A logical learning theory explanation of why personality scales predict behavior

An explanation of why personality scales predict is drawn from the tenets of logical learning theory (Rychlak, 1977). This theory holds that behavior is not only responsive in nature, but also telosponsive, i.e., enacted intentionally for the sake of premises. Personality scales tap the subject's premises concerning some aspect of behavior, the meanings of which are then extended in behavior telosponsively so that a prediction to some criterion performance becomes possible. The subject in effect creates the behavior based on his or her premises. An important telosponse inhuman learning is that of affective assessment, which is operationalized as reinforcement value (like-dislike). Two experiments establish the role of reinforcement value in scale measurement and prediction. The first demonstrates that subjects score higher on personality dimensions which they like very much than on dimensions which they greatly dislike. The second experiment then establishes that a personality dimension which a subject both likes and scores highly on is more predictive to an independently assessed manifestation of this personality characteristic than is a comparable dimension which is disliked.     

Interpretive sensory-access theory and conscious intentions

It is typically assumed that while we know other people's mental states by observing and interpreting their behavior, we know our own mental states by introspection, i.e., without interpreting ourselves. In his latest book, The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge, Peter Carruthers [2011. The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues against this assumption. He holds that findings from across the cognitive sciences strongly suggest that self-knowledge of conscious propositional attitudes such as intentions, judgments, and decisions involves a swift and unconscious process of self-interpretation that utilizes the same sensory channels that we employ when working out other people's mental states. I provide an overview of Carruthers’ book before discussing a pathological case that challenges his account of self-knowledge and mentioning empirical evidence that undermines his use of a particular kind of data in his case against introspection of conscious attitudes.     

A response time model for choice behavior

A subject in a two-choice situation characteristically makes several observing responses before performing the final choice. This behavior can be described by means of a random walk model. The present paper explores some possibilities as to how this model can be extended to include choice time. The assumption is made that the duration of each step in the random walk is a random variable which is exponentially distributed. With this assumption, one can predict the probability distributions of the choice times as well as the moments of these distributions.The author gratefully acknowledges his debt to W. K. Estes and C. J. Burke. This study was initiated while the author held a USPHS postdoctoral fellowship at Indiana University.     

Life experience and the value-free foundations of Blumer's collective behavior theory

Herbert Blumer stated throughout his long career that his ideas regarding collective behavior originated with his introduction to pragmatist philosophy under the auspices of G. H. Mead at the University of Chicago. Blumer's biography, however, presents a different picture. Firsthand experiences with mob behavior, collective outrage, and the fallout associated with Blumer's public utterances early in his career may have had significant impact on the eventual corpus of collective behavior.     

Game theory and belief in God

In the last few decades game theory has emerged as a powerful tool for examining a broad range of philosophical issues. It is unsurprising, then, that game theory has been taken up as a tool to examine issues in the philosophy of religion. Economist Steven Brams (1982), (1983) and (2007), for example, has given a game theoretic analysis of belief in God, his main argument first published in this journal and then again in both editions of his book, Superior Beings. I have two main aims in this paper, one specific and one general. My specific aim is to show that Brams’ application of game theory to examine belief in God is, in particular, deeply flawed in two respects. My general aim is to show that any game-theoretic model in which a human being and God are players can only succeed at the cost of abandoning the assumption that God is omnibenevolent.     

The many-worlds theory of consciousness

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.     

A specific calculating ability

We report two experiments that investigate the calculating strategy used by a low IQ savant to identify prime numbers. Hermelin and O'Connor (1990) had suggested previously that this subject may use a procedure first described by Eratosthenes to detect a prime number, namely, dividing a target number by all primes up to the square root of the target number and testing for a remainder. In the first experiment, we compare the reaction times of the savant to decide whether a number is prime with those of a control subject proficient in mathematical calculation. In addition, we measured the savant's speed of information processing using an inspection time task. We found that the reaction times of the savant, although generally faster, followed the same pattern of the control subject who reported using the Eratosthenes procedure. The savant's inspection time indicated that his speed of processing was far superior to that expected from someone of his IQ. In the second experiment, we measured the time it takes mathematics students to divide by different prime numbers and we also tested them on the prime identification task. We used their division times to simulate their performance on the prime number identification task under the assumption that they used the Eratosthenes procedure. We also simulated the reaction times that would result from a simple memory-based procedure for identifying primes. We found that the Eratosthenes simulation, in contrast to the memory simulation, provided a good fit to both the students' and the savant's reaction times. We conclude that the savant is using a complex computational algorithm to identify primes and suggest two explanations of how the apparent contradiction between his low general intelligence and his superior numerical ability might be resolved.     

Primary qualities, secondary qualities and the truth about intention

In this paper I will argue that Crispin Wright’s defence of the claim that the truth about intention is judgement-dependent is unstable because it can serve also to establish that the truth about shape is judgement-dependent, thereby violating his constraint that in developing the distinction between judgement-independent and judgement-dependent subject matters we have to be driven by the assumption that colour and shape will fall on different sides of the divide.     

Toward a Spinozistic modification of skinner's theory of man

B. F. Skinner argues in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York 1971) that only his theory of man is compatible with a ‘scientific’ approach to human behavior. I argue that Skinner's entirely open‐ended view of man is inadequate for his own purposes in that it leaves no room for the claim that certain value judgments are universally valid, something I argue Skinner is committed to despite an explicit avowal in one place of cultural relativism. I then go on to show that a modification of Skinner's theory of man which builds on Spinoza's notion of conatus would provide one with a theory‐based rationale for universally valid judgments without involving one in a ‘non‐scientific’ approach to human behavior. Specifically, I argue that such a Spinozistic modification would provide one with a theory‐based guarantee that man will not evolve in such a way that a truly scientific observer would deem a totalitarian state good.     

On field's argument for substantivalism

In this article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space‐time to be à substance since it ascribes field properties to space‐time points. There is petitio principii error made in this reasoning because Field does not give any justification for his controversial assumption that fields are properties of space‐time points. What is more, I suggest, Field's interpretation of field theory is incompatible with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory, at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should also take into account the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space‐time to be a substance.     

The denial of moral dilemmas as a regulative ideal

The traditional debate about moral dilemmas concerns whether there are circumstances in which an agent is subject to two obligations that cannot both be fulfilled. Realists maintain there are. Irrealists deny this. Here I defend an alternative, methodologically-oriented position wherein the denial of genuine moral dilemmas functions as a regulative ideal for moral deliberation and practice. That is, moral inquiry and deliberation operate on the implicit assumption that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. This view is superior to both realism and irrealism in accounting for moral residue and other crucial phenomenological dimensions of our experience of moral dilemmas.     

The behavioral theory of timing: Reinforcer rate determines pacemaker rate

In the behavioral theory of timing, pulses from a hypothetical Poisson pacemaker produce transitions between states that are correlated with adjunctive behavior. The adjunctive behavior serves as a discriminative stimulus for temporal discriminations. The present experiments tested the assumption that the average interpulse time of the pacemaker is proportional to interreinforcer interval. Responses on a left key were reinforced at variable intervals for the first 25 s since the beginning of a 50-s trial, and right-key responses were reinforced at variable intervals during the second 25 s. Psychometric functions relating proportion of right-key responses to time since trial onset, in 5-s intervals across the 50-s trial, were sigmoidal in form. Average interpulse times derived by fitting quantitative predictions from the behavioral theory of timing to obtained psychometric functions decreased when the interreinforcer interval was decreased and increased when the interreinforcer interval was increased, as predicted by the theory. In a second experiment, average interpulse times estimated from trials without reinforcement followed global changes in interreinforcer interval, as predicted by the theory. Changes in temporal discrimination as a function of interreinforcer interval were therefore not influenced by the discrimination of reinforcer occurrence. The present data support the assumption of the behavioral theory of timing that interpulse time is determined by interreinforcer interval.     

The alienness of the unconscious: on Laplanche's theory of seduction

In this paper the author uses a clinical example as a focus for an exploration of his thesis that the parent is the 'other' who implants his or her unconscious message into the child by means of seduction. As the other is alien, the unconscious of the child cannot any longer be considered the centre of the person but is decentred by the implanted alienness. The author draws on Laplanche's seduction theory to argue that the unconscious message of seduction by the other is exclusively sexual and that it cannot be translated nor symbolized because an interpretative system shared by subject and object is lacking. The decentred alterity of the unconscious allows for comparison with a third object and hence a structural triangulation of the mind which is a prerequisite for symbolization. The role of the analyst in permitting a transference enactment and so facilitating the beginning of sexual symbolization is discussed in relation to the clinical example given at the start of the paper.     

Caveats on a process-tracing measure and a remedy

In process-tracing studies, a frequently used index describes whether information selection behavior is attribute — or alternativewise. The performance of this index is investigated under the assumption that subjects select information in a random fashion. The results show that the index may lead to inaccurate conclusions regarding the information-acquisition strategy of a subject. In addition, a Monte Carlo study is conducted that examines the sensitivity of the index to strategy changes. An alternative index is derived and a latent-class model is proposed for a parsimonious representation of individual differences in information acquisition.     

Application of a behavioral theory of motivation to the concepts of anxiety and impulsivity

Gray's model has been employed in attempts to formulate theories concerning the processes underlying various types of psychopathology. In the most direct application of his model, the dominant mood is assumed to reflect the strength of the underlying motivational system—i.e., strong anxiety with a strong behavioral inhibition system (BIS), strong positive affect with a strong behavioral activation system (BAS). This approach would predict strong anxiety to be associated with a dominance of passive avoidance and extinction and, similarly, strong positive affect with a dominance of impulsivity and other approach behaviors.The present paper has argued that these expectations are based on an implicit assumption that equally stressful environments are encountered—an assumption that would be undermined by individual differences in the very motivational systems under consideration. Examination of the approach-avoidance conflict paradigm supported the argument that, at least in the case of anxiety, one should not expect a strong association between behavior and motivational states. In particular, a weak behavioral inhibition system or strong behavioral activation system is likely to facilitate anxiety-producing impulsive behavior, whereas a strong behavioral inhibition system or weak behavioral activation system may facilitate anxiety-reducing cautious behavior. Other factors were also thought to promote independence of affective states and behavioral traits across individuals.On this argument, trait anxiety conceptualized as resulting from a strong BIS may not be highly correlated with frequent anxiety. Stating this another way, the behavioral correlates of a dominant BIS may be relatively independent of a trait involving a dominance of anxious mood. Using Tellegen's (1985) discussion of self-report measures of mood and personality traits, it was proposed that the trait factor of Constraint may be more strongly associated with behavioral consequences of the BAS and BIS, whereas the Negative Emotionality dimension is largely unrelated to the behavioral effects of the BIS. Since Negative Emotionality corresponds to the traditional anxiety/neuroticism factor, this proposal differs from the customary assumptions about the alignment of Gray's motivational systems and personality traits. The personality trait of Positive Emotionality (cf. extraversion) may be associated with individual differences in the strength of the BAS, with both affective and behavioral components. Thus, the hypothesis of motivational-behavioral uncoupling offers an alternative to the usual intepretations of the three major dimensions seen in most personality inventories. Unfortunately, it remains unclear as to how well the three major personality traits (Positive Emotionality, Negative Emotionality, and Constraint) are aligned with the hypothesized underlying motivational dimensions, and any hypotheses must be seen as extremely tentative.Finally, the question of the validity of self-report measures was discussed briefly. Of greatest interest is the possibility that a subset of subjects are unable to accurately report their emotional states, and that methods are available for identifying these individuals. If so, the validity of these self-report measures may be significantly improved, facilitating research on anxiety and impulsivity.     

Self-reinforcement

Self-reinforcement in operant situations generally refers to those arrangements in which the subject delivers to himself a consequence, contingent on his behavior. However, it is noted that the definition of all other types of reinforcement make its delivery contingent on the subject's behavior. What is actually at issue is the agent who defines whether or not the response required for reinforcement has been met. In self-reinforcement, the subject himself defines this. In the laboratory, this requirement is machine-defined; in school examinations, it is teacher-defined; and in many clinical self-control situations, it is also independently defined. A reinforcement contingency presupposes such independence, absent in self-reinforcement. Implications for research and practice are discussed and alternative formulations are offered.     

Why it is difficult to see the anima as a helpful object: critique and clinical relevance of the theory of archetypes

This paper is divided into three parts. The first deals briefly with more general aspects of the theory of archetypes (as conceived by Jung); the second examines the anima archetype in rather more detail, because it is, apart from the self, the main archetype in Jung's thought; and the third discusses the clinical repercussions of the anima theory and of the theory of the archetypes in general. The various references to Jung himself and certain circumstances of his life are included here on the assumption that personal problems in his biography contributed decisively to the constitution of his theory, so that deeper insights accure if they are taken into account.     

Cross-cultural perspectives: implications for attachment theory and family therapy

Cross-cultural perspectives have always been useful for understanding behavior. They clarify the distinction between aspects that are essentially part of the human condition and those that are the most responsive to variation. The interesting article by Rothbaum and his colleagues is in that tradition, contrasting the cultural values and family patterns in Japanese society with those of Western cultures, including our own, and suggesting that these differences shape the nature and course of attachment. It stimulates questions about what we have taken for granted in our theories and in our evaluations of dysfunctional behavior.     

A recruitment theory of simple behavior

A statistical theory of choice is developed using a sequential sampling assumption. Response latency distributions for certain simple reaction-time situations are derived and tested. Both response probability and response latency measures are developed for a two-alternative judgment situation and the relationship between the two measures explored. The sampling parameter is proposed as a means of representing incentive conditions in choice situations and ROC curves are obtained by appropriate manipulations of this parameter. A solution to the overlap problem in simple discrimination-learning situations is also derived.This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation. The writer has benefited from discussions with his students, James R. Erickson, James G. Greeno, Duane R. Martin, Kirk H. Smith, and Charles F. Stroebel. For generous suggestions with regard to certain mathematical matters, the writer is indebted to Professors Ingram Olkin, Stephen Orey, and Milton Sobel of the Statistics Department at the University of Minnesota.