Weber (slope) analyses of timing variability in tapping and drawing tasks

Timing variability in continuous drawing tasks has not been found to be correlated with timing variability in repetitive finger tapping in recent studies (S. D. Robertson et al., 1999; H. N. Zelaznik, R. M. C. Spencer, & R. B. Ivry, 2002). Furthermore, the central component of timing variability, as measured by the slope of the timing variance versus the square of the timed interval, differed for tapping and drawing tasks. On the basis of those results, the authors posited that timing in tapping is explicit and as such uses a central representation of the interval to be timed, whereas timing in drawing tasks is implicit, that is, the temporal component is an emergent property of the trajectory produced. The authors examined that hypothesis in the present study by determining the linear relationship between timing variance and squared duration for tapping, circle-drawing, and line-drawing tasks. Participants (N = 50) performed 1 of 5 tasks: finger tapping, line drawing in the x dimension, line drawing in the y dimension, continuous circle drawing timed in the x dimension, or continuous circle drawing timed in the y dimension. The slopes differed significantly between finger tapping, line drawing, and circle drawing, suggesting separable sources of timing variability. The slopes of the 2 circle-drawing tasks did not differ from one another, nor did the slopes of the 2 line-drawing tasks differ significantly, suggesting a shared timing process within those tasks. Those results are evidence of a high degree of specificity in timing processes.     

Variability in the timing of responses during repetitive tapping with alternate hands

Summary This paper addresses the question of whether a simple two-stage account of variability in timing developed for single-hand repetitive tapping is applicable to regular tapping with the hands in alternation. The task required key presses at a steady rate, previously set by a periodic auditory signal. On separate blocks of trials four subjects used the index finger of the left hand or of the right hand at intervals of 200, 400, and 800 ms or alternated between the hands at intervals of 100, 200, or 400 ms. For each subject the variability of the between-hand intervals in the 200- and 400-ms alternate-hand conditions was greater than the variability of the same interval in the single-hand conditions. In the 100-ms alternate-hand condition correlations between adjacent (between-hand) intervals were reliably less then –.5. These results are inconsistent with the simple two-stage model, and two variants are shown to provide a better qualitative fit to at least some aspects of the data.     

Temporal precision in tapping and circle drawing movements at preferred rates is not correlated: further evidence against timing as a general-purpose ability

Recently, researchers have discovered that individuals who are consistent timers in a tapping task are not necessarily consistent timers when they perform a continuous drawing task. In other words, nonsignificant correlations were found among tapping and drawing movements for timing precision (S. D. Robertson et al., 1999). In the present experiment, the authors investigated whether or not consistency in timing for tapping and drawing was correlated when participants (N = 24) were allowed to move at their preferred rate of movement. There were no significant correlations between tapping and drawing in terms of timing precision. That result lends further support to the notion that timing behavior is specific to the nature of the task, and thus further weakens the idea that timing is a generalized ability that can be imposed on a variety of different types of tasks.     

Impetus beliefs as default heuristics: Dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge about motion

We examined the extent to which findings from the literature on naive physics and representational momentum studies are consistent with impetus beliefs postulating imparted internal energy as a source of motion. In a literature review, we showed that, for situations in which impetus theory and physical principles make different predictions, representational momentum effects are consistent with impetus beliefs. In three new experiments, we examined people’s implicit and explicit knowledge of the effect of mass on the rate of ascending motion. The results suggest that implicit knowledge is consistent with impetus theory and is unaffected by explicit knowledge. Expert physicists, whose explicit knowledge is in accord with Newtonian principles, exhibited the same implicit impetus beliefs as novices when asked to respond in a representational momentum paradigm. We propose that, in situations in which an immediate response is required and one does not have specific contextual knowledge about an object’s motion, both physics experts and novices apply impetus principles as a default heuristic.     

Programming precision in repetitive tapping

The present paper reports an experiment using the Fitts' tapping paradigm. It is concerned with a comparison of movement times and accuracy during blind and visual repetitive tapping. A blind condition was used to investigate rapid aiming movements under motor program control, whilst visual aiming was used to assess the role of visual feedback for control purposes. Subjects in the blind conditions were able to replicate the amplitude specifications of the task, whereas effective target width was constant for a set amplitude and did not reflect specified target width. Subjects, furthermore, responded more rapidly when tapping blind. These results are discussed in terms of the magnitude of forces being attempted as a result of performing a set amplitude, and the role of visual feedback.     

Timing variability in circle drawing and tapping: probing the relationship between event and emergent timing

R. Ivry, R. M. Spencer, H. N. Zelaznik, and J. Diedrichsen (2002) have proposed a distinction between timed movements in which a temporal representation is part of the task goal (event timing) and those in which timing properties are emergent. The issue addressed in the present experiment was how timing in conditions conducive to emergent timing becomes established. According to what the authors term the transformation hypothesis, timing initially requires an event-based representation when the temporal goal is defined externally (e.g., by a metronome), but over the first few movement cycles, control processes become established that allow timing to become emergent. Different groups of participants (N = 84) executed either 1 timed interval, 4 timed intervals, or 2 timed intervals separated by a pause. They produced the intervals by either circle drawing, a task associated with emergent timing, or tapping, a task associated with event timing. Analyses of movement variability suggested that similar timing processes were used in the 2 tasks only during the 1st interval. Those results are consistent with the transformation hypothesis and lead to the inference that the transition from event-based control to emergent timing can occur rapidly during continuous movements.     

Correlations for timing consistency among tapping and drawing tasks: evidence against a single timing process for motor control.

Three experiments were conducted to examine whether timing processes can be shared by continuous tapping and drawing tasks. In all 3 experiments, temporal precision in tapping was not related to temporal precision in continuous drawing. There were modest correlations among the tapping tasks, and there were significant correlations among the drawing tasks. In Experiment 3, the function relating timing variance to the square of the observed movement duration for tapping was different from that for drawing. The conclusions drawn were that timing is not an ability to be shared by a variety of tasks but instead that the temporal qualities of skilled movement are the result of the specific processes necessary to produce a trajectory. These results are consistent with the idea that timing is an emergent property of movement.     

Distinguishing implicit and explicit learning

I agree with Dienes and Berry’s (1997) and Neal and Hesketh’s (1997) call for investigations of the qualitative differences between implicit and explicit learning and note that such investigations must be guided by a workable definition of what is implicit and by theories that predict what the qualitative differences might be. Following Schacter, Bowers, and Booker’s (1989) retrieval intentionality criterion, I propose using anencoding intentionality criterion to distinguish implicit from explicit learning; we can reasonably infer that implicit learning has occurred when a variable known to influence explicit learning has no effect in a comparable implicit learning condition. I then suggest that implicit learning depends on noncognitive, nonhierarchical associations, whereas explicit learning depends on cognitive, hierarchical associations, and briefly describe an experiment that confirms a qualitative difference between implicit and explicit learning predicted by this hypothesis.     

Correlations of stress and timing in periodic tapping

The purpose of this study was to explore control mechanism in sequential by measuring, simultaneously successive stress and timing in peridic tapping. Stress and timing were estimated by the accelerative impulse (PAI) at an instance of tap and by interimpulse interval (IRI), respectively. Autocorrelations of PAIs and IRIs and cross-correlation between the two processes provided evidence that the tapping sequences at 250- and 300-msec intervals were temporally patterned into units of two responses; stressed and unstressed responses as well as longer and shorter IRIs alternated with each other, and the stressed responses were either preceded and followed (type I) or followed and preceded (type II) by longer and shorter IRIs, respectively. The type of pattern found during synchronization tapping was preserved during self-paced tapping followed in a sequence. The results were interpreted in terms of rhythmic organization of the sequential movements.     

Processing implicit and explicit representations.

This article summarizes the results of a 15-year research program dedicated to understanding how implicitly activated memories affect remembering and proposes a model for describing such influences. Implicit memories are manipulated by varying the number of associates preexperimentally linked to test cues or to studied words. Assumptions of the model specify when implicit memories of various types are likely to contribute to performance in various tasks. The main assumptions are that encoding involves both explicit and implicit processing components and that these components provide mutually exclusive sources of information during testing. Experiments designed to evaluate the exclusivity assumption are reported, and implications of the findings for several theoretical frameworks are discussed.     

The micro-structure of tapping movements in children

In order to investigate the development of movement speed in relation to movement organization, children of 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 years of age and adults carried out a reciprocal tapping task, in which time pressure and distance were manipulated. The duration, velocity, acceleration and accuracy of the movements were compared between age groups. Age differences appeared mainly in the homing time, not in the duration of the distance covering movement phase. Accuracy and velocity of the distance covering movement phase differed with age. Time pressure affected the homing time, but not the duration of the distance covering phase. Distance manipulation affected mainly the velocity and duration of the distance covering movement phase and the homing time. In the discussion it is contended that age differences in homing time may be related to both the accuracy of the distance covering movement phase and the rate of information processing of the subject.     

Input- and output-monitoring in implicit and explicit memory

Previous experiments have shown that the procedure of questioning subjects retrospectively about the input and output status of information (input and output monitoring) is a useful method for assessing the awareness states of subjects during implicit and explicit memory tasks. The main purpose of the present study was to investigate whether the previous findings could be extended to other implicit and explicit memory tasks. We were especially interested in whether differences in input- and output-monitoring performance can be observed when both the implicit and explicit memory tasks are conceptual ones. In a final test phase, the target items from the study phase and new distractor items were presented. In a recognition-like situation, subjects had to decide whether an item had been presented in the study phase (input status), as well as whether they had produced the item in the memory-test phase (output status). In all three experiments judgments about the input status - but only for those items that had been produced in the implicit or in the explicit memory test - were more precise after explicit than after implicit memory testings. This finding was not influenced by the distinction between perceptual and conceptual-memory tasks (Exp. 1), and was obtained under conditions in which the implicit and the explicit memory tasks were both conceptual and differed only in test instructions (Exps. 2 and 3). These results suggest that not only subjects performing a perceptual test of implicit memory, but also subjects in a conceptual implicit test were less aware of using information from a previous study episode than subjects who received memory instructions. It is concluded that requiring judgments about the input status of information is a good method for assessing subjects test awareness and is preferable to the use of a questionnaire (Exp. 3). In contrast, in all three experiments no differences were found with the output-monitoring measure between implicit and explicit test conditions.     

Force and timing variability in rhythmic unimanual tapping

In 3 experiments the interdependencies between timing and force production in unimanual paced and self-paced rhythmic tapping tasks were examined as participants (N = 6 in each experiment) tapped (a) to 1 of 3 target periods (333 ms, 500 ms, and 1,000 ms), while they simultaneously produced a constant peak force (PF) over a 50-s trial; (b) to produce 1 of 3 target forces (5, 10, and 15 N) at their preferred frequency, while keeping their rhythm as invariant as possible; and (c) to all combinations of target force and period. The results showed that (a) magnitudes of force and period were largely independent; (b) variability in timing increased proportionally with tapping period, and the variability in force increased with peak force; (c) force variability decreased at faster tapping rates; and (d) timing variability decreased with increasing force levels. (e) Analysis of tap-to-tap variability revealed adjustments over sequences of taps and an acceleration in the tapping rate in unpaced conditions. The interdependencies of force and time are discussed with respect to the challenges they provide for an oscillator-based account.     

Mutual influence of implicit and explicit attitudes

Research and theory distinguish two types of attitude: automatic evaluative reactions and deliberate evaluative judgments, referred to as implicit and explicit attitudes, respectively. Although these attitudes are distinct, they may influence each other. Four studies tested whether implicit and explicit attitudes are both influenced by propositional and associative learning. We also tested whether changes in one kind of attitude mediate changes in the other. Study 1 found that propositional learning about novel individuals directly influenced explicit attitudes and indirectly influenced implicit attitudes through changes in explicit attitudes. Studies 2 and 3 replicated this finding and extended it by simultaneously demonstrating that associative learning through Evaluative Conditioning directly influences implicit attitudes and indirectly influences explicit attitudes through changes in implicit attitudes. Study 4 replicated these effects for attitudes toward familiar, rather than novel, targets. These results suggest that implicit and explicit attitudes can share common antecedents and influence each other.     

Context-dependence of implicit and explicit memory characteristics

The present experiments explore whether repetition priming in a word-stem completion task is context-dependent. In the first experiment, the environmental context was changed or remained constant at the testing stage. Implicit memory performance did not reveal any effects of environmental context. When tested by free recall, however, the same subjects showed an environmental congruency effect. On the other hand, effects of a change in presentation modality were restricted to implicit memory measures. In the second experiment, self-awareness was manipulated to create congruent or incongruent internal contexts at the testing stage. Performance on the word-stem completion task was seen to be influenced by internal contextual information. This pattern of results corroborates a processing account of implicit memory phenomena. Implicit and explicit expressions of memory utilize episodic information, but in a different way.     

The projection of implicit and explicit goals

In 3 studies, the authors analyzed whether projection occurs for both conscious and nonconscious goals. In Experiment 1, participants who were predisposed to hold a learning goal over a performance goal rated others as possessing more of a learning goal. In Experiment 2, participants who were either implicitly primed with or explicitly assigned to have the goal to compete perceived others as striving for competitive goals more than control participants. In Experiment 3, the authors demonstrated that it was the actual goal to compete rather than the trait construct of competitiveness that was projected. The control of automatic goal projection effects is discussed, and interpersonal consequences of goal projection are delineated.     

A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge

The implicit-explicit distinction is applied to knowledge representations. Knowledge is taken to be an attitude towards a proposition which is true. The proposition itself predicates a property to some entity. A number of ways in which knowledge can be implicit or explicit emerge. If a higher aspect is known explicitly then each lower one must also be known explicitly. This partial hierarchy reduces the number of ways in which knowledge can be explicit. In the most important type of implicit knowledge, representations merely reflect the property of objects or events without predicating them of any particular entity. The clearest cases of explicit knowledge of a fact are representations of one's own attitude of knowing that fact. These distinctions are discussed in their relationship to similar distinctions such as procedural-declarative, conscious-unconscious, verbalizable-nonverbalizable, direct-indirect tests, and automatic-voluntary control. This is followed by an outline of how these distinctions can be used to integrate and relate the often divergent uses of the implicit-explicit distinction in different research areas. We illustrate this for visual perception, memory, cognitive development, and artificial grammar learning.     

Development of implicit and explicit category learning

We present two studies that examined developmental differences in the implicit and explicit acquisition of category knowledge. College-attending adults consistently outperformed school-age children on two separate information-integration paradigms due to children’s more frequent use of an explicit rule-based strategy. Accuracy rates were also higher for adults on a unidimensional rule-based task due to children’s more frequent use of the irrelevant dimension to guide their behavior. Results across these two studies suggest that the ability to learn categorization structures may be dependent on a child’s ability to inhibit output from the explicit system.