To end ambiguous sentences

A study of the time required to complete ambiguous sentences suggested that: even though Ss are unaware of the ambiguity while completing sentences, they take more time to complete ambiguous sentences than unambiguous ones: the degree of difficulty in completing ambiguous sentences is related to the linguistic level at which the ambiguity occurs: sentences containing two ambiguities are more difficult to complete than those containing only one, and when these two ambiguities occur at different linguistic levels, these sentences are harder to complete than when both occur within the same linguistic level: ambiguity may affect the grammaticality and relevance of completions; and may cause stuttering and laughter, even without awareness of the ambiguity. An attempt to fit these results to several theories of the processing of ambiguous sentences led us to the conclusion that ambiguity interferes with our understanding of a single meaning of a sentence, and that the degree of interference varies with the linguistic level at which the ambiguity occurs.     

To end ambiguous sentences

A study of the time required to complete ambiguous sentences suggested that: even though Ss are unaware of the ambiguity while completing sentences, they take more time to complete ambiguous sentences than unambiguous ones: the degree of difficulty in completing ambiguous sentences is related to the linguistic level at which the ambiguity occurs: sentences containing two ambiguities are more difficult to complete than those containing only one, and when these two ambiguities occur at different linguistic levels, these sentences are harder to complete than when both occur within the same linguistic level: ambiguity may affect the grammaticality and relevance of completions; and may cause stuttering and laughter, even without awareness of the ambiguity. An attempt to fit these results to several theories of the processing of ambiguous sentences led us to the conclusion that ambiguity interferes with our understanding of a single meaning of a sentence, and that the degree of interference varies with the linguistic level at which the ambiguity occurs.     

Children's ability to make tentative interpretations of ambiguous messages

Consistent with prior research, 5- and 6-year-old children overestimated their knowledge of the intended referent of ambiguous messages. Yet they correctly revised their interpretations of ambiguous messages in light of contradicting information that followed immediately, while maintaining their initial interpretations of unambiguous messages (Experiment 1). Children of this age were able to integrate information over two successive ambiguous messages to identify the intended referent (Experiment 2). However, unlike 7- and 8-year-olds, they were no more likely to search for further information following ambiguous messages compared with unambiguous ones (Experiment 3). We conclude that although 5- and 6-year-olds' interpretations of ambiguous messages are not tentative at the outset, they can use source monitoring skills to treat them as tentative retrospectively, at least over short time spans.     

Children's uncertainty about the interpretation of ambiguous messages

Three investigations were made into relationships between children's uncertainty about the correctness of their interpretation of an ambiguous message, and their judgment of the quality of that message. In the first two investigations, we compared one condition under which 5-to 6-year-olds made a single interpretation of an ambiguous message, with another condition under which they could make both possible interpretations. It was found that making both interpretations had no effect on children's confidence about the correctness of a particular one of the interpretations. Children who made both interpretations were often confident about the correctness of one of them. In the second investigation, we found that children who were uncertain about the correctness of one particular interpretation, did not necessarily realize that they could not tell which of the two possible interpretations was correct. They did not necessarily recognize the ambiguity in the message. In the third investigation, we identified children who correctly identified messages as ambiguous after they knew that they had made the wrong interpretation, but who were confident of the correctness of their interpretation of ambiguous messages before they knew the outcome. Hence awareness of uncertainty when making an interpretation may not be necessary for the development of understanding ambiguity. The results are discussed in terms of the significance of the child's awareness of uncertainty for development of understanding about message ambiguity.     

Resolving syntactic category ambiguity: An eye-movement analysis

In two experiments, participants' eye movements were monitored as they read sentences containing biased syntactic category ambiguous words with either distinct (e.g., duck) or related (e.g., burn) meanings or unambiguous control words. In Experiment 1, prior context was consistent with either the dominant or subordinate interpretation of the ambiguous word. The subordinate bias effect was absent for the ambiguous words in gaze duration measures. However, effects of ambiguity did emerge in other measures for the ambiguous words preceded by context supporting the subordinate interpretation. In Experiment 2, context preceding the target words was neutral. Ambiguity effects only arose when posttarget context was consistent with the subordinate interpretation of the ambiguous words, indicating that readers initially selected the dominant interpretation. Results support immediate theories of syntactic category ambiguity resolution, but also suggest that recovery from misanalysis of syntactic category ambiguity is more difficult than for lexical-semantic ambiguity in which alternate interpretations do not cross syntactic category.     

Preschoolers' sensitivity to speaker action constraints to infer referential intent

We investigated how preschoolers use their understanding of the actions available to a speaker to resolve referential ambiguity. In this study, 58 3- and 4-year-olds were presented with arrays of eight objects in a toy house and were instructed to retrieve various objects from the display. The trials varied in terms of whether the speaker's hands were empty or full when she requested an object as well as whether the request was ambiguous (i.e., more than one potential referent) or unambiguous (i.e., only one potential referent). Results demonstrated that both 3- and 4-year-olds were sensitive to speaker action constraints and used this information to guide on-line processing (as indexed by eye gaze measures) and to make explicit referential decisions.     

Knowing when you don't know enough: Children's judgements about ambiguous information

Two experiments were carried out to find out whether young children's failure to realise when messages are ambiguous is specific to verbally transmitted information about a person's intended meaning. In Experiment 1, children judged whether they had been told/shown enough to identify which one of a set of cards the experimenter had chosen. In one game the experimenter gave verbal messages about her chosen cards, and in a second game, she gave visual messages. With ambiguous visual messages, relevant parts of cards were physically covered. We expected that this would make it more obvious that the speaker's intended meaning was not being fully conveyed. No difference was found between verbal and visual conditions: correct judgements about message ambiguity occured with the same frequency in both.In Experiment 2, children judged in one game whether they had been told enough about the experimenter's chosen card, as in Experiment 1. In a second game, visual information about a card was not conveyed by the experimenter, Rather, the child operated a pointer, set in a disc with windows, beneath which lay cards. The child judged whether the window showed enough for him/her to tell which card the pointer indicated. Again, correct judgments about ambiguity occured with the same frequency in both games.The results implied that children's failure to realise when verbal messages are ambiguous is but one aspect of a more general failure to realise when one has insufficient information at one's disposal to guarantee a correct interpretation of what the world is like.     

Event-related potential indices of ambiguous sentence processing

An event-related potential (ERP) probe was used to examine various models of ambiguous sentence processing. ERPs to light flashes were recorded during and immediately after auditorily presented ambiguous and unambiguous target sentences. Each target sentence was preceded by either a relevant or a neutral context sentence. Principal component analyses of the ERPs indicated that although certain components varied as a function of ambiguity, none of the components varied as a function of preceding context. These findings provided some support for a postdecision model of ambiguity processing which suggests that both meanings of an ambiguity are always processed, even when prior disambiguating context is available.     

Country of Origin as a Heuristic Cue: The Effects of Message Ambiguity and Product Involvement

This research applies the heuristic-systematic model to understand how country-of-origin (CO) cues can affect the way consumers process advertising messages and evaluate advertised products under different conditions. Findings of Experiment 1 show that, when product information is ambiguous, consumers are more likely to engage in heuristic processing, relying on CO cues to infer product quality and form their product evaluations. However, when product information is unambiguous, consumers engage in systematic processing and evaluate the product based on their assessments of product attributes. Findings of Experiment 2 further suggest that product involvement affects the extent to which consumers engage in heuristic processing when message ambiguity is at different levels. Specifically, mediational analyses indicate that, when product information featured in an ad is ambiguous, a low-involving product engages consumers in heuristic processing. Furthermore, when product information is unambiguous, a low-involving product engages consumers in systematic processing, whereas a high-involving product involves participants in an additivity processing style in which CO cue-based heuristic processing and attribute-based systematic processing co-occur.     

Uncertainty matters: impact of stimulus ambiguity on infant social referencing

Most infant social referencing studies have assumed that infants would be more likely to engage in social looking and be influenced by adults' message when a context is ambiguous. The present study empirically tested the effect of stimulus ambiguity on infants' referencing behaviours, with three different stimuli (positive, ambiguous, and negative), two different messages (happy and fearful), two different message providers (mother and stranger), and in two age groups (12 and 16 month olds). A typical social referencing paradigm was used and infants' social looking and regulation were measured. Infants looked at adults more frequently and faster during ambiguous situations than during unambiguous situations. They also tended to regulate their affect and behaviour based on adults' message only towards ambiguous toys. Older infants tended to look at adults faster, and showed stronger reactions towards ambiguous stimuli than younger infants, suggesting that infants' social development may moderate the effect of stimulus ambiguity on social referencing. Overall, results indicated that the ambiguity postulate is a legitimate assumption for infant social referencing. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Communicative Context Affects Use of Referential Prosody

The current study assessed the extent to which the use of referential prosody varies with communicative demand. Speaker–listener dyads completed a referential communication task during which speakers attempted to indicate one of two color swatches (one bright, one dark) to listeners. Speakers' bright sentences were reliably higher pitched than dark sentences for ambiguous (e.g., bright red versus dark red) but not unambiguous (e.g., bright red versus dark purple) trials, suggesting that speakers produced meaningful acoustic cues to brightness when the accompanying linguistic content was underspecified (e.g., “Can you get the red one?”). Listening partners reliably chose the correct corresponding swatch for ambiguous trials when lexical information was insufficient to identify the target, suggesting that listeners recruited prosody to resolve lexical ambiguity. Prosody can thus be conceptualized as a type of vocal gesture that can be recruited to resolve referential ambiguity when there is communicative demand to do so.     

Untrained speakers' use of prosody in syntactic disambiguation and listeners' interpretations

We investigated how naively produced prosody affects listeners' end interpretations of ambiguous utterances. Non-professional speakers who were unaware of any ambiguity produced ambiguous sentences couched in short, unambiguous passages. In a forced-choice task, listeners could not tell which context the isolated ambiguous sentences came from (Exp. 1). However, listeners were able to correctly paraphrase the least ambiguous subset of these utterances, showing that prosody can be used to resolve ambiguity (Exp. 2). Nonetheless, in everyday language use, both prosody and context are available to interpret speech. When the least ambiguous sentences were cross-spliced into contexts biasing towards their original interpretations or into contexts biasing towards their alternative interpretations, answers to content questions about the ambiguous sentence, confidence ratings, and ratings of naturalness all indicated that prosody is ignored when context is available (Exp. 3). Although listeners can use prosody to interpret ambiguous sentences, they generally do not, and this makes sense in light of the frequent lack of reliable prosodic cues in everyday speech. Received: 3 April 1998 / Accepted: 21 October 1998     

Impression management in behavior toward handicapped patients]

A previous study (Tr?ster, 1989) showed that nonhandicapped persons preferred a physically handicapped interaction partner to a nonhandicapped partner in an attributionally unambiguous situation. In order to test whether this "sympathy effect of physical handicap" is based on tendencies of impression management, 48 female subjects had to choose to sit next to either a physically handicapped or nonhandicapped female interaction partner in order to view a film together. Attributional ambiguity was varied by either confounding the choice of an interaction partner with a second, socially acceptable alternative (attributionally ambiguous situation: a choice between two films) or not confounding it (attributionally unambiguous situation: no choice between films). Public responsibility was manipulated by informing the subjects about their freedom to choose where they wished to sit either in public (public responsibility) or in private (no public responsibility). The results supported the impression management hypothesis: The handicapped interaction partner (in a wheelchair) was only preferred when the subjects had to anticipate that observers would deduce a preference of the chosen partner from the subjects' choices because of the attributionally unambiguous situation and the public announcement of their freedom of choice. Results suggest that the nonhandicapped strive to exhibit positive and nondiscriminative behavior toward the handicapped in order to avoid creating a disadvantageous impression in an observer.     

Effects of syntactic category assignment on lexical ambiguity resolution in reading: an eye movement analysis

Readers' eye movements were monitored as they read sentences containing lexically ambiguous words whose meanings share a single syntactic category (e.g., calf), lexically ambiguous words whose meanings belong to different syntactic categories (e.g., duck), or unambiguous control words. Information provided prior to the target always unambiguously specified the context-appropriate syntactic-category assignment for the target. Fixation times were longer on ambiguous words whose meanings share a single syntactic category than on controls, both when prior context was semantically consistent with the subordinate interpretation of a biased ambiguous word (Experiment 1) and when prior context was semantically neutral as to the intended interpretation of a balanced ambiguous word (Experiment 2). These ambiguity effects, which resulted from differences in difficulty with meaning resolution, were not found when the ambiguity crossed syntactic categories. These data indicate that, in the absence of syntactic ambiguity, syntactic-category information mediates the semantic-resolution process.     

Taking perspective in conversation: the role of mutual knowledge in comprehension

When people interpret language, they can reduce the ambiguity of linguistic expressions by using information about perspective: the speaker's, their own, or a shared perspective. In order to investigate the mental processes that underlie such perspective taking, we tracked people's eye movements while they were following instructions to manipulate objects. The eye fixation data in two experiments demonstrate that people do not restrict the search for referents to mutually known objects. Eye movements indicated that addressees considered objects as potential referents even when the speaker could not see those objects, requiring addressees to use mutual knowledge to correct their interpretation. Thus, people occasionally use an egocentric heuristic when they comprehend. We argue that this egocentric heuristic is successful in reducing ambiguity, though it could lead to a systematic error.     

The effects of endowment on the demand for probabilistic information

Research shows that individuals are ambiguity averse: they choose unambiguous over equivalent ambiguous prospects and price them higher (either as buyers or sellers). Moreover, it is often assumed that ambiguity averse individuals are willing to pay an ambiguity premium for information that reduces ambiguity [Camerer, C. F., & Weber, M. (1992). Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 325–370]. However, when people are asked to exchange an ambiguous alternative in their possession for an equivalent unambiguous one, they prefer to retain the former [Roca, M., Hogarth, R. M., & Maule, A. J. (2006). Ambiguity seeking as a result of the status quo bias. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 32(3), 175–194]. We present three experiments investigating the economic effects of endowment on attitudes towards ambiguity and the ambiguity premium. The experiments, based on a [Becker, G., DeGroot, M., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method. Science, 9, 3] procedure, show that the value attributed to ambiguity reducing information is substantially affected by the status quo of the individual.     

Children's understanding of private keys in referential communication

A private key is a referential utterance used to inform selectively. The ambiguity of the utterance conceals meaning from nonselected audience members. The purpose of this study was to examine three aspects of children's understanding of the use of private keys. Experiment 1 concerned children's sensitivity to information in the context of utterance (i.e., the common ground). Experiment 2 examined appreciation of audience design and the speaker's intent. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 explored some reasons for children's problems in understanding private keys. The results show that even first graders are sensitive to common ground information and the speaker's intent. However, audience design is troublesome even for second graders in some situations, probably because they fail to assess the knowledge of the audience members. Private keys are important theoretically because they represent an aspect of referential communication involving the uses of ambiguous utterances that have been ignored by developmental researchers.     

Practice makes perfect: Training the interpretation of emotional ambiguity

The interpretation of emotionally ambiguous words, sentences, or scenarios can be altered through training procedures that are collectively called cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I). In three experiments, we systematically manipulated the nature of the training in order to discriminate between emotional priming and ambiguity resolution accounts of training effects. In Experiment 1 participants completed word fragments that were consistently related to either a negative or benign interpretation of an ambiguous sentence. In a subsequent semantic priming task they demonstrated an interpretation bias, in that they were faster to identify relatedness of targets that were associated with the training-congruent meaning of an emotionally ambiguous homograph. We then manipulated the training sentences to show that interpretation bias was eliminated when participants simply completed valenced word fragments following unrelated sentences (Experiment 2), or completed fragments that were related to emotional but unambiguous sentences (Experiment 3). Only when participants were required to actively resolve emotionally ambiguous sentences during training did changes in interpretation emerge at test. Findings suggest that CBM-I achieves its effects by altering a production rule that aids the selection of meaning from emotionally ambiguous alternatives, in line with an ambiguity resolution account.