The Moral Value of Envy

It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy is not merely morally permissible, but morally valuable. Here I provide a defense of envy's moral value. I argue that feelings of envy are integral to the value that moral agents place on the goods and talents that they judge to be central to a worthwhile life.     

The Nonworseness Claim and the Moral Permissibility of Better-Than-Permissible Acts

Grounded in what Alan Wertheimer terms the “nonworseness claim,” it is thought by some philosophers that what will be referred to herein as “better-than-permissible acts”—acts that, if undertaken, would make another or others better off than they would be were an alternative but morally permissible act to be undertaken—are necessarily morally permissible. What, other than a bout of irrationality, it may be thought, would lead one to hold that an act (such as outsourcing production to a “sweatshop” in a developing country) that produces more benefits for others than an act that is itself morally permissible (such as not doing business in the developing country at all) with respect to those same others, is not morally permissible? In this article, I argue that each of the two groups of philosophers that are most likely to accept the nonworseness claim—consequentialists and non-consequentialists—have reason to reject it, and thereby also have reason to reject the belief that better-than-permissible acts are necessarily morally permissible.     

Immigration

It is not a fundamental human right to live wherever one would most like to be. We have to ask when a state should admit people not its citizens wishing to enter and settle within its territory. To exclude someone from entry to a country where he wishes to settle infringes his liberty. When anybody's liberty is infringed or curtailed the onus of proof lies upon those who claim a right to infringe or curtail it, other things being equal. This paper argues that there are two reasonable grounds for refusing entry to would-be immigrants. First, in order to avoid genuine overpopulation; and second, to protect vulnerable cultures being submerged by large numbers of people of a more robust culture. Neither of these restrictions applies in the case of Britain and the paper concludes by demanding an immediate liberalisation of immigration laws and immediate public recognition by government of the benefits of immigration and determined discouragement of xenophobic propaganda against it. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

American elementary school children's attitudes about immigrants, immigration, and being an American

The current study examined 5 to 11-year-old European American children's (N = 90) attitudes regarding immigrants, immigration policy, and what it means to be an American. The majority of children in the sample (from a predominantly European American community) held strong American identities and had distinct ideas about what it means to be an American (namely, one must love America, live by its rules, and be White). Children were in favor of legal immigration as a policy, and although they believed in allowing illegal immigrants to stay if employed, many younger children believed they should go to jail. Many children in the sample were aware of Americans' anti-immigration sentiments, largely attributing it to ethnic/cultural discrimination. Finally, children held negative attitudes about immigrants, particularly Mexican immigrants. These negative attitudes were most evident among children who held a strong, prototypical national in-group identity. In contrast, children did not hold differential attitudes about White and Black Americans.     

Seeing double,being double: longing,belonging, recognition,and evasion in psychodynamic work with immigrants

Psychically immigrants live double lives, simultaneously dwelling in the world they have left and the world in which they live, and into which most try to fit to avoid the alienating experience of being “other”. Doubleness is not a conscious act, but it is a preconscious counterpoint to just about every social interaction. I argue that successful psychodynamic treatment allows immigrants to take the doubleness for granted, in effect seeing double and being double. In this way they come to effortlessly privilege one self-state over the other. The recognition and acceptance of competing self-states proves transformative in any treatment, but never more so than in working with immigrants who contend with several culturally competing selves in their daily lives and seek one relationship in which they can all be seen and heard. I describe treating an immigrant who, when I began to work with her, excelled at seeing double, but being double posed a terrifying dilemma. At least two self-states were engaged in a tug of war; she feared that the winner would take all.     

Un Emploi Correspondant À Ses Attentes Personnelles? Le Cas Des Nouveaux Immigrants Au Québec

This paper studies the characteristics of immigrants who are likely (or unlikely) to find a job matching their aspirations. Data are from the 2002 Survey of selected workers for a sample of 1,875 economic immigrants that were admitted in Quebec between January 1997 and June 2000. Our empirical results confirm standard findings in the literature on immigration about the limited international transferability of human capital across countries, especially, of the foreign experience. In order to improve the chances of success of new immigrants, the implications of such results for immigration policy command a questioning and a re-examination of: (1) the resources allocated to the recruitment and information of potential immigrants in their country of origin prior to migration; (2) the programs already in place to facilitate their integration in the labour market; and (3) the Point System that is in use for selecting the most potentially successful immigrants.     

A Note on Justice,Care, and Immigration Policy

Should a “caring” immigration policy give special treatment to would-be immigrants who are near neighbors? It is argued that, while those on our borders requesting entry have some special claim, it should not drown out the claims of more distant applicants for citizenship.     

Howard Andrew Knox and the origins of performance testing on Ellis Island, 1912-1916

Howard Andrew Knox was Assistant Surgeon at the immigration station at Ellis Island, New York, between April 1912 and May 1916. In response to public disquiet that the physicians at Ellis Island were failing to prevent mentally retarded people from entering the country, Knox and his colleagues assembled a collection of performance tests that could be administered to potential immigrants with little knowledge of the English language. They were subsequently used in clinical practice and in educational, psychological, and social research. Because of the early work done at Ellis Island, it is nowadays taken for granted that any adequate measure of intelligence must include both verbal and performance subtests.     

Cities and Immigration: A Reply

In my book, Cities and Immigration, I suggest shifting responsibilities for the integration of immigrants from the state to the city level. The articles in this issue challenge some of my suggestions. I discuss these challenges with regard to three questions: should a city enjoy greater autonomy to decide who, and how many, immigrants should settle within its borders? Should immigrants enjoy local voting rights even before naturalization? And is there a morally preferable model for integrating immigrants into the city?     

Should Cities Control Immigration Policy?

Avner de Shalit wants cities to have their own immigration policies. On a radical reading, this would transfer control over immigrant admissions from states to cities. But can cities choose the immigrants they prefer on economic or cultural grounds, or does this discriminate unfairly against those judged to be less desirable? I argue that de Shalit fails to apply the luck egalitarian principle consistently when discussing immigrant admissions. I also claim that there is a tension between seeing cities as the bearers of distinct cultural ethoses, and therefore as bulwarks against the homogenising effects of globalization, and disbarring them from carrying out culturally selective immigration policies. De Shalit’s own preferred model of the immigrant-friendly city – Amsterdam – appears to lack any distinct ethos, other than an ethos of welcome and cultural blending. Moreover, democratic states also have a legitimate interest in controlling immigration. They must be concerned about the consequences for social justice of admitting migrants and the political effects that follow when the migrants become citizens themselves. They must also consider the environmental impacts of population growth. Cities should play a major role in integrating immigrants, but not in admitting them.     

Fired Up by Morality: The Unique Physiological Response Tied to Moral Conviction in Politics

Studies provide mounting evidence that morally convicted attitudes elicit passionate and unyielding political responses. Questions remain, however, whether these effects occur because moral conviction is another strong, versus a distinctly moral dimension of attitude strength. Building on work in moral psychology and neuroscience, I argue that moral conviction stems from a distinctive mode of mental processing that is tied to automatic affective reactions. Testing this idea using a lab experiment designed to capture self‐reported moral conviction and physiological arousal, I find that conviction about political objects positively predicts arousal evoked by the objects, while attitude extremity and importance do not. These findings suggest that moral conviction items do tap into moral processing, helping to validate the conviction measure. They also illustrate the value of using physiological indicators to study politics, help explain why morally convicted attitudes trigger such fervent responses, and raise normative questions about political conflict and compromise.     

The relationship between different components of national identities and psychosocial adjustment among high-school adolescent immigrants from Russia and Ukraine in Israel

This study investigated the relationship between different components of national identities of immigrants (related to both the country of origin and host country), and psychosocial adjustment in pre-migration and post-migration periods. Adolescents who immigrated from Russia and Ukraine to Israel (N = 151) completed questionnaires at four time points: about six months prior to, and in the first, second, and third years after, immigration. At each point, adolescents were assessed on degree of identification they felt with the citizens of their country of origin and Israel and on their attitudes towards the two countries. Five indexes of psychosocial adjustment were measured: emotional and behavioural problems, self-esteem, social competence, school competence and loneliness. Adolescents' positive attitudes towards the host country were associated with higher psychosocial adjustment, both before and after immigration. Positive attitudes towards the country of origin were associated with higher psychosocial adjustment in the post-migration period. Degree of identification with either nation was not related to psychosocial adjustment. Findings suggest that it may not be identity per se that is the critical factor for adjustment for adolescent immigrants, but rather the extent to which they feel affirmation, pride and positive regard towards the two countries. For adolescent immigrants, idealization of origin and host countries may fulfil an important developmental role allowing them to de-idealize parental figures and create new objects of idealization.     

The Roles We Make Others Take: Thoughts on the Ethics of Arguing

Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of which she cannot fulfill, she is liable to suffer morally significant harms. One way to react to this problem is by requiring arguers to set up argument structures and allocate roles so that the argument will be reasons-reflective in as balanced a way as possible. However, I argue that this would create to heavy a burden. Arguers would then habitually have to take on roles that require them to divert time and energy away from the goals that they started arguing for and instead serve the goal of ideal reasons-reflectiveness. At least prima facie arguers should be able to legitimately devote their time and energy towards their own goals. This creates a problem: On the one hand, structures that create morally significant harms for some arguers should be avoided—on the other hand, arguers should be able to take argument-roles that allow them to devote themselves to their own argumentative goals. Fulfilling the second requirement for some arguers will often create the morally significant harms for their interlocutors. There are two possible solutions for this problem: first, arguers might be required to reach free, consensual agreements on the structure they will adopt for their argument and the way they will distribute argumentative roles. I reject this option as both fundamentally unfeasible and practically unrealistic, based on arguments developed by theorists like Krabbe and Jacobs. I argue that instead, we should take a liberal view on argument ethics. Arguers should abide by moral side constraints to their role taking. They should feel free to take roles that will allow them to concentrate on their argumentative goals, but only if this does not create a situation in which their interlocutors are pushed into a role that that they cannot effectively play.

     

Talent for Citizenship and the American Dream: the USA as Outlier in the Global Race for Talent

The failed 2007 US Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) included a “points-based system,” a proposal to shift toward supply-driven, merit-based selection. In an intensely polemic environment, this largely Republican initiative was opposed strongly by Democrats who argued that skill-based selection would weaken the traditional moral foundation of the USA, enshrined in its policy of family reunification. Through critical discourse analysis of policy documents and political rhetoric on the floor of the Senate during the CIRA debate, I explore the complexity of the relationship between neoliberalism, race, and immigration policy in the USA. I argue that the points-based system, which would severely disadvantage immigrants from the global south, became a foil for talk about Latino migration. The CIRA debate demonstrates the conflict in the USA between a need for (unskilled) labor and a nation-building project that excludes Latino migrants.     

An "opting in" paradigm for kidney transplantation

Almost 60,000 people in the United States with end stage renal disease are waiting for a kidney transplant. Because of the scarcity of organs from deceased donors live kidney donors have become a critical source of organs; in 2001, for the first time in recent decades, the number of live kidney donors exceeded the number of deceased donors. The paradigm used to justify putting live kidney donors at risk includes the low risk to the donor, the favorable risk-benefit ratio, the psychological benefits to the donor, altruism, and autonomy coupled with informed consent; because each of these arguments is flawed we need to lessen our dependence on live kidney donors and increase the number of organs retrieved from deceased donors. An "opting in" paradigm would reward people who agree to donate their kidneys after they die with allocation preference should they need a kidney while they are alive. An "opting in" program should increase the number of kidneys available for transplantation and eliminate the morally troubling problem of"organ takers"who would accept a kidney if they needed one but have made no provision to be an organ donor themselves. People who "opt in" would preferentially get an organ should they need one at the minimal cost of donating their kidneys when they have no use for them; it is a form of organ insurance a rational person should find extremely attractive. An "opting in" paradigm would simulate the reciprocal altruism observed in nature that sociobiologists believe enhances group survival. Although the allocation of organs based on factors other than need might be morally troubling, an "opting in" paradigm compares favorably with other methods of obtaining more organs and accepting the status quo of extreme organ scarcity. Although an "opting in" policy would be based on enlightened self-interest, by demonstrating the utilitarian value of mutual assistance, it would promote the attitude that self-interest sometimes requires the perception that we are all part of a common humanity.     

An “Opting In” Paradigm for Kidney Transplantation

Almost 60,000 people in the United States with end stage renal disease are waiting for a kidney transplant. Because of the scarcity of organs from deceased donors live kidney donors have become a critical source of organs; in 2001, for the first time in recent decades, the number of live kidney donors exceeded the number of deceased donors. The paradigm used to justify putting live kidney donors at risk includes the low risk to the donor, the favorable risk-benefit ratio, the psychological benefits to the donor, altruism, and autonomy coupled with informed consent; because each of these arguments is flawed we need to lessen our dependence on live kidney donors and increase the number of organs retrieved from deceased donors.

An “opting in” paradigm would reward people who agree to donate their kidneys after they die with allocation preference should they need a kidney while they are alive. An “opting in” program should increase the number of kidneys available for transplantation and eliminate the morally troubling problem of “organ takers” who would accept a kidney if they needed one but have made no provision to be an organ donor themselves. People who “opt in” would preferentially get an organ should they need one at the minimal cost of donating their kidneys when they have no use for them; it is a form of organ insurance a rational person should find extremely attractive.

An “opting in” paradigm would simulate the reciprocal altruism observed in nature that sociobiologists believe enhances group survival. Although the allocation of organs based on factors other than need might be morally troubling, an “opting in” paradigm compares favorably with other methods of obtaining more organs and accepting the status quo of extreme organ scarcity. Although an “opting in” policy would be based on enlightened self-interest, by demonstrating the utilitarian value of mutual assistance, it would promote the attitude that self-interest sometimes requires the perception that we are all part of a common humanity.     

Why be moral: Humanist and behavioral perspectives

Students of philosophy have struggled with the question, “Why should I be moral?” Many diverse theorists have constructed elaborate logical arguments that explain why people in general should behave morally, but have had difficulty explaining why any given individual, safe from detection or retribution, should behave in a moral fashion. To avoid this problem, the notion of a supernatural deity (one who is always watching and thus removes the notion of nondetection and nonretribution) has been introduced by numerous thinkers. Philosophical systems that pride themselves on being based only on natural phenomena, however, can make no such recourse (leading to the charge, particularly from the religious, that without a god concept there can be no morality). Naturalistic humanists and behavior analysts are two groups who have found themselves unable to invoke a deity and thus face the question “Why should I behave morally?” Parallel attempts from both camps will be described and analyzed, with the conclusion being drawn that although such naturalists may not be better off than their more religious friends, they are certainly no worse off.     

Emotional Engineers: Toward Morally Responsible Design

Engineers are normally seen as the archetype of people who make decisions in a rational and quantitative way. However, technological design is not value neutral. The way a technology is designed determines its possibilities, which can, for better or for worse, have consequences for human wellbeing. This leads various scholars to the claim that engineers should explicitly take into account ethical considerations. They are at the cradle of new technological developments and can thereby influence the possible risks and benefits more directly than anybody else. I have argued elsewhere that emotions are an indispensable source of ethical insight into ethical aspects of risk. In this paper I will argue that this means that engineers should also include emotional reflection into their work. This requires a new understanding of the competencies of engineers: they should not be unemotional calculators; quite the opposite, they should work to cultivate their moral emotions and sensitivity, in order to be engaged in morally responsible engineering.     

Attracting Immigrants to Smaller Urban and Rural Communities: Lessons Learned from the Manitoba Provincial Nominee Program

Low birth rates and population ageing have slowed population growth rates in Canada, and immigration has become the primary driver of population and labour force growth in the nation. The distribution of new arrivals to Canada, however, has been concentrated in a few major cities. Until recently, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver have been the destination of approximately 75% of all immigrants. All orders of government have introduced policies and programs to influence the regional distribution of immigrants across the country, ostensibly so that the benefits of immigration will be more evenly shared on a national basis. An assessment of the Manitoba Provincial Nominee Program helps identify policy and program initiatives and best practices effective in changing the regional distribution of immigrants and attracting more new arrivals to smaller urban and rural communities.     

Evidence for a sensitive period for acculturation: younger immigrants report acculturating at a faster rate

Though recent adult immigrants often seem less acculturated to their new society than people who immigrated as children, it is not clear whether this difference is driven by duration of exposure or exposure during a sensitive developmental period. In a study aimed at disambiguating these influences, community and student samples of Hong Kong immigrants to Vancouver, Canada, completed the Vancouver Index of Acculturation, a measure that assesses respondents' identification with their mainstream and heritage cultures. A longer duration of exposure was found to be associated with greater identification with Canadian culture only at younger ages of immigration, but not at later ages of immigration. Conversely, identification with Chinese culture was unaffected by either age of immigration or length of exposure to Canadian culture. These findings provide evidence for a sensitive period for acculturation: People are better able to identify with a host culture the longer their exposure to it, but only if this exposure occurs when they are relatively young.