Coaching Generation Z Athletes

How Generation Z athletes' (those born after 1996) characteristics influence coaching practice has not been examined. This study examines coaches' perceptions of Gen Z athlete characteristics, challenges, and effective coaching strategies. Twelve highly experienced coaches and sport science providers were interviewed and revealed that coaches characterized Gen Z athletes as having excellent technology skills, high expectations for success, short attention spans, poor communication skills, and an inability to deal with adversity. Challenges included connecting with them and working with their support networks. Strategies included connecting process with performance, teaching communication skills, being direct, setting clear expectations, and building resiliency.

Lay Summary

Coaches' perceptions of Gen Z athletes (athletes born after 1996 and having grown up in a totally digital world) characteristics, the challenges working with them, and effective Gen Z coaching strategies were examined. Interviews with 12 highly experienced tennis coaches revealed both positive (e.g., highly educated, high expectations for success) and negative (e.g., finding ways to connect with them, working with support network) characteristics, as well as strategies for effectively coaching them (e.g., connecting process with performance, teaching basic communication skills).     

Z formalnej teorii ekstensji i intensji

Streszczenie Praca nie zawiera żadnej proponowanej prz∈z autora d∈finicji ekst∈nsji i intensji wyrażeń w systemach semantycznych. Rozpatruje się dwie relacje równoważności ekstensjonalnej i intensjonalnej, które zachodzą między wyraż∈niami (zdaniami, termami) oraz funkcje gdzie e jest wyrażeniem, spelniające warunki. Każda para takich funkcji jest pewną reprezentacją ekstens ji i intensji wyrażeń. W pracy rozważa się ogólne własności reprezentacji ekstensji i intensji oraz podaje się przykłady takich reprezentacji. Wyróżnia się tzw. obiektywną reprezentację ekstensji i wprowadza się pojęcie tzw. semantycznego domknięcia modelu. Pokazuje się, że ekstensje i intensje termów można zredukować do ekst∈nsji i intensji zdań. Rozważa się relacje strukturalnej równoważności ekstensjonalnej i int∈nsjonalnej wyrażeń. Relacje te redukują się w przypadku tzw. normalnych systemów semantycznych do syntaktycznej równoważności wyrażeń. Istnieje pewien związek tych relacji z pojęciem kodenotacji wprowadzonym przez K. Ajdukiewicza.     

Confluence Proofs of Lambda-Mu-Calculi by Z Theorem

Studia Logica - This paper applies Dehornoy et al.’s Z theorem and its variant, called the compositional Z theorem, to prove confluence of Parigot’s $$\lambda \mu $$ -calculi extended...     

`Reference' to D. Z. Phillips

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Compositional Z: Confluence Proofs for Permutative Conversion

This paper gives new confluence proofs for several lambda calculi with permutation-like reduction, including lambda calculi corresponding to intuitionistic and classical natural deduction with disjunction and permutative conversions, and a lambda calculus with explicit substitutions. For lambda calculi with permutative conversion, naïve parallel reduction technique does not work, and (if we consider untyped terms, and hence we do not use strong normalization) traditional notion of residuals is required as Ando pointed out. This paper shows that the difficulties can be avoided by extending the technique proposed by Dehornoy and van Oostrom, called the Z theorem: existence of a mapping on terms with the Z property concludes the confluence. Since it is still hard to directly define a mapping with the Z property for the lambda calculi with permutative conversions, this paper extends the Z theorem to compositional functions, called compositional Z, and shows that we can adopt it to the calculi.     

D. Z. Phillips on Christian immortality

D. Z. Phillips is widely assumed to have held that Christian immortality has no reality outside of language. The author challenges that assumption, demonstrating that Phillips wished to show that contemporary analytic philosophy distorts the reality that immortality has for believers. While most philosophical accounts of Christian immortality depend upon terms that have little religious significance, Phillips offered accounts that stress the centrality of that significance. The author gives an account of the sort of philosophical attention that Phillips gave to Christian immortality and demonstrates Phillips’ lament for both the lack of this sort of attention in contemporary philosophy as well as the loss of certain ways of living that exemplify a belief in eternal life with God.     

D. Z. Phillips and reasonable belief

As an illustration of what Phillips called the “heterogeneity of sense,” this essay concentrates on differences in what is meant by a “reason for belief.” Sometimes saying that a belief is reasonable simply commends the belief’s unquestioned acceptance as a part of what we understand as a sensible outlook. Here the standard picture of justifying truth claims on evidential grounds breaks down; and it also breaks down in cases of fundamental moral and religious disagreement, where the basic beliefs that we hold affect our conception of what counts as a reliable ground of judgment. Phillips accepts the resultant variations in our conceptions of rational judgment as a part of logic, just as Wittgenstein did. All objective means of determining the truth or falsity of an assertion presume some underlying conceptual agreement about what counts as good judgment. This means that the possibility of objective justification is limited. But no pernicious relativism results from this view, for as Wittgenstein said, “After reason comes persuasion.” There is, moreover, a non-objective criterion of sorts in the moral and religious requirement that one be able to live with one’s commitments. In such cases, good judgment is still possible, but it differs markedly from the standard model of making rational inferences.     

An A to Z guide to DSM-IV conundrums

The work on the 4th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) poses many puzzling conundrums that touch on complicated and important theoretical and practical issues. None of these can be resolved in the DSM-IV, but we hope that the Task Force's decisions will be informed by thorough reviews of the currently available evidence and extensive input from all sectors of the mental health field. In this article we provide an alphabetical guide to DSM-IV conundrums that we hope will stimulate comments, suggestions, and criticisms about the work of the Task Force.     

Z badań nad klasyczną logiką nazw

Allatum est die 24 Januarii 1969     

D. Z. Phillips and Wittgenstein's On Certainty

I start from Phillips' discussion of Rhees's dissatisfaction with the idea of a language‐game. Then, from a rereading of Moore, I go on to exemplify interconnected uses of the expressions “language‐game,”“recurrent procedure,”“world‐picture,”“formal procedure,”“agreement in judgment,”“genre picture” and “form of life.” The discussion is related to sense perception, our knowledge of time and space, and the picture‐theory. These topics connect with Wittgenstein's earlier treatment of the will – which changed markedly later. The subtext (in footnotes) confronts (i) the sceptical methods of Descartes and Hume with the grammatical methods of Leibniz, Kant and Wittgenstein, and (ii) the realism of Leibniz and the Tractatus with the transcendental idealism of Kant. My conclusion is that, although the method of Wittgenstein's later work remains in a sense grammatical, (i) in its new form it can free us from the conviction that the intellect can and must resolve one way or the other the conflicts that arise in the course of the latter confrontation, and that (ii), although release from such a conviction is to be seen as the aim of philosophical discourse in general, it allows philosophy to retain its overriding significance. A positive element in that lies in the respect the method demands for that in a human life which is transcendental to the activity of scientific theorising: respect, therefore, for the unique perspective of the individual historical agent.