Undercover Education: Mice, Mimesis, and Parasites in the Teaching Machine

What happens to education when the potential it helps realizing in the individual works against the formal purposes of the curriculum? What happens when education becomes a vehicle for its own subversion? As a subject-forming state apparatus working on ideological speciesism, formal education is engaged in both human and animal stratification in service of the capitalist knowledge economy. This seemingly stable condition is however insecured by the animal rights activist as undercover learner and??worker, who enters education and research laboratories under false premises in order to extract the knowledge necessary to dismantle the logic of animal utility on which the scientific-educational apparatus rests. The present article is based on a semi-structured interview with an undercover worker. It draws on a synthesis of critical education and posthumanist theories to configure knowledge creation and subjectification processes in the ??negative spaces?? of education. The techne of undercover work includes mnemotechnical and prosthetic devices, calculation of risk, and mimetic labor. The article argues that the agenda of the undercover worker generates a multi-strained mimetic complex that composes a parasitic educational subject-assemblage redirecting scientific knowledge away from the animal stratification logic of the knowledge economy into different viral circuits; different lines of flight. It invites a rearticulation of the formal education state apparatus in more indeterminate directions, provoking scientific-educational knowledge-practices to become a catalytic impulse for their own disintegration.     

Getting narced: Neutralization of undercover identity discreditation

“Communicative work directed to transforming an individual's total identity into an identity lower in the group's social types is called a ‘status degradation ceremony'” (Garfinkel 1956, p. 420). Status degradation ceremonies are particularly troublesome for undercover narcotics agents. In this context, they act as the mechanism by which agents’ dissembled identities are questioned and their real police ones revealed. This process, what officers call “getting narced,” is the topic of the present paper. Explored here are both its causes and the responses officers proffer to neutralize full identity exposure. Causes are tactical in nature and involve transactional overaggressiveness. Neutralization responses are dramaturgical in nature and involve sarcastic admission, evidential refutation, and belligerent denial/threatening retort. Discussion focuses on the conceptual implications of officers’ counteruncovering moves (Goffman 1969) as these relate to the sociology of accounts (Scott and Lyman 1968). Data were drawn from ethnographic interviews with 30 high school undercover officers operating out of a large U.S. city.     

Releasing the Self: The Healing Legacy of Heinz Kohut

Paradoxically, the more powerful the USA has become the more that paranoia seems to mark its relation to itself and to others. In this article we argue that there is a connection between its denial of its own destructiveness, self-idealization expressed in the belief that America represents the end point of the civilizing process towards which all other societies are drawn, and the paranoid conviction that an enemy Other (communism, Islam) aims to corrupt or destroy ‘God's chosen people’. First Vietnam and now September 11th inflicted grievous injuries upon this narcissism and we suggest that the invasion of Iraq can be considered as an indication that the USA has failed to ‘work through’ this trauma, instead it has sought to reassert an imaginary omniscience. Just as the destruction of the Twin Towers was the breaking through of the Real upon the Imaginary, so the ‘Real’ war in Iraq has begun after the ‘Imaginary’ war was declared ‘over’ by Bush.     

Counselling young people: Counsellors' perspectives on ‘what works’ – An exploratory study

Aim: Counsellors who work with young people in a range of contexts know that they are not engaging with ‘mini‐adults’. The issues young people bring to counselling are often complex, challenging and wide‐ranging, as adolescents are experiencing times of turbulence and change in their physical, emotional, social and psychological development. This paper focuses on a research project undertaken with five counsellors who work with young people, and asks the question: ‘What works?’ Method: The research project is an in‐depth qualitative study into the counsellor's experience of counselling young people, using a narrative approach. Findings: Four key shared themes emerged: the significance of ‘safety’ in the relationship; building the therapeutic alliance; flexibility and integration relating to theoretical orientation; and the use of creativity. Outcomes: This paper offers counsellors the opportunity to reflect on ‘what works’ and consider the professional knowledge, which underpins their own counselling practice with young people.     

Can Architecture be Barbaric?

The title of this article is adapted from Theodor W. Adorno’s famous dictum: ‘To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.’ After the catastrophic earthquake in Kocaeli, Turkey on the 17th of August 1999, in which more than 40,000 people died or were lost, Necdet Teymur, who was then the dean of the Faculty of Architecture of the Middle East Technical University, referred to Adorno in one of his ‘earthquake poems’ and asked: ‘Is architecture possible after 17th of August?’ The main objective of this article is to interpret Teymur’s question in respect of its connection to Adorno’s philosophy with a view to make a contribution to the politics and ethics of architecture in Turkey. Teymur’s question helps in providing a new interpretation of a critical approach to architecture and architectural technology through Adorno’s philosophy. The paper also presents a discussion of Adorno`s dictum, which serves for a better understanding of its universality/particularity.     

Beliefs and Experiences of Bereaved Teenagers: some spiritual and moral issues

When people die it is quite common for the bereaved to think about where they have gone and to maintain links with them in some way. Traditional Christian beliefs about ‘heaven’ and ‘hell’ may be revised and other ideas about spiritual continuity are often explored. This article will discuss responses from 94 11‐17‐year‐olds (38 males/56 females) regarding circumstances of and reasons given for a death; explanations and support; religious affiliation and belief in God; answers to the question ‘Why do people die?’ and ‘What happens after death?'; experiences of having a sense of the presence of the deceased; and personal qualities, attitudes towards other people and views of life. It will conclude by reassessing some of the moral and spiritual issues raised.     

Primoratz on Terrorism

ABSTRACT In ‘What is Terrorism?’ Igor Primoratz defines terrorism as “the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they would not otherwise take”. In this article I argue that Primoratz is wrong (a) to posit a necessary connection between terrorism and terror or intimidation, (b) to argue that terrorism is directed solely against people, and not, for example, property, and (c) to argue that the targets of terrorism proper are ‘the innocent’.     

Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity

This article considers the question ‘What makes hope rational?’ We take Adrienne Martin's recent incorporation analysis of hope as representative of a tradition that views the rationality of hope as a matter of instrumental reasons. Against this tradition, we argue that an important subset of hope, ‘fundamental hope’, is not governed by instrumental rationality. Rather, people have reason to endorse or reject such hope in virtue of the contribution of the relevant attitudes to the integrity of their practical identity, which makes the relevant hope not instrumentally but intrinsically valuable. This argument also allows for a new analysis of the reasons people have to abandon hope and for a better understanding of non-fundamental, ‘prosaic’ hopes.     

Kenosis,Dynamic Śūnyatā and Weak Thought: Abe Masao and Gianni Vattimo

The verb κεν?ω (kenos) means ‘to empty’ and St. Paul uses the word ?κ?νωσεν (ekenosen) writing that ‘Jesus made himself nothing’ and ‘emptied himself’. ?ūnyatā is a Buddhist concept most commonly translated as emptiness, nothingness, or nonsubstantiality. An important kenosis–?ūnyatā discussion was sparked by Abe Masao’s paper ‘Kenotic God and Dynamic ?ūnyatā’ (in 1984). I confront the kenosis–?ūnyatā theme with Vattimo’s kenosis-based philosophy of religion. For Vattimo, kenosis refers to ‘secularization’: when strong structures such as the essence and the fulfilment of the Christian message are weakened. Parallels between Abe’s and Vattimo’s thought will be demonstrated with regard to themes current in East–West comparative philosophy: reality and emptiness, the overcoming of metaphysics, the position of the Self, the human and the divine, and the relationship between science and religion. The latter point is particularly timely because since the 1990s religious fundamentalism has pushed forward a curious ‘religion as science’ hypothesis. Both thinkers’ relationship with the idea of Nothingness will also be explored. Finally, Abe’s interpretation of ?ūnyatā will be presented as a form of ‘weak thought’. Both Abe and Vattimo design a religious attitude based on negativity without falling into the trap of anti-religious nihilism. Abe’s negation of the subject, which leads to a pluralism of beings, can very well be compared with Vattimo’s paradoxical ‘credere di credere’ (to believe to believe), through which Vattimo describes the attitude of an ego that has lost its own subjectivity. The person who does not believe but only ‘believes to believe’ is a sort of non-ego. I show that a ‘half-theistic’ way of thinking God based on kenosis can work in the service of plurality because it deconstructs the principle of reality based on faith and ‘fullness’.     

Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations

It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations vis‐à‐vis large‐scale injustice? In this article, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed, and unorganised groups of people are often in a position to perform distributive collective actions. As such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address structural injustice through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are ‘collective’ only in a fairly weak sense.     

The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Findings in recent research on the ‘conjunction fallacy’ have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content‐blind—in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content‐blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we first show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term ‘probability’ in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term ‘frequency’ narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of ‘probability’ down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact—rather than the presence or absence of ‘extensional cues’—accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassified as fallacies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imaginative Transportation

Actors, undercover investigators, and readers of fiction sometimes report ‘losing themselves’ in the characters they imitate or read about. They speak of ‘taking on’ or ‘assuming’ the beliefs, thoughts, and feelings of someone else. I offer an account of this strange but familiar phenomenon—what I call imaginative transportation.     

Heidegger in the township

Imagine Heidegger in a township. Imagine you are able to translate his concept of ‘care’ to ‘the people’. Would they agree that in their ordinary experience people care? I argue not and contend that, instead, they would choose the term ‘struggle’. I analyse experiential aspects of ordinary life in the context of the township, which involves a significant part of people around the world, in order to argue that, at least in such contexts, it is a more common experience for people to struggle than to care. In this way I hope to show how a phenomenological analysis of everyday life experience such as Heidegger's can contribute to the understanding of contextual issues, but also how a context can induce the introduction of new concepts of thinking.     

Difficulties in Defining the Concept of God: Kierkegaard in Dialogue with Levinas,Buber, and Rosenzweig

This article investigates difficulties in defining the concept of God by focusing on the question of what it means to understand God as a ‘person.’ This question is explored with respect to the work of Søren Kierkegaard, in dialogue with Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas. Thereby, the following three questions regarding divine ‘personhood’ come into view: First, how can God be a partner of dialogue if he at the same time remains unknown and unthinkable, a limit-concept of understanding? Second, if God is love in person and at the same time a spiritual reality ‘between’ human agents, in what ways are his personal and trans-personal traits related to each other? Third, what exactly is revealed through God’s ‘name’? By way of an inconclusive conclusion, divine personhood is discussed in regard to prayer, where the problems of predication that arise in third-personal speech about God are linked with the second-personal encounter with God.

     

Kagan on Speciesism and Modal Personism

Shelly Kagan argues in his ‘What's Wrong with Speciesism?’ for four provocative claims: 1. speciesism is not necessarily a mere prejudice; 2. most people are not speciesists; 3. ‘modal personism’ more closely reflects what most people believe, and 4. modal personism might be true. In this article, I object to Kagan's account of what constitutes a ‘mere prejudice’, and I object to the sort of argument he uses to show that most people are not speciesist. I then attempt to motivate, and defend what I take to be the best version of modal personism; answer several problems for the view; and raise other problems that I think are harder to answer.     

Sensitizing Questions: A Method to Facilitate Analyzing the Meaning of an Utterance

Much social science research entails interpreting the meaning of utterances, that is, phrases spoken, written or gestured. But how should researchers interpret the meaning of such utterances? A recent surge of research, informed by dialogism, emphasizes the contextual, social and unfinished nature of meaning. The present article operationalizes dialogism theory into six ‘sensitizing questions’ which can guide analysis. The questions are: (1) What is the context? (2) What is the speaker doing? (3) Who is being addressed? (4) Who is doing the talking? (5) What future is constituted? (6) What are the responses? Each question (and 16 sub-questions) is illustrated by analyzing the potential meanings of a single utterance. The article is a contribution to the development of new forms of ‘method’ for interpretative qualitative research. These methods aid the ‘human instrument’ to become a sensitive, theoretically-informed, and accountable analyst.     

Career guidance and therapeutic counselling: sharing ‘what works’ in practice with young people

Many young people in the UK and across the world, where austerity measures are biting deep, find themselves at a time of crisis and uncertainty in their lives. The assumptions previously held of clear and straightforward career paths are being challenged and ‘career’ has come to mean more than simply ‘work’ or ‘employment’. This has implications for career practice, where career advisers are engaging with a range of complex issues in their guidance interactions with clients. This article draws on research undertaken with therapeutic counsellors into ‘what works’ when counselling young people. It offers career practitioners the opportunity to reflect on four key emerging themes and to consider how the discipline of therapeutic counselling might inform guidance practice.     

Answering to Future People: Responsibility for Climate Change in a Breaking World

Our everyday notions of responsibility are often driven by our need to justify ourselves to specific others – especially those we harm, wrong, or otherwise affect. One challenge for contemporary ethics is to extend this interpersonal urgency to our relations with those future people who are harmed or affected by our actions. In this article, I explore our responsibility for climate change by imagining a possible ‘broken future’, damaged by the carbon emissions of previous generations (including ourselves), and then asking what its inhabitants might think of our current behaviour, our moral thinking, and our excuses. In particular, I will focus on a simplified scenario where present people can only avoid a broken future by sacrificing Rawlsian favourable conditions. Suppose we refuse to avoid a broken future, on the grounds that we cannot be expected to make such great sacrifices. If the broken future lacks favourable conditions, will its inhabitants accept our excuses? Will they hold us responsible for things we regard as excusable? If so, should we be guided by their judgements or by our own?     

Can One Be Cognitively Conscious of God?

How do humans ‘register’ God: attain knowledge or revelation of God? Analysis is familiar in terms of explanatory hypothesis, necessity, authority and commitment. However individuals speak also of ‘experience’ or ‘consciousness’ of God/Christ/grace – received widely, not just by an esoteric few. But may we properly hold that people can be cognitively aware of God? Undoubtedly such speech has problematic aspects. Not only do psychosis, self-deception, gullibility recur. Commentators are liable to enlist what may be termed the A-conceptual Lucidity picture, which critically fails. Various positions urged by thinkers rule out by definition the very possibility of cognitive awareness of God. Some analysts assert: a person’s experiencing x is constituted throughout by the person’s use of concepts in toto reached previously and independently. But, why adopt any a priori dismissiveness? We should favour a portrayal of people’s epistemic situation respecting God called the Consciousness Portrayal. Phrases therein include: ‘God’s gracious, guiding activity’; ‘a person’s access to God’; ‘attentive consciousness/conceptualization/knowledge of God’; ‘diverse levels or modes of consciousness’; ‘God’s guidance in a person’s creatively picking out concepts’; and ‘“cognition” which, as regards meaning, is not just a function of calculative reasoning’. Alertness to usage in non-religious contexts aids our finding the religious phrasing intelligible. The Portrayal is approachable from an internal and external angle. Opponents’ challenges to the Portrayal invoke some broad epistemological theses, often pronounced intrinsic to ‘rationality’. But we fittingly espouse certain contrasting epistemological views. And these prove to fortify the Consciousness Portrayal.