Mental visualization of objects from cross-sectional images

We extended the classic anorthoscopic viewing procedure to test a model of visualization of 3D structures from 2D cross-sections. Four experiments were conducted to examine key processes described in the model, localizing cross-sections within a common frame of reference and spatiotemporal integration of cross sections into a hierarchical object representation. Participants used a hand-held device to reveal a hidden object as a sequence of cross-sectional images. The process of localization was manipulated by contrasting two displays, in situ vs. ex situ, which differed in whether cross sections were presented at their source locations or displaced to a remote screen. The process of integration was manipulated by varying the structural complexity of target objects and their components. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated visualization of 2D and 3D line-segment objects and verified predictions about display and complexity effects. In Experiments 3 and 4, the visualized forms were familiar letters and numbers. Errors and orientation effects showed that displacing cross-sectional images to a remote display (ex situ viewing) impeded the ability to determine spatial relationships among pattern components, a failure of integration at the object level.     

Mental images can be ambiguous: Reconstruals and reference-frame reversals

Philosophers and psychologists have debated whether or not mental images of ambiguous figures are reversible as pictures of such figures are. Previously, empirical evidence both pro (Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989) and con (Chambers & Reisberg, 1985) has been obtained. In a series of four experiments, we identify the conditions under which images of classic ambiguous figures like the duck/rabbit and the snail/elephant are reversible. We distinguish between two types of reversal: those that entail a change in reference-frame specification as well as a reconstrual of image components (reference-frame realignments) and those that entail reconstruals only (reconstruals). We show that reference-frame realignments can occur in imagery, particularly if observers are given an explicit or an implicit suggestion; and that reconstruals of images occur commonly, regardless of experimental conditions. In addition, we show that images constructed from good parts are more likely to reverse than images constructed from poor parts. On the basis of these results, we propose a functional organization of shape memory that is consistent with shape recognition findings as well as with our reversal findings.     

Mothers' & fathers' explanations of observed interactions with their children

Mothers and fathers were asked via an open-ended interview technique to explain specific interactions with their children that had been noted during a period of family observation in the home. Explanations were obtained for behavior in five interactional contexts (e.g., interactions involving discipline and interactions encouraging the child to be independent). The explanations were classified first to determine the extent to which they referred to what might have been actual thoughts at the time of the behavior. Second, they were content analysed to determine how much parents perceived themselves as responding to the child, versus how much they presented their behavior as arising from their own dispositions, purposes, and experiences. Results showed that most of the explanations did not contain what could be considered conscious cognitions at the time of the behavior. This suggests parents might have been responding automitically in the situation. Also, parents did not perceive their behavior as being mainly in response to the child. Instead they primarily saw themselves as the agents of their own actions. The latter trend varied in degree according to the interactional context. Mothers seemed more child centered in their explanations than fathers. Implications are examined for future research on links between parental cognition and behavior, and for the methods adopted to study parental cognitions. Questions are raised about the extent to which parents planfully determine their behavior and the extent to which they are aware of the reasons for their behavior.     

Average explanations

Good scientific explanations sometimes appear to make use of averages. Using concrete examples from current economic theory, I argue that some confusions about how averages might work in explanations lead to both philosophical and economic problems about the interpretation of the theory. I formulate general conditions on potentially proper uses of averages to refine a notion of average explanation. I then try to show how this notion provides a means for resolving longstanding philosophical problems in economics and other quantitative social sciences.Some of the ideas in this essay were presented at the Philosophy of Economics II Conference at Tilburg University. I thank the participants for helpful remarks.     

Reasons explanations (of actions) as structural explanations

Non-causal accounts of action explanation have long been criticized for lacking a positive thesis, relying primarily on negative arguments to undercut the standard Causal Theory of Action (Wilson and Shpall , in: Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016). Additionally, it is commonly thought that non-causal accounts fail to provide an answer to Donald Davidson’s (1963) challenge for theories of reasons explanations of actions. According to Davidson’s challenge, a plausible non-causal account of reasons explanations must provide a way of connecting an agent’s reasons, not only to what she ought to do, but to what she actually does. That is, such explanations must be truth-apt, not mere rationalizations. My aim in this paper is to show how a non-causal account of action can provide explanations that are truth-apt and genuinely explanatory. To make this argument, I take as a given an account of the practical syllogism (the syllogistic form of practical reasoning) discussed by Michael Thompson (Life and action: elementary structures of practice and practical thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2008) and Eric Wiland (Reasons, Continuum, New York, 2012), according to which the practical syllogism is truly practical rather than propositional in nature. Next, I present my primary positive thesis: reasons for actions have explanatory power in virtue of being parts of a structure—the practical syllogism—that contains the action being explained. I then argue that structural action explanations can meet Davidson’s challenge and that they genuinely explain actions. Finally, I conclude by addressing some objections to my argument.

     

Adolescents' explanations for political issues: concordance with their views of self and society.

The relationships between adolescents' explanations for unemployment, poverty, and homelessness and their beliefs about opportunity, reports of family values, and personal aspirations were tested for 434 teenagers (mean age = 16 years 4 months). Explanations were coded for references to individual causes, societal causes, or both. Higher maternal education and average household income in the adolescent's school district were positively related to the likelihood of attributing all three problems to societal causes. When explaining unemployment, older adolescents noted both causes, and boys mentioned individual factors whereas girls mentioned societal factors. After adjustment for background factors, those endorsing individual causes were more likely to believe that all Americans enjoyed equal opportunity and that government support encouraged dependency, and they were more committed to materialist goals. In contrast, youth endorsing societal or situational causes had more altruistic life goals and reported that compassion was emphasized in their families.     

Young children's psychological explanations and their relationship to perception‐ and intention‐understanding

The present study examined two key aspects of young children's ability to explain human behaviour in a mentalistic way. First, we explored desires that are of a level of difficulty comparable with that of false beliefs. For this purpose, the so‐called ‘alternative desires’ were created. Second, we examined how children's psychological explanations are related to their understanding of perception and intention. A perception‐understanding task, an intention‐understanding task and a psychological‐explanation task were administered to 80 three‐year‐olds. Results offer support for the thesis that the level of difficulty of belief and desire explanations is comparable. Moreover, children's psychological explanations are related to their understanding of perception and intention. The results lend support to the idea that mentalistic explanations are an explicit manifestation of children's level of theory of mind. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating everyday explanations

People frequently rely on explanations provided by others to understand complex phenomena. A fair amount of attention has been devoted to the study of scientific explanation, and less on understanding how people evaluate naturalistic, everyday explanations. Using a corpus of diverse explanations from Reddit’s “Explain Like I’m Five” and other online sources, we assessed how well a variety of explanatory criteria predict judgments of explanation quality. We find that while some criteria previously identified as explanatory virtues do predict explanation quality in naturalistic settings, other criteria, such as simplicity, do not. Notably, we find that people have a preference for complex explanations that invoke more causal mechanisms to explain an effect. We propose that this preference for complexity is driven by a desire to identify enough causes to make the effect seem inevitable.     

Reasons as explanations

Can a normative reason be understood as a kind of explanation? I here consider and argue against two important analyses of reasons as explanations. John Broome argues that we can analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of explanation and ought. On his view, reasons to ? are either facts that explain why one ought to ? (what he calls “perfect reasons”) or facts that play a for-? role in weighing explanations (what he calls “pro tanto reasons”). I argue against Broome’s account of both perfect and pro tanto reasons. Other philosophers, including Joseph Raz, analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of explanation and good. On this view, some fact is a reason to ? if and only if that fact explains why ?-ing would be good in some respect, to some degree. This view avoids the objections to Broome’s view, but should be rejected since not all explanations of why ?-ing would be good constitute reasons to ?.     

Viewing-as explanations and ontic dependence

Philosophical Studies - According to a widespread view in metaphysics and philosophy of science (the “Dependence Thesis”), all explanations involve relations of ontic dependence between...