Socratic Questioning in Alien Landscapes?

This commentary considers the role of Socratic questioning in Alien Landscapes? I discuss the three roles that Glover sees Socratic questioning playing in psychiatry: 1. Questioning to clarify problems, 2. Questioning to treat symptoms, 3. Questioning to reconstruct lives. Although I am broadly sympathetic to the idea that philosophical conversations can help us conceptualise, and deal with, mental distress, I raise two concerns. First, is there any way of providing courses of transformative Socratic questioning cheaply (e.g. through manualisation)? Second, how close is the connection between helping individuals to develop systems of belief and value that fit epistemic norms and helping them to live flourishing lives?     

Morality and Interpretation: Commentary on Jonathan Glover's Alien Landscapes?

What is required of the interpreter of disordered minds and what can we learn from the process? Jonathan Glover's book focuses on human interpretation and its role in psychiatry. His hope is that a more careful and sensitive exploration of minds that are very different from our own, will assist us to answer a range of important questions about human agency, identity and responsibility. In this commentary I will focus on the process and purpose of interpretation and expand on some of the moral issues that arise out of the interpretive challenges posed by mental disorders.     

What's Possible? What Matters? Reply to Commentaries

The three discussants agree that a definition of psychoanalysis tied to session frequency is problematic and needs to change. Yet none supports my recommendation to redefine the practice of psychoanalysis in terms of the practitioner's training. This prompted me to look more closely at my proposal and push my thinking further. I argue that psychoanalysis, like many other professions, needs to define its practice as the application of its complex and evolving knowledge and skill base, grounded in its unique field of inquiry. Although there are individual exceptions, the inculcation of this knowledge and skill base is generally best accomplished through psychoanalytic training. This assertion, however, rests on the premise that our training curricula keep pace with our rapidly evolving field of inquiry and knowledge. To further clarify my vision I examine the nature of psychoanalytic expertise. I suggest that such expertise amounts to the inculcation and integration of a large number of psychoanalytic frames of reference. I contend further that the nature of contemporary psychoanalytic theories is such that important psychoanalytic frames of reference are proliferating more rapidly than in the past, that the relationships among them are becoming more complex, and that consequently the application of psychoanalytic theory to practice is also becoming more complex. Psychoanalytic training programs need to recognize this expanding complexity and revise curricula and pedagogic methods on an ongoing basis to reflect this evolution within our field.     

What Is It Like to Be an Alien?

This brief article is concerned with an aspect of Jonathan Glover's book, Alien Landscapes?. After reflecting a little on the book as a whole, the question that is taken up is, ‘Why might a book that seeks to help those without mental disorders understand what they are like “from the inside” be of interest to laymen and practitioners in the criminal law?’. One answer lies in part in the way that ‘what it is like from the inside’ might interact with judgements of criminal responsibility. Taking its cue from examples used by Glover the article considers, and puts pressure on, the ‘dual view’ he proposes: that when dealing with those with mental disorders we should treat them as responsible agents in the sense of not withholding from them Strawson's ‘reactive attitudes’, while nevertheless accepting that their personalities and behaviours are the results of large doses of ‘bad luck’.     

Is schizotypy taxonic? Response to

Beauchaine, Lenzenweger, and Waller (2008) criticize our taxometric study of schizotypy (Rawlings, Williams, Haslam, & Claridge, in press) on a variety of methodological and philosophical grounds. We argue that their critique selectively applies more stringent standards to our work than to studies supporting their view that schizotypy is taxonic (i.e., categorical). Many of their criticisms apply at least equally to existing studies that offer support for a schizotypy taxon, and these studies are vulnerable to biases favouring taxonic conclusions that were controlled for in our study. Contrary to their criticisms, we did not claim to have disconfirmed previous taxonic findings about schizotypy, and our findings positively support dimensional models of schizotypy rather than merely being null results. Similarly, our findings are not artefacts of the sampling or measurement decisions that they question. Even well-replicated taxometric findings are not immune to empirical challenge, and evaluation of such challenges must be even-handed.     

Making Our Hairs Stand on End—A Call to Psychoanalysis to Look Outside Itself: Response to Commentaries

I am grateful for the rich commentaries of Ogden and Ferro and Civitarese, and wish we could continue this discussion, as it speaks to the importance of psychoanalysis looking outside itself to the arts and other disciplines to enrich and expand our ways of hearing. In my response I take up Ogden's discussion of the resistance of the medium of psychoanalysis and the necessity of “changing the terms.” I present a short sequel to the clinical material presented in my paper to illustrate what Ogden is discussing. I also agree with the importance of Ferro and Civitarese's focus on the primacy of incarnate emotional experience and the necessity of moving in and out of integration and nonintegration as we struggle to register what is going on in the analytic encounter and how we may all generate meaning out of these experiences.     

Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein

Foundationalist, Coherentist. Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect—all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating. chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "Intinitism"—the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. My conclusion will be that until Klein answers these metaphysical worries he will not have restored Infinitism as a viable option in epistemology.