primarily meant to be an affirmation and guide for those Christian psychologists and others working in the allied professions. However, both veteran theorists and newcomers to such inquiry will benefit from this essay. Discussion begins with the dynamic of surrendering and receiving a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The understanding of the unique person as soul: in mind, body, life and spirit is discussed. In addition, the working of the incarnate Holy Spirit is elaborated for both therapist and patient in the regenerative and therapeutic process. Psychopathology is reframed in reference to the Judeo-Christian revelation of sin and evil. In addition, truth, falsity and psychopathology are considered in light of the essentially regenerated man/woman or “new creation” in Christ. Some practical examples for psychotherapeutic intervention are offered, including the unique role of the Christian psychologist and his or her relationship with both patient and Christ. Seven major assumptions of “incarnational” or Christian psychology, which diverge from purely secular (psychological) theory and practice, are presented. Lastly, Christian psychology is distinguished from both “integrated” psychology and theology; and Biblical counseling.

Are we born and do we die?

The stranglehold on our imagination by the mind-body dualisms that permeate the culture is such that most people seem to suppose that "body" and "soul" name distinct and separable entities. Resisting such dualisms in favour of an old-fashioned Aristotelean view of the soul as the form of the body, this essay considers two questions: do human parents produce human beings, and do human beings die? The doctrine of the special creation of the individual soul seems to require us to answer the first question in the negative because, according to this doctrine, parents only produce matter for the God-given soul to form. As to the second, many people seem to suppose that human beings do not die, only their bodies do. Arguing against the view that immortality is a natural property of human minds, the essay suggests (with the help of Joseph Ratzinger) that, whether we speak of "immortality" or of "resurrection", life from death is neither nature, nor achievement, but gift.     

Unification: What is it,how do we Reach and why do we Want it?

This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual harm, i.e., a state of mind we should try to avoid by all means. By calling unification an intellectual benefit, we claim that this form of understanding has an intrinsic value for us. I argue that unification really has this alleged intrinsic value. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

What is conditionalization,and why should we do it?

Philosophical Studies - Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to...     

If we compute faster, do we understand better?

Practitioners of cognitive science, “theoretical” neuroscience, and psychology have made less use of high-performance computing for testing theories than have those in many other areas of science. Why is this? In high-performance scientific computation, potentially billions of operations must lead to a trustable conclusion. Technical problems with the stability of algorithms aside, this requirement also places extremely rigorous constraints on the accuracy of the underlying theory. For example, electromagnetic interactions seem to hold accurately from atomic to galactic scales. Large-scale computations using elementary principles are possible and useful. Many have commented that the behavioral and neural sciences are largely pretheoretical. One consequence is that we cannot trust our few theories to scale well for a very good reason: They don’t. We have some quite good computational theories for single neurons and some large-scale aspects of behavior seem to be surprisingly lawful. However, we have little idea about how to go from the behavior of a single neuron to the behavior of the 10¹¹ neurons involved when the brain actually does something. Neural networks have offered one potential way to leap this enormous gap in scale, since many elementary units cooperate in a neural network computation. As currently formulated, however, neural networks seem to lack essential mechanisms that are required for flexible control of the computation, and they also neglect structure at intermediate scales of organization. We will present some speculations related to controllability and scaling in neural networks.     

Consciousness and identity: who do we think we are?

This article proposes that the epistemological concerns raised by the inherent incoherence of thought requires a dialogical approach to understanding consciousness and identity. It is argued that such an approach leads to (a) a fundamentally spiritual view of self, (b) a radical view of consciousness as a non-local field that shapes the limits of our perception, and (c) a determination of the degree of gap between reality and thought's representation of it. A method of measuring this kind of consciousness is examined, and examples of insights gained through this methodology are provided. Implications of this perspective are explored, and conclusions arising from this inquiry are presented.     

How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action

Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the "sense of agency" have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on some trials. Participants (1) expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, (2) pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start posiment to the target shift if required and (3) reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants' intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive (motoric) and the preconstuctive (intentional) aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness. Delays during either interval boosted undershoots, suggesting increased reliance on a time-limited sensory memory for action. The experience of action is thus strongly influenced by prior thoughts and expectations, but only over a short time period. Thus, awareness of our actions is a dynamic and relatively flexible mixture of what we intend to do, and what our motor system actually does.     

What do we owe co-nationals and non-nationals? why the liberal nationalist account fails and how we can do better

Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism—namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values—is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the issue of what, according to the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled.     

Personality,pupils, and purple cows: we have the right answers,but do we have the right questions?

In this article, I consider first the questions about the relation between personality and education that we have, to a large extent, answered, and then the questions that we have yet to answer, and, in large part, even to ask.     

Law,professional practice,and professional organizations: Where do we go from here?

The ethical dilemmas presented to the practicing school psychologist by the plethora of laws that dictate procedures, policies, and instrumentation are discussed. The function of professional organizations, both national and state, is described as (a) anticipating legislation, (b) developing political impact, (c) affecting existing laws, and (d) affecting proposed legislation. Coordination of efforts among various groups and development of political expertise is urged as a way to approach issues of concern to both psychologists and their clients.     

Law,professional practice,and university preparation: Where do we go from here?

In this time of legal decisions which call much professional practice into question, it is well to ask ourselves questions as to why we are the object of court concern and how our preparation is related to our difficulties. It is suggested that current psychological practice is basically Aristotelian in nature and that our specialty suffers as a consequence. Several suggestions are presented for adjustments in university preparation. Intelligence testing and ability grouping are referred to throughout, for they have been primary targets of the courts. Examples pertaining to personality and other often measured psychological variables could have as appropriately been offered.     

Towards a multidisciplinary guideline religiousness,spirituality, and psychiatry: what do we need?

ABSTRACT

A multidisciplinary guideline on religion, spirituality (R/S), and psychiatry aims to address: (1) organising R/S consultation in mental health care, (2) categorising research findings, and (3) professionalism and education with respect to R/S. Contents are derived from brainstorm sessions with key participants in the field of R/S and psychiatry in the Netherlands, and from the position statements on R/S and psychiatry in the UK and by the World Psychiatric Association. The following chapters are proposed: (1) ethical and existential themes and R/S, (2) R/S in stages of mental health care practice, (3) R/S counselling, (4) collaboration, and (5) relationship to other guidelines. The core themes need verification by specialists in the field, nurses, therapists, counsellors, patient-practitioners, and psychiatrists. The author recommends to approach R/S in an easy way, to listen to matters of personal meaning, and to leave the task to others in case of a lack of affinity.     

Multimedia: where are we now and where do we go from here?

This paper comments on the current state and future role of computer-based multimedia in psychology instruction. It includes practical tips on getting started with successful multimedia production. It also introduces a new World-Wide Web site archiving this information as well as other useful multimedia production and teaching resources.     

What do we want? Critical psychotherapy and counselling! When do we want it? Now,now, now! A critical review of a critical issue

This review offers a critical commentary on the contributions to this issue. It outlines four aspects to a critical approach and uses them to read horizontally across all five papers.     

When and where do we apply what we learn? A taxonomy for far transfer

Despite a century's worth of research, arguments surrounding the question of whether far transfer occurs have made little progress toward resolution. The authors argue the reason for this confusion is a failure to specify various dimensions along which transfer can occur, resulting in comparisons of "apples and oranges." They provide a framework that describes 9 relevant dimensions and show that the literature can productively be classified along these dimensions, with each study situated at the intersection of various dimensions. Estimation of a single effect size for far transfer is misguided in view of this complexity. The past 100 years of research shows that evidence for transfer under some conditions is substantial, but critical conditions for many key questions are untested.     

Why do we eat? Children's and adults' understanding of why we eat different meals

In this study the author examined why children and adults think they need to eat. Preschoolers through adults were provided with physiological, social, psychological, and routine causes for eating breakfast, lunch, snack, and dinner, and were asked to either agree or disagree with the causal responses provided. A 4 Reason x 4 Meal repeated measures analysis of variance revealed significant main effects for meals and reasons, as well as significant Meal x Reason and Meal x Reason x Grade interactions. The effect sizes ranged from 0.1 to 0.7. Across all age groups, participants acknowledged physiological needs and desires (fulfilling hunger and needs to stay healthy) and routine (e.g., it is dinner time) as the primary causes for eating breakfast, lunch, and dinner. However, for snack physiological needs were the primary reason. Second-grade students onward spontaneously produced biological justifications such as the need for energy and nutrition as important reasons for food consumption. These results lend support to the developmental model that children's and adults' understanding of eating changes in middle childhood.