幼儿说谎行为的发展及其与说谎认知的关系

该研究考察了3~5岁幼儿违规后说谎的人数及其年龄特征,同时探讨了说谎行为与说谎概念理解、道德评价之间的关系。研究结果表明,即使是3岁儿童,违规后出现说谎的人数至少在一半以上,但4、5岁儿童在说谎的人数上要显著地多于3岁儿童。在说谎/说真话概念理解与道德评价的发展上,年龄间差异显著,从3岁至5岁逐渐达到成熟水平。研究结果没有发现是否说谎与说谎认知之间的关系,即在说谎/说真话的概念理解与道德评价上,说谎组儿童与没有说谎组儿童没有显著的差异。     

意图线索对5-11岁儿童理解说谎概念及道德评价的影响

研究探讨了交往意图的直接阐述与否对5、7、9和11岁儿童说谎/说真话概念判断及其道德评价的影响。结果表明:5岁儿童在作说谎或说真话的判断及其道德评价时,还不会利用意图线索;自7岁或9岁起意图明确与否影响着儿童概念判断与道德评价;但对不同言语情景的影响并不相同。由此也证实了意图线索对儿童说谎概念的判断及其道德评价的作用除了与儿童的年龄有关外,还取决于言语的情景。     

幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征及其与心理理论水平的关系

研究探讨了3～4岁幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征,并在此基础上考察了说谎的概念理解水平与道德评价之问的关系,及说谎认知与心理理论水平的关系。结果表明：3岁和4岁幼儿在说谎和说真话概念的判断上年龄差异显著,在对说谎的道德评价上,年龄差异不显著;幼儿心理理论与说谎概念的相关显著,4岁组的心理理论与道德评价的相关显著。     

意图明确条件下小学儿童对说谎的理解与道德评价

本研究对 7、9和 1 1岁儿童进行了说谎概念的理解与道德评价的研究。研究的目的是想揭示小学儿童在说话者意图明显的条件下对说谎的理解和道德评价中的认知特点。结果发现 ,“事实”因素是影响儿童理解“说谎”的决定因素 ;对说谎 /说真话的道德评价则不同于理解 ,至少到 9岁时 ,儿童的评价依据已由“事实”因素开始转向考虑说话者内在心理过程的“交往目的”因素 ,“情景”因素对道德评价也有一定的作用。     

为集体或为个人情境下小学儿童对说谎或说真话的理解和道德评价

研究探讨了291名7、9、11岁小学儿童在为集体或为个人情境下对说谎或说真话的理解和道德评价。结果表明,集体观念已经对11岁儿童对说谎概念的理解产生显著影响,11岁儿童在为集体情境下更少将主人公的话判断为说谎;随着年龄的增长,小学儿童对个人真话的评价越来越消极,对集体谎的评价越来越积极;当诚实原则和集体观念发生冲突时,7岁儿童主要受到诚实原则的支配,9岁儿童集体观念与诚实原则几乎是并驾齐驱,11岁儿童主要受到集体观念的影响;随着年龄的增长,小学儿童更多地从诚实和为集体两个方面陈述评价的理由。     

交往情景下个体对说谎的理解及其道德评价

研究探讨了个体理解交往情景下说谎／说真话概念及其道德评价上的年龄差异,以及事实成份、交往动机与交往情景因素在其中的作用。结果表明：(1)3岁到4岁是说谎概念理解的转折点;(2)除3岁儿童外,大部分被试依据事实成份来理解谎前真话;(3)从小学开始,随着年龄的增长,个体对“白谎”与直率真话的道德评价中越来越多地考虑到交往动机或情景因素。     

不同情景下小学儿童对说谎与说真话的道德评价

研究探讨了小学7、9、11岁儿童在对说谎与说真话进行道德评价时不同情景间的差异.研究结果发现,小学儿童对于具有积极意义的说谎/真话的评价显著地好于消极性的说谎/真话.但在对具有积极意义的说谎以及具有消极意义的真话进行评价时,具有显著的情景间差异.总的来说,在个体情景下,对谦虚谎及做好事说真话的评价具有年龄的效应,且谦虚谎的评价比白谎更为积极,而白谎的评价比集体情景下的说谎与伤害性说谎更为积极;而儿童对于交往情景下直率真话的评价在所有的年龄都趋于中性,有别于其他情景.     

3~4岁幼儿谎言概念理解的特点及心理理论、父母教养方式的作用

以165名3~4岁幼儿为研究对象,采用情境故事法考察谎言概念理解的年龄特点,并进一步探讨幼儿心理理论、父母教养方式对幼儿谎言概念理解的作用。结果表明:(1)幼儿对说真话行为与说谎行为的概念理解不是同步发展的,对说谎的概念理解要早于对说真话的理解,4岁幼儿的谎言概念理解水平高于3岁;(2)控制幼儿的年龄和言语能力后,心理理论与谎言概念理解显著正相关,专制教养方式与谎言概念理解显著负相关;(3)幼儿心理理论在专制教养方式与谎言概念理解之间起部分中介作用。     

小学儿童对说谎及说真话的评价

该研究分析比较了７、９、１１岁儿童对故事中好／坏行为的评价,及对此两种行为说谎／说真话的评价。研究目的是想通过小学儿童对好行为与坏行为说谎或说真话的道德评价来检验说谎发展中的一些普遍性问题。结果表明：被试都有相当的能力区别行为与言语反应间的差异。对好／坏行为都予积极／消极的评价;而对相应的言语反应的评价则因条件而不同。     

假想的道德两难情境下小学儿童对说谎或说真话的抉择

研究探讨了294名7、9、11岁的小学儿童在道德两难情境下对说谎或说真话的道德行为抉择。结果表明,在个人谎故事条件下,随着年龄的增长,儿童越来越倾向于选择说真话;在集体谎故事条件下,11岁儿童比7岁、9岁儿童更倾向于选择说谎。7岁儿童已具有初步的集体观念,随着年龄的增长,小学儿童的集体观念日趋稳定。随着年龄的增长,小学儿童更多地从诚实、为集体或为个人等多个方面来陈述说谎或说真话的理由。     

父母心理控制对流动儿童道德推脱的影响:学校道德氛围感知的中介作用和性别的调节作用

以345名12～17岁初中阶段流动儿童为被试,采用问卷法考察学校道德氛围感知在流动儿童父母心理控制与道德推脱关系中的中介作用,以及性别的调节作用。结果表明:(1)父母心理控制正向预测流动儿童道德推脱;(2)学校道德氛围感知在父母心理控制和流动儿童道德推脱之间起到部分中介作用。(3)性别在父母心理控制与学校道德氛围感知间起调节作用,性别调节了中介模型的前半路径,具体而言,与男孩相较,女孩的学校道德氛围感知受到父母心理控制的影响作用更加显著。     

Prosocial and antisocial children's perceptions of peers' motives for prosocial behaviours

This study investigated whether peer‐nominated prosocial and antisocial children have different perceptions of the motives underlying peers' prosocial actions. Eighty‐seven children, aged 10–12 years old, completed peer‐nomination measures of social behaviour. On the basis of numbers of social nominations received, a subsample of 51 children (32 who were peer‐nominated as ‘prosocial’, and 18 who were peer‐nominated as ‘antisocial’) then recorded their perceptions of peers' motives for prosocial behaviours. Expressed motives were categorized predominantly into three categories, coinciding with Turiel's (1978) ‘moral’, ‘conventional’, and ‘personal domains’. Results indicate that children's social reputation is associated with the extent to which they perceive peers' prosocial motives as ‘personal’ or ‘moral’, with more prosocial children attributing moral motives, and more antisocial children attributing personal motives. Although traditionally Turiel's domain theory has been used to understand ‘antisocial’ children's behaviour, the current findings suggest that ‘prosocial’ children's behaviour may also be related to domains of judgment.     

4～6岁儿童对“偶得物品”与“拥有物品”的分享行为

采用被试内设计法,在三种实验条件下考察180名4～6岁儿童的分享判断及其对“偶得物品”与“拥有物品”的分享行为的发展。结果发现:(1)儿童在对分享故事情境进行不充当角色的判断时,90%的4岁儿童和100%的5岁、6岁儿童能做出正确判断。当他们进行充当故事中人物角色的判断时,4岁儿童判断的正确率降低到81%,5岁和6岁儿童的判断无变化。(2)4岁儿童中大约四分之一的人能够把在实验室情境中偶然得到的、自己喜欢的物品让给未得到该物品的同伴分享,能够这样做的5岁儿童大约有一半,而6岁儿童能够这样做的人达到七成以上,从4岁到6岁,发展趋势非常明显。(3)在对“自己拥有的”物品的分享上,大多数4～6岁儿童都不能将其让给在竞赛中失败、未获得该物品的同伴一同分享。(4)儿童在对分享情境的判断与他们的真实分享行为之间存在着不一致现象。     

不同情境中情绪预期对青少年道德决策的影响

为考察道德情绪对道德决策的影响,研究以123名13岁和16岁的青少年为被试,采用2(年龄：13岁、16岁)×2(情境类型：亲社会、反社会)×2(情绪预期：道德定向、自利定向)的混合实验设计,考察了在不同的情境中和不同定向的情绪预期下青少年的道德决策情况。结果表明,年龄和情境类型的交互效应显著,反社会情境中16岁青少年比13岁青少年更倾向于判断自己会做出道德行为,亲社会情境中两个年龄组的道德决策判断无显著差异。情境类型和情绪预期的交互作用也显著。反社会情境中,青少年在自利定向情绪预期下判断自己会做出道德行为的可能性显著大于道德定向情绪预期;亲社会情境中,两种预期下青少年的道德决策判断不存在显著差异。结果说明,道德情绪会影响青少年的道德决策,在不同的情境中对道德决策的影响不同。     

‘No fair, copycat!’: what children’s response to plagiarism tells us about their understanding of ideas

Adults believe that plagiarizing ideas is wrong, which requires an understanding that others can have ideas and that it is wrong to copy them. In order to test when this understanding emerges, we investigated when children begin to think plagiarism is wrong. In Study 1, children aged 7, 9 and 11 years old, as well as adults, disliked someone who plagiarized compared to someone who drew an original drawing or someone who drew an identical picture by chance. Study 2 investigated the same question with younger children, focusing on children aged 3–6 years old. Children aged 5–6 years old evaluated plagiarizers negatively relative to unique drawers, but 3–4-year-olds did not. Study 3 replicated the findings from Study 2 and found that children justify their negative evaluations of plagiarizers by mentioning concerns over copying. These experiments provide evidence that, by age 5 years old, children understand that others have ideas and dislike the copying of these ideas.     

Maslow's hierarchy,moral development,and prosocial behavioral skills within a child psychiatric population

Maslow's assertions concerning conative needs and prosocial/antisocial behavior among disturbed children were examined in a psychiatric population of children 9 to 14 years old. Controlling for age and Piagetian cognitive development, it was found that among the participants in the midrange of moral reasoning (for this age group, as measured by Kohlberg's interview) there was a positive and highly significant relationship between prosocial behavior ratings and conative development. Clarity of the needs for belongingness was predictive of higher prosocial peer ratings, over and above the predictive utility of moral reasoning level. These results also supported Eron's observations about the potential for healthy dependency needs to deter aggressive behavior.We wish to acknowledge the invaluable aid of Scott R. Vezina in the processing of the data reported herein, and we also wish to express our gratitude to Anne Cartelli for her untiring and superb secretarial assistance.Ordering of authors' names was determined by random procedure and is not indicative of disproportionate contributions to the overall research.     

Cross-cultural differences in children's choices, categorizations, and evaluations of truths and lies

This study examined cross-cultural differences and similarities in children's moral understanding of individual- or collective-oriented lies and truths. Seven-, 9-, and 11-year-old Canadian and Chinese children were read stories about story characters facing moral dilemmas about whether to lie or tell the truth to help a group but harm an individual or vice versa. Participants chose to lie or to tell the truth as if they were the character (Experiments 1 and 2) and categorized and evaluated the story characters' truthful and untruthful statements (Experiments 3 and 4). Most children in both cultures labeled lies as lies and truths as truths. The major cultural differences lay in choices and moral evaluations. Chinese children chose lying to help a collective but harm an individual, and they rated it less negatively than lying with opposite consequences. Chinese children rated truth telling to help an individual but harm a group less positively than the alternative. Canadian children did the opposite. These findings suggest that cross-cultural differences in emphasis on groups versus individuals affect children's choices and moral judgments about truth and deception.     

Omission bias and perceived intention in children and adults

Omission bias refers to the tendency to judge acts of commission as morally worse than equivalent acts of omission. Children aged 7–8 and 11–12 years, as well as adults, made moral judgements about acts of commission and omission in two conditions in which the protagonist obtained a self‐directed benefit. In the antisocial condition, the other person was harmed; in the selfish condition, the other person was not harmed. The results showed that adults and both age groups of children judged that the agent who did something (act of commission) was morally worse than the agent who did nothing (omission) for both antisocial and selfish conditions, although this judgement tendency was clearer in the selfish condition than in the antisocial condition. Agent intention was held constant across commission and omission, but most participants rated the intention of the agent who did something as stronger than that of the agent who did nothing. These results suggest that omission bias occurs regardless of differences in age and situation. In addition, perceived intention appears to change in conjunction with omission bias.     

Children's utilization of emotion expectancies in moral decision‐making

This study investigated the relevance of emotion expectancies for children's moral decision‐making. The sample included 131 participants from three different grade levels (M = 8.39 years, SD = 2.45, range 4.58–12.42). Participants were presented a set of scenarios that described various emotional outcomes of (im)moral actions and asked to decide what they would do if they were in the protagonists' shoes. Overall, it was found that the anticipation of moral emotions predicted an increased likelihood of moral choices in antisocial and prosocial contexts. In younger children, anticipated moral emotions predicted moral choice for prosocial actions, but not for antisocial actions. Older children showed evidence for the utilization of anticipated emotions in both prosocial and antisocial behaviours. Moreover, for older children, the decision to act prosocially was less likely in the presence of non‐moral emotions. Findings suggest that the impact of emotion expectancies on children's moral decision‐making increases with age. Contrary to happy victimizer research, the study does not support the notion that young children use moral emotion expectancies for moral decision‐making in the context of antisocial actions.